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INTRODUCTION
Ohio attorney Columbus Delano envisioned a bleak future if the state supreme
court upheld a new voting law. The innovative 1863 statute allowed absent Civil War
soldiers to vote in Ohio elections, just  as  if  they  were  home.  Delano’s  client,  Democrat  
John McBride, would have won his election bid for Wayne County probate judge based
exclusively on the votes cast within the county, but he lost the race when canvassers
added the votes of absent soldiers to  the  home  vote.    Before  the  law’s  enactment,  there  
was no such thing as absentee voting in Ohio, and Delano argued that the legislature
lacked authority to invent it. The law giving absent soldiers an opportunity to vote was
not only unconstitutional, Delano  insisted,  but  also  “subversive  to  the  very  foundation  of  
the  state  government.”    It  would  transform  the  elective  franchise  intolerably,  making  it  “a  
mere transitory or migratory thing, to be exercised not at any stated or prescribed
election precincts,  but  anywhere,  and  in  any  part  of  the  world.”1
To the modern American ear, this protest may sound puzzling. Twenty-first
century Americans take absentee voting for granted as a convenience that facilitates
participatory democracy by allowing citizens to cast ballots  “anywhere, and in any part of
the  world.” But such voting was completely unfamiliar to Ohioans in 1863. The statute
created something altogether different from what they had come to understand about
elections and voting. There was no precedent before 1863 for Ohioans to cast ballots

1. Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573, 582 (1863), italics in the original. Delano did not share his
client’s  Democratic  political  views.    A  Whig  turned  Republican,  Delano  served  in  the  state  assembly  when  
he   argued   McBride’s   case.   Earlier   he   had   served   a   term   in   congress and had narrowly lost to Benjamin
Wade in the 1862 contest to represent Ohio in the U.S. Senate. Rossiter Johnson, ed., The Biographical
Dictionary of America (Boston: American Biographical Society, 1906), 3:227.
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anywhere other than in their own Ohio communities, in the company of neighbors and
under   the   watchful   eyes   of   community   leaders.   Now   a   subset   of   the   state’s   qualified  
voters – soldiers – could vote in distant locations, not only away from their home
communities but altogether outside the state. Delano lost his constitutional argument –
the court upheld the new law – but even the court agreed that this was something new,
something  the  framers  of  Ohio’s  constitution  had never contemplated.2
During the Civil War, twenty northern states did what Ohio did by creating novel
opportunities for absent Civil War soldiers to vote. Though mindful of what was going
on in other states, states acted individually in doing so, and the stories of how it happened
vary. For the newest state of Nevada, which became a territory during the war and
achieved statehood barely a week before Election Day in 1864, absentee voting
represented no jolting departure from earlier electoral practices, since Nevada was too
young to have developed its own traditions of voting. Most states, however, entered the
war with firmly established election habits, some tracing their legal origins back nearly
two centuries. For them absentee voting departed dramatically from familiar election
norms. Before enactment of these precursors to modern absentee voting laws, state laws
had   tightly   tethered   balloting   to   the   voter’s   community,   requiring   strict   supervision   by  
local elites and in-person participation by voters. One scholar aptly describes antebellum
elections   as   “masculine,   communal”   events.3 Under the new laws, elections remained
decidedly masculine, but hardly communal in the prewar sense of that word. Now

2. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 612.
3. Adam I.P. Smith, No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006), 15.
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eligible voters – as long as they were soldiers – could cast their ballots in distant places
where they served as warriors, far from the watchful eyes of their neighbors and
community leaders. In the absentee voting process that the new laws created, the absent
party was as much the soldier’s  civilian  community as it was the soldier himself.
With the subordination of the home community’s  role  came  the  subordination  of  
previously  paramount  legal   values.  Preserving   “the  purity”  of  elections,  so  evident  as   a  
value in the antifraud provisions of nearly all earlier election laws, suddenly gave way to
the higher value of keeping absent soldiers within the community of voters. Dating from
their earliest existence as political polities, most states had become progressively sterner
in   their   laws’   attempts   to   discourage fraud. The anti-fraud provisions all depended for
enforcement on the tight oversight of the voting process by election supervisors, men
chosen  from  the  social  and  political  elites  of  each  community.    And  while  many  states’  
soldier-voting laws mimicked the oversight mechanisms of pre-war laws – including
election judges and clerks selected from among the soldiers gathered in the field to vote,
opportunities for challenging the qualification of soldiers to vote, sworn oaths for election
officials and voters, the keeping of poll books, etc. – in operational reality such
mechanisms were relatively toothless when implemented away from the states in military
settings. Predictions of that toothlessness by opponents of enactment did not deter
proponents, to many of whom it simply did not matter. For them, it was the  legislature’s  
responsibility, and within   the   legislature’s   constitutional   authority, to subordinate the
value  of  election  “purity”  to   the  more  important   wartime  imperative  of  allowing  absent  
soldiers to vote, no matter the far greater risk of fraud.
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State by state, legislators, lawyers, and judges would disagree about whether the
novelty of these new voting arrangements created constitutional problems, as Columbus
Delano argued unsuccessfully that they did in the Ohio case. Constitutional or not,
however, all could agree that the new laws created an entirely new form of political
participation, upending settled views about what an election was.
The phenomenon was, in other words, legally radical. Chapters 1 and 2 undertake
an examination of the contours of that radicalism.  Chapter  1  is  a  case  study  of  one  state’s  
experience with the invention of absentee voting. It constructs a history of election law in
Ohio, comparing the prewar sense of what an election was, as revealed over six decades
in statutes and constitutions, with the very different kind of election contemplated by the
state’s   1863   soldier-voting law. Voting had always been tethered firmly to local Ohio
communities; that connection was   integral   to   the   very   idea   of   an   election.   The   state’s  
1863 soldier-voting law severed the link, albeit temporarily – the  law  expired  at  the  war’s  
end – and only for soldiers. All five Supreme Court justices who   listened   to   Delano’s  
arguments agreed that the law broke new ground by creating a mode of voting that
constitutional framers had never contemplated. Over one strenuous dissent, however, the
court majority ruled that the state constitution did not stand in the way and that the
legislature had authority to invent something altogether new – a voting opportunity
divorced from Ohio communities and correspondingly more vulnerable to fraud.
Chapter 1 stands for several propositions, some of them at odds with what other
historians have said: that   Ohio’s   new law departed radically and suddenly from a long
tradition rooting elections in local communities in the state; that the departure did not
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consist of a change in residency qualification (or any qualification) for suffrage, but that
it was radical nonetheless; and that the context in which absentee voting took place under
the new law – the soldier’s  military “community”  far  from  Ohio’s  borders  – was utterly
unsuited for the operation of antifraud mechanisms grafted onto the new law pro forma
from  the  state’s prewar election law.
Chapter 2 broadens the examination to describe the unfolding innovation of
soldier-voting legislation in the other 19 states where it happened. Focusing on formal
law, that examination demonstrates that Ohio typified the national experience in its
struggle to find constitutional footing for a radical, albeit temporary, departure from legal
antecedents, though not from antecedent residency (or other) suffrage qualifications. The
struggle played out in various ways, each demonstrating the intensity of the collision with
prewar law. Sometimes it played out in court, sometimes through constitutional
amendment, and sometimes by limiting the new voting right to federal elections as a halfloaf way of avoiding the strictures of the state constitution. More than half the states
acted late in the war, after the potency of the issue in the competition for civilian votes
became evident in late 1863. The tardy start for these states created a time crunch that
sparked procedural innovations designed to leap constitutional hurdles in time for the
1864  elections.  It  was  another  measure  of  the  laws’  radicalism.
Supreme court decisions in Ohio and eight other states help demonstrate how
legally problematic the new idea was, even in states where the courts concluded that it
was constitutionally permissible. Four of the nine court opinions (California,
Connecticut, Michigan, and Pennsylvania) struck down the laws altogether. Two other
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state courts (New Hampshire and Vermont) struck down portions of the laws, permitting
the legislation to stand as to federal but not state elections. The other three (Iowa, Ohio,
and Wisconsin) upheld the laws. In all nine cases, justices tried to divine whether
constitutional framers had intended, on the one hand, to fix the place of voting in local
communities   as   a   part   of   the   state’s   foundational   law   or,   on   the   other   hand,   to   permit  
legislatures   to   set   the   “where”   of   voting   as   lawmakers   thought   best.   The   outcomes
generally hinged on the court  majority’s  approach  to  the challenge of teasing meaning out
of constitutional text drafted by men who, as justices on both sides of the debate
repeatedly recognized, had never dreamt of absentee voting. Judges who looked to state
history  for  the  meaning  of  a  constitution’s  undefined  words – words  such  as  “election”  or  
“vote”   – tended to vote for overturning the laws. The historical examination by these
jurists invariably concluded that constitutional framers incorporated traditional
understanding when they used these words, and those understandings always attached the
act of voting to a community setting within the state. In contrast, judges limiting their
examination to the plain meaning of constitutional text tended to uphold the laws. These
justices deferred to legislators unless they could find explicit and unambiguous
prohibitions against absentee voting in constitutional texts. Judges adopting both
approaches agreed that the laws departed from earlier understandings about elections, but
those looking to history for interpretative assistance attached constitutional consequences
to the departure, while those looking only to the plain meaning of constitutional text did
not.
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Chapter 2 also demonstrates two other ways that Ohio typified the national
experience legally. At first blush, both invite the view that the legal innovation,
characterized throughout this dissertation as radical, was nothing of the sort. First, neither
Ohio nor any other state that invented this new way of voting for absent soldiers
expanded its prewar suffrage qualifications, even for soldiers.

None, for example,

granted absent soldiers the right to vote if they were too young to vote under the prewar
constitution or if their race or citizenship disqualified them. Even states that found it
necessary to amend their constitutions to accommodate absentee voting limited the scope
of the amendments to soldiers already enfranchised under prewar constitutions, generally
white male citizens at least 21 years old.
A second feature of the legal innovation, common to Ohio and the rest of the
country, follows from the first, but bears emphasis. In neither Ohio nor any other state did
the soldier-voting law result from, or result in, a relaxation in the residency qualification
for voting. In fact, contrary to the treatment of this subject by other historians, soldiervoting laws left prewar residency requirements completely undisturbed.
Viewed from a rights-conscious perspective, which looks above all to who
belongs to the community of eligible voters, those two attributes strip the soldier-voting
laws of any claim to radicalism. The radicalism of the laws becomes evident, however,
when viewing voting rights through a contemporary lens as a communal, public right,
belonging not to individuals as autonomous actors, but to the local community where
individuals participated as members.

Soldier-voting laws stripped elections of that

communal quality. That was a radical change measured against the antebellum sense of
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what elections were and how voters participated in them. In the court cases surveyed in
Chapter 2, as in the Ohio case highlighted in Chapter 1, lawyers and judges disagreed
about whether that change breached constitutional requirements, but all treated the
change as a major departure. By demonstrating the legal radicalism of soldier-voting
laws, Chapter 2 disputes and seeks to correct the scholarly theory that these laws
culminated a long and gradual process of loosening residency restrictions associated with
antebellum migration. In fact, the change was abrupt, and it did nothing to loosen
residency requirements.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 offer an explanatory theory for the change. Politics was the
clearest driving force, of course, given the absence of so many electors whose votes both
parties coveted. Historians correctly treat soldier-voting legislation as a vote-maximizing
response to the temporary absence of a big slice of the electorate.4 To treat the soldiervoting phenomenon as nothing more than an effort to garner  soldiers’  votes, however, is
to overlook a larger and more complex political picture. The creation of absentee voting
for military servicemen was part of a temporary political phenomenon that assigned an
important role to soldiers in the contest for civilian votes. Unique circumstances set the
stage for political combat in 1863-1864, and those circumstances made it indispensable to
both parties for soldiers to participate as political actors in unprecedented ways. They
participated not  only  as  voters,  but  also  as  spokesmen  for  the  parties’  major  messages  and
endorsers of party candidates. The dissertation coins   the   term   “politics   of   soldiers”   to  
describe the political messaging of   these   years.   In   the   politics   of   soldiers,   the   parties’  

4. The Ohio Supreme Court put the figure at one-quarter to one-third. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 607.
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support   of   soldiers,   and   each   party’s   enlistment of the voice of soldiers in its political
messaging, became essential to securing civilian votes. Both parties needed the
conspicuous support of soldiers for credibility in communicating their campaign themes.
Friction over soldier-voting laws was part of this larger partisan tug of war over the
political kinship of servicemen.
Chapter 3 examines the unfolding of these dynamics in 1863 Pennsylvania
politics,  treating  that  state’s  experience  as  a  proving  ground  for  the  political  themes  that  
characterized the national contest that unfolded the following year in the Lincoln –
McClellan contest. At the start of the war, only Pennsylvania had a law allowing absentee
voting by soldiers. In 1861 a losing candidate in a local election challenged the law. That
contested election culminated in a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in 1862 striking
down the law as unconstitutional. The   court’s   decision, and the state elections the
following year, served to politicize soldier voting and sparked a national surge in soldiervoting legislation. Before the case, states were just awakening to the concept of granting
special voting accommodations to absent soldiers. Partisan alignment over the issue, with
Republicans favoring the idea and Democrats opposing it, had not yet crystallized. That
changed after the author of Pennsylvania’s   high   court’s   decision,   George   Woodward,  
won  the  Democratic  Party’s  nomination  for governor in 1863. His opponent, Republican
incumbent Andrew Curtin, used the court decision to portray Woodward as anti-soldier
voting and therefore anti-soldier,  while  positioning  himself  as  “the  soldiers’  friend.”  
The Woodward-Curtin contest field-tested the competing campaign themes that
the national parties embraced in 1864 – treason v. loyalty, military competence v.
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ineptitude, and solicitude for (white) soldiers v. neglect of the troops. And just as in the
national contest of 1864, Pennsylvania Democrats and Republicans in 1863 enlisted the
voice of soldiers in their political messaging to civilian voters. Republicans used the
soldier-voting issue to gain an edge in the home vote in  that  year’s  version  of  the  politics  
of soldiers. Curtin  beat  Woodward  on  the  strength  of  the  “soldiers’  friend”  meme,  central  
to which was the soldier-voting issue.
Chapter 4 describes the politics of soldiers in the national competition between
Lincoln and McClellan. By this time, largely because of what had happened in the
Curtin-Woodward race, and also because by then it was clear that Republican candidates
would win the soldier vote, a partisan divide over soldier voting had solidified.
Republicans’   conspicuous   support   for   the   new   form   of   voting,   and   the   party’s   success  
tarring Democrats as anti-soldier for opposing soldier-voting laws, became a major
advantage in winning civilian votes. Riding the soldier-voting horse in the politics of
soldiers, Republicans secured the status as the friend of the soldier, giving them
correspondingly greater credibility in electoral messaging wars.
As with the 1863 Pennsylvania gubernatorial contest, both parties in 1864 needed,
and therefore enlisted, the voice of soldiers in their political messaging. Republicans did
so to portray McClellan as disloyal, cowardly, and militarily incompetent. Democrats did
so to portray Lincoln a bungling commander-in-chief and as neglectful of the troops,
particularly white troops whose wellbeing Lincoln purportedly subordinated to the
interest of slaves and armed African-Americans. Soldiers spoke more credibly than any
other citizens on all these subjects. So, in making and rebutting these charges,
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Republicans and Democrats respectively relied on the voice of soldiers in appeals for
civilian votes. Both  parties  brought  the  soldiers’  voice  to  bear  in  letters  from  soldiers  to  
partisan newspapers, straw polls in the same newspapers purporting to show that soldiers
favored one party or the other, the selection of soldiers to speak at campaign rallies, the
gathering of endorsements for one candidate or the other by prominent military figures,
and the use of the lexicon of soldiering to praise or attack candidates.
Chapter 5 describes the predicament the soldier-voting issue created for
Democrats. Starting with the experience of the Curtin-Woodward contest in
Pennsylvania, they understood the political hazards of opposing soldier-voting laws,
much as Republicans had learned the same lesson in 1862 when they opposed a soldiervoting bill in Ohio.5 Democrats naturally wanted to demonstrate their support of the
troops   and   the   troops’   reciprocal   support   of   Democrats,   just   as   Republicans   wanted   to
demonstrate the opposite. One way to do that was to endorse soldier-voting legislation.
But Democrats could not easily do that. Unlike Republicans, many Democrats harbored
deep misgivings about the laws. Their misgivings were both ideological and practical.
Ideologically, Democratic Party purists believed that soldiering was incompatible with
voting.6 Voters needed to exercise independent judgment, while soldiers had to accept
subordination to the judgment of others. A related fear was that a standing army, always
5. As discussed more fully in Chapter 5, Republicans early in the war doubted that their candidates
would get fair treatment in the army, given a command structure then dominated by officers of Democratic
Party pedigree. It was the mirror image of the conviction Democrats would come to embrace starting in
1863, by which time the Lincoln administration had asserted its control over the military command
structure.
6.  This  attitude  was  of  a  piece  with  Democrats’  antipathy  to  war  generally,  and  civil  war  in  particular,  as  
incompatible with liberty and an invitation to despotism. See, e.g., Jean H. Baker, Affairs of Party: The
Political Culture of Northern Democrats in the Mid-Nineteenth Century (New York: Fordham University
Press, 1998), 148-158.
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a bugaboo of Democratic orthodoxy, would corrupt and overwhelm democracy if armed
with political power.
Practically, Democrats feared that Republican military leaders would cheat in
administering the soldier vote. By 1863, the Lincoln administration held a strong grip on
the military command structure. Democrats believed that Republicans would use that
control corruptly to tilt the playing field of soldier voting in favor of Republican
candidates. As evidence, they pointed not only to episodes of bullying and intimidation
against Democratic soldiers by their military superiors, but also to cases of military
interference in civilian elections, especially in Border States and always to the
disadvantage of Democratic candidates.
Democrats coped with this predicament uneasily. Reluctant to oppose soldiervoting laws too loudly, they muted their opposition to the legislation and trumpeted
evidence of Republican bullying and interference in implementing the laws when they
passed. In keeping with the politics of soldiers, they enlisted the voice of soldiers to make
their case that Republicans, if allowed by passage of soldier-voting legislation, would
abuse their power to steal the soldier vote.
An appendix describes the operational features of each state’s soldier-voting
system and describes the legal frictions that arose in most states. As an organizing
framework for that state-by-state  discussion,  the  appendix  distinguishes  between  “senior”  
states, defined as those entering the Union before 1800, and  “junior”  states  that  entered  
thereafter. That demarcation, concededly somewhat arbitrary, serves to demonstrate that
the innovation of absentee voting was much more likely to clear constitutional hurdles in
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the younger states, where the grip of the communal tradition of elections was not as tight
as in the senior states.
To the extent that scholars have paid attention to these laws at all, they have
focused on the direct effect of soldier voting on election outcomes and the partisan divide
over the issue. The only full-length book on the subject of soldier-voting laws, entitled
Voting in the Field, is a monograph by Josiah Benton, published in 1915. 7 It is an
encyclopedic examination of the legislative history of every military suffrage law. Benton
painstakingly scoured state house and senate journals and legislative committee reports to
construct a timeline of statutory enactment, state by state. His book also compiles the
results   of   soldier   voting,   where   those   data   were   available.      Benton’s   work,   though not
free of substantive errors, is an indispensable source of raw data about how the laws came
into existence. James McPherson in 1988 cited it as one of the two best sources on
soldier-voting laws.8
The other source McPherson salutes is an article by Oscar  Osburn  Winther,  “The  
Soldier Vote in the Election of 1864.” 9 Winther discusses all the laws, though more
sketchily   than   Benton,   and   not   always   accurately.   Winther   focuses   less   on   the   laws’  
legislative history than on the partisan friction they engendered and on the direct effect of
soldiers’  votes on election outcomes. Winther also assembles good evidence of military
7. Josiah H. Benton, Voting in the Field; a Forgotten Chapter of the Civil War (Boston: Priv. Print,
1915).
8. James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University
Press,   1988),   805n69.   Examples   of   Benton’s   errors   are   his   omission   of   a   California   soldier-voting law
enacted in 1863 from his  account  of  that  state’s  experience  and  his  statement  that  three  Michigan  high  court  
justices  rendered  opinions  in  the  case  striking  down  that  state’s  soldier-voting law. (Four Michigan justices
wrote opinions in the 1865 case of People ex rel. Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127.)
9.   Oscar   Osburn   Winther,   “The   Soldier   Vote   in   the   Election   of   1864,”   New York History 25, no. 4
(October 1944).
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interference with civilian elections, particularly in Indiana, which had no soldier-voting
law. Neither Benton nor Winther attempts a contrast between the new laws and their
prewar antecedents, beyond the obvious distinction that prewar laws did not permit
absentee voting while the new statutes of course did. And neither Benton nor Winther
probes the court cases arising out of the soldier-voting laws for a sense of the
constitutional upheaval the laws created.
There are fine state-by-state studies of the subject. A leading scholar of the field is
Jonathan W. White, who has examined both the Pennsylvania and New York laws, in
separate articles  in  2004.    His  article  on  Pennsylvania’s  experience  focuses  on  the  shifting  
partisan positions on soldier voting. White documents the early bipartisanship in both the
support for and the opposition to soldier-voting laws in the Keystone State, noting that
the sharp partisan divide took shape only in 1863 and 1864.10 White’s   second   article  
describes the organizing efforts both parties launched, at the national level, to get ballots
and partisan information to troops – a   “get   out   the   vote”   drive   aimed at soldiers. For
Republicans, the Lincoln administration provided the organizing oomph, while New
Yorkers associated with Governor Horatio Seymour provided it for Democrats. New
York’s  national  role  emerged  at  the  same  time  the  state  was  grappling  with  passage and
implementation of its own soldier voting law, all of which White describes lucidly.11
A handful of other state-specific articles are similarly valuable. The best treatment
of  Ohio’s  experience  with  soldier  voting,  by  Arnold  Shankman,  discusses  the impact of
10.  Jonathan  W.  White,  “Citizens  and  Soldiers:  Party  Competition  and  the  Debate  in  Pennsylvania  Over  
Permitting Soldiers  to  Vote,”  American Nineteenth Century History 5, no. 2 (2004).
11.   Jonathan   W.  White,   “Canvassing   the   Troops:  The   Federal   Government   and   the   Soldiers’   Right   to  
Vote,” Civil War History 50, no. 3 (September 2004).
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the military vote on the 1863 Ohio gubernatorial election. Shankman shows for Ohio
what White shows for Pennsylvania: that Republicans and Democrats were ambivalent
about soldier-voting laws until 1863, when Republican support and Democratic
opposition jelled. Shankman also documents the abuse of soldier voting by the politicized
army command, up to and including Edwin Stanton. It is a story of sharp elbows and foul
play, including discriminatory furloughs, destruction of Democratic ballots sent to army
camps, and the physical abuse of soldiers who had the temerity to speak out as or for
Democrats.12
Frank Klement offers perhaps the most cynical appraisal among scholars in the
field in his article about Wisconsin. Klement characterizes Wisconsin’s   legislation   as   a  
raw power play by Republicans, who constructed the soldier-voting system to maximize
opportunities for Republican officers in the army to control voting by their subordinates.
And  during  the  pendency  of  a  court  challenge  to  the  law’s  constitutionality, Republicans
amended the law to permit soldiers to vote in elections for state Supreme Court justices.
According   to   Klement,   this   had   the   desired   effect   of   securing   the   chief   justice’s   vote  
upholding the law, since he needed support from voting troops to secure his own
reelection.13
Another scholar writing in the World War II period (during which soldier voting
again became a subject of national interest) offers a far more positive assessment than
Klement’s,   this   one   with   respect   to   the   Minnesota statute. According to Lynwood G.
12.   Arnold   Shankman,   “Soldier   Votes   and Clement L. Vallandigham in the 1863 Ohio Gubernatorial
Election,”  Ohio History 82 (Spring 1973).
13.  Frank  L.  Klement,  “The  Soldier  Vote  in  Wisconsin  during  the  Civil  War,” The Wisconsin Magazine
of History 28, no. 1 (September 1944).
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Downs,  the  absentee  voting  system  created  by  that  state’s  1862  law  should  be  a  source  of  
pride for Minnesotans because of the pains both parties took to assure evenhandedness in
the balloting. The law fell short of full success, according to Downs, because the state
lacked  resources  to  implement  the  law  for  all  of  Minnesota’s  far-flung soldiers.14
Samuel  T.  McSeveney,  in  an  article  about  Connecticut’s  experience  with  soldier  
voting, underscores the disadvantages Democrats suffered in securing a level playing
field in the soldier vote. Furloughs played an unusually large role in voting by
Connecticut soldiers, and (as all scholars of the subject have noted) these were far harder
to come by for Democrats than for Republicans.      Connecticut’s   law   applied   only   to  
soldiers stationed outside the state, meaning that members of the provost guard and those
convalescing in Connecticut hospitals had to travel back to their home towns on furlough
in order to vote. Similarly, because the law gave absentee voting rights only to registered
voters, and Connecticut required in-person voter registration, servicemen who came of
age during the war had to return home on furlough to register before they could vote. The
Lincoln   administration’s willingness and ability to manipulate furloughs worked to the
disadvantage of Democrats in Connecticut even more than it did in other states.
McSeveney also documents a phenomenon that sheds light on the driving force behind
the laws. In the absence of soldier-voting laws, soldiers had reason to expect, or at least
hope for, furloughs to return home for elections. Cherishing furloughs, many soldiers felt

14. Lynwood G. Downs,  “The  Soldier  Vote  and  Minnesota  Politics,  1862-1865,”  Minnesota History 26,
no. 3 (September 1945).
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ambivalent about laws allowing them to stay in their encampments to vote. Although the
laws ostensibly benefitted them, soldiers themselves did not clamor for their enactment.15
This dissertation attempts to advance understanding of the subject beyond the
scope that these scholars explore. Each of their works illuminates the subject importantly.
Each describes  the  parties’  efforts  to  secure  soldier  votes,  the  parties’  differences  over the
issue in   the   legislative   process,   partisan   conflict   about   the   fairness   of   the   laws’  
implementation, and the direct effects of soldier voting on election outcomes. But none
situates soldier-voting laws in the legal and constitutional history of suffrage or elections.
None, for example, mines pre-war election laws as a basis for comparison to the soldier
voting law, with respect to either the mechanics of voting or the prewar intensity of antifraud values reflected in election law, for example. 16 Nor do they attempt to place
soldier-voting legislation in a larger context of soldiers as players and props in the
political messaging necessitated by the structural features of 1863-1864 politics.
Civil War historians James McPherson, Phillip Shaw Paludan, Gary Gallagher,
William C. Davis, and Allen Guelzo touch on soldier voting as part of their overall
treatment of the war, but only briefly, focusing mainly on the strong preference soldiers
expressed for Lincoln over Democrat George McClellan in the presidential election of
1864.17 Attention to soldier voting is equally light among most scholars of nineteenth

15.  Samuel  T.  McSeveney,  “Re-electing Lincoln: The Union Party Campaign and the Military Vote in
Connecticut,”  Civil War History 32, no. 2 (June 1986).
16. The overarching antifraud objective of residency requirement becomes starkly clear from several of
the high court decisions about the constitutionality of soldier-voting laws surveyed in Chapter 2, and the
history  of  Ohio’s  prewar  election  laws  discussed  in Chapter 1.
17. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 803-806; Gary W. Gallagher, The Union War (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2011). (Gallagher limits his treatment of the subject to a reprint from Frank
Leslie’s  of soldiers from the Army of the Potomac gathered around a handbill, posted on a tree, announcing
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century political culture.

Jean Baker (Affairs of Party), Joel Silby (The American

Political Nation: 1838-1893), and Glenn Altschuler and Stuart Blumin (Rude Republic:
Americans and Their Politics in the Nineteenth Century) hardly mention soldier voting or
soldier-voting laws at all, intimating when they do that soldiers were outside the
mainstream political community. 18 An exception with particular significance for this
dissertation is Kenneth Winkle, author of The Politics of Community: Migration and
Politics in Antebellum Ohio.19 While Winkle sees Ohio’s 1863 law as part of a decadeslong loosening of residence restrictions in voting rights, this dissertation argues in
Chapter 1 that the law departed with legal antecedents abruptly and did not change
residency requirements.
The dissertation draws on the very rich historiography on Civil War politics,
particularly in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. A prominent scholar on that subject is Mark Neely Jr.
His The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (1992), The Union
Divided: Party Conflict in the Civil War North (2002), and The Boundaries of American
Political Culture in the Civil War Era (2005) serve as essential sources. William Frank
Zornow’s  Lincoln and the Party Divided (1957),  John  C.  Waugh’s  1997  book,  Reelecting
an election in 1864.); William C. Davis, Lincoln’s  Men  (New York: Touchstone, 1999), 211-213; Allen C.
Guelzo, Fateful Lightning: A New History of the Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012), 464. For the preference of union soldiers for Lincoln, see also Jennifer L. Weber,
Copperheads:  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  Lincoln’s  Opponents  in  the  North  (New York: Oxford University Press,
2006), 194-199.
18. Baker, Affairs of Party.  (In  her  sparse  treatment  of  soldier  voting,  Baker  characterizes  the  laws  as  “a  
suspension of the residency requirements that made out-of-district   voting   illegal.”   Id. In contrast, this
dissertation demonstrates in Chapter 2 that all soldier-voting laws left residency requirements intact.); Joel
Silbey, The American Political Nation, 1838-1893 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991); Glenn
C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin, Rude Republic: Americans and Their Politics in the Nineteenth
Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
19 . Kenneth J. Winkle, The Politics of Community: Migration and Politics in Antebellum Ohio
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
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Lincoln: The Battle for the 1864 Presidency and Doris Kearns  Goodwin’s  Team of Rivals
are  all  excellent  treatments  of  the  1864  election  and  Lincoln’s  political  skills.  But  none  
situates the voice of soldiers generally, or soldier-voting laws in particular, in the political
messaging wars of 1863 and 1864, as this dissertation attempts to do.
Joseph   Allan   Frank’s   1998   book,   With Ballot and Bayonet: The Political
Socialization of American Civil War Soldiers is particularly important to this project.
Frank suggests that Civil War soldiers were less the agents of political parties than the
other way around. Passionate pro-war feelings within the army intensified the Republican
prosecution of the war, Frank argues. His book documents the ways that a   “core”   of  
highly politicized Union soldiers influenced the terms of the national debate, pushing the
North’s   war   effort   in   radical   directions.   Frank’s   work   shows   the   pervasiveness   of  
bullying and intimidation by radical Republican soldiers of their Democratic-leaning
fellows. In a 2007 essay about the political activism of Pennsylvania soldiers, Timothy
Orr describes a similarly bottom-up   phenomenon.   Focusing   on   soldiers’   letters   to  
newspapers  and  political  “resolutions”  adopted  by  pro-administration military units, Orr
describes   the   army   as   “an   organized   political   body”   that sought to eliminate the
legitimacy of partisan conflict, sometimes with threats or acts of violence against
Democrats.20
In contrast to Frank and Orr, who describe a bottom-up direction – from soldiers
in the field to civilian political operatives back home – in the formulation of party
ideologies, this dissertation identifies a top-down   character   in   the   parties’   enlistment   of  
20.  Timothy  J.  Orr,  “A  Viler  Enemy  in  our  Rear,”  in  The View from the Ground: Experiences of Civil
War Soldiers, ed. Aaron Sheehan-Dean (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 174.
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“the   voice   of   soldiers”   to   communicate   campaign   themes,   most   demonstrably in the
branding of Republican candidates like Andrew Curtin  as  “the  soldiers’  friend.”    Taken  
together,   Frank   and   Orr’s   arguments   and   this   dissertation   suggest   that   perhaps   soldiers  
and political parties used each other.21
Adam   I.P.   Smith’s   2006   book,   No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North,
buttresses Frank and Orr and is helpful for its insights about the dilemma Democrats
faced, the subject of Chapter 5, below. Wartime makes partisanship at least marginally
illegitimate, Smith argues, thereby complicating the challenge of the party operating as a
loyal opposition. In a wartime environment, it is easy to paint politicians opposing an
incumbent president as treasonous, and Smith demonstrates how effectively Republicans
applied that paint to antiwar Democrats in the Civil War, effectively delegitimizing
Democrats’  objections  to  the  Lincoln  administration’s  war  policies.22
Smith documents ways that politicized soldiers participated in, and lent moral
authority   to,   the   Republicans’   project   of   delegitimizing   partisan   opposition   and   thereby  
marginalizing Democrats.  Smith  calls  the  Republican  project  the  “doctrine  of  patriotism.”  
In agreement with Frank and Orr, Smith describes the politically aware volunteer army
(though not regulars) as a forum for political action that pitched into partisan combat
enthusiastically, often heavy-handedly, in support of that doctrine.23 To this extent, these
three scholars capture one element of the multi-faceted phenomenon referred to in this
dissertation  as  the  politics  of  soldiers.  “No-partyism”  as  a  pro-war partisan ideology was
21. Joseph Allan Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet: The Political Socialization of American Civil War
Soldiers (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1998), 66, 95, 102, 133.
22. Smith, No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North.
23. Id. at 73, 93-99.
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a variant of the Republican campaign theme disparaging anti-war politicians as disloyal,
and Smith shows that soldiers were instrumental in communicating that theme.
Frank, Orr, and Smith describe a pervasive climate of enforced one-partyism, with
soldiers serving the role as its moral legitimizers and, sometimes thuggishly, as enforcers
of the pro-war orthodoxy. In this telling, with respect to loyalty, soldiers shaped a
political phenomenon broader than the political messaging of election seasons. Instead,
soldiers put their considerable and muscular imprimatur on a wartime culture of
ubiquitous loyalty that included but extended beyond election campaign themes. This
dissertation focuses on the narrower role of loyalty and disloyalty as political campaign
messages, with soldiers serving on both sides of the messaging wars. And unlike their
scholarship, this dissertation identifies loyalty and disloyalty as just one of the contested
themes in the partisan messaging for which soldiers were enlisted, the others being
military incompetence, cowardice, and solicitude for white troops. The politics of soldiers
drew servicemen into the partisan point and counterpoint on each of these subjects in
ways that Frank, Orr, and Smith do not address, although their work certainly helps in the
thematic construction of this dissertation.
The scholarly debate about whether peace Democrats like George Woodward
were actually disloyal remains unsettled, though it matters in this dissertation only as
historiographical background. Scholars including Eric McKitrick, Jean Baker, Joel
Silbey, and Frank Klement argue that they were in fact loyal and even helpful to the
Union cause. They point to evidence showing that many Democrats supported most
aspects of the Lincoln administration’s   war   effort,   other   than   those   connected   with  
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emancipation and arming former slaves. Michael Holt has taken issue with that
consensus. In a 1998 essay, Holt argues that proponents of the view that Democrats were
loyal erred by looking too exclusively at the conduct of Democrats at the federal level,
disregarding more problematic examples of Democratic opposition at the state level.
Pennsylvania’s  George  Woodward  is  among  the  “strident  antiwar  Democrats”  Holt  cites  
as   an   “embarrassment”   to   the   party’s   claim to loyalty. (The others were Clement
Vallandigham of Ohio and Thomas Seymour of Connecticut.)24
Jonathan W. White mounts a careful rebuttal to Holt and a defense of Woodward.
White  argues  that  in  Woodward’s  view  of  constitutionalism,  under  which  states   had the
right to secede, citizens who supported the exercise of that right could not be guilty of
treason. To Woodward and other adherents to a contractual view of constitutionalism,
any loyal American could express approval of southern secession. And, as White makes
clear, at no point did Woodward ever advocate taking up arms against the United States,
which would indeed have constituted treason. He simply believed that there was no
disloyalty in the act or advocacy of peaceable secession.25
This dissertation   tries   to   steer   clear   of   the   merits   of   the   parties’   attack   themes,  
focusing instead on the uncontested fact that the parties deployed the themes and used

24.  Eric  McKitrick,  “Party  Politics  and  the  Union  and  Confederate  War  Efforts,”  in  The American Party
Systems, ed. William Chambers and Walter Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967; Baker,
Affairs of Party; Joel Silbey, A Respectable Minority: The Democratic Party in the Civil War Era, 18601868 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1977); Frank L. Klement, Dark Lanterns: Secret
Political Societies, Conspiracies, and Treason Trials in the Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University  Press,  1984);;    Michael  F.  Holt,  “An  Elusive  Synthesis:  Northern  Politics  During  the  Civil  War,”  
in Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand, ed. James M. McPherson and William J. Cooper, Jr.
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998).
25.  Jonathan  W.  White,  George  Washington  Woodward  and  J.S.  Black,  “A  Pennsylvania  Judge  Views  
the Rebellion: The Civil War Letters of George  Washington  Woodward,”   The Pennsylvania Magazine of
History and Biography 129, no.2 (April 2005): 199-201.
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soldiers whenever they could to communicate them. The merits of the claims and
counterclaims of disloyalty, for example, matter less for purposes of this dissertation than
the undisputable fact that the claims and counterclaims were made and that soldiers
participated in making them. The same is true about the merits of the other themes of the
messaging wars. Was George McClellan really a physical coward, as Republican
propagandists asserted in 1864? His major biographer, Stephen Sears, lends credence to
the  charge  without  using  the  word  “coward”  in   his   indictment   of  McClellan.26 Many of
McClellan’s   contemporaries, including some who supported Lincoln, heatedly disputed
the assertion, as Chapter 4 elaborates. This dissertation attempts agnosticism on the
question, since all that matters for the argument here is that Republicans accused
McClellan of cowardice, Democrats denied the accusations, and that, because of unique
structural features of 1863-1864 politics, each side enlisted the voice of soldiers in
advancing its side of the debate. It is likewise with the merits of the other themes that
drew on the voice of servicemen in the politics of soldiers.
The soldier-voting phenomenon deserves more attention than it has received in
the historiography of voting rights. Attorney Columbus Delano, introduced here at the
outset, lamented the portent of voting becoming   “a   mere   transitory   thing”   if   the   Ohio  
Supreme Court upheld the 1863 soldier-voting law. Delano had his feet firmly planted in
voting tradition in expressing that lament, and his forebodings were in a way prescient of
a very different kind of voting in the future. Historians of the arc of American suffrage
rights have described a bumpy trajectory. Starting with the colonial model of elections as
26. Stephen W. Sears, George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon (New York: Da Capo Press, 1988),
xi, 200-222
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town meetings in a system of virtual representation by white male property owners voting
viva voce and theoretically representing the interest of their disfranchised neighbors, the
trajectory culminates in a system of individualized and portable voting by secret (and
sometimes electronic) ballot, with each elector representing his or her own interests.27
One terminus of the arc is rooted in republicanism, with voting as a communal right, and
the other in liberalism, with voting as an individual and portable right. Community
control over eligibility determinations and the process of voting became decreasingly
important over the course of the trajectory.28
Civil War soldier voting straddled these two worlds interestingly, but it has
largely escaped notice by historians. George Frederick Miller includes a short section of
one chapter about the Civil War laws in his brief 1948 book about absentee voting, noting
that some of the laws pioneered the modern mechanism of absentee balloting and
cursorily describing the way they functioned.29 In his 2000 book, The Right To Vote: The
Contested History of Democracy in the United States, Alexander Keyssar surveys the
nation’s   entire   experience   with   voting   laws,   a   prodigious   and   highly   successful  
undertaking, including the halting, off and on trajectory toward expanded participation in

27 .   See   Marc   K.   Kruman,   “Legislatures and   Political   Rights,”   in   Encyclopedia of the American
Legislative System: Studies of the Principal Structures, Processes, and Policies of Congress and the State
Legislatures since the Colonial Era, ed. Joel H. Silbey (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1994), 3:1237.
28. Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States
(New York: Basic Books, 2000). Over the course of the eighteenth and nineteen centuries, Keyssar writes,
as  individuals’  attachments  to  particular  communities  waned,  “the  laws  governing  elections,  like  most  areas  
of   law,   stressed   the   primacy   and   protection   of   individual   rights.”   Id. at 300. Keyssar sets the modern
terminus   of   the   trajectory   at   the   emergence   of   the   Supreme   Court’s   one-person, one-vote doctrine
[Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)], although one could argue that the 26th Amendment (1971),
extending suffrage protections to 18-year olds, deserves a place in the story.
29. George Frederick Miller, Absentee Voting and Suffrage Laws (Washington, DC: The Daylion
Company, 1948), 29-35.
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America’s   political universe. 30 But Keyssar devotes barely a paragraph to Civil War
military suffrage and omits analysis of the soldier-voting laws from his otherwise
extensive appendices. Moreover, Keyssar understates the extent to which residency
requirements reflected not so much a desire to assure that prospective voters had a
modicum   of   “attachment”   to   or   stake   in   their   community   as   a   rather   sharp-edged
determination to prevent fraud, particularly voting by pretenders and multiple voting in
the same election by people moving from one voting district to another on Election
Day.31
The radicalism of soldier-voting laws in dislodging hometown communities from
the voting process  has  a  conservative  counterpoint  in  the  laws’  narrow  coverage,  but  the  
laws have escaped attention by scholars otherwise attentive to conservative impulses in
suffrage law. Some scholars of the evolution of political rights point to the privilege that
white males sustained through at least the 1920s, even in circumstances that might have
invited political reform. The Civil War soldier-voting phenomenon arguably supports
their arguments.

Without reference to the conservative side of soldier-voting laws,

Barbara Welke, for example, traces the persistence of the legal exclusion of minorities,

30. Id.
31.  In  Keyssar’s  defense,  the  insistence  on  a  citizen’s  “attachment”  to  or  stake  in  the  community  may  be  
a positive way to frame the anti-fraud objectives that residency requirements served. Arguably, the two
formulations of the purpose of residency requirements are merely flip sides of each other. Tellingly,
however, none of the soldier-voting court decisions that reviewed the history of residency requirements
uses the positive framing of the concept that Keyssar  emphasizes.    None  refers  to  “attachment”  or  “stake.”  
As  elaborated  in  Chapter  2,  all  talk  about  fraud  prevention  and  the  imperative  of  preserving  the  “purity”  of  
elections. Keyssar is not alone in emphasizing community attachment as the primary purpose of residency
requirements. See, e.g., Silbey, The Political Nation, 148.
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women, and various categories of immigrants in   favor   of   “able   white   manhood.” 32
Similarly, in  her  account  of  women’s  quest  for  equality  in  public spheres (including but
not limited to political spheres), Sandra VanBurkleo notes that women realized political
gains from neither the Revolutionary War nor the Civil War, both of which catalyzed
such gains for white men.33 And Rogers Smith posits  that  “multiple  traditions,” including
a   “persistent   belief   in   white   Anglo-Saxon   Protestant   male   superiority,”   shaped   the  
formation of political rights in American law, trumping Lockean liberalism as American
law’s  animating  force.34
The limited scope of soldier-voting laws, which would come as no surprise to
these  scholars,  may  obscure  the  laws’  radicalism,  since  in  rights  conscious  terms  the  laws  
broke no new ground. But in divorcing communities from elections the laws were
something radically new. This dissertation undertakes to document that radicalism and
identify its causes.

The Machinery of Soldier Voting
Before embarking on an examination of the legal and political frictions associated
with enactment of soldier-voting laws, it is useful to consider how the laws designed
absentee voting to work in practice.

32. Barbara Young Welke, Law and the Borders of Belonging in the Long Nineteenth-Century United
States (New   York:   Cambridge   University   Press,   2010).   Welke’s   categories   of   historic exclusion extend
beyond women and minorities to the disabled.
33. Sandra F. VanBurkleo, Belonging   to   the   World:   Women’s   Rights   and   American   Constitutional  
Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
34. Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1997), 3.
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There was a snowflake quality to the voting arrangements the laws created — no
two were identical. The variations, however, tended to cluster around two alternative
models, designated here as the Iowa and Minnesota models.35 The appendix examines
each  state’s  version  of  the  two  general  models,  but  the  models  themselves  merit  a  brief  
introductory description.
Laws following the Iowa model called for setting up election sites in military
encampments  where  soldiers  served.  These  voting  sites  “in  the  field”  tried  to  recreate  the  
full choreography of elections back home, complete with election judges, poll books,
procedures for challenging qualifications, etc. Fourteen states adopted variations of this
approach: California, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,
Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania (which used the Minnesota model as well),
Vermont, and Wisconsin.
In contrast, laws following the Minnesota model, presaging modern forms of
absentee voting, allowed soldiers to complete their ballots individually in the field and
forward them sealed to their voting precincts back home, to be counted with civilian
ballots. Seven states adopted the Minnesota model: Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, New
York, Pennsylvania (which also adopted the Iowa model), Rhode Island, and West
Virginia.
The details of voting under both models varied from state to state as to such
matters as the categories of soldiers covered, the offices for which soldiers could vote, the
mechanisms for providing advance notice of elections in the field, structures for
35. Pennsylvania, after amending its constitution to overcome the 1862 court decision striking down the
state’s  prewar  law  as  unconstitutional,  adopted  both  models.
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supervising balloting, oaths for voters and election supervisors, the form of ballots and
poll books, mechanisms for challenges, the assignment of commissioners to assist with
implementation and the duties of commissioners, etc. The following description of the
laws’  operation  in  the  eponymous  states  is  offered for illustrative purposes.

Iowa36
The Hawkeye State enacted its bill on September 11, 1862.37 Voting under the
law occurred at election sites set up “at  every  place  where  a  Regiment,  Battalion,  Battery  
or Company of Iowa soldiers may be found or stationed.”38 That formulation effectively
excluded sailors in the navy, since naval organization included none of the listed
designations. But the law covered every  “soldier  in  the  military  service  of  this  state  or  the  
United States,” including draftees and army regulars. This coverage provision also
specified surgeons and chaplains.39
Setting the template for many military suffrage laws, this one dictated that the
provisions   of   the   general   election   law   would   apply   to   voting   in   the   field,   “so   far   as  
applicable, and  not  qualified  by  the  provisions  of  this  Act.”40 As we shall see in chapter 1

36. The choice of Iowa as a model for its form of absentee voting is debatable. Pennsylvania had
enacted a soldier-voting  law  long  before  the  Civil  War,  in  1813.  It  called  for  establishing  voting  sites  “in  
the   field”   for  absent  Pennsylvania  soldiers.  So,   while  the   Pennsylvania Supreme Court set that law aside
early in 1862 before any other state had acted, the 1813 law based on its seniority arguably deserves the
honor of designation as a model. Missouri, too, provided for absentee voting before Iowa did, following a
similar model, but Missouri acted non-legislatively and arguably illegitimately in doing so. As the first
state to adopt this model legislatively during the Civil War, Iowa gets the nod as the model for purposes of
this study.
37. An Act to Amend Title IV of the Revision of 1860 so as to Enable the Qualified Electors of this
State in the Military Service, to Vote at Certain Elections, ch. 29, 1862 Iowa Acts 28.
38. Id. at § 8.
39. Id. at § 2.
40. Id. at § 6.
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describing the soldier-voting experience in Ohio, this language indulged a fiction.
Unavoidably, field elections in fact resembled civilian elections only superficially, since
the laws could not replicate in military camps the mechanisms that served to protect
against   fraud   in   elections   back   home,   above   all   supervision   by   members   of   the   voters’  
own community. But the Iowa model tipped its hat, however synthetically, to the
communal quality of elections that had predominated before the war in every state. The
notable difference, of course, was that the statutes substituted the temporary community
of  the  absent  soldier’s  military  unit  for  the  permanent  community  of  his  neighbors  back
home.41
The law called for polling sites to open for each Iowa regiment. If that failed to
make   it   “practicable   for   all   to   vote   together,”   as   when   part   of   the   regiment   was   on  
“detached  service,”  then  the  detached  unit  could  open  its  own  polling  site.42 The eligible
Iowa soldiers at each site elected three election judges, who in turn appointed election
clerks. The only qualification was that the judges (though not necessarily the clerks) had
to be eligible Iowa voters.43 That meant they had to be white males, at least 21 years old,
U.S. citizens, with at least six months of residence in Iowa and 20 days of county
residency.44

41. Joseph Allen Frank asserts that in many army units, soldiers remained tied to their communities
back  home  and  that  military  units  often  retained  “a  communal  character.”  Frank,  With Ballot and Bayonet,
14-15.   To   the   extent   that   this   typified   military   life,   the   Iowa   model’s   attempted   replication   of   civilian
elections   was   not   synthetic.   But   not   even   Frank   argues   that   the   “community”   in   the   field   resembled   the  
community back home on Election Day.
42. An Act to amend Title IV of the Revision of 1860 at § 9.
43. Id.
44. IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. III, § 1.
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As in elections back home, judges and clerks swore oaths, promising among other
things   to   “studiously   endeavor   to   prevent   fraud,   deceit   and   abuse”   in   the   election.45 To
assist the election judges and clerks, the law provided for commissioners to travel from
Iowa with necessary election paraphernalia: copies of the law, forms of poll lists and
returns, and the text of oaths to administer to judges, clerks, and challenged voters.
Commissioners also carried the election returns back home to Iowa.

46

The

commissioners, appointed by the state census board, each covered just one regiment,
although the law authorized the governor to supplement that allocation with more
commissioners if he thought it necessary. Commissioners had to swear an oath that
included   the   promise   to   perform   their   responsibilities   “without   reference   to   political  
preferences,”   and,   like   election   judges   and   clerks,   to   “studiously endeavor to prevent
fraud,  deceit  and  abuse.”47
The statute specified the information that each ballot had to include, starting with
the  voter’s  home  county  and  followed  by  the  name  of  the  voter’s  preferred  candidate  for  
each office. The offices up for election, and the preferred candidates names, could be
printed in advance on the ballot (assuming that the party organization found a way to
deliver such prepared ballots to the military camps) or written by hand by the voter. 48
Soldiers announced themselves to the judges and clerks, by name, county of
residence, and military attachment. The clerks entered all this information in the poll

45. An Act to amend Title IV of the Revision of 1860 at § 11.
46. Id. at §§ 25, 26.
47. Id. at §§ 29, 30.
48. Id. at § 15. In two states, Minnesota and Connecticut, the soldier-voting laws expressly allowed
commissioners  to  carry  ballots  to  the  states’  military  encampments, but only if the political parties provided
the ballots. (See discussion of those states in the Appendix, infra.)  Iowa’s  statute  did  not  so  state.  
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books.49 If no one challenged the voter, the soldier placed his ballot in the ballot box.50 If
there was a challenge, the judges administered an oath to the soldier testing all elements
of eligibility – U.S. citizenship, state and county residency, and age. (As to age, the oath
read,   “Do   you   solemnly   swear   …   that   you   are   twenty   one   years   of   age,   as   you   verily  
believe?”)  If the soldier swore the oath, his vote was accepted.51
At the close of voting, the judges tallied the votes, the clerks double-checked the
tally, and the judges entered the final result on the return form. Then the returns, together
with the poll books and ballots, were given to a commissioner (or if no commissioner was
on  hand,  placed  in  the  mail  “or  other  safe  mode”)  for  delivery  to  the  Board  of  Canvassers  
in Iowa. There the results of the soldier voting were added to the civilian results to
determine election winners.
Minnesota
Minnesota enacted its soldier-voting law on September 27, 1862, hardly two
weeks  after  Iowa  had  acted.  Unlike  Iowa,  Minnesota  did  not  try  to  open  election  sites  “in  
the   field,”   opting   instead   for   a   system   that   allowed   soldiers   to send completed ballots
from their military encampment back home to their election districts in Minnesota. It was
the first state to do so.52

49. Id. at § 16.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. An Act to Enable Citizens of this State, who are or may be Engaged in the Military or Naval Service
of the United States, to Vote in the Election Districts where they Reside, at the General Election to be held
in the Month of November, 1862 and all Subsequent General Elections, during the Continuance of the
Present War, ch. 1, 1862 (extra session) Minn. Laws 13. [hereinafter this law will be referred to as the
Minnesota’s  Soldier-Voting Law]
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The law covered military personnel comprehensively, allowing absentee voting
by  “all  persons  …  in  the  military  or  naval  service,”  provided  they  were  eligible  electors  
“when  they  mustered  into  the  service.”53 This included volunteers, draftees, regulars, and
sailors in the navy. The law went a step further, authorizing voting by servicemen who
turned 21 during their military service, provided they qualified as residents before
enrolling. The law applied comprehensively to elections, as well, authorizing absent
soldiers   to   vote   in   “all”   annual   elections,   starting   in   1862,   but   only   “during   the  
continuance of the present war.”54
Commissioners  were  key  to  the  law’s  functioning.  The  governor,  with  the  advice  
and consent of the state senate, appointed the commissioners. They were stretched thin, a
total of eight commissioners being assigned for all the states where Minnesota
servicemen were stationed. By the terms of the law, four commissioners were Democrats
and four Republicans.55
The law allowed the two political parties to supply their pre-printed ballots to the
commissioners, who then provided the ballots to the voting soldiers.   The   soldier’s  
completed ballot would get forwarded home to Minnesota only after he first swore an
oath, which a commissioner administered in person. The oath touched on the elements of
voting eligibility other than race and gender. It covered age (21), residence (four months
in Minnesota and ten days in the election district), and U.S. citizenship. Minnesota was
unusually generous in its citizenship qualification for suffrage, enfranchising not only

53.  Minnesota’s  Soldier-Voting Law at § 1.
54. Id.
55. Id. at § 6.
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then-current United States citizens, but also foreigners  who  had  declared  their  “intention  
to become such citizen, conformably to the laws of the United States on the subject of
naturalization.”56 The oath covered both citizenship categories.57
The soldier would complete his ballot, place it in an envelope supplied by the
commissioner,   “seal   the   same   with   sealing   wax”   (also   provided   by   the   commissioner),  
and swear the above oath. The commissioner then signed a form in the nature of a
notarization on the back of the sealed envelope. It attested to the name of the soldier, the
name   of   the   commissioner,   the   soldier’s   military   attachment,   the   fact   that   soldier   had  
taken   the   oath,   and   the   commissioner’s   assurance   that   the   soldier’s   vote   was   “free   and  
voluntary.”58
The commissioner then mailed the envelope to the   soldier’s   voting   district   in  
Minnesota. The election judges there, after confirming that the soldier named on the
envelope   was   on   the   district’s   voting   registry,   opened   the   envelope   and   added   the  
enclosed ballot to the civilian votes in the ballot box.59 This meant that there could be no
separate tally of the soldier votes. The same was true of other states adopting this
model.60

56. M INN. CONST. of 1857, art. VII, § 1. The constitutions of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Kansas
similarly allowed prospective citizens to vote. MICH. CONST. of 1831, art. VII, § 1; WIS. CONST. of 1848,
art. III, § 1; KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. V, § 1. The Minnesota oath did not address the two categories of
Native Americans allowed  to  vote  under  this  section  of  the  constitution.  One  was  “Persons  of  mixed  white  
and  indian  blood   who   have   adopted  the   customs  and   habits  of  civilization.”  The  other   was  those  Indians  
found  by  a  court  to  be  “capable  of  enjoying  the  rights  of  citizenship  within  this  State.”  Minnesota’s  SoldierVoting Law at § 1.
57.  Minnesota’s  Soldier-Voting Law at § 3.
58. Id.
59. Id. at § 5.
60. Benton, Voting in the Field, 312.
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Like many soldier-voting laws, this one included an argumentative provision in
the nature of a legal fiction. Its title pronounced that the voting system set forth in the law
would enable absent   soldiers   “to   vote   in   the   Election   Districts   where   they   reside….”61
The statement had a purpose. Soldiers voting under the law filled out their ballots in the
field, far from home and arguably  in  violation  of  the  state  constitution’s  requirement that
the   elector   must   vote   “in   the   election   district”   where   he   met   a   ten-day residency
qualification.62 In   the   event   of   a   challenge   to   the   law’s   constitutionality,   a   court   would  
have to decide whether an absentee ballot, prepared in the field but ultimately deposited
in the local ballot box, would satisfy the requirement. The statement in  the  law’s  title  was  
meant, in bootstrap fashion, to help cement the argument that it would.
In one form or another, it was an argument waged across the country as states
sought to conform the novelty of absentee voting to constitutions framed by men who had
never contemplated such a thing. Minnesota’s  law  never  faced  a  court  challenge testing
the fit of its soldier-voting law with its constitution. Iowa’s  law  did,  as  did  many others,
among  them  Ohio’s.

61.  Minnesota’s  Soldier-Voting Law.
62. M INN. CONST. of 1857, art. IV § 1.
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CHAPTER 1
“WORDS  BECOME  THINGS:”  THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  OHIO

In the 1863 election for probate judge of Wayne County, Ohio, Republican Henry
Lehman ran against Democrat John McBride in a tight race. Election Day fell only six
months   after   passage   of   Ohio’s   military   suffrage   law,   which   allowed   absent   soldiers   to  
vote.   Of   the   ballots   cast   at   the   polling   places   in   Wayne   County’s   sixteen   townships,  
McBride won by 183 votes. But Lehman did much better than McBride among the
county’s  absent  soldiers.  Lehman  got  380  of  those  votes  to  only  57  for  McBride.    That  
advantage  overcame  Lehman’s  deficit  among  the  civilian  voters.    So,  in  accordance  with  
the new law, the county clerk dutifully certified Lehman the winner – and Wayne
County’s  newest  probate  judge  – by a final tally of 3369 to 3227.
McBride challenged the election results in a lawsuit. His court papers asked the
Wayne County Court of Common Pleas to install him as the winner on the grounds that
Ohio’s   military   suffrage   law   was   unconstitutional   and   that the ballots of the absent
soldiers   therefore   should   not   count.      McBride’s   complaint   alleged   all   sorts   of  
constitutional infirmities in the law. The new statute, said his lawyers, violated the
proscription against class legislation, since it allowed absent electors to vote only if they
were soldiers, thus discriminating against electors who might be absent for other reasons.
Moreover,   McBride’s   attorneys   insisted,   the   legislators in Columbus could not
constitutionally adopt laws having effect outside Ohio (all but two of the absent soldiers
 The author borrows   this   title   from   his   Masters   Thesis,   entitled,   “Words   Become   Things:   Absentee  
Soldiers  and  Ohio  Election  Law,”  (Wayne  State  University,  2003).
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voting in the Lehman-McBride election had cast their ballots outside the state), and in
fact the Ohio constitution, properly interpreted, allowed electors to cast their ballots only
in  the  town  where  they  resided.    The  county  judge  agreed  with  McBride  that  the  state’s  
1851 constitution barred the legislature from allowing voting outside Ohio. So he set
aside the election results and declared McBride the winner.1
Now   it   was   Lehman’s   turn.      He   appealed   to   the   Ohio   Supreme   Court,   insisting  
that the new law was indeed constitutional. His lawyers argued that the constitution left it
for the legislature to decide where elections could be held and that the soldier-voting law,
in creating a way for soldiers to vote away from home, was a legitimate exercise of that
legislative authority. In a lengthy opinion, the court majority ruled that the legislature
was within its constitutional authority in allowing out-of-state Ohio soldiers to vote. It
reversed the lower court ruling and declared Henry Lehman the winner.
Of  the  five  justices  on  the  court,  only  one  took  McBride’s  side  of  the  argument.    
In  a  dissenting  opinion   even  lengthier  than  the   majority’s, Justice Rufus Ranney traced
the   meaning   of   the   word   “election”   and   the   nature   of   voting   through   Ohio’s   legal   and  
constitutional history. Ranney maintained that by 1851, when the state ratified a revised
constitution,  “election”  had  come  to  mean  a  public meeting, occurring in an Ohio election
district and overseen by election officials who, as district residents, knew the community
and its voters well enough to ensure that only qualified electors cast ballots. Framers
1. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 573, 574. The lower court disallowed only the votes cast outside of Ohio. It
allowed the two votes by soldiers absent from their townships but within the state, both of which went to
Lehman.   The   court’s   distinction   between   in-state and out-of-state absentee ballots was part of the
inspiration for an 1864 amendment to the soldier-voting law. It expressly extended the absentee voting
right to servicemen both within and without the state. An Act to Enable the Qualified Voters of this State in
the Military Service to Exercise the Right of Suffrage, 61 Ohio Laws 88 (1864).
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hadn’t   expressly   defined   the   word,   since   there   was   no   need   to   do   so.   “Election”   was   a  
word of common usage, understood to mean what it had always meant in Ohio law. Now,
by allowing voting outside the state and beyond the reach of community-based
enforcement, Ranney objected, the soldier-voting law had unconstitutionally redefined
the very concept of an election.2
To   the   consternation   of   Democrats   and   the   relief   of   Republicans,   Ranney’s  
opinion persuaded none of his four colleagues on the bench. The court ruled 4-1 in
Lehman’s   favor.   So it was that Henry Lehman moved triumphantly into his new
chambers in Wooster, Ohio, as the duly elected probate judge of Wayne County. Like it
or not, Ohioans would live with the novelty of absentee voting for their servicemen for
the rest of the war.
Though McBride’s lawyers lost their argument, they were right that the 1863
election law broke abruptly from well-settled state law that had anchored elections to
Ohio communities and granted control of election sites to local community leaders. The
law had long empowered those leaders (usually township trustees) to decide, for example,
whether  a  migrant  recently  arrived  in  town  met  the  state  constitution’s  qualifications  for  
suffrage, including particularly whether he qualified as a resident.
This chapter examines the prewar evolution of Ohio election law to demonstrate,
as  a  measure  of  the  1863  law’s  novelty,  the  decades-long stasis in the control that local
elites enjoyed over legal voting rights. Community control over elections endured
undiminished through the   state’s   growth,   maturation,   and   experience   with   heavy  

2. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 630.
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migration in the first half of the nineteenth century. Throughout that antebellum
experience,   Ohio’s   election   laws   showed   a   fierce   determination   to   prevent   fraudulent  
voting – to  preserve  the  “purity”  of  elections,  as  the  statutory  language  often  put  it  – by
entrusting oversight of the election process to community leaders who knew their
neighbors and could presumably distinguish between qualified voters and pretenders. All
that changed abruptly in 1863 when absent Civil War soldiers briefly gained voting rights
away from the watchful eye of township leaders. Just as abruptly, the status quo ante
returned  at  the  war’s  conclusion,  with  community  leaders  back  in  charge.

Fitting Soldiers into an Election System Designed for Civilians
Ohio was an early mover among states that experimented with the innovation of
absentee voting for soldiers. It was the fifth state to enact a soldier-voting law, passing
its statute in early 1863.3 Partisan alignments on the issue had not yet crystalized. The
bill in fact received bipartisan support.4 When the idea for such a law was first floated in
1862, Republicans had opposed it, fearing that Democrats in high positions in the
military would abuse their power in the army to cheat Republican candidates in soldier
voting. After Republicans did poorly in the 1862 elections, they concluded that the
absence of soldiers from in-state election sites hurt their side more than it hurt
Democrats. They therefore joined Democrats in supporting the legislation in 1863.5

3. The first four were Missouri, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. Benton, Voting in the Field, v.
4. The bill passed the Ohio house of representative by a 79-2 vote. Id.,73.
5.  Arnold  Shankman,  “Soldier  Votes  and  Clement  L.  Vallandigham”.
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Ohio’s   law   followed   the   Iowa   model,   calling   for   election   sites   to   open   at   the  
encampments where Ohio soldiers served. Under the law, these faraway elections
mimicked elections at home, complete with ballot boxes, election judges and clerks,
ballot challenges, poll books, and tally sheets.6 Election officials in the field forwarded
the vote count back to election districts back home, where the soldier results were added
to civilian votes to determine winners and losers.
In   its   coverage,   Ohio’s   law   was   more   comprehensive   than   most.   By   an   1864  
amendment,  it  defined  “military  service”  to  mean  more  than  just  service  as  army  soldiers.    
The law now explicitly extended the opportunity for absentee voting to men working in
the   service   as   “teamsters,   wagoners,   quartermasters   and   their   employees,   and   those  
engaged   in   the   subsistence,   transportation   and   naval   departments   of   said   service.” 7 A
separate amendment in 1864 enlarged the types of elections in which absent servicemen
could vote. The 1863 enactment covered county, state, congressional, or presidential
elections. As expanded in 1864, the law also covered municipal elections.8 Neither the
original 1863 law nor its 1864 amendments excluded draftees or army regulars, as laws in
several other states did. Overall, no state had a soldier-voting law broader in its scope, as

6. An Act to Enable Qualified Voters of this State, in the Military Service of this State, or of the United
States, to Exercise the Right of Suffrage, 60 Ohio   Laws   80   (1863).   [Hereafter   cited   as   “Ohio   SoldierVoting  Law  of  1863”].
7. An Act to Enable the Qualified Voters of this State in the Military Service to Exercise the Right of
Suffrage, § 1, 61 Ohio Laws 88, 88 (1864). The same amendment eliminated any lingering doubts about
the geographic scope of the law, stipulating that it applied to absent soldiers whether inside the state or
beyond   Ohio’s   borders.   Id. As we shall see, the majority in Lehman construed the 1863 act as already
having this broader scope. In this sense, the 1864 amendment was redundant. The amendment also limited
the  law’s  duration  to  “the  existence  of  the  present  rebellion.”  Id.
8. An Act to Enable the Qualified Voters of Cities and Incorporated Villages which are Divided into
Election Districts and Wards, of this State, who may be in the Military Service of this State, or of the
United States, to Exercise the Right of Suffrage, 61 Ohio Laws 49 (1864).
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to   both   covered   personnel   and   applicable   election   categories,   than   Ohio’s   law   as  
amended.
One reason soldier-voting laws have received relatively little attention among
Civil War scholars is that absentee voting results did not alter the outcome of major
elections.  In  his  fine  article  about  the  Ohio  soldier  vote  in  the  state’s  1863  gubernatorial  
election, for example, scholar Arnold Shankman shows the insignificance of the soldier
vote. In that election, John Brough, the candidate of the Unionist party (an amalgam of
Republicans and war Democrats) trounced Democrat Clement Vallandigham, a strident
opponent  of  the  war.  Brough’s  margin  of  victory  in  the  civilian  vote (62,920) was larger
than the total number of votes cast by absent soldiers (43,765). So, even though Brough
won  95%  of  the  soldiers’  votes,  he  didn’t  need   any  of  them  to   win.9 Similarly, in the
1864 elections, the soldier vote from Ohio, though more than 81% for Lincoln, had a
marginal  effect.  Lincoln,  who  won  the  Ohio  soldiers’  vote  80%-20%, would have carried
the  state  even  if  he  had  lost  100%  of  the  state’s  51,000  voting  soldiers,  just  as  he  would  
have won nationally even without any of the soldier votes cast.10
But sometimes the soldier vote mattered a great deal, as it certainly did in the
contest between Henry Lehman and John McBride in Wayne County, Ohio. The example
illuminates the relevance of military suffrage in down-ballot elections. And because the
election sparked a contest that went all the way to the Ohio Supreme Court, where the

9.   Shankman,   “Soldier   Votes   and   Clement   L.   Vallandigham,”   104.   Brough’s   lopsided   win   among  
soldiers compares to his more modest, though still solid, margin in the civilian vote, which he won 57.3%
to   42.7%.      Shankman   shows   that   at   least   some   of   Brough’s   oversized   win   among   soldiers   owed   to  
manipulation, coercion, and fraud by pro-administration military commanders.
10.  Winther,  “The  Soldier  Vote,”  457;;  McPherson,  Battle Cry of Freedom, 804-805.
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adversarial process of litigation brought sharp focus to the constitutional issues the new
law raised, the case also helps illuminate the novelty of the statute.
Before returning to Lehman v. McBride, it is useful to situate the new law in the
history   of   Ohio’s   prewar   election   laws,   starting   with   a   caveat.   While   elections   are  
artifacts of law, and an understanding of what it meant to have an election begins with a
close  look  at  Ohio’s  election  laws  before  1863,  the  similarities  and  contrasts  in  statutory  
wording   between   the   1863   law   and   its   antecedents   reveal   only   part   of   the   new   law’s  
radicalism, albeit the biggest part. 11 In many of its provisions governing operational
details, however, the military suffrage law achieved a deceptive appearance of harmony
with  the  state’s  electoral  traditions  by  borrowing  much  of  its  wording  from  earlier  Ohio  
election laws. Nevertheless, the core provision permitting voting elsewhere than in
Ohio’s  cities  and  townships  was  dramatically  different  from  earlier  prewar  laws.  The  new  
law also authorized voting in the midst of war. Earlier laws were written for peaceful,
civilian venues, under the supervision of civilian leaders. The new law operated in
sometimes violent, and always martial, settings controlled by the military hierarchy.
Close attention to the operational effects of that contextual difference helps illuminate the
1863 soldier-voting  law’s  dissonance  with  Ohio’s  election traditions as defined by earlier
legislation.
In enacting election laws, the legislature of course had to operate within a
constitutional framework. By the time it adopted its military suffrage law in 1863, the

11. The 1864 law, already discussed, did not substantially alter the voting procedures of the 1863 law,
and of course added nothing to its novelty. Because it was the 1863 law that broke with tradition and was
the focus of the court case, that law forms the basis of the comparisons drawn in this chapter.
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Ohio legislature had functioned under two state constitutions, the first drafted in 1802
(the year before Ohio entered the union) and the second nearly half a century later, in
1851. In their treatment of elections and suffrage, the two constitutions differed only in
minor ways, most of which had little or no bearing on the dispute in Lehman v. McBride.
Both   required   voting   “by   ballot,”   and   both   restricted   suffrage   to   substantially   the   same  
category of people: 21-year-old white men with at least a year of residency in Ohio.12
The 1851 constitution deleted a taxpaying qualification of the 1802 version, and while the
1802  constitution  left  it  for  local  election  judges  to  decide  which  men  were  “residents,”  
the 1851 version authorized (but did not require) the legislature to specify durational
local residency requirements.13 More significantly, the two constitutions differed in the
way they addressed the matter of where election balloting was to take place. In the
section  that  established  voting  qualifications,  the  1802  constitution  specified,  “no  person
shall be entitled to vote except in the county or district in which he shall actually reside at
the   time   of   the   election.”14 The 1851 constitution omitted those words, a change that
defenders of the 1863 soldier-voting law pointed to as evidence that the new constitution
no longer fixed the place of voting.
In the Lehman case, the justices would debate the significance of that omission, as
we shall see later in this chapter. But by 1863, when the legislature passed the soldiervoting law, a long succession of election laws enacted under both constitutions had firmly

12. OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, §§ 1, 2; OHIO C ONST. of 1851, art. V, §§ 1, 2.
13. OHIO CONST. of   1851,   art.   V,   §   1.   Ohio’s   1851   constitution   was   unusual   in   its   delegation   to   the  
legislature of authority to set the durational minimum for local the local residency qualification. Neither
side in Lehman disputed the suffrage qualifications applicable to absent soldiers, including residency
requirements.
14. OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1.
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established what it meant to have an election in Ohio. In remarkably consistent terms,
and with subtle shifts over time, these laws described the ornate stagecraft of public
elections, and the strict choreography that voters and election officials followed in
casting, challenging, counting, and communicating the votes. The 1863 soldier-voting
law tried self-consciously to replicate these familiar steps in as many ways as possible for
Ohio’s   far   away   troops.      War   and   geography,   however,   made   perfect   replication  
impossible.
The  1863  law’s  starkest  departure  from  previous  law  related,  of  course,  to  the  site  
of voting. Before 1863, Ohio law had rooted elections inseparably to locations in Ohio.
An election had always been a community event, and election laws had consistently
provided that voters could cast their ballots only in the community where they resided.
Each township constituted an election district, and the law called for voters to gather at a
specified  location  in  their  township  to  conduct  their  elections.    The  state’s  first  election  
law,  adopted  in  1803,  instructed  each  county  court  of  common  pleas  “to  name  a  certain  
house”   in   each   of   the   county’s   townships   where   voters   “shall   meet”   to   conduct   their  
election. 15 By 1809, the authority to designate the election site had shifted from the
county  court  to  each  township’s  own  trustees,  but  elections  remained  occasions  at  which  
qualified  citizens  would  “meet  and  vote”  somewhere  in  the  township.16 The 1824 election
law  spoke  of  elections  in  the  same  terms,  as  an  occasion  to  “meet  and  vote.”17 The verb
“meet”  appears  less  frequently  in  the  election  law  in  1831,  but  the  sense  of  an  election  as  

15. An Act to Regulate Elections, § 2, 1 Ohio Laws 76, 76 (1803).
16. An Act to Regulate Elections, § 3, 8 Ohio Laws 550, 551 (1809).
17. An Act to Regulate Elections, § 3, 22 Ohio Laws 32, 32 (1824).
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a township meeting remained evident. The law, as it always had, still spoke of electors
voting  “at”  elections.18
In these years, as elections became more protracted affairs with more participants,
they became less like traditional meetings.19 But they still constituted public gatherings.
The 1841 election  law  omitted  the  verb  “meet,”  but  still  referred  to  elections  as  events  at  
which   voters   “assembled”   in   the   community.   As   late   as   1859,   the   legislature   spoke   of  
elections  as  events  that  people  “attended.” 20 Over the entire span of nearly six decades
between   Ohio’s   statehood   and   the   war,   state   law   consistently   connected   elections   and  
voting to location, and the location was always at a gathering place within the
community.
Participation in these public election events was limited to qualified voters
residing in the township – men known to each other, with interests and feelings tied to the
community, and presumably well positioned to know whether other prospective electors
actually qualified to vote.21 Tethering  elections  to  the  place  of  voters’  residence thereby
served a policing function, which remained an integral element of election laws
throughout the six decades leading up to the war. The 1841 law, in terms virtually

18. An Act to Regulate Elections, § 11, 29 Ohio Laws 44, 46 (1831). The  law  used  the  verb  “meet”  in  
describing elections to fill vacancies (§ 38) as well as elections in newly formed counties (§ 39).
19.  An  1837  statute  hinted  at  the  shifting  nature  of  election  “meetings”  by  relieving  election  judges  of  
the duty to finish the vote tally on Election Day. Amendatory   of   ‘An   act   to   regulate   elections,’   passed  
February 18, 1831, 35 Ohio Laws 56 (1837). For a description of how antebellum elections operated in
practice,  see  Kenneth  Winkle,  “Ohio’s  Informal  Polling  Place:  Nineteenth-Century Suffrage in Theory and
Practice,”   in   The Pursuit of Public Power: Political Culture in Ohio, 1787-1861, ed. Jeffrey Brown and
Andrew Cayton (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994), 169-184.
20. An Act to Preserve the Purity of Elections, § 19, 39 Ohio Laws 13, 18 (1841). An Act to Amend
Section Seven of an Act to Regulate the Election of State and County Officers, passed May 3, 1852, § 1, 50
Ohio Laws 311, 311 (1852).
21. For the justification of early nineteenth century residency requirements, see Keyssar, The Right to
Vote,  33;;  and  Kruman,  “Legislatures  and  Political  Rights,” 3:1235-1253.

45

identical to the 1831 law before it and the 1824, 1809 and 1803 laws before that,
provided  that  “no  elector  shall  vote  except  in  the  township  or  ward  in  which  he  resides.”22
The 1841 provision to this effect remained in force up to the 1863 legislative session. It
clearly barred voting by anyone – soldier or civilian – away from his hometown on
Election Day. The whole purpose of the 1863 soldier suffrage law was to change that
restriction for absent Civil War soldiers. Constituting a major step away from a long
tradition rooted in all preceding election laws, the change was radical.
The new law allowed each Ohio soldier in the field (assuming he qualified as an
eligible voter) to cast his ballot at one of three remote locations. First, the law required a
poll to open at the quarters of the commanding officer of the military company in which
Ohio soldiers served.23 All soldiers attached to that company who were within two miles
of that location could vote there and only there. Second, servicemen not attached to a
company   and   those   more   than   two   miles   from   a   company   commander’s   quarters   could
vote  at  the  polls  of  any  company  that  might  be  “most  convenient  to  them.”    This  group  
included not only artillerymen (organized by batteries, not companies), but also infantry
officers with command over units larger than a company, such as regimental, brigade, or
divisional commanders. Thus the Ohio colonel who commanded a regiment, and his
22. An Act to Regulate Elections of 1803, § 13; An Act to Regulate Elections of 1809, § 10; An Act to
Regulate Elections of 1824; Ohio enacted a second election law in 1824: An Act to Regulate Elections in
the township of Cincinnati, § 5, 23 Ohio  Laws  14,  15  (1824).    This  law  established  each  of   Cincinnati’s  
four   wards  as  an  election  district.    The   act  states  the  residency  restriction  as   follows:   “That  the   qualified
voters of said township or city [i.e., Cincinnati] shall vote in the respective ward in which they reside, and
not  elsewhere.”    Throughout  the  period  covered  by  this  chapter,  references  to  “wards”  in  Ohio  election  law  
appear to apply only to Cincinnati.); An Act to Regulate Elections, § 9, 29 Ohio Laws 44, 45 (1831); An
Act to Preserve the Purity of Elections, § 3, 39 Ohio Laws 13, 15 (1841). References to these statutes in
subsequent   footnotes   are   abbreviated   as   “Ohio   election   law   [year],”   followed by the pertinent section
number.
23. Companies were organizational units in both the infantry and the cavalry, but not the artillery or
navy.
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staff, could drop in to vote at the quarters of any of the ten or so companies in his
command, as could the brigadier general above him (commanding perhaps five
regiments), the divisional general above him (typically in charge of three brigades), and
up to the corps and army commanders above them, each with a staff of aides. Third, if
twenty or more Ohio servicemen found themselves in a place more than two miles from
any   company   commander’s   quarters,   they   could   create   their   own   polling   place   on   the  
spot.24
By 1863, Ohio infantrymen and cavalry troopers served in about 140 regiments,
each nominally with ten companies, scattered across many states, with the heaviest
concentrations in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia. That meant potentially at least
1400 polling stations outside Ohio, not counting those that might be set up as needed by
detached units of twenty or more. More than fifty additional infantry regiments – 500
more companies – were added by the time of the 1864 election.25 The total number of
potential voting sites thus created for Ohio soldiers in the field exceeded the number of
election sites for civilians back home.26
Having established this critical difference in the permissible voting site, the new
law required the Ohio servicemen, gathered at the makeshift polling stations set up for
them in the field, to follow most of the same ritualized voting procedures that election

24. Ohio soldier-voting law (1863), § 2.
25.  “The  Civil  War  Archives,”   http://www.civilwararchive.com/unionoh.htm (accessed July 15, 2013).
For information on the organization of Union forces, see McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 322-327.
26. This conclusion is derived from the conservative assumption that Ohio had no more townships in
1863 than it does today. According to its Secretary of State, as of 2011 Ohio had 1309 townships, a number
probably greater than the total in the Civil War. Ohio Secretary of State, Municipal roster for 2010-2011,
accessed
July
15,
2103,
www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/publications/election/muniroster2010_2011/Townships.csv .
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laws had long imposed on  polling  sites  for  civilians.    As  in  Ohio’s  townships  and  wards,  
three election judges presided over the process at each voting site for soldiers, wielding
nearly absolute power over the election. Whereas election judges back home were
usually township trustees, in the field they were soldiers, elected by the Ohio soldiers
gathered at the site. As at home, two election clerks served under the election judges.
Judges  and  clerks  alike  swore  an  oath,  including  the  promise  “to  studiously  endeavor  to  
prevent fraud,  deceit,  or  abuse”  in  conducting  the  election.27
The  clerks’  job  included  recording  the  voters’  names,  and  the  tally  of  votes  given  
for   each   office,   in   “poll   books.”      These   were   in   the   nature   of   files   with   record-keeping
formats that conformed to a template printed in the statutes. The two election clerks had
to keep duplicate copies of the poll books, recording everything identically in both.
Soldiers  and  civilians  alike  voted  “by  ballot.”  The  election  laws  barely  addressed  
the form of the ballot, requiring  only  that  it  be  a  “single  piece  of  paper,  on  which  shall  be  
written   or   printed”   the   names   of   the   preferred   candidates. 28 In most elections, voters
could fashion their own ballots, but more typically they used pre-printed ballots provided
to them by the political parties or published in partisan newspapers before the election.29
A few soldier-voting laws made provision for both political parties to distribute their
ballots  to  soldiers  through  the  agency  of  “commissioners”  who  traveled  to  army  posts to
help  implement  the  laws,  but  Ohio’s  law  did  not.30

27. Ohio Soldier-Voting law (1863), § 5.
28. Ohio election law (1803), § 13; Ohio election law (1809), §10; Ohio election law (1831), § 9. The
soldier-voting law said nothing about the form of the ballot.
29. Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 28; Silbey, The American Political Nation, 59.
30. Minnesota’s  law  is  an  example. An Act to Enable Citizens of this State, who are or may be Engaged
in the Military or Naval Service of the United States, to Vote in the Election Districts where they Reside, at
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The  1863  law’s  replication  of  earlier  election  law  provisions  about  ballots  masked  
another of many profound practical differences between the two election contexts. By
the mid-nineteenth century, the major political parties had achieved modern levels of
organizational efficiency and were adept at supplying the party faithful and prospective
voters  with  the  party’s  ballots.    Organizational  prowess  in  ballot  distribution  was  a  key  to  
electoral success, but neither party had experience distributing ballots to absent voters.
As the war progressed, access to ballots became increasingly problematic for absent
soldiers, especially if the soldier was a Democrat.31
Once he had either prepared his own ballot or obtained one pre-printed, the voter
– whether civilian or soldier – handed it to one of the election judges. The civilian
election   laws   had   always   insisted   that   the   voter   do   so   “openly   and   in   full   view,”   a  
requirement eliminated in the 1863 law. 32

Upon receiving the ballot, and while still

holding   it,   the   election   judge   publicly   announced   the   voter’s   name.33 At this point, the
prospective voter was subject to challenge by any other voter present or any of the
election judges. When someone challenged the voter’s  eligibility,  it  became  the  election  
judges’   duty   to   conduct   an   immediate   and   formal   inquiry.      For   civilian   elections,   this  
meant administering an oath, interrogating the voter, and finally deciding whether to

the General Election to be held in the Month of November, 1862 and all Subsequent General Elections,
during the Continuance of the Present War, ch. 1, §6, 1862 (extra session) Minn. Laws 13, 16.
31. Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet, 140;;   Shankman,   “Soldier   Votes   and   Clement   L.   Vallandigham,”  
99. Chapter 5 elaborates on this difficulty for Democrats.
32. Ohio election law (1803), § 13; Ohio election law (1809), §10; Ohio election law (1824), § 10; Ohio
election law (1831), § 9.
33. Ohio election law (1803), § 13; Ohio election law (1809), § 10; Ohio election law (1824), § 10;
Ohio election law (1831), § 9.
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accept or reject the ballot.34 The soldier suffrage law did not prescribe any procedure for
handling a challenge, stating only that before accepting the ballot, the election judge had
to   “be   satisfied”   that   the   voter   was   qualified.35 For all practical purposes, the election
judges’  decision  about the challenge was final. No mechanism existed, either for soldiers
in the field or civilians back home, for immediate appeal. Review happened, if at all,
only   in   an   election   “contest,”   held   in   an   Ohio   court   and   occurring   days   or   even   weeks  
later, after an election winner was declared.36
If no one challenged the voter, or if the judges satisfied themselves that a
challenged voter was indeed eligible, the election judges accepted the ballot. A judge
placed the accepted ballot in a locked ballot box, and the election clerks entered the name
of the voter in the duplicate poll books.37 Voters, judges, and the clerks continued this
process for the six or eight hours that the polls stayed open. 38 At the close of the voting,
with the ballot box still locked, the clerks counted the names they had entered in the
duplicate poll books and noted the total. The judges then signed the poll books and
turned to the task of counting the votes.39

34. Ohio election law (1803), § 15; Ohio election law (1809), § 12; Ohio election law (1824), § 12;
Ohio election (1831), § 10.
35. Ohio Soldier-Voting law (1863), § 8.
36. Ohio election law (1831), § 43. Neither the 1841 election law nor the soldier-voting law changed
this procedure.
37. Ohio election law (1803), § 14; Ohio election law (1809), § 11; Ohio election law (1824), § 11;
Ohio election (1831), § 10; Ohio soldier-voting law (1863), § 8.
38. Under the 1831 law, the polls in Ohio townships opened between 8:00 AM and 10:00 AM and
closed at 4:00 PM, except in Cincinnati, where they closed at 6:00 PM. Ohio election law (1831), § 5. The
soldier-voting law opened the polls at 10:00 AM and split the difference in the civilian closing times,
closing the polls for soldiers at 5:00 PM. Ohio soldier-voting law (1863), § 3.
39. Ohio election law (1803), § 16; Ohio election law (1809), § 13; Ohio election law (1824), § 13;
Ohio election (1831), § 13; Ohio soldier-voting law (1863), §§ 8-9.
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Vote counting followed an elaborate and labor-intensive process far better suited
to placid civilian settings than to hectic war zones, but the election laws described them
almost identically for both settings. One election judge opened the ballot box, began
removing the ballots one at a time, and publicly announced the votes shown on each one.
Then he handed the ballot to the second judge for his examination, and he in turn passed
it to the third judge, who finally strung the ballot on a thread. 40

All the while, the

election clerks entered each vote in the duplicate poll books. After processing all the
ballots in this fashion, the clerks tallied the votes, entered the tallies in the poll books,
then sealed and forwarded one of the poll books to the clerk of the county court of
common pleas. 41 The 1863 law required all these tallying and bookkeeping steps in
terms virtually identical to the provisions of law governing elections in Ohio.
By requiring so many of the time-honored election procedures that Ohio law had
provided since 1803, the soldier-voting law sought to do more than just give the absent
serviceman a way to cast his ballot. The 1863 law tried to recreate, in each of these 1500
or so remote locations where soldiers might find themselves on Election Day, full-blown
Ohio elections. In statutory text, the transplanted events resembled elections that had
grown familiar to Ohioans for nearly six decades. But the remote settings contemplated
for these recreated Ohio elections, and the differences between a temporary community
of absent soldiers and a permanent community of civilians back home, made perfect
replication of the home-front election impossible in the field. The constitutional issues
40. The threading of ballots was a consistent feature of Ohio election laws, appearing in the 1803
election law, § 17, and the 1809 election law (§ 14). The 1831 election law preserved it (§ 14), as did the
1863 soldier-voting law (§ 10).
41. Ohio election law (1803), § 23; Ohio election law (1809), § 19; Ohio election law (1824), § 21;
Ohio election (1831), § 21; Ohio soldier-voting law (1863), §§ 8-9.
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that divided the Lehman court grew out of that impossibility; the law could not graft all
the features of an Ohio election onto   an   election   held   far   outside   the   state’s   borders,  
sometimes in zones of active combat.
Some differences between the elections that soldiers experienced and the election
process for civilians would hardly have mattered to any voters. In the townships back
home, for example, the township clerk kept the second poll book – the one not forwarded
to the county courthouse – “for  the  use  of  persons  who  may  choose  to  inspect  it.”42 For
soldier voting in the field, election officials forwarded the second poll book to the
secretary of state, where the county clerk could obtain it on demand. 43 The ballots cast
in the field were mailed to the county court along with the first poll book. 44 But the state
election laws had never directed election officials to do anything at all with ballots cast in
Ohio.
In other ways, however, elections in the field differed substantially from elections
held back home.

Soldiers could experience only a pale imitation of the cultural

phenomenon of an election among civilians. Scholars of nineteenth century American
politics such as Jean Baker, Joel Silbey, Glenn Altschuler, Stuart Blumin, and Richard
Bensel have vividly described the remarkable spectacle of Election Day. By the midnineteenth century, an election was as much a social as a political event. Baker portrays
elections  of  this  era  as  “secular  holy  days,  a  time  when  daily  routines  were  interrupted,  

42. Ohio election law (1831), § 22.
43. Ohio Soldier-Voting Law (1863), § 16.
44. Id.
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work   was   suspended,   and   communities   observed   a   public   festival.” 45 On a typical
Election Day in civilian America, according to Silbey,
…  there  was  intense  excitement  and  an  exuberant,  busy  atmosphere.    In  addition  to  
the voters streaming in and out, and the party workers and election officials who
had to be there, large crowds bustled around the polling places: wives, children, and
other family members, as well as vendors, entertainers, and simple gawkers.
Elections were special events. Amid the continuous electioneering and political
arguments, picnic, drinking, and boisterous celebration went on throughout each
polling day.46
Beyond listing all the ingredients and steps to follow in the statutory recipe for
making  an  election,  Ohio  election  law  had  never  defined  the  term  “election.”  Neither  did  
the  state’s  constitution.    It  was  a  word  that  constitutional  framers  and  legislators believed
had a commonly understood meaning, making definition unnecessary in drafting. Of
course no amount of care in legislative drafting could transplant to the war theater the
familiar  features  of  the  civilians’  “secular  holy  day.”      Wives,  children, and entertainers
could not materialize at the typical site of soldier voting in the field. If Election Day fell
during one of the many lulls in fighting, when armies rested or regrouped during
interludes of peace between engagements, a degree of festivity might have crept into the
election   process   for   servicemen;;   drinking   and   carousing   were   not   alien   to   the   soldiers’  
experience.      But   how   completely   foreign   to   civilian   sensibilities   the   soldiers’   voting  
experience must have been when Election Day fell during battle. For fighting soldiers, an
election was no picnic. Consider the voting experience of a fervently Republican Ohio
soldier whose unit found itself engaged in combat on election day in October 1864:

45. Baker, Affairs of Party, 271. See also, Richard Franklin Bensel, The American Ballot Box in the
Mid-Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
46. Silbey, The American Political Nation, 143. See also Altschuler and Blumin, Rude Republic:
Americans and Their Politics in the Nineteenth Century, 69-79.

53

The election judges and clerks moved along our lines in ambulances. It was a day
of   constant   marching   and   fighting.      At   every   halt   of   a   few   minutes’   duration  
balloting progressed vigorously, votes being more than once sandwiched in
between volleys of musketry scarcely fifteen minutes apart. The rebels at every
charge advanced with vociferous cheers for McClellan to which our boys reacted
with cheers for Lincoln and solid arguments with their Enfields. It produced a
marked effect upon our soldiers. What wonder that they voted almost
unanimously for the Union ticket? How could they fight rebels one moment,
hazarding life and limb for the dear old government, and the next undo all they
were  doing  by  voting  for  Treason’s  cowardly  allies  at  the  rear.47
Ohioans contemplating soldier voting in 1863 – a year earlier   than   this   Ohio’s  
soldier’s   1864   experience   – had already developed a well-informed understanding that
voting soldiers would experience an election environment starkly different from what
civilians back home had come to expect on Election Day. By April 1863 when the Ohio
legislature enacted the soldier-voting law, the country had seen photographs of the
grotesque scenes of battlefield carnage at Antietam. They had read newspaper accounts
of Bull Run, Shiloh, Fredericksburg, and Murfreesboro, and countless smaller
engagements. They had read first hand accounts in letters from servicemen at the front
and heard the stories in person from returning soldiers. They surely knew that for many
soldiers, elections would not resemble the familiar home front spectacle. If it troubled
lawmakers  that  they  were  inventing  something  radically  different  from  the  “secular  holy  
day,”  they  obviously  did  not  let  their  misgivings  stand  in  the  way  legislatively.    
The soldier-voting law of 1863, however, did create election novelties with more
obviously legal significance. For example, the Ohio soldiers who assembled to vote at
the  makeshift  polling  stations  in  the  field  were  from  any  number  of  Ohio’s  eighty-seven
47.  William  Lewis  Young,  “Soldier  Voting  in  Ohio  During  the  Civil  War”  (master’s  thesis,  Ohio  State  
University,   1948),   70.      Young’s   treatise   does   not   examine   the   legal   or   constitutional aspects of soldier
voting, but it serves as an excellent source on the impact of soldier voting on Ohio politics during the Civil
War.
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counties. Even on peaceful days, this meant coping with daunting logistical challenges
unknown to voters and election officials at civilian polling stations. The soldier-voting
law required the election clerks and judges to keep separate sets of poll books, in
duplicate, for the voters of each Ohio county and to separately thread the ballots for each
county. Back home, where only electors from the township could vote, only one pair of
poll books and one thread of ballots were needed. 48

Even that could pose logistical

challenges. An historian of Ohio elections describes the difficulties civilian election
clerks   had   working,   “sometimes   feverishly,”   to   keep   up   with   the   pace   of   voting   and  
maintaining accuracy in the two poll books.49 When voting occurred for soldiers at the
battle front, any unit of which could include men from several counties, one wonders
how, in the heat of combat, election officials jostling about in rolling wagons could have
managed to keep accurate records in the different duplicate sets of poll books,
segregating ballots from different counties on different threads, all the while dodging
bullets.
Then there was the problem of notice. How did absent soldiers know when and
where to vote? For elections in Ohio, the law required the county sheriff, fifteen days in
advance,  to  publish  a  “proclamation”  announcing  the  date  of  the  election  and  the  offices  
at stake. He also had to post a copy of the proclamation at the election site in each

48. Ohio Soldier-Voting Law (1863), § 7; Ohio election law (1831), § 10.
49.  Winkle,  “Ohio’s  Informal  Polling  Place,”  169-184, 173.
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township and publish a copy of it in a county newspaper, if the county had a newspaper.50
The soldier-voting law made no provision at all for advance notice.
The 1863 law also departed from the procedures civilian election judges followed
when deciding the eligibility of a challenged voter. Ohio law had always vested election
judges with wide discretion in resolving   challenges   to   a   voter’s   eligibility.      The   1803  
election  law  granted  election  judges  “power  to  examine  [the  prospective  voter]  on  oath  or  
affirmation,   touching   his   qualification   as   an   elector,”   and   authorized   him   to   accept   the  
ballot   if   he   was   “satisfied   that   the   elector   is   legally   entitled   to   vote.”51 The 1809 law
expanded   the   election   judges’   authority   by   allowing   them   to   swear   in   and   interrogate  
“disinterested  witnesses”  during  the  challenge  process.52 The 1824 and 1831 laws made
no substantial changes   in   the   election   judges’   duties   or   responsibilities   in   resolving  
challenges.53
The election law of 1841 left almost all provisions of the 1831 law intact, but it
overhauled the procedures governing challenges and added stiff new penalties for
violating election rules. The new law equipped township officials with powerful tools for
disciplining the voting process, and more insistently than ever before it required those
officials  to  use  the  tools.  Entitled  “An  Act  to  preserve  the  purity  of  elections,”  this  antifraud statute particularly targeted voters who cast ballots in the wrong township or in
more than one township. Legislators designed the law to impose greater uniformity and

50. Ohio election law (1831), § 4. Before 1831, the laws required only the proclamation; there was no
mention of newspaper notice. Ohio election law (1803), § 5; Ohio election law (1809), § 5; Ohio election
law (1824), § 5.
51. Ohio election law (1803), §§ 14, 15.
52. Ohio election law (1809), § 12.
53. Ohio election law (1824), § 12; Ohio election law (1831), § 12.
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tighter discipline on the enforcement of the residency qualification for suffrage. While
all   earlier   election   laws   had   straightforwardly   required   electors   to   vote   “only   in   the  
township,  or  ward,  in  which  he  resides,”  statutory  penalties  for  voting  in  more  than  one  
township had not existed in the early Ohio election laws. 54

The 1803 law imposed up to

$500   in   penalties   on   candidates   who   gave   or   promised   “any   meat,   drink   or   any   other  
reward”  in  exchange  for  votes  and  punished  voters  who  accepted  such  inducements  with  
up to a $100 penalty, but it imposed no penalty for violating the residency restrictions.55
The 1824 law preserved the penalty for giving inducements, deleted the penalty for
accepting them, and added a $100 fine for tricking an illiterate voter into casting a preprinted  ballot  “contrary  to  his  inclination.”56 It imposed no penalty for voting outside the
township of residence.
The  1831  law  was  the  first  to  penalize  “voting  in  more  than  one  township  or  ward  
at   the   same   election,”   imposing   a   $50   penalty. 57 This   coincided   with   Ohio’s   first  
statutory accommodation   of   absent   electors.      If   a   voter’s   “actual   employment   in   the  
business  of  his  trade,  occupation  or  profession”  took  him  temporarily  to  another  township  
in the same county, he could vote there.58 But the 1841 law, in its assault on voter fraud,
ended this modest  experiment  in  voting  outside  one’s  own  township  and  added  a  flurry  of  
new strictures and far harsher penalties focused mostly residency fraud. It started by
tightening  the  familiar  provision   of  all  earlier  laws  that  “no  elector  shall  vote  except   in  
54. Supra, note 1.
55. Ohio election law (1803), § 29.
56. Ohio election law (1824), § 29. In 1839, the legislature added penalties for wagering on elections,
imposing  a  fine  equal  to  “the  amount  hazarded”  in  the  wager. An Act to Punish Betting on Elections, and
for other Purposes, 37 Ohio Laws 79 (1839).
57. Ohio election law (1831), § 11.
58. Id. at § 9.
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the  township  in   which  he  resides.”59 It then painstakingly defined residency, addressing
nine different scenarios that had made residency debatable before 1841, including a
voter’s  temporary  absence  from  the  township  (he  retained  his  residency),  his  temporary
presence in a township (it did not count as residency), and his conducting business in one
town  while  keeping  his  family  in  another  (his  family’s  place  of  residence  controlled).  
Among  the  1841  law’s  innovations  for  “preserving  the  purity  of  elections”   were
precise, step-by-step instructions for election judges to follow when interrogating a
challenged voter. The new law scripted the oath to administer when swearing the voter
before interrogation. It prescribed exact questions to ask for each category of challenge –
citizenship, residency, and age. It listed two questions to pose when someone challenged
the  prospective  voter’s  U.S.  citizenship  (and  follow-up questions when the voter claimed
to be a naturalized citizen, including a demand that he produce a certificate of
naturalization), five questions to test Ohio residency, four for challenges to his county
residency,   and  so  forth.     For   a  challenge  to   the   prospective  voter’s  age,   election  judges  
had   to   ask   the   young   soldier,   “are   you   twenty   one   years   of age to the best of your
knowledge  and  belief?”    Only  for  challenges  based  on  the  voter’s  race  was  the  1841  law  
silent on the form of questioning.60
In one sense, these tightly drawn interrogation requirements diminished election
judges’  discretion  as  gatekeepers – a rare thing in prewar election law – by dictating the
precise questions to ask challenged voters. But it did so not in a way that protected
59. Conforming that wording more precisely to the language of the 1802 constitution, the 1841 law
added  the  qualifying  adverb  “actually,”  so  that  now  a  voter  could  cast  his  ballot  only  “in  the  township  or  
ward where he actually resides.”  Ohio  election  law  (1841),  §  3  (emphasis  added).    
60. Id. at § 13. The law was silent about challenges based on race, suggesting that such challenges were
rare before 1841.
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migrants whose ballots the election judges had unjustly rejected in the past or diminished
the power of local officials to block unwelcome voters. The purpose was the opposite: to
impose discipline on election judges who, the legislature believed, had neglected their
duties in the past by allowing unqualified migrants to vote. The statute, then, was an
anti-migrant election law meant to discourage careless or corrupt election judges from
exercising their gatekeeping obligation to bar unqualified migrants from voting.61
The law still vested all power in the election judges, who still had the final word
on challenged votes. They could reject a ballot even after the prospective elector
personally   swore   that   he   met   the   eligibility   criterion   under   challenge,   “if   they   [the  
election  judges]  shall  be  satisfied,”  from  the  evidence  they  chose  to  hear,  that  the  voter  
was unqualified.62
It was a tough law, meting out stiff penalties against fraud, especially residency
fraud. Four of the penalty provisions specifically targeted non-residents: six months in
the  penitentiary  for  voting  in  a  township  “in  which  [the  voter]  does  not  actually  reside;;”  
three  years  of  “hard  labor”  for  voting  in  a  county  and  “not  being  a  resident  thereof;;”  five  
years  at  hard  labor  for  voting  by  “a  resident  of  another  state;;”  and  five  years,  also  at  hard  

61. Not surprisingly, this anti-migrant tilt arose in a political context. Whigs had won the elections of
1840 and dominated the Ohio legislature the following year. As a rule, Whigs before 1850 looked with a
jaundiced eye on suffrage expansion, even for white males. Democrats, in contrast, favored easier suffrage
for immigrants and other lower class white men, among whom Democrats outpolled Whigs in most
elections. The 1841 election law bears all the hallmarks of Whig skepticism about enlarging the electorate
and Whig belief that Democrats corrupted the election process. Rush Welter, The Mind of America, 18201860 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 42; Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage from
Property to Democracy 1760-1860 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 261; Winkle, The
Politics of Community, 77.
62. Ohio election law (1841), § 16.
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labor,  for  voting  more  than  once  “at  the  same   election.”  63 Persons aiding or abetting a
non-resident’s   voting   also   faced   up   to   five   years   at   hard   labor.64 Justice Rufus Ranney
did not exaggerate when he described the law, in his dissenting opinion in the Lehman
case,   as   “perhaps   one   of   the   most   perfect and stringent for the prevention of fraud at
elections  to  be  found  in  any  state.”65 It certainly imposed far harsher maximum penalties
than any earlier Ohio election law ever had.66
Moreover the penalties tilted the balance of power away from aspiring voters. No
provision of the statute punished election judges for rejecting the ballot of a voter they
knew  to  be  qualified,  but  the  law  subjected  them  to  punishment  for  up  to  five  years  “at  
hard   labor”   for   accepting   the   ballot   of   a   voter   they   knew   to   be   unqualified. 67 This
imbalance would encourage an election judge in a close case to play it safe by rejecting
the   voter’s   claim   of   residency.   And   the   law   imposed   an   affirmative   duty   on   election  
judges  to  challenge  voters  they  knew  “or  suspect[ed]”  to  be  unqualified, again on penalty
of up to five years at hard labor. 68 The law directed its muscle disproportionately at
voting by unqualified migrants. In contrast to the severe penalties a non-resident faced,

63. Id. at §§ 4, 5, 6, and 7. The stated terms of confinement were, in each case, maximum penalties for
the offense described.
64. Id. at § 10.
65. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 627. Ranney believed the 1841 law shed light on the intent of the framers of
Ohio’s   1851   constitution,   since   none of those framers (and Ranney had been one of them) expressed
dissatisfaction   with   it.   Neither   the   majority   opinion   nor   Lehman’s   attorneys   disputed   Ranney’s  
characterization of the 1841 law as having been intended to target fraud.
66. For a differing view, arguing that the 1841 law was part of a trend toward relaxed residency
qualifications and was in fact more lenient than its antecedents, see Winkle, The Politics of Community, 62.
Winkle’s  theory  of  “volitional  residence”  posits  that  migrants  in  the  decades before the Civil War gained
ever greater autonomy in determining their own residence, and to that extent their eligibility to vote. It is a
theory at odds with the arguments and supporting evidence set forth in this chapter.
67. An Act to Preserve the Purity of Elections, § 24, 39 Ohio Laws 13, 18 (1841).
68. Id. at §§ 18, 24.
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the maximum punishment for underage voting or voting by a convicted felon was six
months in the penitentiary.69
In 1857, the legislature amended some provisions of the 1841 act without altering
its decidedly anti-fraud spirit or diminishing the authority of election judges to
superintend the process.

The 1857   law   imposed   Ohio’s   first   specific   durational  

requirements both for county and township residency, requiring 30 days of residency in
the county and 20 days in the township. It also made corresponding adjustments in the
oaths  for  testing  challenged  voters’ residency and imposed the same penalties as the 1841
act for violations of the now precisely stated residency rules. 70 Election judges enjoyed
as tight a grip over the proceedings as under the 1841 law, and they still functioned under
a mandate to enforce suffrage qualifications strictly, under risk of harsh penalty for
waiving them. Fraud prevention remained their paramount legal responsibility.
In contrast, the 1863 soldier voting law gave virtually no guidance to election
judges faced with a challenge. In much the same terms as earlier election laws, it
provided  merely  that  the  election  judges  in  the  field  should  accept  the  soldier’s  ballot  if  
“the   judge   be   satisfied”   that   the   voter   met   the   state’s   eligibility   requirements,   but   it  
provided no instruction about how the election judge might pursue his doubts.71

The

1863 law left intact the anti-fraud provisions of the 1857 law for voting within Ohio,
69. Id. at § 8.
70.  The  1851  constitution  addressed  voters’  qualification  in  Article  V,  §  1,  which  provided  as  follows:  
“Every   white   male   citizen   of   the   United   States,   of   the   age   of twenty-one years, who shall have been a
resident of the state one year next preceding the election, and of the county, township, or ward, in which he
resides, such time as may be provided by law, shall have the qualifications of an elector, and be entitled to
vote   at   all   elections.”   (emphasis   added   to   highlight   the   new   legislative   authority   to   impose   durational  
residency requirements); An Act to Further  to   Amend  the  Act  Entitled   ‘An   Act  to  Preserve  the  Purity  of  
Elections,’  passed  March  20,  1841, 54 Ohio Laws 136 (1857).
71. Ohio Soldier-Voting Law (1863), § 8.

61

explicitly stating that in elections set up for soldiers away from their home townships but
still within the  borders  of  Ohio,  “all  the  provisions  of  the  general  law  in  relation  to  fraud  
at  elections  and  the  punishment  thereof”  applied.72 It did not say this about elections set
up for Ohio soldiers in other states. This created the anomaly of tight statutory discipline
in resolving election challenges in Ohio, but relative laxity over challenges in the field.
As the 1841 and 1857 statutes made clear, the system relied heavily on election
judges  to  preserve  the  “purity  of  elections.”    Who  were  these  critically  important people?
For  elections  in  Ohio,  the  law  assigned  the  posts  to  the  “township  trustees,”  or  in  the  case  
of Cincinnati to city councilmen. Every April, each Ohio township elected local officers,
including   appraisers,   a   treasurer,   two   “fence   viewers,”   two   overseers   of   the   poor,   a  
township clerk, and three township trustees. 73

The trustees stood atop the local

governmental hierarchy with authority to designate how many constables and highway
supervisors the township would have and power to impose taxes on local property. 74
They were generally older and richer than average voters and more likely to be merchants
and   professionals   instead   of   farmers   and   laborers.   As   the   town’s   most   prestigious  
politicians, they knew and were known by the local voters. 75 Who better to safeguard
the  “purity”  of  elections  by  identifying  the  town’s  legitimate  voters  and  weeding  out  the  
pretenders? From 1809 to the Civil War, election laws always assigned the role of
election judges to these trustees. The township clerk – also elected annually – was
72. Id. at § 19.
73. An Act Providing for the Incorporation of Townships, § 7, 22 Ohio Laws 412 (1824). In 1831, Ohio
abolished the position of overseer of the poor and assigned the duties of the position to the township
trustees. An Act to Amend the Act to Provide for the Incorporation of Townships, §§ 1, 2, 31 Ohio Laws
18, 19 (1832).
74. An Act Providing for the Incorporation of Townships (1824) at §§ 10, 11, 12.
75.  Winkle,  “Ohio’s  Informal  Polling  Place,”  174.
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automatically assigned as one of the two election clerks, and the three election judges
selected the other.76
The election laws recognized that the township trustees and the township clerk
could not always perform their election duties. They might be absent or they might
themselves run for an office. When that happened, the law provided for replacements.
The voters on hand when the polls opened would elect from among themselves, vive
voce, the necessary substitutes. Upon their selection, and before the rest of the election
process proceeded, these substitute election judges or clerks took an oath – a step not
required of the township trustees or the township clerk – to perform their election duties
as  best  they  could  and  to  “  studiously  endeavor  to  prevent  fraud,  deceit,  or  abuse.”77 But
because   voters   chose   the   substitutes   from   among   the   community’s   eligible   voters,   the  
policing function remained in local hands. Whether the election judge was a town trustee
or a substitute, he shared his township residency with the qualified electors and brought
the advantage of familiarity with his neighbors to the task of refereeing challenged
ballots.
The 1863 soldier-voting law could not replicate this critical feature of civilian
elections.

The polling sites in the field could never draw on the services of township

trustees or clerks, who of course performed their duties back home. More fundamentally,
the military polling stations did not draw Ohioans from just one township. Although

76. Ohio election law (1831), § 6; Ohio election law (1824), § 7; Ohio election law (1809), § 7. The
1803 election law provided that the qualified voters present when the polls opened should elect the three
election judges, vive voce. Ohio election law (1803), § 7.
77. Ohio election law (1831), § 7; Ohio election law (1824), § 8. The 1809 Ohio election law required
the oath even when the township trustees and the township clerk served as the election officer. Ohio
election law (1809), § 9.
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Union infantry companies typically consisted of men from the same town, or at least the
same county,78 the identity between a company and a single township was never perfect.
The Conscription Act of 1863 permitted a drafted man to hire a substitute to fill his place.
While  conscripts  represented  a  relatively  small  percentage  of  the  Union’s  overall  force,  
they often took advantage of the substitution opportunity.79 These substitutes, according
to James McPherson, were likely to be eighteen and nineteen year olds and immigrants.80
Neither category was eligible to vote in Ohio, but even if the draftee found a substitute
from Ohio who did qualify as an elector, there was no telling what part of Ohio he might
come from. Moreover, Ohio soldiers unattached to the company could still vote at the
company’s   polling   station,   no   matter   where   they   resided   in   Ohio,   if   they   were   officers  
above the rank of company commander, or if they were artillerymen, or if election day
found them more than two miles away from their own company’s  headquarters.    In  each  
of these situations, Ohioans from multiple townships, and probably multiple counties,
would  mix  at  the  same  polling  place.    And  the  law’s  allowance  for  any  group  of  twenty  
Ohioans to set up their own election site when no Ohio company was within two miles
further  assured  that  residential  homogeneity  among  Ohio’s  voting  soldiers  would  be  a  hit  
or miss proposition.
So, not only did the 1863 law permit Ohioans to cast ballots out-of-state, and to
do so in the company of men from different Ohio communities, without oversight by
civilian leaders, but now for the first time the voters and election judges might not have

78. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 326; Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet, 14.
79. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 601; Frank, With Ballots and Bayonets, 7.
80. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 601.
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common residential ties. Here surely was a paradigmatic shift in what it meant for
Ohioans to have an election.
To accommodate the unavailability of township trustees and clerks for service as
election officers, and the inevitable mix of soldiers from different communities at the
polling sites, the 1863 law provided for choosing the three election judges by a vive voce
vote among the soldiers on hand when the makeshift military polling place opened, as
long as the judges were qualified Ohio voters. The three election judges then appointed
the two election clerks.81 Like substitute election judges and clerks in the townships back
home, the soldiers chosen to serve these functions had to swear to perform their duties
diligently  and  to  “studiously  endeavor  to  prevent  fraud,  deceit,  or  abuse.”82
But beyond borrowing from the text of statutes that applied to civilian elections,
the law could not replicate for military elections an officiating system resembling the
system back home. Consider first the handicaps imposed by military hierarchy. Soldiers
could hardly overlook the command structure when choosing their election judges. Some
might think it foolhardy to run or vote against a superior officer seeking that position, or
against another soldier whom the superior openly preferred. Joseph Allen Frank has
documented the sometimes heavy-handed way that officers in the Union army monitored
the political preferences of soldiers under their command and punished subordinates who
espoused views deemed anti-administration. Soldiers were mindful of the risks of
offending the political sensibilities of their superiors.83 The known political preferences

81. Ohio soldier-voting law (1863), § 4.
82. Id. at § 5.
83. Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet, 120, 133, 137.
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of the officer serving as election judge might deter ballot challenges by his subordinates,
and   many   soldiers   would   find   it   reckless   to   challenge   their   superior’s   ballot   no   matter  
who  was  election  judge.    When  a  superior  officer’s  proffered vote drew a challenge from
some bold trooper, would a subordinate soldier serving as election judge have the
temerity  to  reject  the  ballot?    Or  would  he  dare  overrule  the  officer’s  challenge  of  another  
voter? Might not the election judge in that position imagine that an officer displeased by
his decision would express that displeasure by assigning the offending election judge to
hazardous or tedious duties or withholding his furloughs?84
Apart from problems the military hierarchy imposed, military culture itself defied
the logic of the policing devices designed for civilian elections. Devotion to the purity of
elections could not rank as high on the scale of virtues for soldiers working as election
judges as it did for their civilian counterparts, their identical oaths notwithstanding. If the
election judge and a challenged voter were messmates who had marched and fought
within the same small band of warriors, the duties of election judge would collide with
the  far  more  powerful  forces  of  “group  cohesion,”  which  tied  soldiers  in  a  fighting  unit  
together  with  unbreakable  bonds  of  loyalty.  In  his  study  of  Civil  War  soldiers’  experience  
with combat, Gerald Linderman quotes a soldier as describing the ties that bound
messmates.  “He  learns  to  look  upon  them as brothers; there is no sacrifice that he will not
make  for  them….  Fellowship  becomes  almost  a  religion.”85 An Ohio artilleryman wrote
in  a  letter  home,  “You  would  not  believe  that  men  could  be  so  attached  to  each  other   –
84. Both Frank and Shankman document the ubiquity of officers wielding their power over subordinates
for harboring or expressing disfavored political views. Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet, 120, 133, 137;
Shankman,  “Soldier  Votes  and  Clement  L.  Vallandigham,”  99-100.
85. Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War
(New York: The Free Press, 1987), 235.
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we  are  all  like  brothers.”86 An Ohio infantryman wrote in 1862 that he and his combat
buddies  “were  hooped  …  with  bonds  stronger  than  steel.”87
The unique group dynamics of combat units invites reflection on the relationship
between soldier and community. On the one hand soldiers saw themselves as belonging
to cohesive communities in the army, distinctive from their civilian communities back
home. On the other hand, they remained products of those home communities, with
enduring political habits and civilian identities formed there. They straddled the two
worlds, one foot in each kind of community.
Their absentee voting under the new law had an active communal aspect in the
context of their intense belonging to a tightknit military unit. One can think of that unit as
their new residence, not fixed geographically, but coherent nevertheless. Soldiers clearly
felt attachments to it, perhaps more powerfully than the attachments they felt to their
permanent hometowns in Ohio. And they certainly had a stake in the health of these
communities similar to or bigger than their stake in the township they came from; the
soldier’s  very  survival  might  depend  on  his  military  unit’s  smooth  functioning.    
In their role as members of these communities, soldiers surely saw themselves as
at least partially removed from the communities they had left behind, and in some ways
better than citizens who remained in those communities. Rogers Smith argues that
lawmakers through most of American history crafted citizenship laws to encourage
groups receiving privileged  status  under  new  law  to  think  of  themselves  “as  a  distinctive  

86. James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997), 86.
87. Id. at 87.
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and  especially  ‘worthy’  people.”  They  were  generally  white,  Protestant  males,  in  Smith’s  
thesis.88 Although Smith does not discuss them, soldier-voting laws treated soldiers – at
least most of those who were white and 21 – as specially privileged voters.
Evidence indeed suggests that some soldiers saw themselves as distinctively
worthy of special treatment compared to their civilian counterparts, whom they
sometimes scorned. In the 1863 elections, for example, the Eighth Ohio regiment elected
an eighteen-year old soldier to serve as an election judge, in defiance of the Ohio soldiervoting   statute’s   requirement   that   military   election   judges   meet   the   qualifications   of   an  
Ohio elector. His fellow soldiers, the under-aged election judge wrote proudly to his
wife,  had  insisted  that  “a  man  who  is  old  enough  to  fight  for  his  country  and  to  risk  his  
life for it is better qualified to vote than are stay-at-home   patriots.” 89 The episode
suggests an attitude among soldiers of belonging to a distinctive community. Indeed, as
James McPherson has documented, soldiers felt the attachment to their community away
from   home   very   intensely.   “All   other   groups,”   writes   McPherson,   “were   secondary:  
regiment, brigade, army, country, even community and family so long as he remained in
the  army.”90

88. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Divisions of Citizenship in U.S. History, 6.
89.  Papers  of  Thomas  Taylor  (microfilm  at  Emory  University,  as  quoted  in  Shankman,  “Soldier  Votes,”  
100). In the civilian context, the age component of suffrage qualification was difficult to enforce, since men
often   did   not   know   their   own   age   precisely.   It   was   a   less   “age   conscious”   era,   one   historian   has   noted,  
before rigorous recordkeeping about age that characterizes   modern   America.   Winkle,   “Ohio’s   Informal  
Polling  Place,”  169-184, 176. Ohio election law reflected that imprecision. Under the 1841 election law, if
a voter was challenged as under-aged,  election  judges  had  to  ask  him,  “are  you  twenty  one  years of age to
the   best   of   your   knowledge   and   belief?”   Ohio   Election   Law   (1841),   §   13.   This   imprecision   in   civilian  
voters’  awareness  of  their  ages,  however,  differed  from  the  willful  misrepresentation  of  age  by  the  defiant  
eighteen year old election judge in the Eighth Ohio.
90. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades, 85.
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In other ways, soldiers remained linked to the communities they left behind. One
scholar argues that the communal character of militia units that became building blocks
of the  volunteer  army’s  organization  kept  alive  a  sense  among  soldiers  that  they  remained  
a part of their home communities, especially compared to army regulars. In their politics,
according   to   Joseph   Allen   Frank   referring   to   volunteers,   “the   men   remained   civilians,”  
whose   ties   to   their   home   communities   “prevented   the   total   absorption   of   the   citizensoldier  into  the  military  culture.”91 In this sense soldiers never left home; they remained
products  of  the  political  culture  of  their  home  communities.  “These  men  were politicians
and  voters  in  their  civilian  life,”  writes  one  scholar  of  soldier  voting,  and  as  soldiers  they  
“remained   politicians   and   voters.” 92 Even when they voted in the field, soldiers saw
themselves as participating in the kind of political ritual that had engaged them in their
civilian   lives.   Voting   in   their   military   camps,   one   historian   has   written,   “affirmed  
republican  government”  for  absent  citizen-soldiers.93
The two communities clashed in soldier-voting statutes. Legislatures enacted
soldier-voting laws in acknowledgment that white citizen-soldiers, by virtue of their
noble   participation   in   the   distinctive   community   of   servicemen,   were   “worthy   people,”  
deserving of the special privilege the laws bestowed. But legislatures crafted the
operational details of the laws as if soldiers in the field lived in communities no different
from the civilian communities they had left behind in Ohio. The same rules of inclusion
and exclusion applied. As members of tight knit communities in the field, soldiers could
91. Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet, 14.
92.  T.  Harry  Williams,  “Voters  in  Blue:  The  Citizen  Soldiers  of  the  Civil  War,”  The Mississippi Valley
Historical Review 31, no. 2 (September 1944): 193.
93. Smith, No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North, 93.
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respect distinctions among themselves based on military rank. But notwithstanding the
terms of the law, they were far less likely than civilians to respect distinctions based on
residence, citizenship, or age, as the experience of the 18-year old election judge from the
Eight Ohio Regiment demonstrates.
When a soldier election judge, of any age, pondered a ballot challenge involving
his comrade in this new community, the merits of the challenge might matter little
compared   to   the   “bonds   stronger   than   steel”   that   attached   him   to   his   comrade.   And   the  
strength of those bonds might trump misgivings a soldier could entertain about the
qualifications of a comrade to vote under Ohio law. That would facilitate improper voting
in ways that the new law technically disallowed. These voters related to each other in
ways very different from the relationship between township trustees and prospective
civilian voters in Ohio, confounding the anti-fraud machinery built into antebellum laws
governing civilian elections. Legal historian Christopher Tomlins expansively defines
“law”   to   include   not   just   law’s   formalities   – written constitutions, statutes, and court
decisions – but also what   he   terms   “legalities,”   meaning   the effects and adaptations of
those formalities in people’s   lives. 94 To   borrow   Tomlins’   parlance,   servicemen’s  
adaptation of soldier-voting statutes to the realities of their lives in military communities
produced legalities, or effects conforming logically to those realities while departing from
the letter of  the  statutes.      The  statutes’  critics  back  home  would  call  such  legalities  fraud,  
and according to formal law they were indeed fraud, but servicemen themselves might
94. Christopher L. Tomlins and Bruce H. Mann, eds., The Many Legalities of Early America (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 7. The book collects essays about facets of law in colonial
America.
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understandably regard them as sensible adaptations fully   justified   by   soldiers’  
circumstances.
This was just one of several discordant features of elections contemplated for
soldiers by the 1863 statute and elections familiar to Ohio civilians. As we have seen,
much else was also different. The number of election sites for Ohio voters potentially
doubled with the addition of the soldier polling places. Elections for soldiers lacked the
holiday atmosphere that characterized many civilian elections. The politicization of the
military command deprived many soldiers of equal access to ballots.95 Soldiers had less
advance notice of elections than civilians enjoyed. Record keeping duties for election
officials in the field created frightful logistical challenges unknown to civilian officials.
And ballot challenges were subject to different procedures for resolutions, controlled by
men  in  a  hierarchical  structure  unlike  the  civilian  hierarchy  contemplated  by  all  the  law’s  
antecedents.
The source of most of these operational differences, and by itself the biggest
difference of all, was the new law’s   core   feature:   for   the   soldiers   it   covered,   the   law  
removed   the   venue   of   elections   away   from   Ohio’s   townships.   That   difference   alone  
profoundly altered the meanings that Ohio law and custom had previously attached to the
word   “election.”      The   operational differences flowing from the change of venue, and
particularly the change from civilian communities at peace to remote military
communities  at  war,  bring  the  law’s  radicalism  into  even  sharper  relief.

95. Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet, 140. Chapter 6 elaborates on this well-documented phenomenon.
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The Constitutionality of the 1863 Soldier-Voting Law
Could a law creating all these differences be constitutional? That was the issue
the five justices of the Ohio Supreme Court faced in Lehman v. McBride. The case came
before them as a legal problem calling for dispassionate judicial resolution. But these five
men   were   themselves   creatures   of   politics   and   society.   In   1863,   Ohio’s   justices   were  
popularly elected, and they well understood the politics of the soldier-voting issue. 96
They knew, first, the numbers involved. In Ohio, about one quarter of eligible voters
served as Civil War soldiers.97 No politician could safely ignore such a huge bloc of
voters.98 And by the time the Ohio court took up the case, it was clear how those soldiers
were likely to vote. Especially in Ohio, absent soldiers voting under the 1863 law
overwhelmingly favored Republicans. In the 1863 Ohio gubernatorial race, decided a
month before the high court ruled in Lehman, Democrat Clement Vallandigham, a
strident opponent of the war, had lost in a landslide to Republican John Brough.
Vallandigham won 42% of the votes cast in Ohio, but only 5% of the soldier vote.99
John   Brinkerhoff,   a   Republican,   led   the   court’s   majority.      He   had   represented  
Ohio in Congress for two terms in the 1840s and after the war served as an alternate
delegate to the Republican National Convention. To the extent that politics colored his
approach to the Lehman case, he seemed a safe bet to favor upholding the soldier-voting

96. OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 2.
97. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 606-607.
98. A scholar of the Wisconsin soldier-voting law argues that the legislature permitted absent soldiers to
vote in elections for judicial offices calculating that this would deter elected judges from ruling against the
constitutionality   of   the   absentee   voting   law.   Such   a   ruling   would   have   been   “political   suicide”   for   a  
popularly elected judge seeking soldier votes for his own reelection, according to this argument. Klement,
“The  Soldier  Vote  in  Wisconsin  During  the  Civil  War,”  44.  
99.  Shankman,  “Soldier  Votes,”  88,  104.
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law. The other three justices who joined with Brinkerhoff as the majority in the Lehman
v. McBride opinion were also Republicans.100
Rufus  Ranney,  the  court’s  lone  dissenter  in  Lehman, brought the opposite political
perspective to the case. Ranney was an active Democrat. Less than a year after the
Lehman decision, he served as a delegate to the Democratic National Convention that
nominated George McClellan to run for president against Abraham Lincoln.101 Earlier in
his career, he had served as a delegate to the convention that drafted the 1851
constitution. There he exhibited strong misgivings about legislative power: at one point
in the proceedings he offered this assessment of how effectively the legislature
supervised  state  finances:  “About  as  a  dog  would  a  man’s  dinner.”102 He had specifically
opposed giving the legislature authority to set durational residency requirements,
believing  that  doing  so  could  result  in  frequent  changes  in  voting  eligibility  “to  suit  the  
caprices  and  changes  of  opinion  of  the  General  Assembly.”103
Democratic party orthodoxy, to which Ranney likely subscribed, held that while
any war threatened republicanism by spawning standing armies and a tyrannical central
government,  civil  war  in  particular  was  “the  worst  of  all  society’s  disorders.”104 Ranney
may   also   have   shared   his   party’s   indignation   about   military   interference in civilian
elections and its skepticism about the chances that soldier voting could be fair under a

100. Winkle, The Politics of Community, 68.
101. Lawrence Kestenbaum, “The  Political  Graveyard:  Index  to  Politicians,”   The Political Graveyard,
last modified December 29, 2013, http://politicalgraveyard.com/bio/ranney-ransohoff.html.
102. Nicole  Etcheson,  “Private Interest and Public Good: Upland Southerners and Antebellum Political
Culture,”  in The Pursuit of Public Power, ed. Jeffrey Brown and Andrew Cayton, (Kent, OH: Kent State
University Press, 1994), 88.
103. Winkle, The Politics of Community, 81.
104. Baker, Affairs of Party, 150.

73

military command structure dominated by Republicans. If Republican political biases
inclined Brinkerhoff and his Republican colleagues to favor the soldier-voting law,
Democratic political biases seemed just as likely to incline Ranney against it. It was with
these prejudices, subordinated, one would hope, to the higher calling of the law and their
oaths of office, that the five justices approached the constitutional issues raised by the
Lehman case.105
Both Lehman and McBride brought powerhouse lawyers to the high court battle,
befitting the importance of the showdown to both sides. The legal teams reflected the
partisan alignments that by this time had formed about the pros and cons of absentee
soldier voting. Democrats saw that their man McBride, who won more than 51% of the
civilian votes, had secured barely 13% of the soldier vote.

This was better than

Vallandigham’s  5%  performance  among  soldiers, but it clearly foretold major problems
for Democrats in the upcoming elections in 1864. Republicans, of course, liked the
soldier-voting results as much as Democrats disliked them. For both sides, the high stakes
justified bringing the best legal talent  to  bear  in  the  fight  over  the  law’s  validity.
Lehman’s   lead   lawyer   was   Columbus   Delano,   a   prominent   Republican.   He   had  
served one term in the House of Representatives as a Whig from 1845-47 and would
serve again from 1865-67. He had been a state delegate to the 1860 Republican
convention in Chicago. Later in life his career would suffer a setback when scandals in

105. Chapter 2 demonstrates that elected justices reviewing the constitutionality of soldier-voting laws
sometimes   ruled   contrary   to   the   political   preferences   of   their   own   party’s   legislators.   The   Michigan   and  
California decisions, in which predominantly Republican courts struck down soldier-voting laws, are
examples.
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the Indian Bureau forced his resignation as Secretary of the Interior under President
Grant, but his star shone brightly in 1863.106
Martin Welker   assisted   Delano   as   Lehman’s   co-counsel. Like Delano, Welker
had   been   a   Whig   before   joining   the   Republican   Party.   He   had   served   as   Ohio’s   Lt.  
Governor from 1858 to 1860 under Salmon Chase. Earlier in the war, he was Judge
Advocate General of Ohio. After the war he would serve three terms in the U.S. House of
Representatives.107
McBride’s   lawyers   brought   even   more   lustrous   credentials   to   the   fight.   Thomas  
W.  Bartley  was  lead  counsel.    A  loyal  Democrat  and  a  “strong  Van  Buren  man,”  he  had  
served briefly as Ohio’s  governor  in  1844  upon  the  resignation  of  the  incumbent.  (He  did  
not  win  his  party’s  nomination  for  the  office  that  year,  and  maybe  he  was  grateful  to  have  
lost. If he had won, he would have found himself in the extraordinary position of running
against his own father, the Whig politician Mordecai Bartley. Mordecai won that
election.) Bartley had served as Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court for three years.
Two of his fellow justices, fellow Democrat Ranney and Republican Brinkerhoff, still sat
on the high court and would hear the arguments.108
John  McSweeney  assisted  Bartley   as  McBride’s  co-counsel. Another prominent
Democrat, McSweeney had served a term in the Ohio senate and several terms as the
106. William S. McFeely, Grant (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), 431-432; Jean Edward
Smith, Grant (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 586-587;;  “Columbus  Delano,”  Biographical Directory
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July
15,
2013,
www.bioguide.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=D000214.
107. George Irving Reed, ed., Bench and Bar of Ohio (Chicago: Century Publishing Company, 1897),
1: 224.
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prosecuting attorney for Wayne County. On his death in 1890, his obituary referred to
him  unqualifiedly  as  “the  greatest  criminal  lawyer  the  State  of  Ohio  ever  produced.”  (It  
also   spoke   highly   of   his   rhetorical   skills:   “His   language   was   the   purest   Saxon,   adorned  
with  poetic  flowers  and  jolly  Irish  wit.”)109
That was the rich mix of political savvy and legal experience, both on the bench
and   on   the   legal   teams,   that   grappled   with   the   legal   issues   raised   by   Lehman’s   appeal.    
McBride lawyers argued, first, that the 1863 law unconstitutionally discriminated in favor
of   a   single   class   of   eligible   voters,   i.e.,   soldiers.   But   it   was   clear   that   McBride’s   team  
would have objected even if the statute gave absentee voting rights to all voters. The
main thrust of their attack on the law was that the constitution did not give the legislature
power  to   separate  voting  from   the  voter’s  place   of  residence.   “The   right   of  the  elective  
franchise,”   they   insisted,   “is,   by   the   terms   of   the   constitution,   not   made   incident   to   the  
locality  of  the  elector’s  residence  in  a  local  election  district,  but  inseparable  from  it.”110
Allowing   voting   outside   the   voter’s   place   of   residence   would   “make   the   elective  
franchise a mere transitory or migratory thing, to be exercised not in any stated or
prescribed election precincts or districts, but anywhere, and in any part of the world
where   an   elector   may   happen   to   be   on   the   day   of   the   election.” 111 And to allow voting
under the exclusive control of military authorities, beyond the reach of civilian oversight,

109 .   “John   McSweeney,”   Find a grave.com, last modified October 1, 2011,
http://www.findagrave.com/cgibin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GSln=McSweeney&GSfn=john&GSbyrel=all&GSdyrel=all&GSst=37&GScntry=4&
GSob=n&GRid=78868069&df=all& .
110. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 584.
111. Id. at 582. (Italics in the original.)
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was   “subversive   of   the   very   foundation   of   the   state   government,”   and   therefore   surely  
unconstitutional.112
The main difficulty facing the McBride team was that their challenge required the
court to infer constitutional limitations on legislative authority that the constitution itself
did not expressly state. The inference – that voting was constitutionally inseparable from
the   voter’s   residence   – was reasonable but not inescapable. The constitution had been
adopted  in  1851.  As  in  the  state’s  1802  constitution,  the  1851  instrument  both  fixed  the  
qualifications of voters and granted the legislature some authority over the conduct of
elections. That authority had limits, and the court in Lehman v. McBride had to decide
whether it fell within those limits for the legislature to let soldiers vote away from  “the  
township   or   ward   of   their   residence,”   where   all   other   Ohio   electors   had   to   vote.      The  
language of the 1851 constitution made this question debatable.
It would not have been debatable under the 1802 constitution. In defining who
among  Ohio’s  citizens  enjoyed  suffrage  rights,  that  instrument  stated,  “no  person  shall  be  
entitled to vote except in the county or district in which he shall actually reside at the
time   of   the   election.”113 That left no room for absentee voting. The 1851 constitution
had omitted  this  wording,  a  point  Lehman’s  lawyers  emphasized.    But  other  provisions  in  
the 1851 instrument made the issue uncertain enough for the justices to need more than
seventy pages to set out their competing opinions.
Some provisions about voting eligibility were clear enough. To qualify as a voter,
an Ohioan had to be white, male, and at least twenty-one years old. He also had to be a
112. Id. at 583.
113. OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1.
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citizen of the United States.114 None of those qualifications mattered in Lehman, but the
constitution required more. The voter had to meet a two-pronged residency test, one
covering Ohio residency and the other covering local residency. He must have been a
resident  of  Ohio  for  “one  year  next  preceding  the  election,”  and  of  “the  county,  township,  
or  ward”  for  “such  time  as  may  be  provided  by  law.”115
The legislature waited until 1857 to exercise its constitutional authority to impose
durational requirements for county and township residency, settling on modest
requirements of 30 and 20 days, respectively. Soldiers who met that qualification when
they entered the service ran no risk of losing it during their temporary absence, even
without the soldier-voting law. The 1841 election law provided that protection by stating,
“a  person  shall  not  be  held  to  have  lost  his  residence, who shall leave his home and go
into  another  state  …  for  temporary  purposes  only,  with  an  intention  of  returning.” 116 The
1851 constitution left this provision undisturbed, and Civil War soldiers surely fit within
its terms.

The soldier-voting law made no change in residence (or any other)

qualifications for soldiers. By its terms, it applied only to soldiers who were already
qualified electors, neither adding to nor subtracting from prewar eligibility requirements.
The change the law wrought, in other words, related not to who was eligible to
vote, but to where an   election   could   be   held.      In   observing   that   “qualifications   which  
confer the right to vote, and the place at which that right may be exercised, are things
quite  distinct  from  each  other,”  the  Supreme Court majority framed the issue as whether

114. OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. V, § 1.
115. OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. V, § 1.
116. Ohio election law (1841), § 2, second paragraph.
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the   1851   constitution   on   the   one   hand   fixed   “the   place   at   which”   eligible   voters   could  
vote, or on the other hand allowed the legislature to set up elections in places of its
choosing, including places outside Ohio for absent soldiers. 117
Most  of  the  debate  centered  on  the  last  three  words  of  the  constitution’s  definition  
of voter eligibility. Article V, section 1 said that a person meeting all the qualifications
of an elector – citizenship, race, gender, age, and residency – could   vote   “at   all  
elections.”118 At all elections?      McBride’s   lawyers,   arguing   to   have   the   law   set   aside,  
pointed  out  that  the  constitution  could  not  have  intended  to  permit  “holding  an  election  in  
Louisiana,  or  in  England,  or  in  China,”  since Ohio had no way to enforce its election laws
extra-territorially.119 To  avoid  that  absurdity,  McBride’s  lawyers  argued,  the  terms  “at  all  
elections”   must   be   read   with   an   implicit   qualification.      As   qualified   by   the   implication  
they urged the court to accept,   the   clause   meant   “at   all   elections   at such place of his
residence.”120
This   asked   more   than   the   court’s   majority   was   willing   to   grant.   Justice   Josiah  
Scott   wrote   the   majority’s   opinion.   Scott   was   a   Republican   with   a   Whig   heritage,   who  
had served in the state legislature.121 His admiration for the law became clear from his
characterization  of  its  purpose:  to  assure  that  soldiers  “shall  not  be  disfranchised  through  
their   devotion   to   the   vital   interests   of   their   country.” 122 Scott denounced the effort to
strike down such a virtuous law, or indeed any law, absent clear language in the
117. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 601.
118. OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 1.
119. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 586.
120. Id. at 584.
121. Joseph P. Smith, ed., History of the Republican Party in Ohio (Chicago: the Lewis Publishing
Company, 1898), 1:66-67.
122. Id. at 607.
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constitution prohibiting the enactment. He could find no such language in this case, and
to  him  that  was  decisive.  He  declared,    “Had  it  been  the  intention  of  the  framers  of  our
present  constitution  to  fix  or  limit  …  the  place  at  which  the  elective  franchise  should  be  
exercised by the voters respectively, it is quite remarkable that no attempt should have
been  made  to  do  so  in  express  terms.”123 Scott  agreed  that  “at  all  elections”  did  not  really  
mean all elections, but he was not inclined to read into the 1851 constitution words that
McBride’s  lawyers  urged  on  the  court,  which  would  have  the  effect  of  striking  down  the  
law. In his opinion for the court, Justice Scott found in the constitution no implied
limitation as to the place of voting. Instead, he saw an implied limitation on the elected
positions   for   which   the   constitution   allowed   electors   to   cast   ballots.   A   man’s  
constitutional  right  to  vote  in  “all  elections”  meant,  wrote  Scott, that he could vote at the
elections of all officers – state, county, and municipal – whose jurisdiction extended over
him and over the township where he resided. And the constitution placed no limits on
where the legislature could decide to situate those elections. If they chose to situate
elections outside the state, they were constitutionally free to do so.124
Justice   Scott   brushed   aside   McBride’s   arguments   that   the   soldier-voting   law’s  
extra-territorial effects rendered the statute unconstitutional. The election involved office
holders  “whose  sphere  of  official  action  lies  wholly  within  the  state  and  who  are  creatures  
of  its  sovereign  will.”125 There was ample precedent for Ohio laws having effect outside
of Ohio, such as laws permitting depositions to be conducted, and wills and deeds

123. Id. at 599.
124. Id. at 598.
125. Id. at 608.

80

executed, outside the state.126 Moreover, said Scott, those who violated the law could be
punished   when   they   returned   to   Ohio.      Besides,   as   an   “independent   sovereignty”   Ohio  
was free to make any arrangement it chose for the selection of its officers unless the
constitution  specifically  said  otherwise.    Scott  insisted  that  even  if  Ohio  should  “see  fit  to  
declare that all her officers should be appointed and commissioned by the Dey of Algiers,
in so far as the result would affect herself, or her citizens or subjects alone, I do not
readily  perceive  how,  or  by  whom,  her  right  to  do  so  could  be  questioned.”127 It might be
a poor policy choice for the legislature to do so, Scott conceded, but that did not make it
unconstitutional.
Scott   made   short   shrift   of   McBride’s   argument   that   the   law   unconstitutionally  
discriminated in favor of a single class of voters. The constitutional requirement of
uniformity, he ruled, meant only that the law had to apply uniformly to all parts of Ohio,
which this law did. There was ample precedent for laws that apply to just one group of
Ohioans, including laws regulating lawyers and brokers, for example.128 In short, Scott
concluded, the legislature acted within its constitutional authority in allowing soldiers to
vote outside the state.
All  of  this  appalled  Rufus  Ranney,  the  court’s  sole  Democrat.  He  identified  four  
constitutional defects in the 1863 statute. First, it effectively nullified the protection
afforded to voters by a constitutional provision   that   voters,   “during   their   attendance   at  
elections   and   in   going   to   and   returning   therefrom,   shall   be   privileged   from   arrest.” 129
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 606.
129. OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. V, § 3.
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Ranney observed that Ohio had no way to confer that protection outside its borders.130
The soldier-voting law also violated  the  constitution’s  requirement  that  county  officers  be  
elected   “in   such   manner   …   as   may   be   provided   by   law.”131 To   Ranney,   “law”   meant  
rules backed by enforceable sanctions, and the criminal sanctions that Ohio had designed
to punish violations of its election rules could not reach outside the state. Ranney
contended   it   was   an   “absurdity”   to   imagine   that   the   framers   of   Ohio’s   constitution  
contemplated extra-territorial legislative sanctions for election violations.132
Third, Ranney argued that absentee voting eviscerated the constitutional suffrage
qualifications, including particularly the requirement that electors reside in their township
for  a  period  “next   preceding  the  election.”   By  stripping   away  the  mechanism  by  which  
those requirements could be policed, Ranney asserted, the law effectively gutted the
qualifications.133 In terms of local residency, while it was for the legislature to decide
what the required period should be, the soldier-voting law, by allowing voting away from
the  township,  “completely annihilates the means, and the only means, [the framers] relied
upon   to   make   this   provision   practically   operative.” 134 The   “evil”   targeted   by   the  
constitution’s  residency  requirement,  Ranney  maintained,  was  multiple  voting  by  people  
falsely claiming to be actual residents of the township. Local voters knew who was
entitled   to   vote,   and   the   residency   requirement   permitted   them   to   “protect   themselves  
from   fraud.”      Removing   the   election   from   the   community   defeated   that   protection,  

130. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 647. Complaints about the politicization of the military made this more
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134. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 633.

82

rendering  it  “not  worth  the  parchment  upon  which  it  is  written.”    Assigning  oversight  for  
one   county’s   election   to   officials   from   another   county,   as   the   1863   law   permitted,  
similarly   undercut   the   protection   intended   by   the   constitution’s   residency   requirement,  
according to Ranney. Those   election   officials   would   have   no   “interest   …   to   guard   the  
election  of  officers  whose  official  acts  can  never  concern  them.”135
Ranney’s  fourth  and  overarching  constitutional  concern  related  to  the  meaning  of  
“election”  as  he  believed  the  1851  framers used that term. While Scott limited his search
for constitutional meaning to the black letter of the text, Ranney in contrast searched
history   for   evidence   of   the   framers’   understanding   of   the   words   they   used.      The  
constitution itself provided no express definition, but Ranney believed that the framers
had  a  clear  and  discernible  meaning  in  mind  when  they  used  the  word.  “Words  become  
things,”  Ranney  maintained,  “and  are  to  have  the  effect  intended  by  those  who  employed  
them.”136 By 1851, Ranney claimed, the  word  “election”  in  Ohio  had  taken  on  a  meaning  
and had become a thing constitutionally incompatible with the concept of absentee
balloting. The 1863 law violated the constitution, then, by departing from the 1851
definition  of    “election.”    
Ranney maintained that an election in the constitutional sense had four
“indispensable  elements.”  It  was,  first,  a  public  meeting.    Second,  it  was  held  within  the  
election district. Third, qualified electors could vote at the meeting. And fourth, those
same electors had the right “to   guard   the   ballot   box   from   illegal   voting   or   other  
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frauds.”137 By cutting elections loose from their mooring in Ohio townships, the soldiervoting law violated the second and fourth of these elements. In reaching his conclusion,
Ranney drew heavily from the 1841 election law – the   one   intended   to   “preserve   the  
purity   of   elections.”      The   1851   framers   had   expressed   no   disagreement   with   that   law’s  
concern   about   election   fraud,   particularly   cheating   by   voters   “falsely”   presenting  
themselves at a  township’s  polling  place.    As  Ranney  saw  it,  the  1851  framers  brought  
this sense of vigilance for the purity of elections to their notion of what a constitutional
election   was.      “Nobody   [in   1851]   had   ever   heard   of   any   other   sort   of   election,”   he  
insisted.138 Removing an election from its proper setting in a township stripped it of the
safeguards that the framers thought essential.
Henry  Lehman’s  lawyers  had  argued,  in  defense  of  the  law,  that  the  constitution  
guarded voting as a personal right, which the 1863 law properly protected by permitting
the soldier, in effect, to carry it with him.139 While it ruled for Lehman, the majority
ignored this argument. Rufus Ranney did not. The right to vote, he insisted, derived
from the constitution and was therefore a   “public   franchise,   belonging   to   the   whole  
community,”   although   it   was   conferred   on   only   some   citizens.     The   community   had   an  
interest   in   safeguarding   this   public   belonging   “against   abuse   and   perversions.”    
Dislodging the act of voting from a location within the community deprived the
community   of   its   ability   to   protect   itself   “from   the   unlawful   intrusions   of   those   not  
qualified  [to  vote]”  and  was  therefore  a  public  wrong.140 Ranney saw the importance of
137. Id. at 630-631.
138. Id. at 629.
139. Id. at 579.
140. Id. at 649.
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the   majority’s   error   as   “impossible   to   overstate”   because   it   “undermines   the   very  
foundation-principles upon which the constitution has founded the exercise of the
elective  franchise.”141
Ranney’s   lament   about   the   “abuse   and   perversions”   that   would   result   from  
allowing soldiers to vote at locations remote from their home communities seem well
founded. The results of the 1863 gubernatorial elections point powerfully to gross
irregularities  in   the  soldier  vote.  The  vote  in   some  counties  virtually  screamed  “fraud”!    
In Trumbull County, Brough won handily in the home vote, 74% to 26% for
Vallandigham.   But   Brough   won   99%   of   the   votes   from   Trumbull’s   absent   soldiers.   In  
Williams County, Brough won the home vote, 60% - 40%, while winning better than
99% of the 365 votes cast by absent soldiers. The home vote in Mahoning County went
to   Brough,   57%   to   43%,   while   99.8%   of   the   county’s   370   absent   soldiers   voted   for  
Brough. In Lake and Paulding counties, Vallandigham won a grand total of zero votes
out of the combined 396 soldiers absent from those counties.142
Ranney’s  differences with Scott about the overarching values of the constitution
and relevance of history in divining the meaning of constitutional text found echoes in
judicial   disagreements   in   cases   challenging   other   states’   military   suffrage   laws,   as   we  
shall see in more detail in Chapter 2. Decisions supporting the constitutionality of such
laws did so based on one or more of the values that Scott extolled – the right to vote, the
injustice   of   “disfranchising”   soldiers,   and   a   state’s   sovereign   right   to   respond   to

141. Id. at 614, 649.
142.   Shankman,   “Soldier   Votes,” 103-104. Ranney did not cite these results and may not have been
aware of them, though they were available before the court ruled.
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exigencies legislatively. Like Ranney, other justices voting to strike down the laws
looked   to   history   for   guidance   about   the   framers’   intentions   and   extolled   the   values  
anchoring  Ranney’s  dissent  – the  “purity”  of  elections,  the  community’s  right  to  oversee
voting, and the constitutional status of time-honored election practices.
A gulf of disagreement about constitutionalism separated Ranney from his four
colleagues, but all five justices substantially agreed that the 1863 soldier-voting statute
law broke   new   ground   for   Ohio’s   election   system.      Whether   Ohio’s   constitution  
permitted the innovation of absentee voting or not, all five justices concurred that it was
an   innovation.   None   of   Rufus   Ranney’s   colleagues   could   have   disputed   his   speculation  
about the  1851  constitutional  framers.    “I  cannot  bring  myself  to  the  belief  that  a  single  
individual [among the framers] supposed it possible that the officer of one county could
be elected by the votes given in another, much less by votes given out of the state.”143
Ranney drew conclusions of unconstitutionality from that dissonance with the past. His
colleagues did not, though they too recognized the dissonance. Either way, the legislature
in 1863 had created something radically different.
The law was radical, first, in its unprecedented elevation of the individual voter
over the community as the central player in an Ohio election, and second in its
subordination   of   overall   election   “purity”   to   the   expanded   suffrage   rights   of   a   class   of  
voters.  Henry  Lehman’s  attorneys argued correctly that the 1863 law protected suffrage
as  a  personal  right  and  was  intended  “to  guard  this  right  wherever  the  person may  be.”144
And Justice Ranney was correct in observing that this inverted the historical relationship
143. Id. at 679-680.
144. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 579 (emphasis in the original).
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among elections, communities, and individual voters. Before 1863, voters participated in
elections only in their capacities as members of an Ohio community, as attendees at
gatherings of townspeople. An election untethered to the community was no more
imaginable than a meeting without people.

In 1863, Ohioans for the first time

conceptualized voting as an activity divorced from the community, and suffrage as a
private right.
It  was  equally  radical  to  expand  voting  rights  at  the  expense  of  election  “purity.”    
From 1803 through 1857, Ohio election laws successively tightened strictures against
fraud and strengthened the hand of community leaders in enforcing them. We have seen
that the 1863 law fit incongruously with those antecedents, and most of the incongruities
related  to  the  system’s  capacity  to  assure  accuracy  and  prevent  fraud.    Severed  from  their  
moorings in civilian communities, elections under the 1863 blueprint opened
opportunities for voting irregularities that Ohio would not have tolerated before the war.
The new law weakened one time-honored protection after another. Prior notice of an
election,  a  voter’s  familiarity  to  fellow  voters  and  to  election  judges  (and  vice  versa),  an  
atmosphere conducive to ballot challenges and their resolution, the primacy of allegiance
to the community, a setting for orderly management of logistical necessities like tallying
and recording, enforceable sanctions for cheating, bribery, or intimidation – all these
attributes of civilian elections were diluted or altogether missing in the 1863 military
elections.
In   light   of   the   state’s   longstanding   aversion   to   risks   of   voting   irregularities,   this  
amounted to an expensive tribute to soldiers. The statute Ohio passed in 1863 addressed
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the problem of suffrage rights for distant soldiers at the expense of a value that had
always been paramount in the statutory structure: preserving electoral purity, largely
through community supervision of the voting process. In the novel elections that the law
created that year, the absent party was not the distant soldier, but the Ohio community he
left behind.
The novelty was short lived. By the terms of an 1864 act amending the 1863 law,
the   opportunity   for   absent   soldiers   lasted   only   as   long   as   “the   existence   of   the   present  
rebellion.”145 When Ohio’s  soldiers  returned  from  the  service,  they  returned  as  voters  to  
the form of elections they knew from their prewar experience. Voting was restricted to
locations in their Ohio townships, under the watchful eyes of the township trustees
charged, as always,   with   guarding   the   “purity”   of   the   ballot   box   by   keeping   out  
pretenders.
What caused this profound change in law? While this dissertation focuses on
political forces underlying the invention of absentee voting opportunities for soldiers, a
potential cause apart from politics deserves mention. Specifically, the ubiquity and scale
of migration in antebellum America in general and Ohio in particular may have played a
role. According to Kenneth Winkle, a scholar of the intersection of migration and politics
in Ohio, as many as half of all Americans moved every decade over the first half of the
nineteenth century, more of them to Ohio than to any other state. Intrastate migration was
also heavy.146 The scholarship of Joel Silbey and Alexander Keyssar support Winkle in

145. An Act to enable the qualified voters of this state in the military service to exercise the right of
suffrage, §1, 61 Ohio Laws 88, 88 (1864).
146. Winkle, The Politics of Community, 11-70.
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positing that the rapid movement of populations naturally weakened the attachment many
people felt toward individual communities.147
It is entirely possible that residential volatility attendant to nineteenth century
migration, together with the general weakening of individual ties to particular
communities, helped  create  an  environment  conducive  to  1863’s  election  law  reform  by  
softening up attitudinal resistance to absentee voting. For example, a man leaving his
longtime home in Warren Ohio for Florence Township, then departing Florence for
Henrietta Township two years later, might end up residing in Toledo and regarding
himself as a bird of passage more than as a man of any Ohio township. He and voters like
him might find little objectionable in a law diminishing the role of township trustees in
certain elections.
These long running societal forces by themselves could not account for the
electoral innovation of absentee voting. Otherwise we would expect the innovation to
have begun earlier and to have taken root more gradually than it did, and we would
expect it to have endured. Instead it emerged abruptly in the context of the Civil War, and
it ended just as abruptly when the war ended. But in conjunction with more immediate
causes associated with   the   war,   the   impact   of   this   societal   phenomenon   as   a   “softening  
up”  agent  is  entirely  plausible.148

147. See Silbey, The American Political Nation, at 148-149; Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 300  (“In  the  
course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the identification of individuals with their oncehomogeneous geographic communities declined, while their sense of belonging to other types of
communities – religious, racial, ethnic, occupational – became   more   salient.”)   Keyssar   argues   that   the  
erosion of property qualifications for suffrage also diminished the hold of communities over suffrage. Id. at
9.
148. For reasons elaborated in this and the following chapter, Winkle takes the connection between
migration   and   electoral   reform   too   far.   In   particular,   he   outdistances   the   evidence   in   arguing   that   Ohio’s  
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For the primary cause one must look to politics, mainly the natural appetite of
politicians to recapture the votes of electors absent in large numbers while in military
service. When Ohio acted, that appetite produced bipartisan support for the law. As the
war progressed and states, including Ohio, gained experience with actual voting by
absent soldiers, bipartisanship gave way to sharp partisan divisions. The unique political
circumstances of late 1863 and 1864 would heighten those differences and put soldiervoting laws on center stage, as elaborated in Chapters 3 and 4.
First,   however,   it   helps   to   understand   how   Ohio’s   law   fit   into   soldier-voting
reforms as a national phenomenon.

soldier-voting law culminated a long evolution in residency requirements rooted in the effect of migration
on  Ohio’s  poor  laws.  Winkle, The Politics of Community, 48-70.
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CHAPTER 2
DISLOCATED SUFFRAGE: THE RADICALISM OF SOLDIER-VOTING
LAWS NATIONALLY

Laws allowing absent soldiers to vote swept the Union states from 1862 to 1865,
departing from legal antecedents almost everywhere. In many ways, the national
experience was Ohio writ large. In all states but one, laws untethering voters from their
civilian communities jarred the prewar legal order, as it did in Ohio.1 The centrality of
communities to the election process, not only as fixed venues for casting ballots but also
as oversight mechanisms to prevent fraud, abruptly gave way – if only for soldiers – to a
notion of voting as an individualized and portable right, dislocated from communities.
That transition upended previous assumptions about the nature of voting and of elections.
This chapter begins by surveying the national phenomenon with attention to the
laws’  common  features  and  major  differences.  The  broad  categories  of  commonality  and  
variation among the laws shed light on what the laws accomplished, what they failed
even to attempt, what they changed, and what they left alone. By one measure, the
phenomenon was profoundly conservative. In particular, the laws did nothing to enlarge
the community of qualified voters. Instead, they granted a new procedural privilege to a
slice of the electorate that already enjoyed the substantive benefits of suffrage. The
chapter   then   turns   to   an   examination   of   the   laws’   radicalism   as   measured   not   by   their  
1. The sole exception was Nevada, which entered the union in 1864 without a prewar political identity
or a prewar legal infrastructure, even as a territory. Therefore its construction that year of a legal
opportunity for absent soldiers to vote upended no prewar legal traditions.
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effect on the boundaries of political belonging, but rather by contemporary
understandings  of  what  elections  and  voting  were  as  a  process.  Prewar,  the  community’s  
role   in   that   process   imparted   to   the   “right   to   vote”   a   public,   collective   quality.   As   the  
1863 law did in Ohio, similar laws in other states altered that communal quality and
thereby challenged earlier understandings, rooted in law, about the essential nature of that
process.
Compounding   the   laws’   substantive   radicalism   was   the   legal   creativity   many  
states   exhibited   in   the   states’   rush   to   implement soldier voting in time for the 1864
elections. Only in late 1863 did it become clear nationally that the issue of soldier voting
would become politically potent in the pursuit of civilian votes. The majority of states
awakened to that reality tardily, often with too little time remaining on the election
calendar for the orderly process of constitutional amendment followed by legislation.
They coped with the time crunch inventively. The same political urgency that prompted
states to abandon long-held substantive notions about the nature of elections also inspired
them to invent aggressive ways to accelerate the usual pace of constitutional change.

Voting  Qualifications:  “Justice”  and  the  “Disfranchised”  Soldier  
Like  Ohio’s  1863  law,  the  laws  in  every state left intact prewar qualifications for
suffrage. The statutes expressed this in various ways, always making it clear that the only
soldiers   whom   the   laws   covered   were   servicemen   already   eligible   to   vote.   Ohio’s   law  
applied  only  to  “the  qualified voters  of  this  state  …  in  the  actual  military  service  of  this  
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state,   or   of   the   United   States.” 2 The statutes of Kentucky, Maine, Vermont, and
Wisconsin used virtually the same limiting language. 3 California’s   law   applied   to   “all  
electors, resident of the State   of   California   …   in   the   military   service   of   the   United  
States.”4 West  Virginia’s  statute  similarly  limited  its  coverage  to  soldiers  “entitled  to  vote  
in  the  township,  who  [are]  necessarily  absent  therefrom  on  the  day  of  any  election….”5
Iowa and Michigan incorporated the limitation not only in the operational text of the laws
but   also   into   their   titles,   but   also   in   the   laws’   title,   describing   the   respective   statutes   as  
allowing  “qualified  electors  of  this  State  in  the  military  service  to  vote….”6
So it was, in one form or another, with every soldier-voting law. None extended
the voting franchise to a previously excluded category of citizen, even if the citizen in
that category served as a soldier. That left out a great many soldiers. For example, most
African-American soldiers, disfranchised by state constitutions by virtue of their
blackness, gained no voting opportunities under the new laws.7 Neither did white soldiers

2. Ohio Soldier-Voting Law (1863), § 1.
3. An Act Regulating the Manner of Soldiers Voting for Electors of President and Vice President of the
United States, within and without this State, ch. 572, § 1, 1863 Ky. Acts 122,122.
4. An Act in Addition to an Act Entitled an Act to Regulate Elections, approved March Twenty-Third,
Eighteen Hundred and Fifty, and all Acts Amendatory thereof and Supplemental thereto, ch. 355, § 1, 1863
Cal. Stat. 549, 550; An Act Authorizing Soldiers Absent from the State in the Military Service to Vote for
Electors of President and Vice President, and for Representatives to Congress; also Regulating the Manner
of Electing Registers of Deeds, County Treasurers and County Commissioners, so that such Soldiers may
be Allowed to Vote therefor, ch. 278, § 1, 1864 Me. Acts 209, 209; An Act Providing for Soldier Voting, P.
L. No. 5, § 1, 1863 Vt. Laws 7, 8; An Act to Enable the Militia and Volunteers of this State, when in the
Military Service of the United States or of this State, to Exercise the Right of Suffrage, ch. 11, § 1, 1862
(extra Session) Wis. Laws 17, 17.
5. An Act to Regulate Elections by the People, ch. 100, § 26, 1863 W. Va. Acts 114, 119.
6. An Act to Amend Title IV of the Revision of 1860 so as to Enable the Qualified Electors of this State
in the Military Service, to Vote at Certain Elections, ch. 29, 1862 Iowa Acts 28; An Act to Enable the
Qualified Electors of this State, in the Military Service, to Vote at Certain Elections, and to Amend
Sections Forty-Five and Sixty-One, of chapter six, of the compiled laws, No. 21, 1864 (extra session) Mich.
Pub. Acts 40.
7. At the time of the Civil War, the constitutions of all but five Union states had race-based prohibitions
against African-American voting (The exceptions were Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode
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who were not citizens or who were younger than twenty-one years old.8 And neither did
women, including the many women who supported the war effort away from home as
nurses or the few women who actually fought in battle.9 The soldiers whom the new
laws privileged – always male, always at least twenty-one years old, and almost always
white citizens – suddenly enjoyed brand new procedural opportunities to vote away from
home. But back home they already enjoyed voting privileges as previously qualified
electors.
Even the eight states that amended their constitutions to authorize soldier voting
did so without creating suffrage rights for soldiers previously excluded from voting.10 In
amending their constitutions, none went beyond the objective of allowing absent
qualified soldiers to vote. Only one state even attempted to expand prewar suffrage
qualifications   by   constitutional   amendment,   and   that   attempt   failed.   Rhode   Island’s  
antebellum rules had a property qualification that applied more onerously to naturalized
U.S. citizens than to native-born citizens.11 Viewing this discrimination as unfair to its
foreign-born veterans, Rhode Island legislators who favored absentee voting for soldiers
tried to eliminate the inequity by constitutional amendment.12 The proposed amendment
failed to win ratification; only the absentee voting amendment secured popular
Island, and Vermont). In addition, New York granted African-Americans voting rights qualified by a
discriminatory property qualification. Keyssar, The Right To Vote, 57, Appendix A9.
8. All state constitutions limited voting rights to 21-year old males.
9. For an account of women serving in Civil War combat, see Deanne Blanton and Lauren M. Cook,
They Fought Like Demons: Women Soldiers in the Civil War (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing
Group, 2003).
10. The eight states that amended their constitutions to authorize absentee voting for soldiers were
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.
11. R. I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, §§ 1, 2. Among the distinctions was that by paying a small tax or
serving in the militia for a year, native-born citizens could avoid an otherwise universal property
qualification for suffrage, while naturalized citizens had no way around the property requirement.
12. Benton, Voting in the Field, 182-188.
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approval. 13 The effort distinguished Rhode Island from the other nineteen states that
enacted absentee voting rights for soldiers, but the outcome aligned Rhode Island with its
sister states in preserving all prewar categories of disfranchisement even as they granted
absent soldiers a new way to vote.
The failure of the laws to extend suffrage rights to previously excluded groups
buttresses the theories of several scholars who have observed in the evolution of
American citizenship rights a recurrent pattern of privilege and exclusion, i.e., privilege
for able-bodied, non-alien, white males – exactly the group privileged by soldier-voting
laws – and exclusion for everyone else. Alexander Keyssar, Eric Foner, Barbara Welke,
and Rogers Smith, to name some who have noted this stubborn pattern, would find
nothing surprising in the privileges and exclusions that characterized all twenty of these
laws. 14 This feature of the laws qualifies them all as conservative in modern, rights-

13. An Act to Approve and Publish and Submit to the Electors a Certain Proposition of Amendment to
the Constitution of the State, ch. 529, 1864 R.I. Acts & Resolves 3. Had Rhode Island’s  effort  succeeded,  it  
would have extended suffrage equality only to a slightly larger group of white males than already enjoyed
full  belonging  in  the  state’s  political  community,  since  the  naturalized  citizens  it  targeted  were  white,  male,  
and at least 21-years old. But even that baby step failed. According to Benton, no record remains of the
tally of the popular votes for and against the amendments. Benton, Voting in the Field, 186.
14. Keyssar and Foner both dispute the whiggish notion of progressively more expansive political rights
for women, minorities, and immigrants through the march of American history. They note, for example, the
tortured trajectory of suffrage rights for African-Americans from exclusion starting in the early 19th
century, to inclusion following the Civil War, to exclusion again after Reconstruction and into the Gilded
Age. Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 54-61; Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1998), 79-116; Welke argues that the development of political rights in American law
from  the  founding  through  the  “long  nineteenth  century”  was  marked  by  the  recurrent  privileging  of  white,  
able-bodied   men   and   the   exclusion   of   everyone   else.   “[W]hite   men   alone   were   fully   embodied   legal  
persons,”   Welke asserts,   “they   were   America’s   ‘first   citizens,’   they   were   the   nation.”   Barbara   Young  
Welke,  “Law  Personhood,  and  Citizenship  in  the  Long  Nineteenth  Century:  The  Borders  of  Belonging,”  in  
The Cambridge History of Law in America, ed. Michael Grossberg and Christopher Tomlins (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 2: 345; Smith, too, describes repeated resurgences of inegalitarianism
and dominion by white male elites in the development of American citizenship. For most of U.S. history,
Smith asserts, most peoples of world were legally excluded from American citizenship by their race,
nationality, or gender. The egalitarianism within the community of white male citizens, such as it was, has
been  “surrounded  by  an  array  of  fixed,  ascriptive  hierarchies”  built into the law, always to the advantage of
white males. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History, 17.
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conscious terms. Their contemporary radicalism consisted not in disturbing prewar
definitions  of  who  qualified  for  the  voting  franchise,  but  in  severing  soldiers’  voting  from  
hometown communities.
That  the  laws’  new  privilege  applied  only  to  already  qualified  electors  sheds  light  
on  claims,  made  ubiquitously  by  proponents  of  the  laws,  that  “justice”  demanded  giving  
absent   soldiers   the   vote.   Soldiers   would   suffer   “disfranchisement”   unfairly   without   the  
right to vote in the field, they insisted. In state after state, a rallying cry for enactment was
that justice required it. Republican Governor Edward Salomon of Wisconsin, for
example,   in   a   message   to   the   legislature   urging   passage   of   that   state’s   law,   wrote   that  
“justice  seems  to  demand  that  [soldiers]  should  be  rewarded  …  for  their  patriotism”  with  
an opportunity to vote in the field. Vermont Governor Frederick Holbrook urged passage
of a soldier-voting   law   “as   an   act   of   justice   to   the   brave   sons   and   freemen   of   Vermont  
who  are  so  nobly  doing  battle  in  the  cause  of  the  country….”  Illinois Governor Richard
Yates   urged   passage   in   the   same   terms   (“[L]et   this   General   Assembly   signalize   its  
patriotism by this [soldier-voting bill] of prompt and necessary justice to the gallant
citizen   soldier   of   the   State”)   as   did   Maine’s   Governor   Samuel   Cony   (“The   justice   of  
extending to our citizen soldiers in the field an opportunity for exercising the right of
suffrage   in   our   elections   has   been   considerably   discussed   and   generally   conceded.”)   In  
New York, a minority report of the Senate Judiciary Committee   proclaimed   “the  
overruling  justice”  of  a  soldier-voting law.15 The purported justice of the cause also found

15. 1862 (extra session) Wisconsin Assembly Journal, 11; 1863 Journal of the Vermont House of
Representatives, 44-46; 1865 Illinois Senate Journal, 33; 1864 Documents printed by order of the
Legislature of the State of Maine, 22-23;;  1863  New  York   Senate   Journal,  740;;  all  as  quoted  in  Benton’s  
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judicial expression. Justice James Campbell, apparently discomfited by the implications
of  his   own  opinion  that   Michigan’s  soldier-voting law violated  that  state’s  constitution,  
suggested   almost   apologetically   “the   only   remedy   is   to   invoke   the   people   to   amend   a  
restriction   which   has   become   too   narrow   for   complete   justice.”16 The Republican press
similarly deployed the rhetoric of justice in advocating passage of such laws. A New York
Times editorial spoke indignantly of stay-at-home opponents of proposed soldier-voting
legislation in New York:
We cannot comprehend either the mind or the heart of any really loyal man who
interposes wretched quibbles and cavils to prevent his neighbor, who has
answered   his   country’s   call,   from   exercising   the   same   civil   rights   he   himself  
enjoys, though he has not answered it. We should suppose the mere thought
would overwhelm him with shame.17
Given that the laws applied only to soldiers already qualified to vote, this rhetoric
reveals a distinctive notion of justice, different from the justice repeatedly invoked by
disfranchised   groups   demanding   suffrage   in   reciprocity   for   fighting   the   country’s   wars.  
German historian Otto Hintze succinctly stated the now familiar formulation linking
suffrage  to  military  service  as  a  matter  of  justice.  “Whoever  puts  himself  in  the  service  of  
the   state,”   Hintze   wrote,   “must   logically   and   fairly   be   granted   the   regular   rights   of  
citizenship.” 18 That is not what advocates of soldier-voting laws meant when they

Voting in the Field, at 53, 80, 264, 120, and 142. Benton gathers these and similar quotations from
politicians in assembling the legislative history of each of the laws.
16. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 148.
17. New York Times, April 1, 1863.
18. As quoted in Ronald R. Krebs, Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 17. African-Americans and women have asserted the fairness
principle of reciprocity as the strategy underlying their efforts to secure an equal place in the military for
their  respective  groups.  “Once  let  the  black  man  get  upon  his  person  the  brass  letters,  US,”  wrote  Frederick  
Douglass with his eye on citizenship rights for African-American   enlistees,   “let   him   get   an   eagle   on   his  
button, and a musket on his shoulder and bullets in his pocket, and there is no power on earth which can
deny   that   he   has   earned   the   right   to   citizenship   in   the   United   States.”   [Frederick   Douglass,   Douglass’  
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demanded   “justice”   for   absent   Civil   War   servicemen.   Even   when   they   explicitly   linked  
arms bearing to voting rights, their meaning was narrower than the literal meaning of the
words they spoke.   In  advocating  enactment   of   Wisconsin’s  law,  for  example,  Governor  
Solomon  said  at  one  point,  “who  bears  arms  should  not  be  disfranchised,  but  permitted  to  
vote,  should  be  the  policy  of  the  country.”19 But the bill Solomon proposed applied only
to already enfranchised soldiers. It left all other soldiers disfranchised, notwithstanding
their arms bearing.
By their invocations of justice, Salomon, Holbrook, Coburn and Yates meant only
that it would be unjust for fully enfranchised men (generally white, twenty-one year old
male citizens) to lose the opportunity to vote when they left home in answer to their
country’s  call  for  service.  That   was   a  far  cry  from   the  notion  that  their  military  service  
rendered unjust the disfranchisement of African-Americans, aliens, and men younger
than twenty-one. If governors or legislators really believed during the war that justice
required   enfranchising   all   men   who   bore   arms   in   their   country’s   service,   the   laws   they  
advocated  when  decrying  soldiers’  disfranchisement  did  not say so.

Monthly 5, (August 1863), 852, as quoted in James M. McPherson, The   Negro’s   Civil   War (New York:
Ballantine Books, 1965), 163]. For   women’s   use   of   the   principle,   see   Linda   Kerber,   No Constitutional
Right to Be A Lady (New York: Holland Wang, 1998). Ronald Krebs documents the ubiquity in American
history   of   group   claims   that   suffrage   is   “the   just   reward   for   their   people’s   sacrifice”   in wartime. Krebs,
Fighting for Rights, 3. So does Alexander Keyssar, who documents both the general phenomenon of
suffrage expansion during wartime and the use of the soldiering-voting nexus as an argument against
woman suffrage. Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 169,  191.  See  also  Kruman,  “Legislature  and  Political  rights,”  
1235, 1238. Linda Kerber examines the converse of the same proposition, observing in the context of
women’s  rights  that  political  inequality  flows  from  disparities  in  citizens’  obligations  to the state, such that
exclusion of women from military service has served to justify their unequal enjoyment of political rights.
Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies, 221-303. Chapter 6 of this dissertation elaborates
on the way the Civil War soldier-voting phenomenon fits in the pattern linking suffrage rights to military
service in American history.
19. 1862 (extra session) Wisconsin Assembly Journal, 11, as quoted in Benton, Voting in the Field, 53.
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A variant of this narrow definition of justice found expression in partisan
arguments about whether soldier-voting   laws   were   needed   to   “enfranchise”   absent  
soldiers. In the political realm, described in the following three chapters, proponents of
the laws branded opponents as anti-soldier   for   favoring   “disfranchisement”   of  
servicemen, a term that spoke for itself as an injustice in the political context. By 1863,
opponents were mostly Democrats, and they challenged the accusations as illogical, if not
mendacious.

Even without a soldier-voting law, qualified absent soldiers remained

enfranchised, Democrats insisted. The obstacle to voting by absent soldiers who met their
states’   suffrage qualifications, they asserted, was not their disfranchisement as voters –
they remained franchised – but their absence from home on Election Day. Thousands of
soldiers proved this by returning home on furlough to vote, either in states that never
passed a soldier-voting law (e.g., New Jersey and Indiana) or for elections in 1863 and
1864 in states that enacted such laws only late in the war. Democrats believed that it
strengthened their side of the debate to point out that soldiers themselves were not
clamoring for absentee voting rights.20 Indeed, there is evidence that many soldiers quite
sensibly disliked soldier-voting laws, since the laws diminished their chances of securing
cherished furloughs to return home to vote.21 These were logical arguments that generally
failed to resonate in the world of politics.
Republicans’  counterarguments  about  enfranchisement  had  logical  merit  as  well,  
and they resonated far better politically. Because soldiers could not return home for
20.  Klement,  “The  Soldier  Vote  in  Wisconsin  During  the  Civil  War,”  40.
21 .   McSeveney,   “Re-electing Lincoln: The Union Party Campaign and the Military Vote in
Connecticut,”   147.   McSeveney   himself   characterizes   soldiers   as   “disfranchised”   without   soldier-voting
laws. Id. at 143.
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elections on their own volition, their status as a practical matter differed little from those
back home whom state constitutions formally excluded from the suffrage. Soldiers could
not come and go as they pleased from their out-of-state military stations, and the
exigencies of war sometimes made furloughs impossible. One could plausibly argue that
this was tantamount to disfranchisement. Republican Governor Ramsey of Minnesota,
urging passage of a soldier-voting  law,  captured  his  party’s  view.  Without  the  new  law,  
the   governor   argued,   “volunteer   soldiers   remain   disfranchised.”22 Or as a Republicandominated   legislative   committee   in   New   York   put   it,   absent   soldiers   were   “practically  
disfranchised”   unless   they   had   access   to   absentee   voting. 23 These Republicans had a
point, and to that extent it was fair to characterize a law giving soldiers a way to vote in
the   field   as   “enfranchising”   them.   By   the   same   logic,   it   was   fair   to   characterize   the  
absence  of  such  a  law  as  “disfranchising”  them.  
Fair or not, as chapters 3, 4, and 5 describe, Republicans used the debate to good
effect in the political combat of 1863-1864. They leveraged partisan divisions over
soldier-voting  laws  to  seize  the  mantel  for  Republican  candidates  as  “the  soldiers’  friend”  
and used that argument to secure votes of both soldiers and civilians. It was somewhat
different in the legal realm. The same rhetorical debate surfaced in judicial decisions
about   the   laws’   constitutionality,   but   in   a   more   bi-partisan way, with Democratic and
Republican justices sometimes departing from the script of their legislative counterparts.
In

upholding

Pennsylvania’s   soldier-voting

law

against

a

challenge

to

its

22. As quoted in Benton, Voting in the Field, 67.
23. Report of the Judiciary Committee of the New York Senate, Senate Journal, 1863, p. 1799, as
quoted in Benton, Voting in the Field, at 140.
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constitutionality, for example, trial court judge John Nesbitt Conyngham, a Democrat,
observed  that  the  challenge,  if  successful,  would  “disfranchise  thousands  of  our  fellowcitizens, who have been drawn from their homes in obedience to the Constitution and for
their   country’s   defence,   and   whose   disfranchisement   will   arise”   when   they   answer   the  
call.24 Byron  Paine,  a  Republican  justice  on  Wisconsin’s  high  court  disagreed.  “So  long  
as electors are at liberty   to   vote   at   their   places   of   residence,”   he   wrote   reviewing  
Wisconsin’s  soldier-voting  law,  “they  cannot  be  said  to  be  disfranchised.”25
Political   and   legal   arguments   about   “justice”   and   “disfranchisement”   aside,   a  
common feature of all soldier-voting statutes was that they privileged only soldiers who
already qualified as electors.

Soldier-Voting Laws and Residency Requirements
A second noteworthy feature common to all the laws follows from the first. All
soldier-voting laws left the residence requirements of prewar election laws entirely intact.
We have just seen that no soldier-voting laws changed any prewar suffrage qualifications.
The unchanged eligibility requirements differed from state to state, but usually included
race (white) and U.S. citizenship, and always included age (21 years and older), gender

24 .   John   Nesbitt   Conyngham,   “In   the   Matter   of   the   Contested   Election   of   District   Attorney,”  
Philadelphia Inquirer, January   16,   1862.   In   the   decision   overturning   Conyngham’s   ruling,   the   Supreme  
Court  took  him  to  task  for  his  use  of  the  term  “disfranchise”  in  this  context.  “It  strikes  us,”  wrote  Justice  
George Woodward for the majority in Chase v. Miller, “that  this  is  an  inaccurate  use  of  language.”  Striking  
down the soldier-voting  law  “would  disfranchise  no  qualified  voter,”  he  ruled.  Chase  v.  Miller,  41  Pa.  403,  
427 (1862).
25. State ex rel. Chandler v. Main, 16 Wis. 398, 418-419 (1863).      For   Paine’s   party   affiliation,   see  
Joseph   Ranney,   “Concepts   of   Freedom:   The   Life   of   Justice   Byron   Paine,”   Wisconsin Lawyer 75, no. 11
(November
2002),
accessed
June
22,
2014,
http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?Volume=75&Issue=11&Artic
leID=231.
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(male),  and  a  minimum  period  as  a  “resident.”  To  be  enfranchised,  a  person  had  to  meet  
all the tests. While the enforcement of voter eligibility rules became more difficult with
absentee voting, no soldier-voting law expressly altered any of the tests of voter
eligibility, including residency. The laws changed only the place where the soldier –
having met exactly the same eligibility requirements as civilian voters back home – could
cast his ballot.
This point about residency merits elaboration, since it is a source of easy
confusion about the laws.26 In defining suffrage rights, all states by the beginning of the
war required a minimum period of residence in the state.

Illinois, Minnesota, and

Wisconsin required nothing more by way of residence, but most states required in
addition that the voter have resided a minimum time in the relevant subdivision (or
subdivisions) of the state, such as county, township, ward, or election district. 27 The
constitutions and statutes measured the residency periods by counting back in time from
the  date  of  the  election,  always  some  specific  number  of  months  or  days  “next  preceding  
the  election,”  meaning  immediately  before  the  election.  
Most Civil War soldiers were absent from their homes far longer than the
residency durations required in any of the laws. Many were gone for years. Prewar state
26. One historian characterizes soldier-voting  laws  as  “a  suspension  of  the  residence  requirements  that
made out-of-district   voting   illegal….”   (Baker,   Affairs of Party, at 291.) Another asserts that the Ohio
soldier-voting law and the Supreme Court decision upholding it culminated a gradual relaxation of
residence requirements occurring over the antebellum decades. (Winkle, The Politics of Community, 4870). The latter argument is grounded on the assertion that relaxed residency rules for voting grew out of a
gradual  loosening  of  residence  rules  in  Ohio  poor  law,  which  then  spilled  over  into  the  state’s  election law.
While the two bodies of law both dealt with the rights of residents, residence qualification for voting
differed   definitionally   and   conceptually   from   the   settlement   rules   for   pauper   relief.   The   theory’s   more  
fundamental problem, however, is in treating  Ohio’s  soldier-voting legislation as a law about the residence
qualification for voting. It was not.
27. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. VI, § 1; M INN. CONST. of 1857, art. VII, § 1; WIS. CONST. of 1848, art.
III, § 1.
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law everywhere, however, made it clear that any citizen, having achieved status as a
resident, retained that status while temporarily away from home. The source of this rule
was variously constitutional, statutory, common law, or some combination of the three,
but the rule applied everywhere. Under this legal principle, well established long before
the war, any resident away from home temporarily, who intended to return home,
retained his residency qualification during his absence. There was no novelty in the
application of this rule to absent Civil War soldiers. Servicemen needed no loosening of
residency rules to retain their voting qualification while temporarily away from home,
and soldier-voting laws provided none.
In Ohio, for example, we have seen in Chapter 1 that statutory law provided this
protection   of   an   absent   voter’s   residency   qualification   long   before   the   war.   The   state’s  
1841   election   law   provided,   “A   person   shall   not   be   considered   or   held   to   have   lost   his  
residence, who shall leave his home and go into another state, or county of this state, for
temporary  purposes  merely,  with  an  intention  of  returning.”28 Kansas’s  prewar  election  
law had a similar provision.29 The  election  law  in  New  Hampshire  provided  an  elector’s  
residence  in  town  “shall  not  be  interrupted  or  lost  by  a  temporary  absence  therefrom  with  
the   intention   of   returning   thereto.”30 Pennsylvania had no such statute, but its Supreme
Court   ruled   that   common   law   achieved   the   same   result   under   principles   of   “domicile,”  

28. Ohio Election Law (1841) § 2.
29. An Act to Regulate Elections and to Prescribe the Qualifications of Voters, and to Prevent Illegal
Voting, ch. 28, § 9 1861 Kan. Sess. Laws (legisl. 1st session) 133,134-135. The Kansas soldier-voting law
of 1864, ch. 59, § 6, 1864 Kan. Sess. Laws 98, 99. incorporated this provision by reference.
30. The Rights and Qualifications of Voters, ch. 25, § 7, N.H. COMP. STAT., 85, 86 (1853).
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which   controlled   determination   of   a   voter’s   residence. 31 Vermont’s   Supreme   Court  
reached  the  same  conclusion  in  its  review  of  that  state’s  soldier-voting  law.  A  soldier’s  
absence  for  war,  the  court  said,  “like  a  absence  from  the  state  upon  a  journey,  or  business,  
is of a temporary character, and the domicil, or residence, continues within the state,
while the person is actually without the state.”32
The same common law rule applied in every state, including Ohio and Kansas,
making  those  states’  statutory  provisions  legally   redundant,   though  useful  as  a   guide  to  
election judges unfamiliar with common law. In some states, the point was made in the
state  constitution,  though  only  for  the  benefit  of  certain  categories  of  voters.  Wisconsin’s  
constitution,   for   example,   provided   that   “no   person   shall   be   deemed   to   have   lost   his  
residence in this state by reason of his absence on business of the state or the United
States.”33 That provision covered not only soldiers, but also federal contractors and the
state’s  federal  office  holders.  Michigan’s  constitution  had  language  virtually  identical  to  
Wisconsin’s,  as  did  New  York’s,  California’s,  and  Nevada’s.34

31.   The   state’s   high   court   explained   that   a   man’s   domicile,   and   therefore   his   residence   for   voting  
purposes, was the place of his permanent home, to which he intended to return when temporarily away. The
local  residency  requirement  in  Pennsylvania’s  constitution,  according  to  the  court,  meant  “the  equivalent  of  
domicile,”  and  soldiers  met  it  notwithstanding  their  temporary  absence from Pennsylvania. Upon his return
home   from   service,   the   court   stated,   the   soldier   “resumes   all   the   civil   rights   of   citizenship,   and,   his  
residence  being  unimpaired  by  his  temporary  absence,  he  has  a  right  to  vote  on  election  day.”  Chase, 41 Pa.
at 421, 423.
32.   Opinion   of   the   Judges   of   the   Supreme   Court   on   the   Constitutionality   of   “An   Act   Providing   for  
Soldier  Voting,”  37  Vt.  665,  670-671 (1864). The court did not discuss a state law predating the decision
and stating that an absence from Vermont for more than one year extinguished voting rights in the state.
VT. COMP LAWS Title I, ch. I, §§ 6, 7 (1851). Research for this dissertation uncovered no similar law in any
other state.
33. WIS. CONST. of 1848, art III, § 4.
34. MICH. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 5; N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art II, § 3. This provision extended
beyond   service   to   the   United   States   to   cover   any   person   absent   while   “engaged   in   the   navigation   of   the  
waters  of  this  state,  or  of  the  United  States,  or  of  the  high  seas”  or  while  being  a  “student of any seminary
of  learning”  or  “while  kept  at  any  almshouse  or  other  asylum,  at  public  expense,”  or  even  “while  confined  
in   any   public   prison.”   The   New   York   provision   not   only   protected   eligible   voters   from   losing   their  
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In no state did the residency requirements of election law demand that a voter,
having   qualified   as   a   resident,   stay   in   town   for   the   specified   number   of   days   “next  
preceding  the  election”  in  order  to  preserve  his  voting  right.  He  was  free  to  come  and  go  
without risking his voting eligibility. He could leave town even for extended periods
without jeopardizing his status as a resident, as long as his absence was temporary. Iowa
Supreme Court Justice George Wright, in his opinion upholding the constitutionality of
that   state’s   military   suffrage   law,   stated   the   proposition   plainly:   “It   is   not   claimed,   nor  
could it well be, that soldiers in the volunteer service of the government, by their absence
have   lost   or   changed   their   residence.”35 Or, as California Chief Justice Silas Sanderson
put  it,  “A  man  is  just  as  much  a  qualified  elector  when  absent  from  the  place  of  voting  as  
when present. In the former case he has the right to vote, but not the opportunity. In the
latter  he  has  both.”36 That was true everywhere. Soldier-voting laws simply equalized the
opportunity for absent soldiers.

Scope of Coverage: Which Soldiers Did the Laws Cover?
The categories of eligible servicemen varied from law to law.37 Soldiers serving
in the regular army presented a particular challenge and were often excluded. According

residency qualification on account of these activities, but also prevented outsiders from gaining a New
York residency qualification by conducting any of the identified activities while in New York temporarily.
N.Y. CONST. of  1846,  art  II,  §  3;;  California’s  1849  tracked  the  New  York  language verbatim. CAL. CONST.
of 1849, art. II, § 4. That provision, the California Supreme Court noted, merely affirmed the common law,
which  held  that  temporary  absence  did  not  change  a  citizen’s  domicile.  Bourland  v.  Hildreth,    26  Cal.  161,  
212 (1864); NEV. CONST. of 1864, art II, § 2.
35. Morrison v. Springer, 15 Iowa 304, 344 (1863).
36. Bourland, 26 Cal. at 238.
37.   As   amended   in   1864,   Ohio’s   law   was   unusually   broad,   explicitly   extending   to   men   in   such   noncombat   roles   as   “teamsters,   wagoners,   quartermasters and their employees, and those engaged in the
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to republican theory, standing armies were invitations to tyranny, especially when they
wielded political power. Those sentiments still had vitality at the outbreak of the Civil
War, finding expression in many prewar state constitutions and in some cases standing as
obstacles to enfranchisement under prewar law.38 The new laws removed none of those
obstacles.
Of the twenty northern states that provided for absentee soldier voting, fifteen had
constitutional provisions either flatly excluding regulars from the franchise

39

or

complicating their enfranchisement by barring regulars from gaining residence by reason
of being stationed in the state. 40

In addition, regulars suffered more generalized

subsistence,  transportation,  and  naval  departments….”  An  Act  to  Enable  the  Qualified  Voters  of  this  State  
in the Military Service to Exercise the Right of Suffrage, (Ohio 1864) § 1.
38. Baker, Affairs of Party, 154; Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009), 7, 172. For the roots of American hostility to standing armies in English political thought, see
Lois G. Schwoerer, No Standing Armies: The Anti-army Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).
39. The constitutions of Kansas, Missouri, and Connecticut flatly excluded regulars from suffrage
eligibility. KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. V, § 3. [Kansas amended its constitution in 1864 to shore up the
foundation for the soldier-voting law it had already passed that year. The amendment preserved the 1859
exclusion of regular servicemen. Joint Resolution, to Amend Section Three of Article Five of the
Constitution of the State of Kansas ch. 45, 1864 Kan. Sess. Laws 81 (1864)]; MO. CONST. of 1820, art III, §
10. Connecticut amended its constitution in 1864 to authorize absentee soldier voting, specifically
excepting   regulars   from   eligibility.   For   the   language   of   Connecticut’s   1864   amendment, see An Act
Relating to the Proposed Amendment to the Constitution, ch. 11, 1864 Conn. Pub. Acts 24.
40. The constitutions of Iowa, Ohio, Michigan, New York, Maine, Rhode Island, Illinois, California,
Minnesota, Nevada, West Virginia, and Wisconsin blocked regulars from gaining a residence qualification
by reason of being stationed in the state. IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 4; OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. V, §
5; MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. VII, § 7; N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 3; ME. CONST. of 1820, art. II, § 1;
R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, § 4; ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. VI, § 6; CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 4; MINN.
CONST. of 1857, art. VII, § 4; NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 2; W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. I, § 6; WIS.
CONST. of 1848, art. III, § 5. In addition, some state constitutions expressed disfavor for standing armies in
ways   not   directly   relevant   to   voting,   such   as   by   banning   them   in   peacetime   as   “dangerous”   (e.g.,   N.H..
CONST. of 1792, Part First, art. XV; VT. CONST. of 1793, CH. 1, art. XVI; ME. CONST. of 1820, art. I, § 18)
or barring the coerced quartering of troops (e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 19; ME. CONST. of 1820,
art. I, § 19).
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constitutional disfavor under language sometimes banning them in peacetime as
“dangerous”  or  barring  them  from  nonconsensual  quartering  with  civilians.41
The upshot was that eight states explicitly excluded soldiers in the regular army
from their absentee soldier-voting laws, sometimes tellingly referring to the regulars as
“the   standing   army.” 42 The soldier-voting laws of Ohio and seven other states with
constitutions barring in-state regulars from gaining residence qualification, remained
silent about the eligibility of absent regulars to vote in the field; the new laws neither
expressly included nor excluded these men.43 That left it for election judges in the field
to   decide   the   eligibility   of   regulars’   case   by   case   as   challenges   arose.   Just   as   Ohio’s  

41.    Standing  armies  as  “dangerous,”  see,  e.g.,  N.H. CONST. of 1792, Part First, art. XV; VT. CONST. of
1793, CH. 1, art. XVI; ME. CONST. of 1820, art. I, § 18. Provisions barring quartering, see, e.g., CONN.
CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 19; ME. CONST. of 1820, art. I, § 19.
42. The eight were Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, Vermont, and
Wisconsin. An Act to Secure the Elective Franchise to Soldiers in the Field, ch. 37, § 1, 1864 Conn. Pub.
Acts  51,  51;;  An  Act  Supplemental  to  an  Act  Entitled  ‘An  Act  to  Regulate  Elections  and  to  Prescribe  the  
Qualifications of Electors, and  to  Prevent  Illegal  Voting.’  Approved  June  3,  1861,  ch.  59,  §  1,  1864  Kan.  
Sess. Laws 101, 101; An Act Authorizing Soldiers Absent from the State in the Military Service to Vote for
Electors of President and Vice President (Me. 1864), § 9; Missouri Convention,  “An  ordinance  to  enable  
citizens of this state, in the military service of the United States or the State of Missouri, to vote, June 12,
1862,”  Journal and proceedings of the Missouri State Convention: Held at Jefferson City, June, 1862, (St.
Louis: G. Knapp & Co, 1862) 15-16; An Act to Enable the Militia and Volunteers of this State, when in the
Military Service of the United States or of this State (Wis. 1862) § 1; An act Providing for Soldier Voting
(Vt. 1863) § 1. Three of these eight states – Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont – had prewar
constitutions  with  no  bar  against  regulars’  voting  or  gaining  a  residence,  though  the  constitutions  in  each  
case prohibited nonconsensual quartering or barred standing armies in peacetime.
43. The seven states in addition to Ohio were California, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, New York,
and West Virginia. Ohio Soldier Voting Act (1863); An Act in Addition to an Act Entitled an Act to
Regulate Elections (Cal, 1863); An Act to enable the Qualified Electors of this State, Absent there from in
the Military Service of the United States, in the Army or Navy thereof, to Vote, 1865 Ill. Laws 59; An Act
to Amend Title IV of the Revision of 1860 so as to Enable the Qualified Electors of this State in the
Military Service (Iowa 1862); An Act to Enable Citizens of this State, who are or may be Engaged in the
Military or Naval Service of the United States, to Vote in the Election Districts where they Reside, at the
General Election to be held in the Month of November, 1862 and all Subsequent General Elections, during
the Continuance of the Present War, ch. 1, 1862 (extra session) Minn. Laws 13; Election Ordinance of
1864, §2, 1 Nev. Comp. Laws; Embracing Statutes of 1861 to 1873, (Bonnifield & Healy) cxxxvii, cxxxviii
(1873); An Act to Enable the Qualified Electors of this State, Absent therefrom in the Military Service of
the United States, in the Army or Navy thereof, to Vote, ch. 253, 1864 N.Y. Laws 549; An Act to Regulate
Elections by the People (W. Va. 1863) § 26.
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soldier-voting law provided no instructions for election judges facing such challenges,
neither did any of the other five.
Eleven laws excluded sailors in the navy, though the laws never stated the
exclusion explicitly. Rather, statutes implied the exclusion by operation of their positive
terms,  which  created  polling  places  where  “soldiers”  served  in  “regiments,”  “companies,”  
or  “battalions.”  These  were  organizational  units  of  armies,  cavalries,  or  artillery,  but  not  
of the navy. 44

The exclusion may have resulted from the size and demographic

composition of naval forces. There were far fewer sailors than soldiers in the Civil War,
particularly from western states. More often than with army enlistees, navy recruits were
predominantly foreign-born and African-American, men that most prewar constitutions
disfranchised. The white contingent was largely an unsympathetic cohort: rowdy, heavydrinking men from the margins of respectable middle class society. Compared to their
counterparts in the army, most were motivated not by patriotism but by the desire to
escape the draft. They resented service in the racially integrated shipboard environment,
and they served grudgingly.45 These  men,  though  they  contributed  greatly  to  the  Union’s  

44. The eleven were Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. An Act to Secure the Elective Franchise to Soldiers in the Field,
(Conn. 1864); An Act to Amend Title IV of the Revision of 1860 so as to Enable the Qualified Electors of
this State in the Military Service (Iowa 1862), § 1; An Act Regulating the Manner of Soldiers Voting for
Electors of President and Vice President of the United States (Ky. 1863) § 1; An Act Authorizing Soldiers
Absent from the State in the Military Service to Vote for Electors of President and Vice President, and for
Representatives to Congress (Me. 1864) § 1; MD. CONST. of  1864,  art.  XII  (“Schedule”);;  An  Act  to  Enable  
the Qualified Electors of this State, in the Military Service, to Vote at Certain Elections, (Mich. 1864) § 1;
Missouri   Convention,   “An  ordinance  to  enable  citizens  of   this   state,  in  the   military  service   of  the  United  
States”   15-16; An Act to Approve and Publish and Submit to the Electors a Certain Proposition of
Amendment to the Constitution of the State (R.I. 1864); An Act Providing for Soldier Voting (Vt. 1863) §
1; An Act to enable the militia and volunteers of this state, when in the military service of the United States
or of this state (Wis. 1862) § 1.
45. Michael J. Bennett, Union Jacks: Yankee Sailors in the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2004).
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military effort, may have escaped the attentions or the respect of state lawmakers with
whom they had little in common socially or demographically. In any event, more than
half of military suffrage laws effectively excluded them.

Duration of Soldier-Voting Laws
Civil War soldier-voting laws paved the way for similar laws in subsequent wars and
also served as a milestone in the development of absentee voting rights generally. 46 But the laws
themselves were generally short-lived. Only five of the twenty soldier-voting arrangements that
came into existence during the Civil War survived very long past the war. 47 In one way or
another,  most  states  followed  Ohio’s  example  in  limiting  the  laws’  duration.48 Four expired at
war’s   end   by   their   own   terms,   with   language   limiting   the   laws’   duration   to   the   period   of   the  
“present   war” (Missouri,   Minnesota),   “during   the   present   rebellion”   (Connecticut),   or   “during  

46. Miller, Absentee Voters and Suffrage Laws, 29-35; Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the
Origins of Our Time (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2013), 197.
47.   The   five   were   Kansas’s,   Maine’s,   Michigan’s   and   Nevada’s   (all   of   which   endured   well   into   the  
twentieth  century)  and  New  Hampshire’s  (which  remained  in  effect  until  1897).  The  Kansas  soldier-voting
law survived the Civil War and remained in effect until at least 1947. [Elections, KAN. STAT. ANN. Ch. 25,
art. XII, §1201 et. seq. (1947)] Maine election law preserved the right of absent soldiers to vote through
World War II. In 1944, the state extended absentee voting rights more generally to citizens away from their
homes on Election Day. [Elections, ME. REV. STAT. tit. I, ch. 8, §§ 83, 84, (1930).ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit.
1, ch. 8, § 83-84. (1930). ME. REV. STAT. ANN Ch.  6,  §§  1,  7  (1944)]  Michigan’s  soldier-voting law expired
by its terms at the end of the war and was ruled unconstitutional by its state supreme court even before that.
But  the  state  amended  its  constitution  in  1866  to  authorize  the  legislature,  during  wartime,  to  “provide  the  
manner in which, and the  time  and  place  at  which”  absent  servicemen  could  vote.  The  state  incorporated  
that  provision  in  its  revised  constitution  in  1908.  It  was  subsumed  in  the  1963  constitution’s  more  general  
grant of legislative authority for all classes of absent voters, not just soldiers. [Benton, Voting in the Field,
at 103; MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. III, § 1, MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. III, § 4] In Nevada, the legislature
incorporated military suffrage provisions into the general elections law in 1866. These remained a part of
Nevada law into the twentieth century. [An Act Relating to Elections, NEV. REV. STAT. Ch. CVII, § 23
(1866); An Act to Provide for Taking the Votes of Electors of the State of Nevada, who may be in the
Military Service of the United States, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 1887, et seq. (1912). See the Appendix for
additional discussion of each state.
48. An Act to Enable the Qualified Voters of this State in the Military Service to Exercise the Right of
Suffrage, (Ohio 1864). This amendment to the 1863 law limited the  duration  of  that  law  to  “the  existence  of  
the  present  rebellion.”
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the   existence   of   the   present   rebellion”   (Ohio).49 The remaining states either repealed soldiervoting statutes legislatively after the war or effectively erased them with postwar revisions to
state constitutions or election laws omitting soldier-voting provisions.50 That five out of twenty

49. Missouri Ordinance, § 1; An Act to Enable Citizens of this State, who are or may be Engaged in the
Military or Naval Service of the United States (Minn. 1862), § 1; An Act to Secure the Elective Franchise
to Soldiers in the Field, (Conn. 1864) § 1; An Act To Enable the Qualified Voters of this State in the
Military Service to Exercise the Right of Suffrage, (Ohio 1864) § 1.
50. Pennsylvania: The election law of 1868 made no reference to absentee voting for soldiers and
included  this  provision:    “No  body  of  soldiers,  armed  or  unarmed,  shall  be  present  at  any  place  of  election  
during  the  time  of  election.”  An  act  Relating  to  the  Elections  of  this  Commonwealth, P. L. No. 192, 1839
Pa. Laws 519; Iowa:    The  general  election  law  of  1880  stated,  “no  person  is  entitled  to  vote  at  any  other  
place  than  in  the  township  in  which  he  resides  at  the  time  he  offers  to  vote.”  There  was  no  exception  for  
absent soldiers. IOWA CODE, Ch. 32, § 492 (1880); Vermont: By 1870, the required location for voting for
congressional  representatives  was  “any  town  in  the  congressional  district  in  which  he  [the  voter]  resides.”  
For electors for U.S. president and vice-president,   it   was   “in   any   town   in   this   state.”   There   were no
exceptions for absent soldiers. VT. COMP LAWS Title I, § 37, (1870); Kentucky: The state repealed its
military suffrage law in 1866, an arguably redundant exercise, since by its terms the soldier-voting law
applied only to the election of 1864. An Act  to  Repeal  an  Act,  entitled  “An  Act  Regulating  the  Manner  of  
Soldiers Voting for Electors for President and Vice President of the United States within and without this
State, ch. 370, 1866 Ky. Acts 25; Maryland: The state constitution of 1864, which enabled absentee voting
for soldiers, had a very short lifespan. A new constitution replaced it in 1867. It deleted the 1864 soldiervoting  provisions  and  restored  the   prewar  suffrage  rules,  once  again  entitling  each  elector  “to  vote  in  the  
ward or election   district   in   which   he   resides.”   MD. CONST. of 1867, art. I, § 1; Wisconsin: The Badger
State repealed its soldier-voting law in 1871, WIS. STAT. tit. XXIX, ch. CLXXXVIII, § 1(1871); West
Virginia: The state omitted military suffrage provisions from the state’s  election  law  in  the  first  post-war
statutory codification, in 1870. Elections by the People for State, District, County, and Township Officers,
W. Va. Code, Ch. III (1870); California:  Not  long  after  the  Supreme  Court’s  ruling  in  1864  that  absentee
soldier voting was unconstitutional [Bourland , 26 Cal. at 161], the California legislature repealed the
state’s  Civil  War  soldier-voting laws in 1866. CAL CODE, Para 7979, § 9 (1864 - 1871); Missouri: In July
1865, a new constitution took effect in Missouri.      It’s   ratification   process   allowed   absent   soldiers   to  
participate,  and  its  suffrage  provision  granted  absentee  voting  rights  to  members  in  “the  volunteer  army  of  
the  United  States,  or  in  the  militia  force  of  this  state….”  MO. CONST. of 1865, art II, § XXI. On revision in
1875, the state constitution omitted this provision; Illinois: No soldier-voting provisions appear in the
election  law  section  of  the  state’s  1871  compilation  of  laws  then  in  effect.  Eugene  L.  Gross  and  William  L.  
Gross, The Statutes of Illinois: An Analytical Digest of All the General Laws of the State in Force at the
Present Time, Second Volume: Acts of 1871 and 1872 ( Springfield: E. L. & W. L. Gross, 1872), 252; New
York: The Empire State repealed its soldier-voting law in 1866. An  Act  to  Repeal  an  Act  Entitled  “An  Act  
to Provide the Manner in which and the Time and Place at which the Electors of this State, Absent
therefrom in the Actual Military Service of the United States, may Vote, and for a Canvass and Return of
their   Votes,” Passed April Twenty-Fourth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Five., ch. 524, § 1, 1866 N.Y.
Laws 1132.
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laws survived the war marks the phenomenon as more than ephemeral, but its status as genuine
reform  is  diminished  by  the  laws’  quick  extinction in fifteen of twenty states.
High Courts Grapple with Radicalism in Soldier-Voting Laws
The   laws’   commonalities   and   differences   underscore   what   the   soldier-voting
phenomenon was not. It was not an expansion of the elective franchise to previously
excluded   groups;;   many   laws   fell   short   of   covering   even   the   entirety   of   their   states’  
voting-eligible soldiers, and none attempted to open suffrage to soldiers left out of their
states’  prewar  suffrage  qualifications.  The  phenomenon  was  not  about  gradually  shifting
residency requirements, or fundamentally about the residency qualification at all. It did
not reflect a bottom-up demand for absentee voting rights by absent soldiers themselves,
many of whom preferred the alternative of returning home on furlough to vote alongside
their neighbors back home. Nor was it long lasting; most absentee-voting arrangements
expired when the war ended or shortly thereafter.
Nevertheless, the laws were radical. Their radicalism emerges from application of
a different yardstick, a yardstick giving primacy to process. By divorcing the process of
voting   from   soldiers’   in-state communities, soldier-voting laws changed an attribute of
elections that all earlier law had embedded in the constitutional order in every state. That
shift, brief and limited though it was, marks the laws as radical and potentially
transformative.
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Just as it did in Ohio, the picture of radicalism emerges from court decisions
weighing   the   laws’   constitutionality.   The   debate   between   Ohio   Supreme   Justices   Rufus
Ranney and Josiah Scott in the Ohio case of Lehman v. McBride played out in similar
terms in other states. Everywhere the question was the same: did the state constitution, in
addition to identifying who could vote, fix the location of voting, or did the constitution
leave that subject for legislatures to decide? To answer that question, justices
approaching the question as Rufus Raney did in the Ohio case, looked to history for
definitions   of   key   constitutional   terms,   terms   like   “election”   and   “vote.”   Their search
revealed to them a legal tradition of exclusively in-person, community-based voting,
which had achieved constitutional status by the time of the Civil War.

Their

interrogation of history also revealed a paramount constitutional value of protecting
electoral  “purity.”  These  justices  saw  fixing  the  place  of  voting  within  local  communities  
as  their  constitutions’  device  for  advancing  that  value,  such  that  divorcing  the  process  of  
voting  from  voters’  home  communities  constituted  an  unconstitutional invitation to fraud.
In contrast, justices approaching the constitutional question as Josiah Scott did in
the Ohio case, while agreeing that absentee voting was a legal novelty and indeed
conceding   that   the   concept   was   unimaginable   to   constitutions’   framers, attached no
constitutional  significance  to  the  novelty.  For  them  the  question’s  answer  lay  in  whether  
the plain meaning of constitutional text, contemporaneously understood, unambiguously
prohibited absentee voting. If it did not, then the legislature had a free hand. Chief
Justice George Martin of Michigan captured this approach vividly in his dissenting
opinion  in  support  of  Michigan’s  statute.  “I  find  myself  unable  to  put  my  finger  upon  any  
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express   provision  of  the  constitution,”  Martin  protested,  “which  deprives  the  legislature  
of  the  right”  to  pass  such  a  law.51 These justices saw a paramount constitutional value in
protecting the right of qualified electors to vote, and they saw absentee-voting laws as
consistent with that value. Like their brethren taking the other side of the issue, however,
they saw the laws as departing pronouncedly from established traditions.
The first state to confront the question was Pennsylvania, the only state in the
union with a soldier-voting law on the books at the outset of the war. That law was first
enacted in 1813.52 After the state revised its constitution in 1838, the law was retained, in
a slightly revised form, as a brief section in a long and comprehensive election passed in
1839. It allowed absent soldiers  “to  exercise  the  right  of  suffrage  at  such  place  as  may  be  
appointed by the commanding officer of the troop, or company, to which they shall
respectively   belong,   as   fully   as   if   they   were   present   at   the   usual   place   of   election.” 53 A
precursor to Civil War soldier-voting laws on the Iowa model, it called for election sites
to open at the encampments where soldiers served, overseen by officers of each
company.54 Before the Civil War, the law never received judicial attention, if indeed it
was ever used at all. 55 But it was used in elections in 1861, and in some of those
elections  soldiers’  ballots  tipped  the  outcome.  

51. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 185-186.
52. An ACT to enable the militia or volunteers of this state, when in the military service of the United
States or of this state, to exercise the right of election, ch. CLXXI, 1812 Pa Laws 213.
53. An Act Relating to the Elections of this Commonwealth, P.L. 192, 1839 Pa. Laws 519.
54. Id. at § 44.
55. In attacking Democrats in general, and Democrat George Woodward in particular, for opposing
soldier voting, Republicans in 1864 charged in an election pamphlet that Pennsylvania soldiers had indeed
voted under the law during the Mexican War. William E. Chandler, The   Soldiers’   Right   To   Vote:   Who  
Opposes It? Who Favors It? (Washington: Lemuel Towers, 1864), 8; Claims that absent Pennsylvania
soldiers had voted in the Mexican War surfaced in a few newspapers during the Civil War. An unsigned
letter to a Republican newspaper asserted that Pennsylvania soldiers had voted in the 1847 gubernatorial
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The   constitutionality   of   the   law   came   before   Pennsylvania’s   high   court   in   the  
1862 case of Chase v. Miller, which struck down the law as unconstitutional. More than
any other court decision dealing with soldier-voting laws, this one reverberated
nationally, both legally and politically. Legally, it drew attention as a potential precedent
in the other eight states where high courts subsequently reviewed the constitutionality of
similar laws, including Ohio.56 Politically, the decision took center stage when its author,
Democrat George Woodward, ran for governor in 1863. Citing his decision in Chase,
Republicans charged over the following two years that Woodward in particular and
Democrats in general were anti-soldier because they opposed soldier-voting laws.
None of those repercussions were foreseeable when the case arose in 1861. In the
race that year for district attorney of Luzerne County, Democrat Chase won the home
vote, but Republican Miller won the overall tally by outpolling Chase among voting
soldiers. The return judges excluded the soldier votes and declared Chase the winner.
Miller contested the outcome in court.57 The lower court judge, a Democrat named John
Conyngham, agreed with Miller that the soldier vote should have counted.

Their

election, most of them for winning Democratic candidate Francis Shunk. (Wellsboro Agitator, June 4,
1862). Another Pennsylvania paper simply stated, without elaboration, that absent soldier votes had been
counted during the Mexican War (Chambersburg Franklin Repository, July 20, 1864). Cf. Neither Josiah
Benton nor Jonathan White, in writing about the Pennsylvania soldier-voting law of 1864, corroborates that
assertion. A likely reason for enactment of the 1813 version of the law was to assist in recruiting for the
War of 1812. See Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 37, 137. For the connection between voting and suffrage
during that war, see Williamson, American Suffrage From Property to Democracy, at 188.
56. Justice Josiah Scott cited the Pennsylvania decision in his majority opinion, opining that differences
between the Pennsylvania and Ohio constitutions rendered the case inapplicable. (Chase, 41 Pa. at 611.)
Rufus Raney cited it in his dissenting opinion as support for his argument that tying elections to local
communities  served  the  constitutional  imperative  of  protecting  the  “purity”  of  elections.  (Id. at 649.)
57 . Chase, 41 Pa. at 414. A fair assumption is that the election officials acted based on their
interpretation of the Pennsylvania constitution, but no record of their reasoning has survived.
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exclusion  “disfranchised”  soldiers,  in  Conyngham’s  opinion,  and  denied  the  legislature’s  
“sovereignty.”58 Chase appealed to the state Supreme Court.
The legal dispute hinged on the meaning of the suffrage provision of
Pennsylvania’s   1838   constitution.      Article   III,   section   1   granted   voting   rights   to   “every  
white freeman of the age of twenty-one years, having resided in the State one year, and in
the election district where he offers to vote, ten days immediately preceding such
election….”59 The central question was whether the language italicized here imposed a
constitutional requirement that voters cast their ballots in person within their
Pennsylvania election districts.
Woodward approached the question as a subject for historical inquiry, just as
Rufus Raney would the following year when he dissented in the Ohio case. Woodward
sought   to   answer   the   question   as   the   constitution’s   framers   would   have   answered   it. In
this he had the advantage of having been one of the framers himself, although his
authority on questions of original intent was presumably no greater than James
Thompson’s,   a   fellow   Democrat   on   Pennsylvania’s   high   court.   Thompson   too   was   a  
delegate to the 1838 convention that drafted the constitution. 60 He dissented from
Woodward’s   opinion   for   the   4-1 Chase majority, although, because he did not file an
explanatory dissenting opinion, we are left to guess at his reasons.
58. Philadelphia Inquirer, January 16, 1862.
59. PA. CONST. of 1838, art. III, § 1, italics added. The same section also conditioned the suffrage on the
payment of a tax. Specifically, the prospective  voter   must  have   “within  two   years  paid  a  State  or  county  
tax,  which  shall  have  been  assessed  at  least  ten  days  before  the  election….”    
60. Woodward participated actively at the convention. On the suffrage provision of the new instrument,
Woodward supported  the  addition  of  “white”  as  a  qualification  for  voting.  Giving  Negroes  the  vote,  he  was  
reported   to   have   said   in   a   convention   speech,   would   “offend   against   nature.”   Democratic Banner
(Clearfield,   PA),   August   26,   1863,   2;;   For   Thompson’s   role   as   a   delegate, see “James   Thompson,”  
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, accessed November 26, 2013,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=T000204 .
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We  do  know  Woodward’s  reasons. The framers, he ruled, went beyond deciding
who could vote (white, 21-year old men meeting residency and taxpaying requirements)
and purposely made the precise place of elections a constitutional element of suffrage,
thereby putting the subject beyond the reach of legislation to alter. They did this in
Article  III,  Section  1  by  linking  the  act  of  voting  physically  to  the  election  “district”  in  
which the voter met the 10-day residency requirement. It was in that district, and only in
that district, that the  voter  could  “offer”  his  vote  by  appearing  there  in  person  to  cast  his  
ballot.
In the Ohio case, Rufus Raney looked to history for a definition of the word
“election”   in   that   state’s   1851   constitution;;   for   Woodward,   the   key   word   in   the  
Pennsylvania constitution   was   “district.”   Pennsylvania’s   constitution   provided   no  
definition, but Woodward concluded that by 1838 the word had taken on a clear meaning
from   the   state’s   long   history   of   election   laws.   Year   after   year,   starting   long   before   the  
1838 constitution, legislation had specified the places of voting and called those places –
always within Pennsylvania – “election   districts.”   By   law,   the   word   had   come   to   mean  
the location where voters convened in person to cast their ballots. The framers had that
definition  in  mind  when  they  used  the  word  “district,”  according  to  Woodward.61
The history of election law in Pennsylvania also revealed to Woodward a
consistent record of ever-tightening guards against fraud. The purpose of requiring voting
in election districts   in   the   1838   constitution,   he   said,   was   “to   exclude   disqualified  
61. Chase, 41 Pa. at 421.  The  constitution  did  not  limit  the  legislature’s  authority  to  create  new  districts,  
Woodward wrote, including a district defined as a specific military encampment within the state, if
legislators wished. But the 1839 soldier-voting  law  did  no  such  thing.  It  simply  ignored  the  constitution’s  
requirement   of   voting   in   a   district,   saying   instead   that   absent   soldiers   could   vote   “at   such   place”   as   the  
soldier’s  commanding  officer  shall  appoint.  This,  Woodward  concluded,  violated  Article III, § 1. Id.
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pretenders   and   fraudulent   voters   of   all   kinds.”   The   soldier-voting law offered none of
these   protections.   It   “opens   a   wide   door   for   most   odious   frauds,”   Woodward   wrote,   by  
allowing soldiers   to   vote   “where   the   evidence   of   their   qualifications   is   not   at   hand   and  
where  our  civil  police  cannot  attend  to  protect  the  legal  voter.”  All  this  collided  with  what  
Woodward   called   “the   labour   of   the   constitution,”   which   was   to   assure   that   suffrage  
rights  “be  preserved  from  abuse  and  perversion.”62
In concluding that the soldier-voting  law  could  not  stand,  Woodward  wrote,  “We  
cannot  be  persuaded  that  the  constitution  ever  contemplated  any  such  mode  of  voting.”63
Rufus  Raney  would  echo  Woodward’s  conclusion about the lesson of history. At the time
Ohio’s   constitution  was   drafted,  “Nobody  had   ever  heard  of   any  other  sort  of  election”  
than  one  held  within  the  voters’  hometown,  Raney  would  say  in  his  dissent  in  the  Ohio  
case.64 The supposed inconceivability of absentee voting to framers became a common
refrain among justices looking askance on the concept of absentee voting.

62. Id. at 425 - 427. Woodward treated the fraud attendant on soldier voting not as a hypothetical risk,
but as a documented certainty. In 1861, the soldier-voting law had come before the court on procedural
issues  not  involving  the  law’s  constitutionality. The undisputed record in that case showed rampant fraud.
Hulseman and Brinkworth v. Rems and Siner, 41 Pa. 397 (1861). With that record apparently in mind
(though he did not cite Hulseman in his Chase opinion),  Woodward  said,  “the  cases  of fraud that have been
before  us”  proved  that  soldier  voting  was  subject  to  cheating  and  manipulation.  He  was  careful  to  absolve  
the soldiers themselves from culpability for the fraud, noting – again undoubtedly from the Hulseman
record – that the actual culprits   “…   were   political   speculators,   who   prowled   about   the   military   camps  
watching for opportunities to destroy true ballots and substitute false ones, to forge and falsify returns, and
to cheat citizen and soldier alike out of the fair and equal election provided  for  by  law.”  (Chase, 41 Pa., at
421.)
63. Id. at 418-419, 424-425. Woodward had to square that conclusion with the fact that the 1813
precursor of the 1839 soldier-voting law was on the books when the 1838 constitution was drafted. He did
so in a lengthy discussion about the legislative history of the 1839 law. In reenacting the 1813 law in a
hasty  rush  to  adjournment,  lawmakers  had  lost  sight  of  the  new  constitution.  It  was  “careless  legislation,”  
he said, pointing as proof to a separate provision of the same 1839 law that prohibited troops from
attending elections. Id. at 417.
64. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at 629.
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The Chase decision sparked a successful initiative to amend the Pennsylvania
constitution so as authorize soldier-voting legislation. Acting on that authority, the
legislature passed a soldier-voting law in time for the 1864 elections.65 The decision also
doomed  Woodward’s  run  for  governor  in   1863  and  marked  a  watershed  moment   in   the  
general politicization of the soldier-voting issue.
Five other state high courts rendered decisions finding soldier-voting laws
unconstitutional. All did so following the approach that Woodward used in striking down
Pennsylvania’s   prewar   law   and   Ranney   used   unsuccessfully   in   urging   his   colleagues   to  
strike down Ohio’s   1863   law.   To   lend   meaning   to   otherwise   undefined   words   of   their  
state constitutions, these justices searched the history of suffrage in their states, as
reflected in earlier constitutions and elections laws. The definitions they extracted from
that search took on constitutional status and, in their minds, left no room for the novelty
of absentee voting.
Three of the cases reaching this conclusion arose in the New England states of
Connecticut, Vermont, and New Hampshire. Unlike the Pennsylvania and Ohio cases,
each of these court opinions was advisory, because it responded to a legislative request
for   the   court’s   views   on   the   constitutionality   of   an   enacted   law   or   a   bill   under  
consideration. The very fact that they made the requests showed legislative uncertainty
about the constitutionality of the laws under consideration. In concluding that absentee
voting was unconstitutional, the three New England court opinions validated the
legislative doubts.
65. An Act to Regulate Elections by Soldiers in Actual Military Service, P.L. No. 871, 1864 Pa. Laws
990.
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Connecticut’s  opinion  came  first.  The  1862  law  under  consideration followed the
Iowa model of calling for election sites to open at out-of-state encampments where
Connecticut soldiers served.66 Justice Thomas Butler, a Whig in his earlier days in the
state legislature, wrote the unanimous court opinion finding the law defective. 67 The
problem,  the  high  court  held,  was  that  the  state’s  constitution  quite  clearly  fixed  the  place  
for   elections   in   “electors’   meetings”   held   in   towns   within   the   state.   Like   Woodward   in  
Pennsylvania and Ranney in Ohio, Butler reached this conclusion by analyzing the
history   of   the   state’s   election   laws.   Dating   from   its   colonial   charter,   the   Fundamental  
Orders   of   1639,   and   continuing   through   its   most   recent   amendment   to   the   state’s  
constitution   in   1836,   “elections”   were   virtually   synonymous with town meetings of
freemen, such that an election held elsewhere than in a town meeting, let alone out of
state, was a constitutional impossibility. The constitution repeatedly referred to elections
as  “meetings  of  electors.”  It  called  for  electors  to  choose  state  officers  and  legislators  “at  
their  meeting”  every  April  and  for  the  casting  of  ballots  “by  each  elector  present  at  such  
meeting.” 68 In language echoing George Woodward, and anticipating Rufus Ranney,
Butler  wrote,  “there  has  never  been  an  election, by the people, of representatives or state
officers,  in  any  other  manner  or  place”  than  by  personal   attendance  by  electors  at  town  
66. An Act in addition to an Act entitled  “An  Act  relating  to  Electors  and  Elections,”  ch.  17,  1862  Conn.  
Pub.  Acts  15,  (hereafter  cited  as  “the  1862  Connecticut  Military  Suffrage  law”).  
67. Opinion of the judges of the Supreme Court, 30 Conn. 591   (1862).   (hereafter   cited   “Connecticut
Supreme Court 1863 Advisory Opinion”).   For   Butler:   “Thomas   Butler,“   Biographical Directory of the
United
States
Congress.
Accessed
June
19,
2014,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B001191.
68. Connecticut Supreme Court 1863 Advisory Opinion, 30 Conn. at 596-600.    Butler’s  citations  were  to  
several sections of Articles 3, 4, and 6 of the 1836 Connecticut constitution. The centrality of town
meetings to local government in early America is well documented in a rich body of literature. See, e.g.,
David Hackett Fischer, Paul  Revere’s  Ride  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Brian P. Janiskee,
Local Government in Early America (Lanham, MD: The Roman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.,
2010).
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meetings in Connecticut. The constitution tethered voting so tightly to township meetings
that soldier voting would be impermissible   even   if   it   happened   in   the   soldier’s   own  
township   within   Connecticut,   unless   it   happened   in   that   township’s   annual   meeting,  
Butler added.69
Anticipating the constitutional problem that Butler identified, the legislature had
attempted a creative legal fiction in crafting the 1862 statute. The law declared that
soldiers’  out-of-state  voting  under  the  law  was  to  “be  considered,  taken  and  held  to  have  
been   given   by   them   in   the   respective   towns   of   which   they   are   residents.” 70 It was a
creative provision, but it failed to carry weight with the court. Voting under the 1862 act
clearly   meant   voting   away   from   Connecticut,   and   the   court   said   that   the   legislature’s  
effort   to   call   it   something   else   was   the   equivalent   of   “legislative   alchemy.” 71 If
lawmakers could  get  away  with  that,  the  court  anticipated,  the  state’s  constitution  would  
count for little. Focusing just on suffrage qualifications, the court imagined where the
slippery slope would lead if not nipped in the bud:
They [the legislators] may authorize minors to vote, and say that their votes shall
be considered, taken and held to be votes of electors of full age; or colored men,
and say their votes shall be considered, taken and held to be the votes of white
men and electors; and so may authorize the taking and counting of women and
aliens.
The Connecticut legislature responded by launching an initiative to amend the
constitution. That project succeeded in time for legislation in 1864, allowing absent
Connecticut soldiers to vote. For the first time in  Connecticut’s  history,  voters  could  cast  
69 . Connecticut Supreme Court 1863 Advisory Opinion, 30 Conn. at 597, 601 (emphasis in the
original).
70. The 1862 Connecticut Military Suffrage Act, § 8.
71. Connecticut Supreme Court 1863 Advisory Opinion, 30 Conn at 602.
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ballots without attending their township meetings, as long as they were qualified
soldiers.72
In   Vermont,   the   decisive   constitutional   word   was   “constable.”   In   elections   for  
executive branch offices including governor,  the  state’s  1793  constitution  directed  voters  
in each town to "bring in their votes ... to the Constable...."73 To protect the argument that
absent  soldiers  were  “bringing  in”  their  votes  “to  the  constable,”  the  soldier-voting law
designated the presiding  election  officials  at  the  far  away  military  voting  sites  as  “special  
constables.”      Treating   that   statutory   wording   as   legerdemain,   the   court   found   that  
absentee voting violated the constitution. Throughout Vermont history, the court noted,
“constables”   presided   at   town   meetings,   and   they   had   no   authority   other   than   as   town  
officials. That historical meaning defined the otherwise undefined word in the
constitution.   So,   in   requiring   voters   to   “bring   in”   their   votes   to   the   constable,   the  
constitution meant they had to present their votes in person to the constable presiding at
the town meeting where civilian Vermonters had always held their elections. That ruled
out absentee balloting.74 As discussed later in the chapter, the Vermont court sustained
the legislature’s   authority   to   prescribe   absentee   voting   in   purely   federal   elections.  
Vermont’s  absent  soldiers  used  that  law  to  vote  by  absentee  ballot,  marking  a  first  in  the  
state’s  history.

72. An Act Relating to the Proposed Amendment to the Constitution, (Conn. 1864); An Act to secure
the Elective Franchise to Soldiers in the Field, (Conn. 1864).
73. VT. CONST. of 1793, CH. II, § 10.
74. In re Opinion of the Judges, 37 Vt. at 670-671. As discussed later in the chapter, the Vermont court
sustained   the   legislature’s   authority   to   prescribe   absentee   voting   in   purely   federal   elections.   Vermont’s  
absent  soldiers  used  that  law  to  vote  by  absentee  ballot,  marking  a  first  in  the  state’s  history.
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court made similarly short work of an 1863
soldier-voting bill patterned on the Minnesota model, relying on history in concluding
that absentee voting was unconstitutional. The court cited treatises and a string of cases
establishing  the  common  law  rule  that  “every  vote  must  be  personally  given.”  The court
determined   the   meaning   of   the   constitutional   word   “vote”   by   examining,   in   the   court’s  
words,   the   “history   of   the   origin   of   the   powers   of   towns   in   New   England,   and   of   the  
nature  and  usages  of  their  meetings.”    That  examination  persuaded  the  court  that framers
had   the   common   law   meaning   of   voting   in   mind   and   that   “the   right   of   suffrage  
established by [the constitution] is to be exercised by the voter in person, at the meetings
duly held for the purpose in the places of the State pointed out by the Constitution.”75
That left no room for the absentee balloting contemplated by the proposed law.
California’s  law  met  a  similar  fate  at  the  hands  of  its  high  court.  The  state’s  1849  
constitution conditioned suffrage on thirty days residence in   the   “county   or   district in
which  [the  voter]  claims  his  vote….”76 In crafting the 1863 soldier-voting law, legislators
clearly anticipated the difficulty this language presented, so, like their counterparts in
Connecticut, they inserted a provision to finesse the problem. It provided that the absent

75. Opinion of Justices, 44 N.H. 633, 636 (1863). The legislature responded with a bill limiting the
absentee voting opportunity to federal elections. An Act to Enable the Qualified Voters of this State
Engaged in the Military Service of the Country to Vote for Electors of President and Vice President of the
United States, and for Representatives in Congress, ch. 4030, 1864 N.H. Laws 3061. As discussed later in
the  chapter,  the  high  court  endorsed  that  approach  for  the  same  reason  that  Vermont’s  court  had  done   so.
Opinion  of  the  Justices  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  on  the  Constitutionality  of  the  Soldier’s  Voting  Bill,
45 N.H 595 (1864).
76. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 1.
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soldiers' votes "shall be considered, taken, and held to have been given by them in the
respective  counties  of  which  they  are  residents.”77
The California Supreme Court showed the finessing language no more respect
than its Connecticut counterpart had in reviewing a similar provision. The case was
Bourland v. Hildreth.78 Justice Oscar Shafter, writing for the court majority, ridiculed the
deeming provision. If the legislature can deem an absentee vote to have been cast locally,
Shafter  wrote,  it  could  just  as  easily  deem  a  minor’s  vote  to  have  been  cast  by  an  adult,  or  
an  alien’s  vote  to  have  been  cast  by  a  citizen,  or  a  “colored”  man’s  vote  to  have  been  cast  
by a white man. Far from protecting the law from constitutional scrutiny, the deeming
provision’s  effect  was  to  “efface”  the  constitution,  Shafter  said  in  a  tone  of  indignation. 79
In reaching the substance of the constitutional question, Shafter relied heavily on
what he saw as the instruction of history. For the framers of the 1849 constitution, he
wrote,   the   meaning   of   the   word   “vote”   was   “imparted   by   traditions   that   became  
historical”   and   by   “habits   of   thought   that   became   chronic,   and   habits   of   action   that  
became muscular almost, both in England and this country, ages before 1849.”   Under  
those traditions and habits, a vote was the physical act of casting a ballot (or giving a
voice vote) in person.80

77. An Act in Addition to an Act entitled an Act to regulate Elections (Cal 1863) § 4. As discussed in
the Appendix, the 1863 law applied by its terms only to the 1863 elections. Two separate laws, both similar
to the 1863 law, were enacted the following year. The 1863 law, following the Iowa model for voting in the
field, is hereafter cited as "California's 1863 law." It included an additional deeming provision meant to
cope with the potential constitutional problems associated with punishing violations occurring outside the
state. It stated that the misconduct "shall be considered, taken, and held to have been committed by such
officer within the jurisdiction of this State...." Id.
78. Bourland, 26 Cal. 161.
79. Id. at 201.
80. Id. at 197.
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Lorenzo Sawyer leaned even harder on the
lessons of history. His concurrence echoes the 1862 opinions of Pennsylvania Justice
George Woodward in Chase v. Miller and Justice Thomas Butler in the Connecticut
Supreme   Court’s   advisory   opinion,   as   well   as   the   1863   dissent   of   Ohio   Justice   Rufus  
Ranney in Lehman v. McBride. Settlers from all over the country had populated
California by the time of statehood, and they brought with them a universal
understanding of what an election was, Sawyer reasoned. In all states,
the personal presence of the elector was required at the place established by law
for receiving  votes….  The  very  idea  of  an  election  embraced  the  idea  of  a  place  
appointed  within  the  district  for  the  meeting  of  the  voters  …  and  the  presence  of  
the  elector  in  person  to  offer  or  claim  his  vote….  Men  had  no  other  conception  of  
the process of voting, or of offering to vote, or of claiming their votes. This
conception and these ideas were necessarily in the minds of the men who framed
our constitution and the people when they adopted it.81
Sawyer’s  point  was  essentially  the  same  as  Ranney’s:  “words  become  things.”
Michigan’s  Supreme  Court  struck  down  that  state’s  1864  law  as  unconstitutional  
in early 1865 in a case arising out of a contested election for prosecuting attorney in
Washtenaw County. 82 It was the last of nine state high court rulings judging the
constitutionality of soldier-voting laws, and it echoed the first, in Pennsylvania. At issue
was  the  1850  constitution’s  provision  that  “no  citizen  or  inhabitant  shall  be  an  elector,  or  
entitled to vote at any election, unless he has resided in the township or ward in which he
offers   to   vote,   ten   days   next   preceding   the   election.”83 The question was whether that
language pertained only to the qualifications of the voter – he had to be a resident of the

81. Id. at 216.
82. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 127.
83. MICH. CONST. of 1851, art. VII, § 1.
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township where his vote is received, no matter where he casts that ballot – or whether it
dictated where the elector casts his ballot, requiring him to be physically present in the
township or ward when he voted. The majority concluded that an elector met the
constitutional requirement only by personally casting his ballot in the township where he
resides and that the soldier-voting law was therefore unconstitutional. Justice James
Valentine  Campbell  explained  that  framer’s  intent  in  requiring  that  voters  be  personally  
present in their township or ward when  they  cast  their  ballots  was  fraud  prevention.  “If  
the   voter   is   required   to   present   himself   personally   at   his   own   place   of   abode,”   wrote  
Campbell,   “his   neighbors   will   know   his   person,   and   will   be   likely   to   know   his  
qualifications….  That  other  means  of  protection may be devised is possible; but the test
by neighboring eyewitnesses has always been the favorite resort of the law, and it is the
best.84
Justice Isaac Christiancy concurred. Relying on history, he concluded that the
term  “offers  his  vote”  in  a  township or ward, as the 1850 framers must have understood
the   term,   meant   “personal   presentation   of   the   vote   at   that   place   to   the   inspectors   or  
officers  presiding  at  such  election.”  This  had  been  the  “uniform  mode  in  all  the  American  
states from their first   organization,”   with   the   single   exception   of   Pennsylvania’s   1813  
law, which Christiancy brushed aside, observing that Michigan had certainly known no
other mode in her history.85
Although Christiancy did not base his conclusion on previous opinions, he
similarly rooted his reasoning in the lessons of history. Courts should give undefined
84. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 127, 144.
85. Id. at 155.
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words in constitutional text the meaning that the framers attached to those words. For
Woodward  in  Pennsylvania,  the  word  was  “district.”  For  the  five  Vermont  justices  it was
“constable,”   and   for   Ranney   in   Ohio   and   Butler   in   Connecticut,   it   was   “election.”   For  
Christiancy   in   Michigan   and   Shafter   and   Sawyer   in   California,   it   was   “vote.”   In   each  
case, the word had meant something quite specific to the framers of the respective
constitutions. For these justices, that meaning attached to the words in the constitution
and left no room for absentee voting laws.
The countervailing judicial approach, typified by Josiah Scott in the opinion
upholding  Ohio’s  law,  attached  no  constitutional significance to the novelty of absentee
voting. Justice Byron Paine, a radical Republican, authored the opinion of the Wisconsin
Supreme   Court   upholding   that   state’s   soldier-voting law.86 He   conceded   “the   framers  
never  contemplated  or  ‘dreamed’  of   a law authorizing a ballot to be cast outside of the
state.”87 But  for  Paine,  this  undisputed  fact  said  nothing  about  the  legislature’s  authority  
under   the   constitution.   The   legislative   power,   Paine   wrote,   “is   sovereign   and  
uncontrollable, except as specially   restricted   in   the   constitution.”   Nowhere   did   the  
constitution   expressly   limit   the   legislature’s   power   to   fix   the   place   of   voting.      Paine  
believed the statute should stand unless constitutional text said, expressly and without
ambiguity, that voting could occur only inside the state. No such text existed.88 For Paine,

86. Chandler, 16 Wis. at 433. As an attorney before the war, Paine had defended an abolitionist accused
of  impeding  enforcement  of  the  fugitive  slave  act.    See  “Byron  Paine,”  Wisconsin  Court  System,  accessed  
May 19, 2014. http://www.wicourts.gov/courts/supreme/justices/retired/paine.htm. The enforcement
episode that drew Paine into his role is described in H. Robert Baker, The Rescue of Joshua Glover: A
Fugitive Slave, the Constitution, and the Coming of the Civil War (Columbus: Ohio University Press,
2006).
87. Id. at 439.
88. Id.
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the   constitution’s   silence   empowered   the   legislature   to   do   as   it   pleased.   The   court’s  
opinion was unanimous.89
There was a similar outcome in Iowa, where the high court sustained its soldiervoting  law   with   reasoning   akin   to   Paine’s  in   Wisconsin   and  Scott’s  in   Ohio.   Under  the  
state’s  1857  constitution,  voting  eligibility  required  a  citizen  to  have  been  for  at  least  60  
days   a   resident   “of   the   county   in   which   he   claims   his   vote.”90 In an election contest
challenging   the   law’s   constitutionality,   the   trial   judge,   Norman   Isbell,   adopted   the  
approach of Justices Woodward of Pennsylvania, Ranney of Ohio, Butler of Connecticut,
Sawyer of California, and Christiancy of Michigan; history gave meaning to the
constitution’s   terms,   he   said.      The   idea   of   absentee   voting   was   utterly   foreign   to   the  
experience   of   the   constitution’s   framers.   When   they   crafted   the   suffrage   provision  
requiring  60  days  of  residence  in  the  county  “of  which  he  claims  his  vote,”  the  notion that
voters   might   cast   ballots   elsewhere   than   in   their   own   county   “would   never   enter   their  
minds,”   Isbell   wrote.   “We   cannot   believe   that   any   man,   at   the   adoption   of   the  

89. According to the leading scholar of the Wisconsin law, the state legislature tried to tip the scales of
justice to  influence  the  court’s  decision.  The  device  for  doing  so  was  an  amendment  to  the  soldier-voting
law to permit soldier voting in elections for state judges. (An Act to Amend Chapter 11 of the General Law
of  the  Extra  Session  of  1862,  entitled  “An  Act  to  Enable the Militia and Volunteers of this State, when in
the Military Service of the United States or of this State, to Exercise the Right of Suffrage, ch. 59, 1863
Wis. Laws 77.) The intention, according to historian Frank Klement, was to pressure the justices to favor
soldier voting so as not to antagonize soldiers whose votes they needed for their own elections. It would
have  been  “political  suicide”  for  the  justices  to  rule  against  the  law.  Klement  argues  that  the  legislature’s  
gambit succeeded in influencing  the  outcome  of  the  court  case.  Klement,  “The  Soldier  Vote  in  Wisconsin  
During the Civil War,” 37-47,  45.  It  is  a  plausible  but  not  a  provable  assertion.  Paine’s  analysis,  after  all,  
employed a respectable approach, entirely in step with the approach of justices elsewhere who voted to
sustain soldier-voting laws based on judicial restraint and deference to legislatures.
90. IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. II, § 1.
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Constitution,   regarded   its   meaning   in   the   light   claimed   [by   the   law’s   defenders],   much
less  any  of  its  framers.”91
Without  disputing  Isbell’s  statement  of  how  the  framers  envisioned  elections,  the  
Iowa Supreme Court reversed his decision, holding that the soldier-voting law was
constitutional. George Wright, a Republican, wrote the court’s  unanimous  opinion.92 He
ruled that the disputed constitutional language defined who could not, but did not fix
where he   could   vote.   The   legislature   was   free   to   set   the   “time,   place,   and   manner”   of  
voting, including out-of-state locations, Wright concluded.      He   cited   Justice   Paine’s  
reasoning in upholding the Wisconsin law, agreeing with Paine that it was
constitutionally   irrelevant   that   the   framers   “never   contemplated   or   ‘dreamed’”   of  
absenting voting. Only if the constitution restricted the legislature in   “clear,   palpable,  
plain”  text  could  a  court  invalidate  a  statute,  and  no  such  prohibition  appeared  in  the  text  
of  Iowa’s  constitution.93
In each of the nine court decisions, justices observed that constitutional framers
had never contemplated the possibility of absentee voting. The very notion was foreign to
their experience and to their idea of what it meant to vote. They disagreed about the
91. Morrison, 15 Iowa 309.
92. For  Wright’s  political  leanings,  see  “George  Grover  Wright,”  Biographical Directory of the United
States
Congress,
accessed
May
29,
2013,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=W000759.
93. Morrison, 15 Iowa at 347-349.  Two  other  states’  high  courts,  in  reviewing  the  constitutionality  of  
soldier-voting   laws,   commented   negatively   on   the   Iowa   Supreme   Court   decision.   Vermont’s   Supreme  
Court, concluding that the constitution of that state barred absentee voting laws covering state (but not
federal)  elections,  expressly  declined  to  adopt  the  Iowa  court’s  reasoning,  declaring  “we  are  not  prepared  to  
say  it  is  sound.”  [Opinion of the Judges, 37 Vt. at 674.] California’s  high  court,  in  striking  down  that  state’s  
law,  said  in  somewhat  harsher  language  that  adopting  the  reasoning  of  their  Iowa  brethren   would  “throw  
the   whole  law  relating  to  the   construction  of   written  instruments  into  hopeless  confusion.”  [Bourland, 26
Cal. at 206.]

128

consequences of the change. To some, it had constitutional effect by violating prewar
election norms that defined the language of state constitutions. For others, it did not,
leaving legislators free to invent something that departed from tradition. Either way, all
recognized that they were dealing with something altogether new.

Seven States Take Creative Legal Steps to Meet Political Deadlines
Compounding the radical impact that the new laws had on the substance of
prewar law was a variety of inventive steps some states took in their haste to implement
voting in the field in time for the 1864 elections. As chapters 3 and 4 describe, by 1864
the political potency of the issue had become clear, particularly from the 1863 election
experiences in Ohio and Pennsylvania. From the Ohio experience, the country learned
that absent soldiers would vote overwhelmingly for Republicans. Even more importantly,
Pennsylvania in 1863 proved that Republicans could win civilian votes by blaming
Democrats for the absence of a soldier-voting law. With 1864 elections on the horizon,
states that had done little or nothing on the issue before November 1863 suddenly swung
into action.94
Seven of these late-acting states – Vermont, New Hampshire, Kentucky, Rhode
Island, Maryland, Maine, and Kansas – faced constitutional obstacles to absentee voting.
By the time they awakened to the political rewards of enacting voting rights for their
absent soldiers, with the 1864 election season fast approaching, time was running short

94. For detail on the timing of enactments, see the text accompanying notes 84-87 in Chapter 3.
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for the often-cumbersome process of constitutional amendment. 95 The time squeeze
inspired inventive legal measures in all seven states.
Three states solved the time shortage by enacting soldier-voting arrangements
limited to federal elections. This half-loaf solution was not the preferred approach
anywhere, since it left absent soldiers unable to participate in elections for state offices. It
was better than nothing, however, and unlike amending a constitution, it could be done
quickly. Vermont, New Hampshire, and Kentucky, each having concluded that its state
constitution barred absentee voting in elections for state officers, seized on the approach
as a quick way around their constitutional obstacles. Their soldier-voting laws
accordingly applied only to representatives to Congress and electors for President and
Vice President.
Vermont’s  Supreme  Court  produced  the  legal  analysis that achieved this outcome,
and the other states followed the Green Mountain State’s  lead.  Vermont’s  high  court,  in  
an advisory opinion requested by the state legislature, concluded that the state
constitution barred out-of-state voting.96 But the court added that the constitutional bar
was irrelevant to elections for congressmen and presidential electors, since the federal
constitution alone controlled that subject.

Language in Articles I and II of U.S.

Constitution, the court concluded, delegates to state legislatures the power to determine

95. Vermont, Kansas, Maine, New Hampshire, Kentucky, Rhode Island, and Maryland faced this
problem.
96. The state constitutional provision   that   created   the   difficulty   stated   that   the   “freemen”   of   each  
Vermont  town  must  “hold  elections  therein”  for  their  representatives  in  the  state  House  of  Representatives.  
(VT. CONST. of 1793, Ch. II, § 7.)
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where to hold elections for federal offices. Absentee voting legislation was within that
delegated authority, the court concluded.97
That interpretation gave the Vermont legislature a free hand to allow absent
soldiers to vote away from home in federal elections, no matter what the state
constitution said about elections. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in an advisory
opinion   shortly   afterwards,   seized   on   the   Vermont   court’s   logic   to   reach   the   same  
conclusion.98 Kentucky’s  legislature,  which  had  taken  no  action  before  1864,  recognized  
state   constitutional   obstacles   similar   to   Vermont’s   and   New   Hampshire’s,   but   did   not  
bother asking its high court for advice. It simply enacted a soldier-voting law limited to
federal elections. 99 Maine did as well, though that state simultaneously launched an
initiative, which ultimately succeeded, to amend its constitution to permit the application

97. For congressional elections, Article I requires  that  voters  meet  the  same  qualifications  as  voters  “for  
the  most  numerous  branch  of  the  state  legislature,”  but  that  speaks  only  to   who can vote for congressional
representatives. It says nothing about where they can vote. Elsewhere in Article I, the court pointed out, the
Constitution   authorizes   state   legislatures   to   determine   “the   place   and   manner”   for   electing   congressmen;;  
“the   Times,   Places   and   Manner   of   holding   Elections   for   Senators   and   Representatives,”   reads   the   U.S.  
Constitution,  “shall  be  prescribed  in  each  State  by  the  Legislature  thereof.”  (In re Opinion of the Judges, 37
Vt. at 677, quoting section 4 of Article I of the U.S. Constitution.) For presidential electors, the
Constitution’s  delegation  of  power  to  state  legislatures  is  similarly broad. Article II provides that each state
shall  appoint  its  presidential  electors  “in  such  Manner  as  the  Legislature  thereof  may  direct….”  (Id.)
98. An Act to enable the qualified voters of this State engaged in the military service of the country to
vote for electors of President and Vice President of the United States, (N.H. 1864). In an earlier advisory
opinion issued in 1863, the New Hampshire court concluded that a bill authorizing soldier voting for state
elections would be unconstitutional under the state’s   1792   constitution.   In   reaching   that   conclusion,   the  
court pointed to a provision of the constitution stating that, in choosing state representatives and senators,
eligible  voters  “shall  be  entitled  to  vote  within  the  district  wherein  they  dwell.”    Elections for other offices,
including   governor,   were   to   be   “in   the   same   manner”   as   elections   for   state   representatives.      Overall,   the  
court  opined,  the  “provisions  of  our  Constitution  …  require  that  the  right  of  voting  shall  be  exercised  by  the  
voter in person at the meetings duly held for the purpose in the places of the State pointed out by the
Constitution.”  That  left  no  room  for  absentee  balloting  for  state  offices.  Opinion of Justices, 44 N.H. at 636.
The legislature took no action in 1863 to initiate a constitutional amendment to solve the problem, leaving
insufficient time to do in 1864. When the legislature that year enacted a bill limited to elections for federal
offices, the court rendered a second advisory opinion finding the second bill constitutional. In so doing, it
endorsed  the  Vermont  court’s  approach.  [Opinion of the Justices, 45 N.H at 606 ].
99. An act regulating the manner of soldiers voting for Electors of President and Vice President of the
United States (Ky. 1863). The act did not extend to the election of congressmen. (Id. at § 1.)
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of  soldier  voting  to  state  officers,  as  well.  (More  on  Maine’s  approach  in  a  moment.)  In  
short, the Vermont gambit succeeded everywhere it was tried.100
As discussed earlier, Rhode Island amended its constitution to overcome the
prewar   provision   confining   voting   to   “town   or   ward   meetings.”   While   the   amendment  
granted  the  legislature  “full  power  to  provide  by  law  for  carrying  this  article  into  effect,”  
ratification would come too late for the legislature to act on its new authority before the
election.101 The amendment itself solved that problem by authorizing absentee voting for
soldiers, and describing  how  that  voting  would  work,  “until  such  provision  shall  be  made  
by   law.”102 The   description   provided   far   less   detail   than   any   state’s   soldier-voting law,
but  more  detail  than  other  states’  constitutional  provisions  enabling  such  laws.  It  was,  in  
effect, legislation masquerading as constitution. But it worked. For the elections in 1864,
100. The logic of the Vermont decision, and of the decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court that
followed  it,  was  not  inescapable.  Neither  decision  arose  out  of  a  contested  election,  and  neither  was  a  “case  
or controversy”   of   the   sort   that   federal   courts   have   authority   to   review   under   art.   III,   §   2   of   the   U.S.  
Constitution. Instead, they were advisory opinions provided at the request of the state legislatures. Neither
the Vermont nor the New Hampshire court had the advantage of a factual record or arguments for and
against, as they would in a case arising out of a dispute between two parties represented by counsel. The
countervailing logic, which did not surface in either advisory opinion, did find expression in a contested
federal  election  for  the  seat  representing  Michigan’s  5th  congressional  district  in  1864.  Lawyers  briefed  and  
argued both sides of that contest, albeit to a congressional committee and not to a court. Republican
Rowland Trowbridge had defeated Democrat Augustus Baldwin, with absent soldiers providing
Trowbridge’s  margin  of  victory.  Baldwin  challenged  the  outcome,  arguing  that  the  soldier  vote  should  not  
have  counted.  By  then  the  Michigan  Supreme  Court  had  ruled  that  Michigan’s  1864  soldier-voting law was
unconstitutional (Twitchell,  13  Mich.  at  127)  and  Baldwin  maintained  that  the  statute’s  unconstitutionality  
should have disqualified the soldier votes that had given Trowbridge his putative victory. The committee
ruled against Baldwin, applying the   logic   of   Vermont’s   high   court.   The   committee’s   minority   issued   its  
own   report,   arguing   that   the   “legislature”   to   which   the   U.S.   Constitution   refers   can   act   only   in  
subordination to the state constitution. The minority cited a case [Shiel v. Thayer, 2 Cong. Elect Cas. 319
(1861); Asher Crosby Hinds, Hinds’  Precedents  of  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States, Vol.
II, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907), 3-4] arising out of an 1860 election in Oregon for that
state’s   seat   in   the   House of Representatives. The state legislature had set the election on a date different
from the date fixed for such elections in the state constitution. One candidate won the most votes on the
election date set by the constitution, but another won the most votes on the date the legislature had set.
Congress  resolved  the  dispute  by  rejecting  the  legislature’s  power  to  ignore  the  state  constitution  in  setting  
the election date.
101. Benton puts the ratification date as September 10, 1864. Benton, Voting in the Field, 186.
102. An Act to Approve and Publish and Submit to the Electors (R.I 1864).
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the state enacted no military suffrage legislation, and this creative constitutional language
sufficed to support voting by absent Rhode Island soldiers.
As in Rhode Island, military suffrage in Maryland depended on a creative solution
to   the   combined   challenge   of   a   constitutional   obstacle   and   dwindling   time.   Maryland’s  
prewar  constitution  said  that  a  qualified  elector  “shall  be  entitled  to  vote  in  the  ward  or  
election district   in   which   he   resides.” 103 To eliminate that obstacle, a constitutional
convention  in  1864  crafted  an  amendment  authorizing  the  legislature  to  “provide  by  law  
for  taking  the  votes  of  soldiers  in  the  army  of  the  United  States  serving  in  the  field.”104
Recognizing that ratification would not happen in time for legislative action before
November,   the   convention   proposed   a   shortcut   much   like   Rhode   Island’s.   In   an   article  
entitled   “Schedule,”   it   permitted   absent   soldiers   to   participate   both   in   the   ratification
process and, while they were at it, to vote in elections for state and federal offices, with
the proviso that their election votes would count only if ratification succeeded. 105 It did
succeed, and like   Rhode   Island’s   men   in   blue,   Maryland   servicemen   voted   in   1864’s  
elections without the benefit of legislation.106
Kansas, too, showed legal ingenuity in coping with a time crunch in 1864. The
suffrage  provision  of  its  prewar  constitution  included  a  problematic  proviso  stating,  “nor  

103. MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 1.
104. In addition, the amendment achieved an array of even more radical reforms, including the abolition
of slavery and the disfranchisement of former confederates. MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, §§ 1, 2.
105. MD. CONST. of  1864,  art.  XII  (“Schedule”),  §  11.
106.  Maryland’s  legislature  did  act  on  its  new  constitutional  authority  in  its  January  session,  1865.  An  
Act to Enable the Qualified Voters of this State, in the Military Service of the United States or this State to
Exercise the Right of Suffrage, and to add the following Sections providing therefor to the Thirty-Fifth
Article of the Code of Public General Laws, ch. 124, 1865 Md. Laws 187. Enacted on March 23, 1865, this
was the last of the Civil War soldier-voting laws.
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shall any soldier, seaman, or marine  have  the  right   to   vote.”107 Without conceding that
the proviso applied to Kansas volunteers, lawmakers acted as if it might and proposed for
ratification a constitutional amendment to get around the potential problem.108 It stated,
“the  legislature  may make provision for taking the votes of electors who may be absent
from their townships or wards, in the volunteer military service of the United States, or
the   militia   service   of   this   state.”109 Lawmakers did not wait for ratification, however,
before enacting a soldier-voting law, passing its statute in June.110 Absent soldiers used
that law to vote in the 1864 elections. Because it was enacted before the amendment took
effect,   the   statute’s   constitutionality   was   debatable. The gambit succeeded, however.
Soldier   voting   under   the   new   law   occurred   after   the   amendment’s   ultimate   ratification,  
and the statute never faced judicial review.
It  took  a  force  more  powerful  than  the  abstraction  of  “justice”  to  account  for  legal  
changes this abrupt and this radical. Comparing  the  laws’  supposed  foundation  on  justice  
with their relatively short life span, one might wonder if justice had very much to do with
it all. Future soldiers in future wars would surely experience the same injustice unless
they, too, enjoyed absentee voting opportunities. Indeed, in a few states the laws endured.
107. KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. V, § 3.
108. One can read the proviso cited in the previous footnote either as excluding all servicemen from
voting or as applying only to the those servicemen identified in a preceding clause of the same section:
soldiers and sailors in the army or navy of the United States – presumably regulars – and stationed in
Kansas. Read the latter way, the final clause stood not as a flat prohibition of a military suffrage statute,
but as a bar to voting by career servicemen stationed in Kansas. The attorney general, Republican Warren
Guthrie, provided the state senate with a written opinion to exactly this effect, stating that before 1861 (the
state constitution  was  drafted  in  1859),  the  term  “soldier”  never  applied  to  volunteers  and  militiamen,  but  
only   to   “that   branch   of   the   national   military   service   known   as   ‘regulars.’”   Kansas   Senate   Journal,   4th  
Cong., reg. sess., February 25, 1864, 413-414.
109. Joint Resolution, to Amend Section Three of Article Five of the Constitution of the State of
Kansas,   (Kan.   1864).   The   amendment   explicitly   excluded   from   suffrage   rights   “any   soldier,   seaman   or  
marine  in  the  regular  army  or  navy  of  the  United  States.”  Id.
110. An Act Supplemental  to  an  Act  Entitled  ‘An  Act  to  Regulate  Elections,’  (Kan  1864).
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Moreover, the Civil War era laws set precedents for soldier-voting laws enacted during
subsequent wars and for more inclusive absentee voting opportunities created in the
twentieth century.111 In the short term, however, the innovation did not endure in most
states. It fizzled out with the end of hostilities, when states restored the primacy of
communities in their voting laws, notwithstanding the potential injustice to soldiers
absent in future wars.
One   can   credit   the   sincerity   of   advocates’   invocation   of   justice   and   still  
acknowledge that baser political motives certainly played a part in inspiring enactment of
the laws. Early in the war, the political motive was simply to garner the votes of the
absent soldiers themselves, and both parties saw reasons to do it. Until 1863, as the
scholarship of both Jonathan White and Arnold Shankman documents, partisan divisions
on the issue had not fully formed. In Ohio and other early-acting states, both parties
supported or opposed soldier-voting bills, and challenged the validity of the laws in
election contests, depending on their calculation of electoral benefit and harm from the
votes of soldiers.112 That calculation shifted late in 1863 as it became apparent not only
that Republicans would win the soldier vote, but also that the issue would have an even
larger impact on civilian votes. A surge in legislative activity resulted from the late
dawning of that awareness.
The following chapters elaborate on that broader political reality, ascribing the
late-blossoming political attraction of soldier-voting legislation to the unique
111. Miller, Absentee Voter and Suffrage Laws, 35.
112.  White,  “Citizens  and  Soldiers,”  5:2;;  Shankman,  “Soldier  Votes  and  Clement  L.  Vallandigham.”
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circumstances of 1863-1864 politics. It was the politics of soldiers, in which soldiers
became the most authoritative spokesmen for   both   parties’   major   campaign   themes.   In  
the politics of soldiers, soldier-voting laws took on their greatest significance in the quest
for civilian votes. After 1865, the politics of soldiers having ended, the appetite for
soldier-voting laws ended, too. As soldiers returned home, considerations of justice for
absent soldiers in future wars undoubtedly waned, as well.
It  speaks  to  the  enduring  power  of  prewar  election  norms  that  at  war’s  end  most  
states reverted to them and to a legal system in which absentee voting once again had no
place.
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CHAPTER 3
1863 PENNSYLVANIA: PROVING GROUND FOR 1864 POLITICAL
MESSAGING
Starting in 1863, soldier-voting laws played an increasingly important role in the
messaging war of Civil War politics. We shall see in Chapters 4 and 5 how powerful that
role had become in national politics by 1864. Republicans that year harnessed the soldiervoting  issue  to  fortify  their  status  as  the  “soldiers’  friends”  and  to  portray  Democrats  as  
“enemies   of   soldiers.”   That   status   underlay the more specific themes that Republicans
used to attack Democrats and their standard-bearer, George McClellan: that Democrats
including McClellan were disloyal, and that McClellan was both a coward and an
incompetent field commander. Soldiers enjoyed unmatched credibility as messengers of
those themes, so Republicans deployed the voice of soldiers in attacking Democrats and
McClellan.   The   “soldiers’   friend”   meme   undergirded   the   party’s   strategy   by  
communicating the broad affinity between Republicans and the soldiers who were so
indispensable   to   their   messaging.   Republicans’   support   for   soldier-voting laws helped
cement that affinity.
Democrats   in   1864   needed   soldiers’   voices   as   well,   not   only   to   refute   the  
Republican attacks but also to carry their own attacks themes: that Lincoln was an inept
commander-in-chief, that he neglected his own troops, and that he subordinated their
wellbeing to the interests of blacks. Soldiers spoke authoritatively on these subjects, so
Democrats harnessed the voice of soldiers  in  attacking  Lincoln.  Democrats’  opposition  to  
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soldier-voting  laws  complicated  the  party’s  claim   to   the  status   of  “soldiers’  friend”  and  
correspondingly  impeded  the  party’s  messaging.  
Most of these 1864 partisan political attack themes had been developed and
perfected   a   year   earlier   in   the   context   of   Pennsylvania’s   gubernatorial   contest.   Unlike  
most states, the calendar for statewide elections in Pennsylvania (like Ohio) was out of
phase with the schedule for nationwide elections held in even numbered years. That
unique  electoral  calendar  heightened  the  national  visibility  of  the  state’s  contests,  making  
it,  in  the  words  of  Mark  Neely,  a  “bellwether”  for  national  politics.1 So the antennae of
political operatives around the country were up as Democrats and Republicans faced off
in  the  Keystone  State’s  1863  contest  for  Pennsylvania’s  governor.  The  lessons  learned  in  
that contest would inform the strategies of contestants elsewhere when they faced off in
1864 elections. After the dust kicked up by Pennsylvania’s  political  storm  in  1863  finally  
settled down, the political potency of the soldier-voting issue became perhaps the most
important lesson of all.
The 1863 race for Pennsylvania governor pitted Republican incumbent Andrew
Curtin against Democratic challenger George Woodward. Curtin positioned himself as
the  “soldiers’  friend,”  in  juxtaposition  to  Woodward,  whom  Republicans  assailed  as  antisoldier. Democrats resisted this labeling as energetically as Republicans advanced it.
Both parties in Pennsylvania  needed  the  imprimatur  of  “soldiers’  friend”  in  1863  as  much  
as the national parties would need it in 1864, because the voice of soldiers was central to
the political combat in both contexts. The differences between Curtin and Woodward
1.   Mark   E.   Neely   Jr.,   “Civil   War   Issues   in   Pennsylvania,”   Pennsylvania Magazine of History and
Biography 135, no. 4 (October 2011): 389-417.
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over   the   state’s soldier-voting   law   became   a   linchpin   in   their   competition   for   soldiers’  
friend status.
Andrew Curtin grew up in Pennsylvania politics as a Whig, switching his
allegiance to Republican in 1860. He won the governorship in 1860 as the candidate of
the People’s  Party,  an  amalgam  of  Pennsylvania  factions  – mostly Republicans, but also
Know-Nothings, and Anti-Masons – united mainly by their opposition to Democrats. He
became   an   enthusiastic   ally   of   Lincoln   and   a   strong   supporter   of   the   president’s   war  
policies.2 His   constitutional   powers   as   governor   included   “commander-in-chief of the
army and navy of this Commonwealth, and of the militia, except when they shall be
called  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United  States.”3 While his military authority operated
at a   level   removed   from   the   direction   of   Pennsylvania’s   troops   in   the   war,   he   ran   for  
reelection in 1863 as the incumbent commander-in-chief, just as Lincoln would in 1864.
And just as Democrats in 1864 attacked Lincoln as a bungling commander, so Democrats
in Pennsylvania assailed Curtin in 1863 as an inept commander-in-chief of the
commonwealth’s  forces.  
Curtin  would  cultivate  the  “soldiers’  friend”  brand  as  a  reelection  device  in  1863,  
and his early service as governor in support of the war effort made the later branding
credible.

Even before the fall of Fort Sumter, Curtin pushed through legislation

improving the organization of the state militia. When Lincoln called for 75,000

2 . Erwin Stanly Bradley, The Triumph of Militant Republicanism: A Study of Pennsylvania and
Presidential Politics 1860-1872 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), 49-50, 89-90, 127129.
3. P A. CONST. of 1838, art. II, § 7.
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volunteers  following  Sumter,  Curtin’s  zealous  response  generated  troops  far  in excess of
the  state’s  quota,  more  in  fact  than  the  Department  of  War  could  absorb.4
Evidence indicates that Curtin indeed genuinely cared about the welfare of
Pennsylvania’s  troops.    He  pushed  the  legislature  to  address  arrearages  in  soldiers’  pay.  
He secured   pensions   for   soldiers’   widows   and   orphans.   He   or   his   representatives  
frequently visited Pennsylvania troops in their field camps and hospitals. He answered
every letter sent to him by soldiers. Soldiers of even the lowest ranks were the first
visitors   ushered   into   the   governor’s   chambers.   He   pushed   for   legislation   to   fund   the  
return  of  bodies  of  deceased  soldiers  for  burial  at  home.    The  memoirs  of  one  of  Curtin’s  
closest  advisors,  attorney  Alexander  McClure,  attest  to  the  sincerity  of  Curtin’s  solicitude
for soldiers. McClure, a practicing lawyer, former state legislator, and one-time chairman
of  the  state  Republican  committee,  wrote,  “Curtin’s  affection  for  his  soldiers  was  that  of  
the  most  loving  father  for  his  own  children.”5
If   Curtin’s   claim   to   the   status   as   “soldier’s   friend”   was   grounded   on   his  
behavior toward actual servicemen, the branding of George Woodward as the enemy of
soldiers was a political construct. It lay somewhere between, on the one hand, a cruel
caricature that stood truth on its head, and, on the other hand, a defensible inference
drawn   from   Woodward’s  political   ideology   and   his   jurisprudence.   In   either  case,  it  had  
nothing  to  do  with  Woodward’s  personal  behavior  or  attitude  toward  soldiers.  In  fact,  in  
his private life, Woodward demonstrated decidedly pro-soldier inclinations. Two of his
4. Bradley, The Triumph of Militant Republicanism, 130-132. The surplus became the Pennsylvania
Reserve Corps, which served as ready reinforcements later in the year following the federal defeat at Bull
Run. Id.
5. Id. at176; Alexander K. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: The John C. Wilson
Company, 1905), 1:497-498.
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own sons served in the Union army, and Woodward himself paid the expenses of raising
a company of volunteers for the 2nd Pennsylvania Reserves.6
We can get some feel for Woodward the private man   from   Curtin’s   ally  
Alexander McClure. Notwithstanding their political differences, McClure had come to
know   and   respect   Woodward   within   Pennsylvania’s   tight-knit legal community.
McClure   admired   Woodward   as   a   “sincere”   and   “courteous”   man.   In   his   memoirs,
written decades after the war, McClure praised him not just as a capable lawyer and
jurist, but also as being sincerely devoted to servicemen.

McClure described an

encounter he had with Woodward on a train ride from Philadelphia to Allentown during
the 1863 gubernatorial campaign. Sitting together, the two men candidly exchanged their
differing   views   about   the   war   and   politics,   “with   entire   freedom,   and   of   course,   with  
utmost   courtesy.”   The   subject   of   supporting   the   “cause   of   the   soldiers”   came   up.  
Recalling the conversation, McClure wrote in his memoir,
I reminded him that he had two sons in the army who had won distinction and
stood among the heroic soldiers of the state, and asked him whether he or I in the
opposing positions with the soldiers was best supporting the cause of the soldiers
in the field. He answered with visible pride that his sons were soldiers, and as
soldiers they would do their duty.7
Personally, then, each man – Woodward and Curtin (through his surrogate McClure) –
reasonably and   sincerely   saw   himself   as   the   soldiers’   friend.   Politically,   however,  
Republicans saw to it that the label stuck only to Curtin.

6. Erie (PA) Observer, October 3, 1863, 2; White, Washington Woodward and Black,  “A  Pennsylvania  
Judge  Views  the  Rebellion,”  201-202.
7. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, 2:55-61.
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Woodward was born in March 1809, a month after Lincoln. By 1861, he had a
long track record as a Democrat and as a jurist. He served as a delegate to the 1837
Pennsylvania

constitutional

convention,

where

he

advocated

successfully for

disfranchising free African-Americans and pushed unsuccessfully for restrictions on the
right of immigrants to vote and hold office, a position that Republicans would use against
him in 1863.8 He first became a judge in 1841, serving for eleven years on the Fourth
Judicial District where he had both trial and appellate duties. While still in that judicial
post, Simon Cameron defeated Woodward in a race for the US senate in 1845. The next
year, James Polk nominated Woodward to the United States Supreme Court, but the
president failed to push the nomination forcefully enough to overcome energetic
opposition led by Cameron, who bore grudges from the previous  year’s  senate  race.  The  
senate rejected Woodward, 29-20.9
Woodward did not slip quietly into obscurity after that setback, but resumed his
state court duties and remained an active figure in Pennsylvania politics even while
serving on the bench. He was elected associate justice to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in 1852 and ran against Curtin for governor in 1863 while still occupying this post on the
state’s  high  court.  By  then,  he  had  earned  notoriety  as  author  of  the  court’s  1862  decision  
in Chase v. Miller,   striking   down   the   state’s   prewar   soldier-voting law. That decision
became  the  centerpiece  of  the  Republicans’  argument  the  following  year  that  Woodward  

8 .   Daniel   J.   Curran,   “Polk,   Politics,   and   Patronage:   The   Rejection   of   George   W.   Woodward’s  
Nomination  to  the  Supreme  Court,”  The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 121, no. 3 (July
1997): 163, 166.
9. Id. at 163; McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, 2:62. Curtin, too, would come to suffer
Cameron’s   political   enmity   after   supporting   Lincoln   over   Cameron   for   the   Republican   presidential
nomination in 1860.
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was anti-soldier. And the year after that, 1864, Republicans would use it against George
McClellan  based  on  McClellan’s  endorsement  of  Woodward’s  candidacy  in  1863.
Woodward’s  role  in  striking  down  the  soldier-voting law was not the only count
in  the  Republicans’  indictment  of  him  as  anti-soldier. The others were his membership in
the peace wing of the Democratic Party and specific statements he made against the war
in 1861. Woodward was avowedly a peace Democrat, but not an extremist within that
group. Like others who regarded themselves as good Americans but who opposed the
Lincoln administration’s   approach   to   the   war,   Woodward’s   loyalty   was   to   “the  
Constitution  as  it  is,  the  Union  as  it  was.”    By  that  standard,  Woodward  was  no  more  a  
traitor than countless other northern Democrats, all believing themselves to be stalwart
patriots.10
Still, his prominence as a Democrat and the reservations he expressed about the
Lincoln   administration’s   policies   made   him   an   easy   mark   for   opposition   propagandists.  
Like many conservative Democrats, Woodward thought civil war invited dangerous
growth of centralized   power.   A   “centralized   despotism,”   he   wrote   to   a   friend   in   1863  
about  his  fears  that  the  country  was  headed  in  the  wrong  direction,  “would  be  the  death  
knell   of   popular   liberty.” 11 Here   is   McClure’s   distillation   of   Woodward’s   ideology:    
Woodward   “was   a   Democrat of the old school, a strict constructionist and sincerely
convinced that there was no safety to popular government in the revolutionary

10.  For  Woodward’s  comfortable  fit  within  the  mainstream  of  Pennsylvania’s  substantial  anti-war (and
anti-African-American) sentiment, see Arnold M. Shankman, The Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement, 18611865 (Rutherford, N.J: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1980), 40, 54-55, 126.
11. Letter from Woodward to Lewis Coryell, June 1, 1863, as quoted in Shankman, The Pennsylvania
Antiwar Movement, 1861-1865, 126.
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innovations   which   are   ever   precipitated   by   civil   war.” 12 He   subscribed   to   Calhoun’s  
“compact   theory,”   under   which states formed the Union in a contractual relationship.
Though he opposed secession, he supported the right of states to secede if they concluded
that the national government had violated the terms of the contract. Southern apologists
for secession pointed to contract violations as their justification, and Woodward saw their
point. He sympathized with southern slaveholders; in an 1860 speech in Philadelphia, he
characterized   slavery   as   an   “incalculable   blessing”   to   the   North.      He   agreed   that  
Republicans were  trying  to  install  a  “negro  despotism,”  as  he  said  in  a  letter  to  a  former  
colleague   on   the   state’s   high   court.   He   did   not   think   that   the   electoral   success   of  
Republicans, misguided though he believed them to be, justified secession by southern
states, and he did not believe that states having seceded had the right to attack the United
States, as South Carolina had done at Fort Sumter. He did believe, however, that each
state had a right to secede peacefully if it chose to. He thought it pointless for the North
to resist southern independence forcibly. Better to let the southern states depart the union
than   to   coerce   them   to   stay.   “We   hear   it   said,   let   the   South   go   peaceably,”   Woodward  
said  in  speech  in  1861.  “I  say  LET  HER  go  peaceably.”13
That kind of rhetoric played into the hands of Republicans eager to tar not just
Woodward, but the whole Democratic Party as disloyal. To many Republicans and their
allies in the pro-war wing of the Democratic Party, anything short of full-throated support
for the Lincoln’s   administration’s   prosecution   of   the   war   constituted   disloyalty.   There  
12. Id. at 61.
13. George Woodward, letter to Rufus E. Shapley, The Press (Philadelphia, PA), October 12, 1863;
White,   Woodward   and   Black,   “A   Pennsylvania   Judge   Views   the   Rebellion,”195-225; Speech by
Woodward in 1861, Huntingdon (PA) Globe, September 9, 1863.
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was no room in the community of loyal Americans for opposition, they sincerely
believed,   especially   organized,   partisan   opposition.      Only   “no-partyism”   sufficed.14 By
that standard, Woodward was indeed disloyal. He not only opposed the Lincoln
administration’s   war   policy,   but   he   opposed   it   as   an   active   partisan,   a   prominent  
Democrat  and,  by  1863,  the  party’s  standard-bearer for governor.
So, even without the 1862 court decision striking down the prewar soldier-voting
law,  Woodward’s  sympathy  with  the  right  of  secession  and  his  outspoken  opposition  to  
Lincoln’s   war   policy   provided   his   detractors   with   ample   ammunition   for   characterizing  
him as disloyal. But those attitudes by themselves did not distinguish Woodward from
untold numbers of peace Democrats holding the same view and do not by themselves
account  for  Woodward’s  place  at  the  head  of  the  Republicans’  rogue  gallery  of  traitors.  It  
was the court case of Chase v. Miller, together with   Woodward’s   run   for   governor   in  
1863, which earned him that distinction.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Chase v. Miller was the first of nine state supreme
court decisions addressing the constitutionality of a soldier-voting law. Authoring the
court’s   opinion striking down the law, Woodward concluded that the framers of
Pennsylvania’s  1838  constitution  went  beyond  deciding   who could vote (white, 21-year
old men meeting the residency and taxpaying requirements) and purposely made the
precise place of elections a constitutional element of suffrage, thereby putting the subject
beyond   the   reach   of   legislation   to   alter.   Woodward’s   decision   striking   down  

14. Smith, No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North, 160-162.
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Pennsylvania’s  prewar  military  suffrage  law  typified  the  approach  that  looked  to  history  
for the meaning of relevant constitutional text. (In Chase, Woodward drew on history to
establish  the  meaning  of  the  word  “district.”)  As  elaborated  in  Chapter  2,  that  approach  
predominated in the six high court decisions rejecting the laws. The court majorities in
Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire, California, and Michigan all applied reasoning
similar  to  Woodward’s  in  striking  down  soldier-voting laws, as did the dissenting opinion
by  Rufus  Ranney  in  Ohio,  where  the  court  majority  upheld  that  state’s  law.    The  majority  
opinion   in   each   case   cited   Woodward’s   conclusion   approvingly. 15 Majority opinions
upholding  the  laws  in  Iowa,  Wisconsin,  and  Ohio  distinguished  Pennsylvania’s  case  from  
their  own,  but  none  criticized  Woodward’s  opinion  as  wrongly  decided.16
From this we can conclude   that   Woodward’s   opinion   was   well   within   the  
mainstream of respectable jurisprudence. Nor did partisanship mark the Pennsylvania
court’s  approach  to  the  issue  of  absentee  voting  by  soldiers  in  any  noticeable  way.    Of  the  
five justices on Pennsylvania’s   high   court,   three   were   Democrats   (Woodward,   Walter  
Lowrie, and James Thompson) and two were Republicans (John Read and William
Strong).17 In the Chase decision,  both  of  the  court’s  two  Republicans  joined  Democrats  

15. In   the   California   case,   for   example,   Justice   Shafter   wrote   that   Woodward’s   opinion   “must   be  
admitted   to   be   a   very   able   and   almost   exhaustive   opinion,”   and   Justice   Sawyer   noted   the   universality   of  
respect  for  the  “correctness”  of  Woodward’s  opinion.   Bourland, 26 Cal. at 207, 223.
16.    Justice   Christiancy  of  the   Michigan   high  court  tempered  his  approval  of  Woodward’s  conclusion  
with   misgivings   about   Woodward’s   having   considered   “the   inexpediency   of   [Pennsylvania’s   prewar  
soldier-voting law] and the dangers to be   apprehended   from   it….”   Twitchell, 13 Mich.at 161 The
“inexpediency”  that  Christiancy  apparently   had  in   mind   was  the  risk  of   fraud  in   soldier  voting,   which   in  
Woodward’s   analysis   rose   to   a   constitutional   problem.   Christiancy   saw   that   line   of   reasoning   as having
“weakened  rather  than  strengthened”  Woodward’s  otherwise  sound  conclusion.  Id.
17.  “Walter  Lowrie,”   Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, accessed March 2, 2014,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=L000485;;   “James   Thompson,”   Biographical
Directory
of
the
United
States
Congress,
accessed
November
18,
2013,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=T000204:   “John   M.   Read,”   Find a grave.com,
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Woodward and Lowrie in the majority opinion striking down the soldier-voting law,
while one of the three Democrats, Thompson, was the sole vote to uphold the law. A
Democratic judge (John Nesbitt Conyngham) also authored the lower court opinion
upholding the law.18 In the final Chase tally, then, the political pedigree of the judges in
no way predicted the partisan alignment that would crystalize over the soldier-voting
issue by 1863. Of the six judges who considered the case, the four Democratic jurists
split 2-2 on whether to sustain the law, while the two Republicans both voted to strike
down the law. That distribution of votes hardly seemed a promising foundation for a
political attack against Democrats as anti-soldier. And the year before deciding Chase,
the high court had voted unanimously against overturning an election in which the soldier
vote was both decisive and manifestly fraudulent. That case was Hulseman and
Brinkworth v. Rems and Siner, and both Republican jurists joined their three Democratic
colleagues in lamenting the fraud while declining, on procedural grounds, to set aside the
election.19
Judicial nonpartisanship about the prewar soldier-voting law corresponded to a
broader nonpartisanship among Pennsylvanians on the issue in 1861 and 1862. By the
end of the war, the laws had become a sharply partisan issue within elective politics, with
Republicans favoring the laws and Democrats opposed. As we shall see, the Chase
decision itself would hasten the process of coalescence, after Woodward threw his hat in
Last
modified
February
33,
2006,
http://www.findagrave.com/cgibin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GSln=read&GSfn=john&GSbyrel=all&GSdyrel=all&GSst=40&GScntry=4&GSob=n
&GRid=13341442&df=all& ;;   “William   Strong,”   nndb.com, accessed November 18, 2013,
www.nndb.com/people/902/000180362
18.  For  Coyningham’s  party  affiliation,  see  “John  Nesbitt  Coyningham,”  Find a grave.com, October 8,
2012, http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=98487037.
19. Hulseman, 41 Pa. 397.
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the political ring as   Democratic   candidate   for   Pennsylvania’s   governor   in   1863.   But   in  
May   1862,   when   Pennsylvania’s   high   court   decided   Chase v. Miller, there was still
bipartisan uncertainty over the political effect of soldier-voting laws, and partisanship
around the issue had not yet coalesced.20 Voting  by  soldiers  in  several  of  Pennsylvania’s  
1861   elections,   as   permitted   by   the   state’s   prewar   soldier-voting law, sparked several
election contests. 21 Losing candidates in races for the state House of Representatives,
municipal offices in Philadelphia, and at least one county position, challenged the soldier
vote. Some challengers were Republicans and others Democrats. As historian Jonathan
H. White documents in his study of party competition for the soldier vote in
Pennsylvania, both parties at this early stage of the war viewed the matter the same way.
They favored soldier voting when it helped their candidates win and opposed it when it
contributed   to   their   candidates’   defeat.   Similarly,   the   partisan   press   viewed   the   subject  
ambivalently, with newspapers of both political stripes coming down for and against
soldier voting.22

20.   Williams,   “Voters   in   Blue:   The   Citizen   Soldiers   of   the   Civil   War,”   187,   189-90; Jonathan White,
“Citizens   and   Soldiers,”   47.      Both   Williams   and   White   point   to   Republican electoral losses in the 1862
elections as catalyzing partisanship on the soldier-voting issue, while Williams also gives weight to the
shifting suspicions of the parties about the dangers to their candidates from abuse of soldier suffrage by
military commanders.
21. There is scant evidence that any absent soldiers voted under the 1813 law in the War of 1812 or
under  its  1839  progeny  in  the  Mexican  War.    A  plausible  explanation  for  the  prewar  law’s  origins  is  that  
the legislature calculated that it would help wartime recruitment. Alexander Keyssar has identified military
security as a reason for expanding male suffrage beyond property and taxpaying qualifications, on the logic
that disfranchised men might be reluctant to serve in state militias on the same terms as enfranchised men.
This law might have grown out of a similar calculation. (Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 15.) No published
court decisions address the laws before the Civil War. When the soldier-voting issue became politicized
following   Woodward’s decision in Chase, some Republican attacks on Woodward asserted that
Pennsylvania soldiers did in fact vote under the 1839 law during the Mexican War. For example, New
Hampshire Republican William Chandler said so in his 1864 pamphlet, The  Soldiers’  Right to Vote. Who
Opposes It? Who Favors It? (Washington, DC: Lemuel Towers, 1864), 8. Chandler did not claim that any
soldiers voted under the 1813 law during the War of 1812.
22. White, Citizens and Soldiers, 50-51.
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Neither   the   widespread   judicial   respect   for   Woodward’s   Chase decision nor the
support  it  garnered  from  Woodward’s  Republican  brethren  on  the  bench  would  spare the
decision from becoming a centerpiece in the political wars that took shape starting in
1863. As Republicans (pro) and Democrats (con) staked out their respective positions
about soldier voting, the Chase decision became synonymous with Democratic
opposition.   And   after   its   author   won   his   party’s   nomination   for   governor   in   1863,  
Republicans saw to it that he became the face of that opposition.
The Democratic nominating convention chose Woodward in June 1863 as Robert
E. Lee mounted a northward offensive that would culminate in the Battle of Gettysburg
in   early   July.   Lee’s   campaign   and   its   denouement   on   Cemetery   Ridge   shaped   the  
Woodward-Curtin political campaign profoundly. 23 With the benefit of hindsight, the
contemporary political operative Alexander McClure believed that the best candidate for
the Democrats would have been General William Franklin, a career soldier with a solid
record of service in the first two years of the war. Choosing Franklin would have avoided
“the  crushing  millstone  of  actual or apparent disloyalty that always more or less hindered
Democratic   success,”   McClure   speculated   in   his   1905   memoirs.   But   peace   Democrats  
dominated the convention, and Woodward was a comfortable choice for them. He was a
familiar and respected stalwart of the party, well liked by the delegates and best qualified,
they   believed,   to   help   Pennsylvania   address   “the   gravest   constitutional   and   legal  
questions  that  would  be  presented”  at  the  close  of  the  war.24

23. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, 2: 53.
24. Id. at 54.
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For   Republicans,   the   absence   of   Pennsylvania’s   75,000 soldiers presented the
biggest challenge in the 1863 election season. The party believed most of them to be
reliable  Curtin  votes,  but  now,  thanks  to  the  high  court’s  decision  in  Chase v. Miller, they
could vote only by returning home on furlough. Many would do so, but in a state where
Democrats outnumbered Republicans by 75,000, the absence from the polls of tens of
thousands of likely Republican votes loomed as a potentially insurmountable obstacle.
The solution, devised by the Republican State Committee,   was   Curtin’s   “Soldiers’  
Friend”   strategy.   The   idea   was   to   harness   the   political   power   of   the   absent   soldiers   as  
advocates for Curtin in letters to their families and friends back home.
Republicans laid the groundwork for the Soldier Friend strategy at the nominating
convention.   The   convention   adopted   a   resolution   saluting   Curtin’s   “vigilant   care   of   our  
soldiers   alike   in   the   field,   in   the   camp,   and   in   the   hospitals”   and   offering   him   to   the  
electorate   as   the   candidate   who   “is   alike   the   friend   of   the   soldier and a favorite of the
people.” 25 Public   meetings   called   after   the   convention   to   ratify   Curtin’s   nomination  
picked   up   the   theme.   The   newspaper   notice   of   one   such   meeting   invited   “all   who   love  
their  country”  to  attend  an 8 pm gathering at Penn Square for ratifying the nomination of
“Andrew  G.  Curtin,  The  Soldiers’  Friend.”26
The Republican State Committee then organized the machinery for converting the
“soldiers’   friend”   brand   into   actual   votes.   Because   the   target   voters   were   civilian  
Democrats, the Republican organization identified Democratic families with soldiers in
the field and then organized pro-Curtin letter-writing campaigns by those soldiers. It
25. North American and United States Gazette (Philadelphia, PA), August 6, 1863.
26. Id., August 21, 1863.
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worked.  “The  army  is  known  to  be  devoted  to  Curtin,”  wrote  one  Republican  newspaper  
as the strategy unfolded,   “and   its   home   influence   can   hardly   be   overstated.”  
A  flood  of  letters  from  absent  soldiers  praising  Curtin  as  “the  soldiers’  friend”  persuaded  
enough Democrats back home to give Curtin a 15,000 majority. Alexander McClure, who
worked   in   Curtin’s campaign,   later   estimated   that   three   quarters   of   the   state’s   absent  
soldiers participated in this letter-writing campaign. Looking back on the campaign as a
memoirist in the early twentieth century, McClure marveled at the efficient
implementation of this strategy.  It  “was  systematically  undertaken  and  carried  out  with  a  
degree  of  perfection  that  has  never  been  surpassed  in  political  management,”  he  recalled  
effusively.27
Even allowing for the likelihood that McClure overestimated the level of
participation  by  soldiers,  evidence  of  the  troops’  widespread  embrace  of  the  branding  of  
Curtin   as   soldiers’   friend   certainly   abounds,   as   does   evidence   that   the   project   was   a  
decidedly top-down affair, with soldiers responding to and embracing political themes
crafted for their consumption by political operatives back home. 28 One Republican
newspaper, for example, published a pro-Curtin letter purportedly speaking for 364
Pennsylvania soldiers, each identified by name. The soldiers were all convalescing in an
unidentified   hospital,   according   to   the   letter,   and   each   one   of   them   had   told   the   “ward  
master”   in   person   that   he   favored   Curtin.      The   letter   explicitly   addressed   itself   to   the  
27. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, 2: 56-58; Tribune (Chicago, IL), October 10, 1863.
28. There is ample scholarship supporting the proposition that soldiers, in a bottom-up process, often
inspired political themes, particularly radical themes, and successfully advocated them to party leaders back
home. See, e.g., Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet; Smith, No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North;
and  Orr,  “A  Viler  Enemy  in  our  Rear,”  171-198. The Pennsylvania Republicans’  “soldiers’  friend” project,
in contrast, is an example of inspiration and leadership flowing in the other direction, in a top-down process
orchestrated by political operatives and embraced by soldiers.
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newspaper’s  civilian  readership.  “Reader,”  it  asked,  “have  you  a  son,  brother,  or  friend in
the army? If so, that one can tell you how it would grieve him if you cast your vote
against   Gov.   Curtin.”   It   praised   commander-in-chief   Curtin   as   a   “protector   of  
Pennsylvania”  against  southern  invaders  and  as  “a  friend  of  its  defenders.  We  know  him  
to  be  a  friend  of  the  soldier,”  a  man  who  “feels  for  us,”  the  letter  assured  readers.29
The same letter assailed Woodward as a pro-Confederacy traitor. Not only had he,
like   other   peace   Democrats,   embraced   as   a   motto   that   “slavery   must   live,   though   the  
Union should   perish,”   but   he   had   also   “decided   against   giving   us,   who   are   fighting   for  
your  liberties,  a  right  to  vote.”  Woodward’s  purpose  in  doing  so,  the  letter  accused,  was  
“to  aid  the  rebels  in  achieving  their  hellish  ends.”  The  letter  concluded  with  an  emotional
and pointed appeal:
We ask you in the names of our comrades who have fallen victims to this infernal
rebellion; we ask it in the names of such us [sic] are still suffering in the hospitals;
we ask it in the names of those who are wasting their lives in rebel prisons; we
ask it in the name of liberty, the Constitution, and the Union, to go to the polls and
vote for A.G. Curtin, the man who never failed us. We leave the matter with you,
reminding you that on your shoulders rest the responsibilities for which posterity
will hold you responsible.30
In another letter purporting to speak for entire units of soldiers, the commander of
the 13th Pennsylvania cavalry forwarded pro-Curtin   “resolutions”   his   troopers   adopted.    
One expressed gratitude to Curtin for  his  “constant  and  successful  exertions”  on  behalf  of  
soldiers,  proving  Curtin  to  be  “the  Soldiers’  Friend.”  Another,  taking  aim  at  Woodward,  
lamented  that  soldiers  had  been  “deprived  of  some  rights  of  citizens  by  a  decision  of  the  

29. North American and United States Gazette (Philadelphia, PA), September 16, 1863.
30. Id.
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Supreme Court, in which the candidate opposing Governor Curtin has rendered himself
conspicuous.”31
A soldier speaking only for himself wrote from a Philadelphia hospital to assure
readers  of  a  Republican  paper  that  Curtin  was  “emphatically  the  friend  of  the  soldier….  
We all want  to  vote  for  him,  if  the  copperheads  will  grant  us  the  glorious  privilege.”    In  
contrast   to   the   soldiers’   friend   Curtin,   he   added,   Woodward   was   “the   copperhead  
candidate   [who]   robbed   the   boys   of   their   right   to   vote.”32 A Republican newspaper in
Wellsboro collected pro-Curtin testimonials from individual soldiers. One, a member of
the 6th Pennsylvania  Reserves,  wrote,  “If  the  soldiers  could  vote,  I  know  Curtin  would  be  
elected.   If   you   wish   to   do   your   country   good,   vote   for   Curtin,   the   soldiers’   friend.” 33
Another   wrote   beseechingly,   “Are   you,   citizens   of   Penna,   going   to   allow   the   soldiers’  
friend to be defeated? If he be defeated, the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac will lose
their  dearest  friend  on  earth.”34 Referring  to  these  servicemen  as  “the  brave  Tioga Soldier
Boys,”  the  paper  challenged  peace  Democrats  to  listen  to  their  message.  “Do  you  hear  it,  
ye  Coppers?  Is  this  thunder?”35
A different soldier made the same point in a letter to another Republican
newspaper. Captain Harry Forster wrote to the Central Press (Bellefonte, PA) describing
himself as a Democrat. Forster claimed that his admiration for Woodward had given way
to  the  conviction  that  Woodward  held  “extreme  Southern  views”  and  “would  give  aid  and  
comfort   to   traitors.”   In   contrast,   said   Forster,   Curtin   “is   the   soldier’s   friend”   and   will  
31. Id., October 6, 1863.
32. Id., August 28, 1863.
33. The Agitator (Wellsborough, PA), October 9, 1863.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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“give  the  National   government  all  proper  aid  and  assistance.”36 Moving up the chain of
command, General George Meade added his voice to the pro-Curtin branding effort.
Meade, a Pennsylvanian himself, had become a hero in his home state as commander of
the triumphant Union troops at Gettysburg. When a unit of the Pennsylvania Reserves
presented  him  with  a  sword,  he  responded  with  a  speech  endorsing  Curtin  as  “the  friend  
of the soldier and the friend of the Government.”37
The theme found its way into partisan song. A pro-Curtin newspaper in
Harrisburg  published  a  song  implicitly  indicting  Woodward  for  opposing  soldiers’  voting  
rights  while  praising  Curtin  as  the  soldiers’  friend.  Entitled  simply,  “Campaign  Song  for  
Curtin,”  it  followed  the  tune  of  “Battle  Cry  of  Freedom”:
He’s  the  champion  of  our  rights,  boys,’  
The  soldiers’  faithful  friend,
Standing firm for Liberty and Union.
He’s  been  faithful  in  the  past,  boys,  
We’ll  trust  him  to  the  end.
Standing firm for Liberty and Union.38
Straw polls purporting to show the pro-Curtin preferences of absent soldiers
fortified the message that Curtin was the friend of soldiers. One, reported by the proRepublican Chicago Tribune, showed Curtin beating Woodward 93-15 among Union
soldiers held captive at Libby Prison in Virginia.39 Another, from a Republican paper in
Harrisburg, described the apparently viva voce polling of two Pennsylvania units at Camp

36. Central Press (Belafonte, PA), September 18, 1863.
37. The Press (Philadelphia, PA), October 3, 1863.
38. Evening Telegraph (Harrisburg, PA), October 2, 1863.
39. Tribune (Chicago, IL), October 30, 1863.
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Tyler in Baltimore. Both units purportedly favored Curtin overwhelmingly, one by 357 to
1, and the other by 323 to 10.40
The   soldiers’   friend   label   served   as   the   backdrop   for   Republicans’   contrasting  
characterizations of Woodward as anti-soldier and disloyal. Among the 1863 attack
themes that presaged attacks Republicans would mount against McClellan in 1864 was
the proposition of a symbiotic alliance between Confederate armies and northern peace
Democrats like Woodward. The southern rebels, in common with northern peace
Democrats, hoped for the defeat of Republican politicians bent on subduing the
Confederacy. The alignment of their interests, according to the Republican argument,
proved the disloyalty of peace men like Woodward. Woodward, argued a Republican
paper  in  Huntingdon,  is  “the  candidate  the  rebels  wanted  elected.”41 Reciprocally, another
Republican  paper  claimed,  peace  Democrats  “rejoice  at  the  success  of  the  rebels.   Loyal  
Democrats   remember,”   the   paper   exhorted,   “Woodward   is   one   of   them.   Remember   he  
disfranchised   the   soldiers.” 42 In a pro-Curtin speech in Philadelphia, retired Union
general   Richard   Busteed   told   his   audience,   “News   of   Woodward’s   election   would   be  
hailed   in   the   rebel   capital   (sic).”   Curtin,   in   contrast,   is   “the   soldier’s   friend,”   Busteed  
added.43
In what may be the most vituperative of all expressions of hostility for proWoodward voters back home, a member of the 42nd Pennsylvania volunteers lashed out at

40. Evening Telegraph (Harrisburg, PA), October 1,   1863.   The   soldiers   voted   after   the   units   “were  
called   into   formation”   and   asked   by   their   commanding   officer   for   “an   expression   as   to   their   choice   for  
Governor  of  their  state.”  Id.
41. Globe (Huntingdon, PA), October 21, 1863.
42. Central Press (Belafonte, PA), October 2, 1863.
43. The Press (Philadelphia, PA), October 12, 1863.
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peace  Democrats  in  his  hometown  of  Nelson.  “I  cannot  help  sending  my  compliments  to  
the  copperheads  of  Nelson,”  wrote  the  soldier,  A.  Miles,  “by  hoping  that  the grass may
refuse  to  grow  upon  their  graves  after  they  are  dead….  Their  backbones  ought  to  be  used  
to whip sheep-killing  dogs  about  the  streets.”44
Such was the commonality of interests between peace Democrats and southern
rebels, claimed Republicans extravagantly, that the Curtin-Woodward contest took on an
importance as great as the recent military clash at Gettysburg. Pennsylvania Democrats,
observed a Republican newspaper in Connecticut,
…   are   fighting   Jeff   Davis’s   battles   on   the   hustings   and   at   the   polls, and their
selection of [Woodward] as their candidate for governor was an act scarcely less
significant of their spirit than would have been the display of the Confederate flag
over the convention hall. Mr. Woodward is a disunionist, pure and simple. His
secessionist opinions have been as openly and positively expressed as those of
Jeff.   Davis   himself….      [Beating   Woodward]   will   be   a   union   victory   scarcely  
inferior in importance to that achieved at Gettysburg.45
Prominent Union general Benjamin Butler made a similar argument to an
audience in Harrisburg. Citing Richmond newspapers, Butler claimed that the
Confederacy was hatching a plot to invade Pennsylvania again, not to gather supplies for
Lee’s   army,   but   “to   give   aid   and   encouragement   to   the   Democratic Party in
Pennsylvania….  You  want  the  soil  of  Pennsylvania  to  be  free  from  the  invader,”  Butler  
proposed,   then   “vote   for   Curtin.”   A   Republican   state   senator,   T.J.   Bigham,   made   the  
same point at a political rally in Pittsburg. Lee would invade Pennsylvania again in the
fall, Bigham predicted, for the purpose of helping elect George Woodward.46 According
44. The Agitator (Wellsborough, PA), October 9, 1863.
45. Daily Palladium (New Haven, Conn.), September 10, 1863.
46 . Butler’s   speech   was   quoted   in   The Liberator (Boston, MA), October 9,   1863.   Bigham’s   was  
described in the Daily Gazette and Advertiser, (Pittsburgh, PA) September 30, 1863.
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to a Harrisburg newspaper, Democrats feared that Union military success would hurt
their candidates at the polls by liberating pro-Curtin soldiers to come home in time for the
election.  “The  Copperheads  are  opposed  to  enlisting  or  reinforcing  the  army,”  the  paper  
claimed,  “for  fear  the  war  will  be  brought  to  a  close  and  the  soldiers  come  home  to  vote.”  
It was because Woodward knew that soldiers opposed him, the paper claimed, that he
struck down the soldier-voting   law.   “The   soldiers   in   the   field   support   the   Government,  
and  for  this  they  were  disfranchised  by  the  action  of  a  Democratic  Supreme  Court.”47
Democrats fought back. A Democratic newspaper in Erie attributed   Curtin’s  
“soldiers’  friend”  image  not  to  the  heartfelt  sentiments  of  soldiers  but  to  the  conniving  of  
Republican   politicians.   It   claimed,   “prominent   politicians   are   constantly   visiting   the  
army, and by speeches and the circulation of lying documents, attempting to convince
them that Gov. Curtin has been their special friend, while Judge Woodward is their bitter
enemy.”  Democrats  operated  at  a  big  disadvantage  in  securing  the  support  of  soldiers,  the  
paper  complained,  since  “Democratic  papers  are  not permitted to be sold in most of the
camps,   while   Republican   journals   are   flooded   into   the   army   by   wholesale.”   The   paper  
encouraged   its   readers   to   reach   out   to   absent   soldiers   by   sending   them   “sound,  
conservative  newspapers.”48
Notwithstanding the difficulties Democrats purported to face in communicating
with  absent  soldiers,  the  party  managed  to  enlist  the  voice  of  soldiers  to  undercut  Curtin’s  
claim  to  be  the  soldiers’  friend  and  to  make  the  case  for  Woodward’s  popularity  among  
the troops. Sergeant U.R. Burkert of the 6th Pennsylvania reserves wrote a letter to a
47. Evening Telegraph (Harrisburg, PA), August 20, 1863 and August 23, 1863.
48. Erie (PA) Observer, September 5, 1863.
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Democratic   paper   in   his   hometown   mocking   Curtin’s   claim   to   be   the   soldiers’   friend.    
Woodward had at least as many friends as Curtin in his unit, claimed Burkert, and they
would vote for Woodward if they could.49
A Democratic paper in Erie published a letter from a Democratic soldier to his
mother  similarly   claiming,  “All   our  boys  would  vote  for  Woodward  if  they   could   get   a  
chance.”  The  letter,  signed  only  “Your  dutiful  son,”  provides  vivid  evidence of the topdown  nature  of  the  Republican  project  to  secure  soldiers’  support  for  Curtin’s  candidacy.  
The  other  day   an  Abolition   tract   man  brought   Curtin’s  pictures  to   the  camp   and  
gave   copies   out   for   nothing.   Most   of   the   men   wouldn’t   have   them   even   at   that
price, but some of us took them just for fun. Somebody stuck one up on a tree,
and   wrote   “The   Soldiers’   Friend”   over   it.   …   The   boys   then   amused   themselves  
throwing  quids  of  tobacco  at  the  picture,  and,  before  we  were  done,  Andy’s  face  
was changed into the more popular color of his favorite niggers.50
A soldier from the 5th Pennsylvania Reserves wrote from his camp in Culpepper,
Virginia, disputing   Curtin’s   claim   to   lopsided   support   in   the   army.   Signing   his   letter  
“Musket,”  he  claimed  that  straw  polls  purporting  to  show  that  Curtin  was  “the  soldiers’  
friend”  were  false.51 Another serviceman, who signed his letter to the same Democratic
paper  in  Harrisburg  “A  Private  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,”  made  the  same  point.     In  
another indication of the top-down nature   of   the   effort   to   brand   Curtin   as   the   soldiers’  
friend,  he  wrote,  “’the  powers  that  be’  are  making  a  political  machine  of  the  Army  of  the  
Potomac   for   the   advancement   of   Andy   Curtin”   by   orchestrating   meaningless   votes   of  
soldiers in the camps to give the appearance of support for Curtin among soldiers.
Soldiers   like   himself   who   preferred   Woodward   were   told   they   “can   never   expect   any  
49. Reading (PA) Gazette and Democrat, October 3, 1863. Burkett disparaged abolitionists populating
the  army  as  “smoked  yankees,”  a  term  of  derision  this  author  has  not  found  in  other  sources.
50. Erie (PA) Observer, November 28, 1863.
51. The Patriot and Union (Harrisburg, PA), October 6, 1863.
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favor   from   those   who   wear   shoulder   straps   [i.e.,   officers]….   Let   a   man   vote   for  
Woodward and he is given to understand that his life in the army will be anything but
pleasant.  O  ain’t  this  a  manly  game?”52
A  particularly  bitter  Democratic  soldier  identifying  himself  only  as  “W.C.”  wrote  
of mistreatment he had suffered for expressing anti-Curtin sentiments. While his proCurtin comrades received furloughs to return home to vote, he drew a grubby assignment
in a military prison in Baltimore formerly used to incarcerate slave criminals. Now, he
reported indignantly, most of its staff was Negro soldiers, some of whom he and other
white  servicemen  were  under  orders  to  salute.    He  wrote  derisively  of  Curtin’s  claim  to  
be   the   soldiers’   friend:   “Yes,   my   Democratic   friends,   we   are   all   here   together,   niggers  
and whites, deserters and conscripts, criminals and convalescents, all used alike. All alike
are  the  subjects  of  Abe  and  Andy,  the  ‘soldiers’  friend.’”53
One line of defense that Democrats tried to construct for Woodward was that his
decision in Chase was actually pro-soldier. By striking down the soldier-voting law,
some Democrats claimed, Woodward vindicated the very constitution that Pennsylvania
soldiers  were  fighting  to  preserve.  “Abolitionists  [complaining  about  the  decision]  would  
violate   the   constitution   the   soldier   is   fighting   to   defend,”   wrote   the   editors   of   a  
Democratic newspaper in Harrisburg.54 Another Democratic paper reminded readers that
Woodward’s   Republican   colleagues   on   the   high   court,   Justices   Reed   and   Strong,   had  
agreed with his decision in Chase. Moreover, the same paper pointed out that in the case

52. Id.
53. Democratic Banner (Clearfield, PA), October 12, 1863.
54. The Patriot and Union (Harrisburg, PA), August 17, 1863.
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of Ewing v. Thompson, it was a Republican judge on the court of common pleas who
ruled that the prewar soldier-voting law was unconstitutional. That decision had the effect
of excluding soldier votes from an election for sheriff of Philadelphia. The Democratic
candidate would have won if the soldier vote had counted. By excluding those votes, the
Republican judge effectively handed the election to the Republican candidate, the paper
correctly pointed out. Viewed in that light, Democrats argued, Woodward was no guiltier
of enmity to soldiers for his ruling in Chase than were the several Republican judges who
reached   the   same   conclusion.   “If   you   want   to   elect   the   real   ‘soldiers’   friend,’   vote   for  
Woodward,”  urged  the  paper. 55
Democratic newspapers also complained that Republicans’  branding  of  Curtin  as  
the   soldiers’   friend   masked   the   Lincoln   administration’s   widespread   abuse   of   the  
furlough   process.   A   soldier   identified   only   as   “Member   of   the   Third   Regiment”   of   the  
Pennsylvania Reserves wrote to a Democratic paper in Gettysburg claiming that
Republican  officers  convened  a  “secret  meeting”  to  learn  the  politics  of  the  regiment  and  
then granted furloughs only to the pro-Curtin   men.   “In   this   way   are   the   Democratic  
soldiers cheated out of those rights to which every American citizen   is   entitled,”   he  
protested.56 Knowing that officers granted furloughs selectively to soldiers thought to be
safely pro-Curtin, soldiers of course expressed themselves as pro-Curtin in straw polls
conducted by the same officers, claimed Democrats.57 Lopsided pro-Curtin straw polls
among   soldiers,   which   Republican   papers   hailed   as   proof   that   Curtin   was   the   soldiers’  
55. Democratic Watchman (Bellefonte, PA), September 18, 1863. The paper correctly summarized the
case of Ewing v. Thompson, 43 Pa. 372 (1862).
56. Republican Compiler (Gettysburg, PA), November 2, 1863.
57. The Patriot and Union (Harrisburg, PA), October 6, 1863; Democratic Banner (Clearfield, PA),
October 12, 1863.
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friend, to Democrats confirmed that corrupt officers dangled the promise of furloughs
only to soldiers willing to commit publicly for Curtin.
Claims and counterclaims in the 1863 contest between Curtin and Woodward
about  who  was  or  wasn’t  the  soldiers’  friend,  about  the  purported  treason  of  Democrats,  
and about the relevance of support for soldier-voting laws to those issues, all found
Woodward and his supporters playing defense, just as those same issues would put
George McClellan and his supporters on defense the following year. But, again presaging
1864, Pennsylvania Democrats in 1863 forced Republicans to play defense by asserting
that the incumbent was an incompetent commander-in-chief and that he neglected the
troops under his command, especially white troops. In their claims and counterclaims on
these issues, too, both parties relied on soldiers as their most credible spokesmen, just as
they would again in 1864.
By Election Day in October 1863, Pennsylvanians, like the rest of the Union,
regarded the repulse of Lee at Gettysburg much the way modern Americans regard it – as
a   great   triumph.   Curtin,   Pennsylvania’s   constitutional   commander-in-chief, reaped
corresponding political rewards, much as Lincoln would benefit politically from
Sherman’s  capture  of  Atlanta  in  1864.  Looking  back  more  than  forty  years  later,  Curtin’s  
close political advisor Alexander McClure saw the Union’s   Gettysburg   victory as
politically  decisive  in  1863.  “The  issue  of  the  memorable  gubernatorial  contest  of  1863,”  
McClure  wrote  in  his  1905  memoirs,  “was  irrevocably  decided  by  the  repulse  of  Pickett’s  
charge  and  the  retreat  of  Lee’s  army  from  the  battlefield  of  Gettysburg.”  McClure  added  
that   while   this   became   clear   in   hindsight,   it   “was   not   fully   understood   at   the   time,   or  
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indeed at any period during the [Curtin-Woodward]   contest.” 58 For contemporaries,
especially   in   Pennsylvania,   the   panic   and   ignominy   occasioned   by   Lee’s invasion
considerably offset the glory in repulsing the invasion. As far as Democrats were
concerned, Curtin deserved as much blame for the former as credit for the latter. They
trained   their   sights   on   Curtin’s   perceived   vulnerability   for   having   allowed   Lee to
encroach so deeply and destructively into their state.
As Lee pressed his offensive push into the north, the Union’s   Army   of   the  
Potomac frantically pursued him from the south. North of Lee, there was no organized
force in Pennsylvania prepared to meet   the   oncoming   confederates.   As   Pennsylvania’s  
commander-in-chief, that became a major concern for Governor Curtin. In May and June,
Curtin and his representatives met with Secretary of War Edwin Stanton to develop a
plan to mobilize a force of Pennsylvanians to resist Lee. They worked through issues that
might hamper the recruitment effort: assuring men they would be paid, guaranteeing a
limited term of service, and assuring the recruits that their service would be limited to the
soil of Pennsylvania. The forces they finally assembled provided a limited but valuable
service. They lacked the strength to impede Lee, but they gathered information about his
movements, which helped the Army of the Potomac plot its ultimately successful
moves.59
In other words, Curtin and the makeshift troops he helped assemble operated at
the margin of the real military action. By constitutional title, he was commander-in-chief
58. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, 2:52.
59. Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command (New York: Charles
Scribner’s  Sons,  1979),  134-140. Among the subjects discussed during these deliberations was the choice
of a commander for the new military organization. Coddington asserts that one name,  suggested  by  Curtin’s  
close confidant and advisor Alexander McClure, was George McClellan. Stanton rejected the idea. Id.
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of the forces of Pennsylvania, but he had no operational control over any of the Union
forces that engaged Lee in the battle of Gettysburg. His role at the fringe of the military
action, however, did not deter political polemicists on both sides from treating him as a
central  player.  Republicans  painted  him  as  an  architect  of  the  union’s  victory.  Democrats
treated him as the goat – the failed commander-in-chief who let Lee invade and wreak
havoc in Pennsylvania. Lincoln would face similar treatment the following year, when
Democrats tarred him as a bungling commander-in-chief.
Lee could not have gotten as far as Gettysburg had it not been for the
“inefficiency  of  Gov.  Curtin,”  claimed  at  least  two  Democratic  newspapers.60 Another
asserted  that  the  invasion,  and  the  resultant  “robbery”  of  Pennsylvania’s  farmers  by  Lee’s  
foragers,  happened  “because  Governor Curtin had not the manliness and the ability to do
his  sworn  duty.”61 James F. Shunk, a lowly private in the Pennsylvania home guard but a
prominent attorney admitted to practice at the US Supreme Court, lashed out at Curtin in
a speech before a mass rally for Woodward in Philadelphia a month before the election.
He   faulted   Curtin   for   letting   rebel   armies   enter   the   state,   and   he   characterized   Curtin’s  
collaboration with Stanton as the dithering of a feeble leader. Shunk praised the direct
response of Democratic governors in New York and New Jersey, who quickly sent troops
to   help   defend   Pennsylvania.   Curtin,   in   contrast,   went   “begging   and   pleading   with   the  
powers  at  Washington  for  leave  to  call  out  his  own  militia,”  and  as  Pennsylvania’s  peril  

60 . The Franklin Repository (Chambersburg, PA), August 19, 1863 and Crawford Democrat
(Meadville, PA), September 22, 1863, both as quoted in Shankman, The Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement,
127.
61. Republican Compiler (Gettysburg, PA), September 21, 1863.
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grew, Curtin “was   trembling   on   his   marrow   bones   before   the   throne   at   Washington.”62
One Democratic paper claimed that the very act of running for office showed that Curtin
shirked  his  military  duties.  When  he  stumped,  the  paper  claimed,  Curtin  “abandoned  his  
duties at Harrisburg  …  when  a  hand  is  needed  at  the  helm.”63
A  facet  of  Curtin’s  inadequacy  as  a  commander-in-chief, and belying his claim to
be  “the  soldiers’  friend,”  according  to  Democrats,  was  his  neglect  of  Pennsylvania  troops.  
These attacks, too, presaged claims that Democrats would make against Lincoln the
following year. One Democratic paper quoted a Pennsylvania soldier complaining in a
letter   home   that   he   hadn’t   “walked   right   since   I   got   the   rheumatism   under   one   of   his  
[Curtin’s]  rotten  blankets.”  The  same  soldier told of a friend who complained mockingly
“of  shoes  with  paste-board soles which he had got from [Curtin,] ‘the  soldiers’  friend.’”64
A soldier in the 5th Pennsylvania Reserves complained in a letter to a Democratic paper
that men in his camp lacked clothing and shoes and that their pay was in arrears, all
thanks  to  the  governor  posing  as  the  soldiers’  friend.65
Another pro-Woodward paper claimed that it was Democrats, not Republicans,
who   championed   “opposition   to   contractor   frauds   and   to   supplying   soldiers with
unwholesome   food   and   shoddy   clothing.” 66 In contrast, another paper said, Curtin
received kickbacks from suppliers of shoddy uniforms, worthless shoes, and defective

62. The Patriot and Union (Harrisburg, PA), September 21, 1863.
63. Democratic Watchman (Bellefonte, PA), September 18, 1863. Unlike Woodward, who let others
speak for him during the campaign, Curtin actively campaigned on his own behalf.
64. Erie (PA) Observer, November 28, 1863.
65. The Patriot and Union (Harrisburg, PA), October 6, 1863.
66. Id., September 5, 1863.
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blankets.67 In sum, Democrats claimed, Curtin, far from being the true soldiers’   friend,  
was  simply  “the  shoddy  candidate  for  Governor.”68
Republicans, of course, trotted out the voice of soldiers to dispute these attacks. A
soldier in the 6th Pennsylvania Reserves called accusations about shoddy equipment a lie.
“The  clothes  we  got  from  the  State,”  he  claimed,  “were  fifty  percent  better  than  any  we  
received   from   the   United   States.”   For   that   reason,   he   added,   and   because   Curtin   was  
indeed   the   soldiers’   friend,   almost   all   his   comrades   supported   Curtin.   To   be   sure,   he  
conceded, some favored   Woodward,   “but   there   are   mighty   few   of   them,   and   [they]   are  
even  despised  by  their  boon  companions.”69
In   the   Democrats’   rogue   gallery   of   Curtin   supporters,   shoddy   contractors   stood  
side  by  side  with  detested  abolitionists.  Democrats’  attacks  on  Curtin  routinely associated
him  with   both.     His  support  of   Lincoln’s  “Negro  war,”   as  they  characterized  it,  was  an  
implicit  affront  to  white  soldiers  and  an  additional  facet  of  Curtin’s  mistreatment  of  white  
troops.  Lincoln  in  1864  would  face  the  same  Democrats’  attacks for purported hostility to
white troops rooted in the emancipatory direction of the Union war effort starting in
1863.
A democratic paper in Erie claimed that Curtin and his Republican allies were
making the war into a fight for abolition, thereby elevating   “the   colored   man   to   an  
equality   in   the   ranks   and   at   the   ballot   box   with   the   white   man….” 70 The same paper
printed  a  letter  from  a  soldier  to  his  mother,  in  which  the  son  ridiculed  Curtin’s  claim  to  
67. Republican Compiler (Gettysburg, PA), November 2, 1863.
68. Democratic Watchman (Bellefonte, PA), September 18, 1863.
69. Evening Telegraph (Harrisburg, PA), October  9,  1863.  A  “boon  companion”  is  a  close  friend  with  
whom one enjoys spending time.
70. Erie (PA) Observer, September 5, 1863.

165

be  the  soldiers’  friend,  then  added,  “We  are  sick and tired  of  hearing  about  ‘the  nigger,’  
and we want to see the abolitionists put down to his level instead of having him put up to
ours.”71
A Democratic paper in Lancaster accused Lincoln and Curtin of being anti-soldier
because they subjected white soldiers to hazards on behalf of blacks. The paper
categorized the voters who the editors claimed favored each candidate. Pro-Curtin
categories  included  “Everyone  who  thinks  that  the  nation  can  only  be  saved  by  the  help  
of  negro  soldiers”  and  “Everyone  who  believes  the  negro  race  is  superior  to  the  white.”  
The pro-Woodward  group,  in  contrast,  included  “Everyone  who  believes  this  government  
was   made   by   white   men   for   white   men,”   and   “Everyone   who   condemns   the   negro   war  
policy   of   the   President   and   his   advisors.” 72 By   his   support   of   Lincoln’s   war   policies,  
including enlisting African-American soldiers into the Union army, another paper
claimed,  Curtin  had  proved  that  his  goals  were  “negro  suffrage  and  negro  equality.”73

The attack themes that Republican and Democrats deployed against each other in
the 1863 gubernatorial race between Andrew Curtin and George Woodward
foreshadowed attacks that partisans would hurl at the presidential candidates in the 1864
race. The parallel was imperfect, since Pennsylvania Democrats in 1863 nominated a
member   of   the   party’s   peace   wing   with   a   civilian   resume,   while   the   next   year   national  
Democrats ran with a pro-war candidate with a military resume. Part of the Republican
71. Id., November 28, 1863 (italics in the original).
72. Intelligencer (Lancaster, PA), September 15, 1863 and September 29, 1863.
73. Republican Compiler (Gettysburg, PA), September 21, 1863.
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attack   strategy   in   1864   was   to   tear   down   McClellan’s   stature   as   a soldier by accusing
him, for example, of physical cowardice. Woodward, never offered to the electorate as a
soldier,  avoided  that  line  of  attacks.  But  in  both  cases,  Democrats’  division  over  the  war  
opened  the  party’s  candidate  to  accusations  of  disloyalty,  either  because  (in  Woodward’s  
case) he was himself a peace Democrat or because  (in  McClellan’s  case) he allied himself
with peace Democrats.
The other attacks that Lincoln and McClellan would face in 1864 were also
familiar to Curtin and Woodward in 1863: that the challenger was a traitor, that the
incumbent was an incompetent war leader, and that the incumbent neglected and
dishonored his white troops. For all these themes, soldiers spoke with special authority,
so both parties enlisted soldiers as messengers of the themes. In both races, for both
parties, the political voice of soldiers was ubiquitous. Underlying the effort to
demonstrate   affinity   with   soldiers   was   the   parties’   struggle   to   achieve   status   as   “the  
soldiers’  friend.”  Republicans  won  that  struggle both years, in no small measure because
they succeeded in painting Democrats as anti-soldier by virtue their real (in 1864) or
purported (in 1863) opposition to soldier-voting laws.

Woodward’s  Judicial  Activism  in  Chase
We close this chapter with a look back at the Chase opinion and an intriguing
aspect of it suggesting that Woodward went out of his way to strike down the prewar
soldier-voting law and may even have flirted with impropriety in the process. Research
has uncovered no scholarship examining this aspect of the Chase decision for the light it
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might   shed   on   Woodward’s   role   in   the   case.   Indeed,   that   light   may   be   quite   dim,   as  
evidence remains murky and ambiguous. Still, such evidence as does exist points to the
irony that Woodward could have reached a sound result and avoided the political penalty
he eventually (and perhaps unfairly) paid for his decision in Chase had he approached the
case with his characteristic conservatism. He did not.
We have seen that Ezra Chase prevailed in the case because of the exclusion of
the soldier votes cast for Jerome Miller, an exclusion that the high court ratified when it
found that the prewar soldier-voting law was unconstitutional. But it is evident from a
close   reading   of   Woodward’s   decision,   and   particularly   its   discussion   of   the   case’s  
procedural   history,   that   the   court   could   have   preserved   Ezra   Chase’s   election   victory  
without reaching the constitutional issue. Most judges, and certainly most judges as
conservative as Woodward, generally prefer to avoid making unnecessary findings and to
decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds. It is worth pondering why Woodward
and the rest of the court majority chose not to do so in Chase.
The   court’s   opportunity   to   escape   the   broad   constitutional   issues   arose from a
defect   in   Jerome   Miller’s   original   petition   for   review   of   the   election   results.   As  
Woodward  explains  in  his  description  of  the  case’s  history,  Miller’s  petition  challenging  
Chase’s   win   lacked   essential   statements   of   facts.   Specifically,   it   did   not provide the
names of the soldiers whose pro-Miller votes the election judges excluded, or the places
where the soldiers cast their ballots. Nor did the petition show that the soldiers who
voted were constitutionally qualified electors, or that they cast their ballots the statutorily
requisite distance from their usual voting place (not less than ten miles under the 1839
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law).  Absent  those  facts,  Miller’s  petition  provided  no  foundation  for  a  court  to  find  that  
the election judges rejected any votes that the 1839 law would have permitted, assuming
it was constitutional.74
The  inadequacy  of  Miller’s  petition  would  have  ended  the  case  in  Chase’s  favor  at  
the lower court level, except that a remarkable thing happened. While the case was
pending at the inferior   court,   the   two   parties   solved   Miller’s   evidentiary   problem   by  
entering into a written agreement – in  legal  parlance  a  “stipulation”  – about the excluded
votes. It essentially said that if the excluded votes were included in the vote count, Miller
would win the election, and that Chase would be the proper winner only if the votes
remained excluded. The lower court concluded that this stipulation was tantamount to
filling   in   the   pieces   missing   from   Miller’s   petition.   The   stipulation   did   so   not   by  
providing any of the missing details – the names of the soldiers, the place where they
voted, their eligibility to vote, etc. – but by presupposing that all the excluded votes
indeed met the requirements of the 1839 law.75 The lower court concluded that if the
two parties had no disagreement about the factual details of the excluded votes, then there
was nothing on that subject for the court to decide; courts exist to referee disagreements,
and the stipulation reduced the disagreement between Miller and Chase to the question of
the  law’s  constitutionality.
In   addressing   the   lower   court’s   acceptance   of   the   stipulation,   Woodward   at   first  
seemed inclined to disagree. He found fault with the substance of the stipulation for its
lack of detail about the who and where of the soldier votes; on all the discrete elements of
74. Chase, 41 Pa. at 414.
75. Id. at 415.
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eligibility  to  vote  under  the  1839  law,  Woodward  noted,  “the  agreement  is  dumb.”76 “If  
we  limit  ourselves  strictly  to  the  agreement,”  Woodward  wrote,  “we  should  be  obliged  to  
say it was wholly insufficient to  support  the  [lower  court’s]  decree….”77
Woodward   might   have   stopped   there,   found   Miller’s   challenge   defective,   and  
reversed the lower court on this procedural basis without venturing into the constitutional
questions. But Woodward passed up that easy chance by giving the stipulation an assist.
“[T]o   help   out   the   record,”   Woodward   wrote   after   observing   all   the   deficiencies   of   the  
stipulation,   “we   choose   to   read   the   agreement   in   connection   with   [Miller’s]   petition   of  
complaint, and we have already seen that  it  [Miller’s  petition]  did  set  forth,  not  as  fully  as  
it ought, but with tolerable precision, the qualified character of the volunteers who cast
the  votes  in  question.”78
In other words, while the stipulation left something to be desired, it was good
enough  when  read  in  conjunction  with  Miller’s  petition  challenging  the  election  results.  
The two documents together, though they left some holes, made it unnecessary for the
court  to  concern  itself  about  the  “who  and  where”  of  the  excluded  soldier  vote.    On  this
basis, Woodward proceeded to address the constitutional issues.
This remarkable approach raises two questions that are unanswerable without
speculation, but reasonable speculation points to interesting possibilities. The biggest
question is why a conservative   justice   like   Woodward   would   choose   to   “help   out   the  
record”   in   order   to   reach   an   avoidable   constitutional   issue?   The   answer,   one   may  

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 416.
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reasonably surmise, is that he wanted to reach the constitutional issue. Perhaps he and his
colleagues recognized that they could not avoid the constitutional issue indefinitely. It
would certainly arise in a subsequent case if they failed to address it in Chase, so why not
get on with it sooner rather than later? They undoubtedly harbored lingering convictions
about the  1839’s  law’s  invitation  to  fraud,  which  they   had recognized unanimously and
lamented in the Hulseman and Brinkworth case only six months earlier. One way or
another, however, they showed eagerness in the Chase case to grapple with a
constitutional question they might have ducked.
A second question is why Ezra Chase and his attorneys agreed with Miller and his
lawyers to enter into the factual stipulation. It is easy to see why Miller agreed. He
needed the stipulation to fill factual gaps in his challenge. Miller carried the burden of
overturning the decision of the election judges, and the stipulation would help him meet
that burden. But why would Chase agree? Why would Chase lift a finger to help Miller
improve the factual record in his challenge to an election that Chase had won? Again, we
are left to speculate.
An unremarked detail in the case points to a possible, though conjectural, solution
to  the  riddle.  It  hinges  on  the  identity  of  one  of  Ezra  Chase’s  attorneys.  The  report  of  the  
case identifies   two   lawyers   arguing   for   Ezra   Chase.   One   was   “L.   Hakes”   and   the   other  
“Stanly  Woodward.”79 Hakes was undoubtedly Lyman Hakes, a prominent trial attorney
of  the  era.  He  practiced  mostly  in  Scranton,  a  city  adjacent  to   Luzerne  County.  “Stanly  
Woodward,”  was also a trial lawyer of prominence. He practiced mostly in Wilkes-Barre,

79. Id. at 405.
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the   biggest   city   in   Luzerne   County.   Remarkably,   he   was   George   Woodward’s   oldest  
son.80 This means that Justice George Woodward decided the case of Chase v. Miller in
favor  of  his  son’s client, Ezra Chase. Leaving aside  the  question  of  whether  his  son’s  role
may   have   affected   Justice   Woodward’s   impartiality   in   the   case, 81 the possibility arises
that Justice Woodward, in ex parte communications with his son or through winks and
nods that are   commonplace   between   judges   and   lawyers,   signaled   his   and   the   court’s  
desire to address the constitutional issue, which it could do only if the parties entered into
a stipulation of the sort that Chase and Miller in fact agreed to. More specifically, if
Chase’s   attorneys   were   confident   that   the   high   court   would,   if   it   could,   decide   the  
constitutional issue in favor of Chase, then they would have nothing to fear from a
80.   The   spelling   of   Stanly   Woodward’s   first   name   sometimes   appears   as   “Stanly,”   as   it   did   in   the  
Supreme   Court’s   report   of   the   Chase decision and also in a 1875 New York Times obituary following
George  Woodward’s  death.  (“Obituary:  Chief  Justice  Woodward,”  New York Times, May 11, 1875.) More
frequently   it   appears   as   “Stanley,”   as   it   did   when   he   spoke   at   a   bar   association   event   honoring   Lyman  
Hakes  after  the  latter’s  death  in  1873  (“Death  of  Lyman  Hakes,”  Scranton Law Times, December 12, 1873)
and also in his own obituaries [Yale University, Obituary Record of Graduates of Yale University
Deceased From June, 1900 to June, 1910 (New Haven: The Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor, Co., 1910), 563;
Rev. Horace Edwin Hayden, ed., Proceedings and Collections of the Wyoming Historical and Geological
Society For the Years 1908-1909 (Wilkes-Barre: E.B. Yordy Co., 1909),10:228]. In a published roster of
Pennsylvania   attorneys   practicing   during   this   era,   the   first   name   appears   as   “Stanley”   [Frank Marshall
Eastman, Courts and Lawyers of Pennsylvania in History (New York: The American Historical Society,
1922), 3:666.], as it does in published genealogical records [Horace Edwin Hayden, Genealogical and
Family History of the Wyoming and Lackawanna Valleys, Pennsylvania (New York: The Lewis Publ.
Comp, 1906) 1:17; William Richard Cutter, ed., New England Families: Genealogical and Memorial (New
York:   Lewis   Historical   Publishing   Company,   1913),   2:604].      Whether   as   “Stanly”   or   “Stanley,”   most  
references  to  him  identified  him  as  George  Woodward’s  eldest  son.  Research  uncovered  no  record  of  any  
other attorney named Stanly or Stanley Woodward practicing law in Pennsylvania during this era. It
appears  incontrovertible  that  “Stanly  Woodward”  and  “Stanley  Woodward”  was  one  and  the  same  attorney,  
the son of Justice George Woodward.
81.  While  modern  norms  governing  judicial  conduct  would  require  a  judge  in  Woodward’s  position  to  
recuse himself, no such rules applied until later in the nineteenth century. (Charles  Gardner  Geyh,   “Why  
Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again," The Review of Litigation 30, no. 4 (2011),
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/826/; Disqualification of Judges for Prejudice or Bias –
Common Law Evolution, Current Status, and the Oregon Experience 48 OR. L. REV. 311 [1969]). The
docket   materials   of   the   case   have   not   survived,   so   we   cannot   determine   whether   Justice   Woodward’s  
relationship   to   Chase’s   lawyer   was   addressed   before   the   court   rendered   its   substantive   decision.      Of   the  
countless  political  attacks  on  Woodward  for  the  “anti-soldier”  outcome  of  the  Chase case, research for this
project found none that raised the father-son relationship in the case.
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stipulation that allowed the court to reach the issue. They may have gained that
confidence  based  on  the  son’s  access  to  his  father  and  the  insights  this  may  have  provided  
about the inclinations of the father and his colleagues. Having learned which way the
court   was   leaning,   Chase’s   legal   team   may   have   concluded   that   there   was   no   risk   in  
entering into the stipulation that Miller needed. Instead of winning the case by refusing to
stipulate and thereby leaving Miller with a factually deficient challenge, Chase would
win on a court finding that the soldier-voting law was unconstitutional.
This hypothesis rests partly on facts not in evidence, as any critical observer
would correctly note. It might very well be wrong. It seems worth offering as a
possibility, however, because it has the virtue of knitting together and making sense of
three important facts that are very much in evidence. First, the court majority, we know
from the Hulseman and Brinkworth case, looked askance on the 1839 soldier-voting law
before the Chase case arrived on its docket. Their eagerness for an opportunity to kill the
law is easy to infer from that fact. Second, Chase entered into a factual stipulation that,
but for the scenario hypothesized above, was clearly against his interests. Third, one of
Chase’s  lawyers  was  Justice  Woodward’s  son,  a  man well positioned to know firsthand
of   the   court’s   inclination   to   strike   down   the   law.      The   hypothesis   connects   those   dots,  
albeit conjecturally.
What we can say without conjecture is that Justice George Woodward did reach
the constitutional issue and decided it by striking down the 1839 soldier-voting law as a
violation   of   Pennsylvania’s   1838   constitution.      He   could   have   rendered   justice   to   Ezra  
Chase without striking down that law; his opinion in the case as much as says so. Instead,
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he made an avoidable finding of unconstitutionality. Michigan Supreme Court Justice
Isaac   Christiancy,   in   reviewing   that   state’s   soldier-voting   law,   faulted   Woodward’s  
opinion   (with   which   Christiancy   otherwise   agreed)   for   evincing   “hostility”   to  
Pennsylvania’s  soldier-voting law.82 Christiancy saw the hostility  in  Woodward’s  having  
attached   constitutional   relevance   to   the   law’s   susceptibility   to   fraud,   a   matter   of   mere  
“inexpediency”   – constitutionally irrelevant – as far as Christiancy was concerned.
Perhaps Christiancy had a point, but even greater hostility is arguably evident from
Woodward’s  gratuitous  consideration  of  the  law’s  constitutionality.  
Mark  Neely  has  characterized  this  Pennsylvania  Supreme  Court  as  “aggressive,”  
having in mind the results not only in Chase, but also in the Kneedler case temporarily
striking down the federal Conscription Act of 1863.83 The most noteworthy aggression in
Woodward’s   Chase decision, however, was less in the outcome than in reaching an
avoidable outcome. While Woodward could not have anticipated it at the time, his
uncharacteristic indulgence in judicial activism doomed his later political ambitions by
saddling  him,  however  unfairly,  with  the  label  of  the  “soldiers’  enemy.”  Had  he  avoided  
the constitutional issue in Chase, the notoriety of having authored the country’s  first  court  
decision striking down a popular soldier-voting law probably would have fallen to a
justice in some other state. As it happened, it fell to George Woodward, and it fell hard.
Woodward’s   defeat   taught   politicians   nationwide   a   political   lesson, and they
applied that lesson in state legislative sessions in 1864. The timing of enactments of
82. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 161.
83.  Mark  E.  Neely,  Jr.,  “Civil  War  Issues  in  Pennsylvania:  A  Review  Essay,”  The Pennsylvania Magazine
of History and Biography, 135:4 (October 2011), 414. As to the result in Chase, Neely praises Woodward
for  having  “made  a  good  case  that  the  old  [soldier-voting]  law  was  unconstitutional.”  Id.
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soldier-voting laws demonstrates that a turning point occurred at the end of 1863. Twelve
of the twenty states that invented ways for absent soldiers to vote did so after January 1,
1864, often reversing positions taken in 1863.

The Michigan and New Hampshire

legislatures, for example, failed to pass soldier-voting bills in 1863. In early 1864, laws
passed in both states.84 The Connecticut, Kansas, Maryland, and Maine legislatures failed
in 1863 to launch the process of amending their state constitutions to authorize soldiervoting legislation. The necessary legislation passed in all four states in early 1864, all
without intervening elections.85 New  York’s  Governor Horatio Seymour vetoed a soldiervoting bill in 1863, partly for constitutional reasons but mostly on policy grounds. He
signed the bill passed in 1864, though the features objectionable on policy grounds in
1863 persisted in the 1864 bill.86 The legislatures in Rhode Island and California ignored
the soldier-voting issue in 1863. Early in 1864, the former took steps to amend its
constitution, and the latter passed a law, in both cases to permit absent soldiers to vote,
and in both cases without an intervening election.87
Concededly, the post hoc character of the 1864 activities in these states does not
decisively establish the Pennsylvania gubernatorial race of 1863 as the propter hoc.
Ohio’s   1863   election   results,   with   soldiers   voting   overwhelmingly   for pro-war John
Brough, surely played a part in sparking this national surge in enthusiasm (by
Republicans) and muted opposition (by Democrats) for soldier-voting laws. But one
84. Benton, Voting in the Field, 95-100, 206. In the Michigan senate, more Republicans (15) than
Democrats (14) voted to kill the bill in March 1863. Less than a year later, with no intervening elections,
senate Republicans all voted for the bill over the unanimous opposition of Democrats. Id. at 95, 100.
85. Id. at 177-178 (Connecticut), 109 (Kansas), 234 (Maryland), and 119 (Maine).
86. Id. at  151.  (Benton  says  of  the  1864  bill,  “It  was  open  to  the  same  objections  as  the  Act  of  1863  and  
yet  Seymour  signed  it.”)
87. Id. at 182 (Rhode Island), and 128 (California).
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cannot dismiss the likelihood that the unwitting hand of George Woodward played a big
part.   His   judicial   exertions   against   Pennsylvania’s   law,   and   Republicans’   masterful  
cultivation  of  Curtin’s  status  of  “the  soldiers’  friend”  based  largely  on  what  Woodward  
had done on the bench, opened political eyes everywhere to the potency of soldier-voting
laws in the political messaging wars taking shape in 1864.
Ironically, then, champions of absentee soldier voting had George Woodward to
thank for advancing their cause, however unintentionally he performed that role.
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CHAPTER 4
THE INDISPENSABLE VOICE OF SOLDIERS IN THE MESSAGING
WARS OF 1864
Andrew Dickson White led a life of impressive accomplishment. Before the Civil
War, he taught history and English at the University of Michigan, where among other
things he organized a student project to   plant   elms   on   the   campus   “Diag,”   which   was  
barren when White first saw it and became handsomely tree lined thanks to him. 1 Shortly
after the war, he co-founded Cornell University with his wealthy friend and fellow New
York state senator, Ezra Cornell. White  became  Cornell’s  first  president,  serving  in  that  
post from 1866 till 1885.

He was popular with students there, as he has been at

Michigan.   In   a   tradition   that   long   outlasted   Dickson’s   tenure   as   president,   all   Cornell  
students with the last name White, no matter what their given name, earned the nickname
“Andy.”      Post-Cornell, he added to the luster of his curriculum vitae. In 1884, White
became the first president of the American Historical Association. He served as president
of the U.S. delegation to The Hague Peace Conference (1889), minister to Russia (189294), and twice as US ambassador to Germany (1879-81 and 1897-1902).2
Having  led  such  a  distinguished  life,  perhaps  it  should  not  surprise  us  that  White’s  
exertions as a Republican partisan in 1864 barely register in his lengthy 1904
autobiography, or that the pro-Lincoln pamphlet he wrote about soldier-voting laws fails
to register at all. Was the pamphlet simply too trivial to merit mention in the memoirs of

1 .Margaret   Buranen,   “Tree’s   Company,”   Michigan Today, September 17, 2013,
http://michigantoday.umich.edu/a8696/ .
2 .   “Legacy   of   Leadership:   Cornell’s   Presidents”   Cornell, accessed October 19, 2013,
http://rmc.library.cornell.edu/presidents/view_item.php?sec=3&sub=8;;   “In   the   Founders   Footsteps:  
Builders of the Cornell University   Library,”   Cornell, accessed October 19, 2013,
http://rmc.library.cornell.edu/footsteps/exhibition/buildingcollections/buildingcollections_8.html.
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such an accomplished man? Or instead could the omission owe to sheepishness White
may have felt in 1904 about his writings as a youthful political operative forty years
earlier? His anti-McClellan pamphlet was a work of political propaganda, full of
distortions and smears. To be sure, distortions and smears did not violate prevailing
norms of political combat, which accepted a degree of mendacity as an inevitable part of
partisan polemics. 3 But they hardly comported with the norms of a distinguished
historian and man of letters, and they fell short of the dignity and integrity a man of
White’s  distinction  would  want   associated  with  his  name  as  he  looked  back  on  his  life.  
That might explain his preference to sweep his 1864 project under the rug, or perhaps
somehow to purge the pamphlet from his own recollections. But whether or not the
pamphlet  secured  a  place  in  White’s  memory,  it  deserves  a  place  in  ours.4
White entitled his pamphlet Political Dialogues: Soldiers on Their Right to Vote,
and the Men They Should Support.5 He wrote it at age 32 while serving in the New York
state senate. It is a fictional play, set in an encampment of Pennsylvania soldiers serving
near Atlanta in 1864. The play has no action, just conversation. The cast members are all
nameless soldiers, identified only by their rank and home state. Some are Republicans,
some  Democrats,  but  they  all  agree  on  the  pamphlet’s  central  message:  traitorous  “peace  
men”  have  captured  the   formerly  honorable  Democratic  party,  and  their  1864  standard-

3. See generally, Martin Jay, The Virtues of Mendacity: On Lying in Politics (Charlottesville: University
of Virginia Press, 2010).
4 . Andrew Dickson White, Autobiography of Andrew Dickson White, (New York: The Century
Company, 1904), 1:122. Of his  role  in  the  1864  campaign,  White  wrote  only  that  he  “tried  to  do  my  duty  in  
speaking through my own and adjacent [state senate] districts, but there was little need of speeches; the
American people had made up their minds, and they reelected Mr. Lincoln   handily.”   Id. He makes no
mention of his pamphlet.
5. Andrew Dickson White, Political Dialogues: Soldiers on Their Right to Vote, and the Men They
Should
Support,
(1864;
The
Cornell
University
Library
Digital
Collections)
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pagevieweridx?c=mayantislavery;idno=39923010;view=image;seq=1 (Hereafter cited as Political Dialogues.)
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bearer George McClellan is now guilty of treason by his association with them. They
have proved their treason by opposing soldier-voting   laws.   To   the   soldiers   in   White’s  
play, that makes them ipso facto anti-soldier and pro-rebellion.
Over  the   course  of  White’s  play,  soldiers   from   other states drift by and join the
Pennsylvanians   in   their   “dialogues.”      Ohioans   arrive   first,   followed   by   Michiganders,  
Wisconsinites, Minnesotans, Illini, Hoosiers, and New Yorkers. One at a time, each
group   adds   its   own   account   of   the   Democratic   Party’s   perfidious opposition to soldiervoting laws. All concur with the Pennsylvanians that by opposing military suffrage,
Democrats in each state had revealed their hostility to soldiers and their affinity to the
Confederacy. And they all agree that McClellan had thrown in with the traitors.
The   Pennsylvanians   are   alone   in   the   play’s   first   scene,   talking   about   soldiervoting rights in that state. Here White introduces George Woodward of the Keystone
State’s  Supreme  Court. Woodward is the key villain and the linchpin  of  White’s  thesis  of  
Democratic sedition. A captain of the Pennsylvania regiment, leading the discussion,
explains to the small gathering that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had struck down the
state’s   prewar   soldier-voting   law,   ruling   that   soldiers   “had   no   right   to   vote.”   An  
incredulous private asks the captain who could possibly have rendered such an opinion.
“It  couldn’t  have  been  any  soldier’s  friend,”  observes  the  inquiring  private.  “It  must  have  
been   some   rebel   sympathizer.”      The   captain   responds,   “You   are   correct.   It   was   George  
Woodward.”6
George   Woodward   had   indeed   authored   the   Pennsylvania   high   court’s   decision  
striking down the only extant soldier-voting  law  in  the  country  in  1862.  White’s  play  tars  
all  “peace  Democrats”  as  proven  enemies  of  Union soldiers, but it gives Woodward top
6. White, Political Dialogues, 2.
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billing  as  the  prime  saboteur  of  soldiers’  voting  rights.  Woodward  was  the  perfect  foil  for  
such polemics, tailor-made for the caricature of Democrats as anti-soldier traitors.
Republican polemicists and newspaper editors had a field day portraying him as an
enemy of Union soldiers and the Union cause.
Like much political polemics, it stood on a weak substantive foundation. As we
saw in Chapter 3, Woodward was an outspoken peace Democrat, but he was hardly antisoldier in any personal sense. Two of his sons served in the Union army, and Woodward
himself paid the expenses of raising a company of volunteers for the 2nd Pennsylvania
Reserves.7 His   hostility   to   the   administration’s   war   effort   was   well   within   mainstream
Democratic thought. Though he opposed secession, his opposition rested on standard,
conservative Democratic orthodoxy.8
Other   jurists   who   shared   Woodward’s   political   views   and   who,   like   Woodward,  
had found constitutional flaws in soldier-voting statutes, did not become whipping boys
for Republican attacks quite the way Woodward did. Rufus Ranney of the Ohio Supreme
Court   and   Chief   Justice   Joel   Hinman   of   Connecticut’s   high   court,   for   example,   were  
Democrats who found constitutional infirmities in their respective  state’s  soldier-voting
laws. Both came under some fire from Republicans for doing so, but not on the national
scale or with the vituperation that Woodward experienced. 9 What made Woodward

7. Erie (PA) Observer, October 3, 1863, 2.
8. Letter from Woodward to Rufus E. Shapley, Philadelphia Press, October 12, 1863; Speech by
Woodward   in   1861,   saying   inter   alia,   “We   hear   it   said,   let   the   South   go   peaceably.   I   say   LET   HER   go
peaceably.”   Globe (Huntingdon, PA), September 9, 1863. Jonathan White offers the best analysis of
Woodward’s  political  thought.  White,  Woodward  and  Black,  “A  Pennsylvania  Judge  Views  the  Rebellion,”  
195-225.
9. A Connecticut newspaper slammed Hinman for concurring   in   the   court’s   ruling   that   the   soldiervoting  law  was  unconstitutional,  noting  that  Hinman  was  “a  member  of  the  Copperhead  McClellan  party.”  
Daily Palladium (New Haven, Conn.), October 5, 1864. But even that paper devoted more space to
attacking Woodward than Hinman.
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special? Why did Andrew Dickson White make Woodward the first of the villains
assailed as a traitor in his play about soldier-voting laws?
There are four elements to the answer, adding up to a perfect storm of political
vulnerability for Woodward. First was his priority in time. Pennsylvania had the only
soldier-voting law on the books at the outbreak of the war, so its law was the first to
come under judicial scrutiny. In Chase v. Miller, Woodward authored the Supreme Court
opinion striking down the law as unconstitutional. This brought national attention to him
(though not to the two Republican justices who joined his opinion). 10 Second, while
many jurists came to the bench from backgrounds in elective politics, Woodward entered
the political fray while still on the bench by running as the Democratic candidate for
governor of Pennsylvania in 1863, at a time when his opinion in the soldier-voting case
was still fresh. That move brought Woodward national attention, particularly because
Pennsylvania’s   statewide   elections   occurred   in   what   was   an   “off   year”   in   most   other
states. In the election, Republicans used his decision against the soldier-voting law as
“proof”   that   he   was   “anti-soldier,”   in   contrast   to   the   Republican   incumbent,   Andrew  
Curtin,   who   branded   himself   successfully   as   “the   soldier’s   friend.”   After   the   1863
election,   Republicans   attributed   Woodward’s   views,   or   more   accurately   their   caricature  
of his views, to the entire Democratic Party, because now Woodward was as conspicuous
in Democratic politics as he was on the judiciary. Democrats became saddled with
Woodward’s   opinion   in   the   soldier-voting case, making them traitorous enemies of the
soldier, according to Republican rhetoric.
Third, shortly after the gubernatorial election, Woodward became entangled in an
additional hot potato case about soldiers and the war. In an eagerly awaited opinion, not
10. Chase, 41 Pa.at 418.
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issued until after the election, he joined a 3-2 court majority in striking down the federal
Conscription   Act   of   1863   as   unconstitutional.   The   draft   exceeded   Congress’s   authority  
under Article I, the state court ruled. The opinion was short-lived, as a reconstituted court
reconsidered and reversed itself before issues of federal supremacy boiled over. But
Woodward remained on the court and stuck to his original view of the matter.11 This
gave Republicans in 1864 even more ammunition for attacking him and Democrats as
hostile   to   the   Union   cause   and   “anti-soldier,”   on   the   logic   that   the   union   cause   and  
incumbent soldiers needed the reinforcements that the Conscription Act promised.
Finally, Woodward unwittingly offered Republicans in 1864 an easy avenue for
attacking their real target, George McClellan. In October 1863, in a blunder that haunted
McClellan for the following twelve months, the politically ambitious general wrote a
letter   endorsing   Woodward’s   candidacy for governor. The Philadelphia press had
erroneously reported that McClellan supported the Republican candidate, Andrew Curtin.
Knowing that the rumor would hurt his political aspirations as a Democrat, McClellan
wrote to the chairman of the Democratic Party’s  State  Central  Committee  in  Philadelphia,  
Charles Biddle, to set the record straight. His letter first denied the rumor. Then it went
the additional step of affirmatively supporting Woodward with the following regrettable
passage:  “I  desire  to  state clearly and distinctly that, having some few days ago had a full
11. The case was Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (1863). It was brought on behalf of Henry Kneedler and
two other Pennsylvania men who had been drafted under the authority of the 1863 Conscription Act. The
court’s  majority  concluded  that  in  fighting  the  Confederacy,  Congress  could  act  only  in  the  way  the  U.S.
Constitution  specifically  authorized  to  “suppress  Insurrections.”    That  was  by  “calling  forth  the  Militia”  of  
one or more states. (Article I, section 8). The  Conscription  Act  did  not  “call  forth”  state  militias,  but  instead  
drafted civilians directly into US military service. The case never got to the U.S. Supreme Court because
the Pennsylvania court reversed itself in early 1864 after Chief Justice Lowry, who voted with Woodward
to strike down the draft, lost his bid for re-election. Daniel Agnew, an avid Unionist, replaced Lowry,
giving a 3-2   majority  in   favor  of  the   Conscription   Act’s  constitutionality.  The  second   Kneedler decision,
over  Woodward’s  dissent,  reasoned  that  Congress  had  unlimited  power  under  section  8  of  Article  I  “to  raise  
and  support  Armies.”  For  an  analysis  of  the  two   Kneedler opinions, see J.L. Bernstein, Conscription and
the Constitution: The Amazing Case of Kneedler v. Lane, 53 A.B.A. J. 708 (1967).
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conversation with Judge Woodward, I find that our views agree, and I regard his election
as  Governor  of  Pennsylvania,  called  for  in  the  interests  of  the  Nation.”12
Republicans pounced and never let up. They claimed that by agreeing with
Woodward’s   views   after   a   “full   conversation,”   McClellan   had   confessed   to   holding   all  
the traitorous, anti-soldier positions that Woodward (supposedly) held. Never mind that
elsewhere in the letter McClellan asserted that he and Woodward were of the same mind
in wanting to restore the Union and preserve the constitution, or that in context his
statement  that  “our  views  agree”  meant  that  they  agreed  on  those  points.    Starting  in  1863  
and continuing through the 1864 election season, Republican newspapers and polemicists
quoted only the damning passage, which taken alone was unqualified in its endorsement
of   Woodward’s   “views.”   His   detractors   said   it   proved   that   McClellan,   like   Woodward  
and other peace Democrats, was hostile to soldier voting, and hence to soldiers, and
hence   was   disloyal.   Democrats’   purported   scruples   about   constitutionalism   were   mere  
“cover”   for   their   antipathy   toward   soldiers   and   overall   perfidy,   according   to   the  
Republican line of attack.13
That was  exactly  how  Andrew  Dickson  White  used  McClellan’s  endorsement  in  
his  play.    Let’s  return  to  the  scene  of  White’s  Pennsylvania  soldiers  talking  politics.  The  
private asks if it was true that McClellan had endorsed Woodward. The corporal answers
by reciting  the  fateful  passage  of  McClellan’s  letter,  word  for  word.  If  McClellan  said  his  
“views   agree”   with   Woodward’s,   argues   the   captain,   “I   can’t   see   how   to   avoid   the  
conclusion   that   what   one   has   said   the   other   approved,   and   that’s   what   I   can’t   do.”   “It  

12. George McClellan to Charles J. Biddle, October 12, 1863, in The Civil War Papers of George B.
McClellan: Selected Correspondence, 1860-1865, ed. Stephen W. Sears (New York: Ticknor & Fields,
1989), 558-559.
13.  “Who  Refuse  Justice  to  the  Soldiers?”  Daily Palladium (New Haven, Conn.), October 5, 1864.
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comes  to  this,”  the  sergeant  concludes,  “Little  Mac  [i.e.,  McClellan]  has  given  us  up  and  
gone   over,   either   in   whole   or   in   part,   and   it   don’t   make   much   difference   which,   to   the  
Chicago  peace  party….  When  he  was  fighting  with  us  for  the  Union  and  the  old  flag, I
was   for   him.   But   I   ain’t   for   any   man   who   would   give   ‘his   voice   and   vote   to  
Woodward.’”14
And   what   specifically   were   the   “views”   of   Woodward   with   which   McClellan  
agreed,   according   to   the   soldiers   in   White’s   play?      The   purported   agreement   was  
complete, extending  even  to  Woodward’s  supposed  view  that  soldiers  were  unworthy  of  
the   vote.   The   captain   cites   language   in   Woodward’s   opinion   in   Miller v. Chase stating
that the soldier-voting  law  “opens  a  wide  door  for  the  most  odious  fraud.”    In  fact,  as  we  
saw in Chapter 2, Woodward made that point (which he premised on a judicial finding of
such fraud in an earlier case) to support his conclusion that the law violated the anti-fraud
spirit   of   the   constitution’s   suffrage   provision.   But   White’s   play   omits   that   context. In
complaining about the risk of fraud, says the captain in the dialog, Woodward reveals a
belief that soldiers are prone to committing fraud. The captain paraphrases Woodward:
“We   can’t   act   as   upright   citizens,   because   we   are   soldiers!”   The   captain   then cites
Woodward’s   reasoning   that   the   constitutional   requirement   to   vote   in   person   in   the  
election   district   was   designed   “to   secure   the   purity   of   elections.”   So,   continues   the  
captain,  Woodward  must  believe  “we  are  not  as  pure  as  those  at  home  – can’t  be trusted
to  do  right  abroad!  Now  my  lads,  I  tell  you  that  is  infamous.”15
By  embracing  Woodward’s  “views,”  in  other  words,  McClellan  had  proved  both  
his hostility to soldier-voting laws and to soldiers generally, and hence his disloyalty to

14. White, Political Dialogues, 6. (Italics in the original.)
15. Id. at 2.
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the Union. White expands on these themes as he brings soldiers from other states to join
the Pennsylvanians. A lieutenant colonel from Michigan describes Democratic opposition
to the soldier-voting  bill  in  that  state,  including  one  legislator’s  view  that  soldier  voting  
represented  a  “corrupting  process.”  The  Pennsylvania  captain  responds,  “Why  all  that  is  
Woodward  over  again.”  And  because  McClellan  agrees  with  Woodward,  McClellan  must  
agree   with   the   Michigan   Democrats,   too.   McClellan   can’t   duck   or   straddle   the   issue.  
“There is no half-way  house  for  him  or  any  man  to  stop  at,”  says  the  captain.  In  the  same  
vein,   an   adjutant   from   Wisconsin   relates   Democratic   opposition   to   that   state’s   law,  
describing  the  party’s  concern  about  the  dangers  and  mischief  attendant  to  soldier  voting
as  nothing  more  than  “the  Woodward-McClellan  objection  over  again.”16
Woodward  wasn’t  the  only  Democratic  traitor  whom  McClellan  cozied  up  to,  in  
White’s   telling.   Clement   Vallandigham   of   Ohio,   Horatio   Seymour   of   New   York,   and  
George Pendleton of Ohio (McClellan’s   running   mate)   all   qualified   as   rebel-loving,
soldier-hating   Copperheads   in   the   eyes   of   the   soldiers   populating   White’s   play.   By   his  
association with them, as with Woodward, McClellan had become guilty of those sins
himself, as had the entire Democratic Party. The Pennsylvania captain lamented the
Democracy’s  decline  into  sedition.   “The  old   party   was  one  of  principle,”  he  said.  “The  
thing that takes its name is a humbug – worse,   a   nest   of   treason.”      And   McClellan,  
“defiled   by   association”   with   so   many   Copperheads,   “got   an   appetite   for   the   food   of  
traitors.”17
Like  Woodward,  each  of  the  other  villains  in  White’s  play  opposed  soldier  voting  
and  therefore,  in  the  words  of  the  play’s  unnamed  private  from  Pennsylvania,  each,  like  

16. Id. at 9.
17. Id. at 11-12.
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Woodward,   “couldn’t   have   been   any   soldier’s   friend.”18 In the Civil War, even more
than  in   other  wars,  it  behooved  every  politician   to   be  seen   as  the  soldiers’  friend,  or  at  
least not as their enemy. Soldiers were central not only to the core activity of the war –
fighting – but also to the political combat that the war stirred. Their centrality went far
beyond their potency as a voting bloc, although it certainly included that. More
importantly,  soldiers  had  expertise  on  the  subjects  at  the  heart  of  the  parties’  main  attacks  
on each other – treason, cowardice, military incompetence, and indifference to the troops.
It   was   essential   for   the   parties   to   enlist   soldiers’   support   for   these   themes.   But   a   party  
could not plausibly enlist soldiers to endorse these messages without first gaining
credibility  as  the  soldiers’  friend.    Likewise,  if  the  party  and  its  candidates  could  secure  
the  mantle  of  the  soldier’s  friends,  the  opposing  party’s  attacks  lost  much  of  their  steam.  
So if, as White argued in his pamphlet, only supporters of soldier voting qualified as the
friend of soldiers, then Republicans had Democrats at a big disadvantage.
Democrats   had  learned  the  power  of  the   “soldiers’  friend”  meme  in   1863  in   the  
Pennsylvania gubernatorial race.

Republicans cast incumbent Andrew Curtin, who

supported soldier-voting  legislation,  as  the  soldier’s  friend  and  Woodward  as  traitorously  
anti-soldier   for   striking   down   Pennsylvania’s   prewar   soldier-voting statute and ruling
against the draft. The main purpose of this messaging was not to secure the votes of
Pennsylvanian soldiers; the Chase v. Miller ruling meant that few soldiers could vote in
the 1863 elections. The real purpose was to mobilize civilian indignation against
Woodward  as  “anti-soldier”  and  civilian votes for Curtin. Alexander McClure, chairman
of   Pennsylvania’s   Republican   state   committee,   marveled   at   the   effectiveness   of   the  
Pennsylvania   Republicans’   “soldiers’   friend”   strategy.   It   was,   he   said,   “systematically  
18. White, Political Dialogues, 2.
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undertaken and carried out with a degree of perfection that has never been surpassed in
political   management.”      A   key   element   of   the   strategy   was   to   organize   soldiers   in   the  
field to write home to voting friends and relatives expressing support for Curtin as the
“friend  of  the  soldier.”  It  worked  brilliantly.  Curtin  won  in a predominantly Democratic
state, and according to McClure the Republican effort to harness soldiers as pro-Curtin
political  messengers  “turned  the  scales”  of  the  election.19
Republicans repeated the successful 1863 Pennsylvania strategy on a national
scale   in   1864.   They   cast   Lincoln   as   the   soldier’s   friend   and   savaged   Democrats   who  
opposed soldier-voting  laws  (and  McClellan  by  association  with  them)  as  “enemies  of  the  
soldiers.”    This  was  the  thrust  of  White’s  pamphlet.  Another  1864  pamphlet,  prepared  for
the  Union  Congressional  Committee,  made  the  same  point,  but  without  White’s  fictional  
soldiers serving as the spokesmen. Written by a New Hampshire Republican, William E.
Chandler, it carried the title The  Soldiers’  Right  to  Vote.  Who  Opposes  It?  Who  Favors
It? Much   as   White   had   done,   Chandler   reviewed   each   state’s   political   struggles   over  
soldier-voting bills, scornfully highlighting the pattern of Democratic Party opposition
and  praising  Republican  support.  He  treated  the  parties’  position  on  soldier-voting laws
as a proxy for their position about soldiers themselves, and hence as a test of loyalty. The
pamphlet’s  two  concluding  sections  are  entitled  “Abraham  Lincoln  and  Andrew  Johnson  
Are   Friends   of   the   Soldiers’   Right   to   Vote”   and   “George   B.   McClellan   and George H.
Pendleton  Are  Enemies  of  the  Soldiers’  Right  to  Vote.”20
The  accusation  of  both  White’s  pamphlet  and  Chandler’s  was  that  Democrats  in  
general and McClellan in particular opposed soldier-voting laws because they were

19. McClure, Old Time Notes, 2:56-58.
20. Chandler, The Soldiers’  Right  to  Vote, 13-14.
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traitors. This was part of a larger attack by Republicans on their rivals as disloyal. Other
Republican attack themes, as we shall see, were that McClellan was inept as a military
leader, and that he was a coward, both morally and physically. On each of these partisan
themes, soldiers enjoyed unparalleled credibility as spokesmen.

As paradigmatic

patriots, soldiers spoke with unique authority on matters of treason and loyalty. Soldiers
understood military competence better than civilians, so who better than soldiers to assail
McClellan as an inept battlefield leader? And as the embodiment of courage, soldiers
presumably knew a coward when they saw one, so Republicans enlisted the testimonials
of soldiers to condemn McClellan on that score, too.
By the same token, Democrats enlisted the voice of soldiers in rebutting
Republican  claims  of  McClellan’s  treason,  incompetence,  and  cowardice.    Democrats  had  
attack themes of their own, and soldiers were uniquely qualified as messengers of these,
as well. Lincoln was a blundering commander-in-chief, they claimed. The war would
have been over and won but for his incompetence. The voice of soldiers – expert as they
were on military competence – obviously added special heft to that critique. Moreover,
Democrats insisted, Lincoln neglected the troops, especially white troops. Their
equipment  was  “shoddy”  and  their  medical  care  poor.    After  Lincoln  sacked  McClellan,  
less skilled leaders than Little Mac subjected soldiers to butchery on the battlefield.
Lincoln sacrificed them in a cause – emancipation – that they never signed up for and that
subordinated them to the interest of black men. These were matters that soldiers could
speak to with authority, and Democrats made sure they did. For the same reason,
Republicans enlisted the voice of soldiers   in   defending   Lincoln   from   the   Democrats’  
charges.
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Each of these Republican and Democratic attack themes was an inevitable
outgrowth of the structure of the political contest of 1864 – of the way the political stage
was set. As always in politics, each party suffered political vulnerabilities that the other
party attacked. The main Republican vulnerability was that war had dragged on too long.
The effort to put down the rebellion had not yet succeeded and, as the parties organized
for the elections in 1864, the war was going poorly for the North. This set up the
Democrats’  charge  that  Lincoln  was  a  blundering  war  leader.  (That  theme  lost  much  of  
its punch late in the election season, when Union forces enjoyed a string of victories,
highlighted by Sherman’s  capture  of  Atlanta  in   early  September.    But   Democrats   never  
abandoned  the  argument.)  Lincoln’s  supposed  indifference  to  the  troops  was  an  egregious  
facet  of  his  overall  incompetence,  in  the  Democrats’  messaging.
Democrats’   vulnerabilities   grew   out of their intra-party division about the war.
American wars always inspire at least some dissent, and the dissent is always met with at
least some accusations of disloyalty. Federalists who opposed the War of 1812 faced
accusations of disloyalty, as did Whigs who opposed the Mexican War. During World
War I universities now thought of as bastions of liberalism fired faculty members for
voicing opposition to that war.21 So the Civil War was hardly unique in sparking dissent
and countercharges of disloyalty. When wartime dissent splits a major political party
during  an  incumbent  president’s  reelection  campaign,  as  it  did  in  1864  (and  also  in  1972  
and 2004), accusations of disloyalty inevitably become a campaign problem that the
challenging party must manage. The party supporting the war predictably brands the
entire opposition as disloyal. Democrats in 1864 tried to solve the disloyalty problem by

21.  See  Eric  Foner,  “Dare  Call  It  Treason,”  The Nation, June 2, 2003. The university Foner identifies in
this article is his own: Columbia.

189
choosing a pro-war standard bearer with a biography of military service, George B.
McClellan. That choice prompted   Republicans   to   seek   ways   to   diminish   McClellan’s  
stature as a soldier. They did so by attacking him as a coward and as an incompetent
commander. The voice of soldiers played a big role in carrying all these political attacks
against McClellan.
So it was that the politics of 1864 became the politics of soldiers. Soldiers of all
ranks  were  central  to  the  messaging  of  both  parties.    Each  party  vied  for  the  title  “friend  
of  the  soldier”  and  disputed  the  rival  party’s  claim  to  that  status.  The  voice  of  the  soldier
became an indispensable weapon in the political combat between Republicans and
Democrats, and particularly in the contest between Lincoln and McClellan.
History has not been kind to George McClellan. It has defined him mostly in
juxtaposition to three iconic figures, with comparisons that inevitably doom McClellan to
a second-class  station  in  the  national  memory.    Robert  E.  Lee,  the  great  “Marble  Man,”  
outfoxed   him   militarily.      Ulysses   Grant,   “Savior   of   the   Union,”   persevered   to   success  
against Lee where the flashier but irresolute McClellan had failed. And worst of all,
McClellan collided with Abraham Lincoln, the most beloved American of them all,
whom the arrogant McClellan spurned as his commander-in-chief and then tried to unseat
in 1864. It is small wonder that McClellan emerges today as a plodding, vainglorious,
mediocre figure.
His star shone much brighter in 1864.

He had his detractors, to be sure,

particularly among Republicans. But he also had fervent admirers, and Democrats had
good reason to think he would carry them to victory in the 1864 election. The resume
was impressive. McClellan had graduated near the top of his class at West Point and had
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served with distinction in the Mexican War. He then entered the private sector, rising to
become president of a railroad, before returning to military service at the outbreak of the
Civil  War.    He  rose  quickly  to  command  the  Union’s  principal  field  force,  the  Army  of  
the Potomac.

Applying formidable organizational skills, he built that army into a

powerful fighting force. This army – McClellan’s  army  – ultimately beat Lee and won
the war.
But the Army of the Potomac would achieve its final success under Grant, not
McClellan. McClellan could never quite bring himself to unleash it. He was more
comfortable on defense than on offense – not a good quality for a commander charged
with putting down a rebellion. His reluctance to send forces into battle, so mystifying
even today, infuriated his contemporary critics and finally exhausted Lincoln’s  patience.    
Historians   attribute   McClellan’s   reticence   to   a   cautious   temperament,   but   radical  
Republicans attributed it to his politics. His loyalties, they claimed, were more to the
Democratic Party than to his commander-in-chief.22
McClellan suffered some celebrated defeats, most famously in the abortive
Peninsula Campaign, a painstakingly planned assault on Richmond in the spring of 1862.
But  he  later  turned  back  Lee’s  invasion  of  Maryland  in  the  battle  of  Antietam.    This  was  
enough of a victory to justify celebration in the North, even though his caution in that
battle  may  have  cost  McClellan  the  opportunity  to  destroy  Lee’s  army  altogether.      In  any  
event,  he  remained  the  country’s  most  famous  military  figure  through  the  first  half  of  the  
war. Even after Lincoln cashiered him late in 1862, McClellan was immensely popular

22. The authoritative biography of McClellan is Stephen W. Sears, George B. McClellan: The Young
Napoleon (New York: Da Capo Press, 1988).
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with Democrats. And Union soldiers, who made up a major voting block in the North,
remained devoted to him.23

Republican  Messaging  in  the  Politics  of  Soldiers:  “McClellan  is  Disloyal”
To deflect charges like the ones Andrew Dickson White leveled against the party,
Democrats hoped that putting McClellan at the head of the ticket would inoculate the
party against the Republican charge that all Democrats were traitors. Their antebellum
association  with  the  Southern  “slave  power,”  which  became  the  Confederacy’s  bulwark,  
made   them   easy   targets   on   the   charge.      So   did   “old”   Democratic   Party   orthodoxy,  
embraced by peace Democrats like George Woodward. It held that while any war
threatened republicanism by spawning tyrannical central government, civil war in
particular  was  “the  worst  of  all  society’s  disorders.”24 Keepers of this orthodoxy believed
that forcible reunion of the North and South contradicted Lockean tenets of consensual
government.      These  purists  in   the  antiwar  wing   of  the  party,  the  “Peace   Democrats”  or  
“copperheads”   as   they   were   called,   favored   prompt   recognition   of   the   Confederacy.    
James  Bayard  of  Delaware  typified  this  faction.    “Bodies  tied  together  by  so  unnatural  a  
bond  of  union  as  mutual  hatred  are  only  connected  to  their  ruin,”  he  said  in  urging  an  end  
to   the   war.      “[A]nything   is   better   than   a   fruitless,   hopeless,   unnatural   civil   war.” 25 In
some quarters, anti-war Democrats went even further, some urging men not to enlist or
displaying the Confederate flag as a statement of protest. So, at least as to that extreme

23. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom offers a balanced portrait of McClellan; Lehman, 15 Ohio St. at
607-608,  a  court  decision  involving  Ohio’s  soldier  voting  law,  states  that  about  a  quarter  of  Ohio’s  eligible
voters were absent soldiers.
24. Baker, Affairs of Party, 150.
25. Id. at 151

192
element of the party, Republican charges of treason had a ring of truth. 26 And beyond
that fringe, Republicans could and did argue that Democrats were guilty by association.
To be sure, the Democratic Party also had a pro-war wing. It included prominent
political figures like Ohio Governor John Brough, New York Attorney General John
Dickinson, and a host of Union military leaders including McClellan. In fact,  the  North’s  
war effort owed these men a great deal. Many Democratic leaders actively supported
recruitment for the Union army, and between 40% and 45% of Union soldiers entered the
war as Democrats.27 Politically, however, this element of the Democratic Party found
itself drowned out by the shrill voices of the antiwar faction. In contrast, Republicans
enjoyed the advantage of far greater unity. They were virtually unanimous in favoring a
resolute prosecution of the war, and in the election year of 1864 their polemicists made
sure   that   war   Democrats   did   not   escape   association   with   the   party’s   putatively  
treacherous antiwar wing. In his study of Civil War politics, Joel Silbey observed that
“[t]he   articulation   of   traditional   Democratic   orthodoxy   made it very easy for the
Republicans,  in  response,  to  draw  the  lines  between  the  parties  sharply  and  distinctly.”28
Republicans drew the lines largely by the device of charging that Democrats were
disloyal. Democrats had reason to hope that the nomination of  McClellan,  the  country’s  
most famous military man through the first half of the war, would undercut that charge,
though surely not silence it.
One technique Republicans used to brand McClellan as disloyal was to build a
mischievously flawed syllogism: 1) in political kinship with northern Democrats, the
country’s   southern   enemy   hoped   the   Republican   incumbent   would   lose   the   election   to  
26. Smith, No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North, 43.
27. McPherson, For Causes and Comrades, 176-7.
28. Silbey, A Respectable Minority, 173.
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McClellan;;   2)   Democrats’   political   fortunes   brightened   when   the   US   suffered   military  
setbacks; therefore 3) Democrats hoped   for   the   enemy’s   success,   which   made   them  
traitors.      As   an   exercise   in   logic,   this   was   complete   rubbish.   An   incumbent’s   political  
prospects  always  suffer  in  proportion  to  the  country’s  misfortunes.    “The  strength  of  the  
Peace  Democrats,”  writes  historian Jennifer  Weber,  “generally  ran  in  inverse  relation  to  
the  successes  (or  failures)  of  the  armies.”29 And wartime antagonists of course welcome
the demise – electoral or otherwise – of their  enemy’s  leader.  So  of  course  Confederates
hoped McClellan would beat Lincoln. 30 Those self-evident propositions say nothing
about  McClellan’s  attitude  toward  the  Confederacy.    Republican  propagandists,  operating  
in the realm of politics – not logic – made repeated use of this wobbly syllogism, which
amounted to the outright assertion that McClellan was disloyal.
Pro-Republican organs, building the foundation of the disloyalty syllogism, first
pointed to an identity of interests between the Confederates and McClellan.

They

claimed that when Union armies won, as they were doing in the fall of 1864, it was bad
news for McClellan.
[T]he success of the Union arms, the triumphs of the United States flag,
and   of   the   Federal   Government,   are   the   ruin   of   [McClellan’s]   cause...  
[T]he feelings of a genuine Copperhead toward [Sherman and Sheridan]
at this moment are very much such as Satan is believed in Catholic
countries to entertain toward holy water.31
In the same vein, the New York Times quoted  Southern  newspapers,  one  saying,  “Every  
defeat  of  Lincoln’s  forces  inures  to  the  advantage  of  McClellan,”  and  another  claiming,  
“The   victory   of   the   rebels   ‘insures   the   success   of   McClellan   – their failure insures his

29. Weber, Copperheads: The  Rise  and  Fall  of  Lincoln’s  Opponents, 9.
30. Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet, 41, 107.
31. New York Times, Sept. 25, 1864, 4.
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defeat.’” 32

A week before the presidential election, a pro-Lincoln newspaper in

Pennsylvania exhorted voters to turn against McClellan  using  the  same  theme.  “Jefferson  
Davis,  were  he  permitted  to  participate  in  next  Tuesday’s  election,  would  certainly  vote  
for  McClellan  and  Pendleton….  Every  ballot  for  McClellan  and  Pendleton  is  equivalent  
to a bullet sent through the heart of a brave  Union  soldier.”33
Political  cartoonists  piled  on  with  their  own  depictions  of  McClellan’s  disloyalty.  
One,   published   in   New   York,   is   entitled,   “UNION   AND   LIBERTY   and   UNION   AND  
SLAVERY.”   On   its   left   panel,   Lincoln   amiably   greets   a   man   depicted   as   “Workman”  
while black and white school children frolic beneath an American flag in the background.
On the contrasting right panel, McClellan shakes hands with Jefferson Davis while a
slave auction proceeds in the background and a Confederate flag waves overhead.

Illustration originally published by M.W. Siebert, Union and liberty! And union and slavery!, 1864. Library
of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Collection: Cartoon Prints, American, Reproduction
Number: LC-USZ62-945.

32. Id. Sept. 24, 1864, p. 4.
33. The Agitator (Wellsborough, PA), November 2, 1864, 5.
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Another cartoon, this one   published   in   Boston   and   entitled   “Democracy,”   uses  
contrasting left/right panels to argue that the Democratic Party had departed from its
patriotic heritage (much as we have seen that the fictional soldiers in Andrew Dickson
White’s  claimed).  

Illustration originally published by Louis Prang & Co., Democracy. 1832-1864, 1864. Library of Congress,
Prints and Photographs Division; Collection: Cartoon Prints, American, Reproduction Number: LCUSZ62-13212.

On  the  left  panel,  labeled  “1832,”  an  animated  Andrew Jackson berates John C. Calhoun:
“By  the  Eternal!”  growls  Jackson,  “this  Union  must  and  shall  be  preserved.  A  Traitor’s  
doom   to   him   who   acts   against   it.”   Calhoun   bows   humbly   before   Jackson,   imploring  
“Pardon!   Pardon!”      On   the   right   panel,   labeled   “1864,”   McClellan   and   Pendleton   bow  
even  more  humbly  before  Jefferson  Davis.  McClellan  addresses  Davis  pathetically:  “We  
should like to have Union and Peace, dear Mr. Davis, but if such is not your pleasure then
please state your terms for a friendly separation.”  Davis  responds  condescendingly.  First  
he  praises  his  kneeling  supplicants  as  “men  of  sense.”  Then  he  states  his  terms:  “call  back  
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those fellows Sherman, Grant and Sheridan, also that old seadog Farragut – after that we
will   see   further.”   A   Confederate   soldier   in   the   background   looks   on,   saying   “Those  
Northern  dogs  how  they  whine!”    
This   cartoon   conveys   the   theme   of   McClellan’s   perfidy   as   the   central   message,  
but adds powerful secondary themes as well. One is that McClellan contrasts poorly with
the northern military leaders Sherman, Grant, Sheridan, and Farragut, all of whom
outshone him. McClellan, in other words, was not much of a general. The other is that he
doesn’t   command   the   respect   of   an   ordinary   soldier.   Real   soldiers   don’t   “whine,”   but  
cowards do. The selection of a military man as the Democratic standard-bearer invited
these two attack  themes,  both  designed  to  undermine  McClellan’s  stature  as  a  soldier.  
An anti-Democrat cartoon published in Philadelphia also drew on the memory of
the  old  “Party  of  Jackson”  to  portray  the  1864  version  of  the  party  as  treasonous.  Entitled  
“A   THRILLING   INCIDENT   DURING   VOTING,   -- 18th Ward,   Philadelphia,   Oct   11”  
(below), it depicts an old man (wearing a top hat and holding a cane) responding when a
“Copperhead”  offers him a ballot. The man with the ballot says of the old man, “Here  is  
an   old   Jackson   Democrat   who   always   votes   a   straight   ticket.”      The   old   man   responds  
furiously:
I  despise  you  more  than  I  hate  the  rebel  who  sent  his  bullet  through  my  dead  son’s  
heart! You   miserable   creature!   Do   you   expect   me   to   dishonor   my   poor   boy’s  
memory, and vote for men who charge American soldiers, fighting for their
country, with being hirelings and murderers?
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Illustration by Joseph Harley, A thrilling incident during voting, --18th Ward, Philadelphia, Oct. 11 /
Harley, del. 1864. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Collection: Cartoon Prints,
American, Reproduction Number: LC-USZ62-89566.

The Republican attack machine – politicians, songsters, pamphleteers, cartoonists,
and newspaper editors – drew on the credibility of real life soldiers to help them carry the
attacks on McClellan as a traitor. Examples abound. The Chicago Tribune quoted a New
Jersey veteran saying to a friend as they watched a Democratic campaign procession in
Trenton:  “I  say,  Jim,  this  is  the  first  rebel  raid  we’ve  seen  since  we  left  Virginia.” 34 The
Tribune also   quoted   “another   chronic   McClellan   officer,”   who   said   upon   learning   that  
Atlanta   had   fallen,   “that   knocks   our   stocks   down   10%.” 35 And the Chicago Tribune
reported that a soldier, called on to speak at a mass meeting in Chicago a day or two after
the  Democrats  had  finished  their  convention,  told  his  audience  that  “he  saw  more  treason  

34. Tribune (Chicago, IL), October 5, 1864.
35. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 9, 1864.
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during the present week in Chicago than he ever saw while marching through the
South.”36
Some   soldiers   lent   their   voices   to   assertions   of   McClellan’s   traitorous   kinship  
with rebels in the context of soldier voting. A pro-Lincoln paper in Ohio printed a
soldier’s  account  of  his  unit’s  experience  voting  in the field. He claimed that rebels along
his  regiment’s  front,  having  learned  when  the  Ohio  troops  would  cast  their  ballots,  timed  
an attack to disrupt the voting.
The election judges and clerks moved along our lines in ambulances. It
was a day of constant marching and fighting. At every halt of a few
minutes’  duration  balloting  progressed  vigorously,  votes  being  more  than  
once sandwiched in between volleys of musketry scarcely fifteen minutes
apart. The rebels at every charge advance with vociferous cheers for
McClellan to which our boys reacted with cheers for Lincoln and solid
arguments from their Enfields. It produced a marked effect upon our
soldiers. What wonder that they voted almost unanimously for the Union
ticket? How could they fight rebels one moment, hazarding life and limb
for the dear old government, and the next undo all they were doing by
voting  for  Treason’s  cowardly  allies  at  the  rear?37
A different Republican paper printed a maudlin poem assailing McClellan and
other “traitors.”      A   voting   soldier   purportedly   penned   it   under   the   pseudonym   “E.  
Pluribus.”    Written  as  a  letter  to  his  mother,  it  was  entitled,  “The  Wounded  Soldier  on  a  
Furlough:”  
Dear Mother, I remember well,
The parting kiss you gave to me;
When merry rang the Union bell,
You bade me fight for liberty.
I  did  not  dream  that  ‘Little  Mac’
Would thus throw off his loyal coat.
O,  Mother  dear!  I’m  coming  back,
Dear Mother – I’ve  come  home  to  vote.
Chorus:
36. Id. Sept. 2, 1864, 3.
37. Quoted in Young,  “Soldier  Voting  in  Ohio  During  the  Civil  War,”  70.
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Call brother comrades to my side,
While fawning traitors smile and dote,
Old Abe and Andy [Andrew Johnson] suit me well;
Dear  Mother!  I’ve  come  home  to  vote.
Come, brother soldiers, one and all –
Oh!  I’ll  be  with  you  by  and  by;;
My country calls me to my home,
Those coward traitors to defy.
I’ve  met  the  foe  upon the field,
Mid  cannon’s  roar  and  bugle  note;;
Our  loyalty’s  our  only  shield  –
Dear  Mother!  I’ve  come  home  to  vote.
Chorus.38
A pro-Lincoln   paper   in   Ohio   quoted   a   soldier   making   the   same   point   that   “E.  
Pluribus”   made,   but   with   more   humor   than   sentimentality. When offered a Democratic
ballot   at   a   civilian   election   in   Vermont,   the   returned   veteran   purportedly   said,   “What   a  
fool I should be to go down and fight the rebels for three years with my musket, and
come here to stab myself in the back with a piece of paper   like   this.”39 A Connecticut
veteran sounded almost exactly the same theme. Asked if he intended to vote the
Democratic   ticket,   the   veteran   supposedly   answered,   “I   have   been   shooting   Democrats  
for three years, and I am not in the habit of voting for the  game  I  kill.”40
The theme of soldiers fighting rebels with their bullets and treason with their
ballots also found expression in a bouncy partisan song composed by a woman and
entitled  “Uncle  Abe  and  Andy”:
We’ll  fight  the  traitors  down,  my  boys,
No foe can stand before us;
We’ll  vote  the  traitors  down,  my  boys,
While  Freedom’s  Flag  waves  o’er  us.
To  fight  and  vote,  we’ll  have  you  note,
We’ll  do  it  all  so  handy;;
We’re  heart  with  heart  and  hand  with  hand
38. Chattanooga Daily Gazette, November 8, 1864.
39. Scioto Gazette (Chillicothe, OH), October 18, 1864.
40. Tribune (Chicago, IL), October 18, 1864.
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With Uncle Abe and Andy.41
General Joseph Hooker, appearing at a meeting of the Union Party in Brooklyn,
assured  the  audience,  “There  are  no  Copperheads  in  the  army.    [The  soldiers]  will  fight  
well,  and  they  will  vote  well.”42 Often rank and file troops participated in the meetings to
report on the political sentiments of their comrades. The Chicago Tribune reported that
at  a  meeting  in  Springfield,  Illinois,  “[t]he  soldiers  took  part  with  a  great  zest,  and  their  
denunciation of the Copperheads were terrible. They appear to be unanimous for Lincoln
and Johnson.”43
The pro-Lincoln   press,   applying   the   disloyalty   syllogism   to   prove   McClellan’s  
treason, always delighted in reports from soldiers in the field about the political
preferences of enemy soldiers. A soldier speaking at a Union party rally in Bridgeport,
Connecticut   said   he   “heard   rebel   soldiers   cheer   the   nomination   of   Gen.   McClellan   all  
along  their  lines.”44 A Republican newspaper in Pittsburg reported an episode in Virginia
about   two   weeks   before   the   1864   presidential   election.      “The   rebels   hung   out   a   huge
placard at a point in their outer works before Richmond, inscribed  ‘Vote  for  McClellan.’  
The Union   troops   responded   by   opening   fire   on   both   the   placard   and   the   ‘McClellan  
canvassers   in   the   rebel   lines.” 45 A Wisconsin paper a week later described the same
incident,   elaborating   that   the   union   barrage   “knocked   placard,   breastwork,   McClellan  
canvassers and all into tinders. The Chicago platform and candidate will go up in just the
same way on the blessed 8th [of November] proximo. – Speed  the  day!”46
41.  Anna  Tellez,  “Uncle  Abe  and  Andy,”  The Republican Campaign Songster for 1864 (Cincinnati: J.R.
Hawley & Co., 1864), 51. (Reprinted by the Cornell University Library Digital Collections.)
42. New York Times, Sept. 23, 1864, p. 1.
43. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 9, 1864, p. 1.
44. Id., Oct. 15, 1864, p.1.
45. Pittsburg Daily Gazette, October 21, 1864, p.2
46. Wisconsin State Register, October 29, 1864.
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In September  1864,  an  Ohio  newspaper  quoted  from  “a  letter  written  [to]  us  from  
the  trenches  near  Petersburg.”  The  letter  reported,  “McClellan  stock  is  not  very  brisk  in  
the army. The rebels like his nomination too well to suit the men. On Monday evening
the lines  on  the  rebel  side  rang  for  miles,  with  traitor  cheers  for  the  nomination  of  ‘Little  
Mac.’”47 The following month, the same paper printed a letter signed by eleven soldiers
from the 79th Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers. As if to lend an extra measure of
credibility  to  their  account,  the  soldiers  started  by  assuring  readers  that  they  “testify  to  the  
following  facts  as  true  to  our  knowledge.”  The  letter  went  on  to  say  that  during  the  battle  
of   Resaca   in   Georgia   “we   distinctly   and   clearly   heard   the   soldiers of the rebel army
cheering  for  Jeff.  David  and  George  B.  McClellan….  Besides,  all  the  rebel  prisoners  with  
whom we conversed since the Presidential nominations agreed in assuring us that their
only hope of establishing a Southern Confederacy rested on the election of Geo. B.
McClellan   for   President   of   the   United   States.”48 The New York Times printed similar
accounts,   reporting   that   “[t]he   rebels   cheered   for   McClellan   in   the   trenches   before  
Petersburgh   (sic)”   and   quoting   a   soldier   speaking   at   a   Union   party rally in Bridgeport,
Connecticut, who  said  he  “heard  rebel  soldiers  cheer  the  nomination  of  Gen.  McClellan  
all  along  their  lines.”49
Republican media sometimes told their audiences that the Confederates went
beyond merely hoping and cheering for McClellan; they actually worked for his election.
In  a  story  entitled  “Rebel  Electioneering  for  McClellan,”  The  New York Times related the
experience of a wounded Union soldier captured by the Confederates. He was released
from the Virginia hospital to return home   upon   his   “promise   to   vote   for   George   B.  
47. Daily Cleveland Herald, September 15, 1864.
48. Id., October 28, 1864.
49. New York Times, October 2, 1864 and October 15, 1864.
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McClellan at the approaching election.... [But] all the prisoners of said hospital who
promptly and positively said they would vote for Abraham Lincoln, were not paroled, but
remained  in  said  hospital.”    The   Times, perhaps grateful to the opportunistic soldier for
supplying such powerfully anti-Democratic images, was inclined to forgive him,
observing  sympathetically  that  “it  is  hard  on  our  gallant  boys  to  have  to  choose  between  
such a cruel alternative as McClellan  or  starvation.”50
Another pro-Lincoln paper described the conversion experience of a soldier who
at one time had favored McClellan. The Union soldier, a captain named Southerland, was
captured near Atlanta and later exchanged. After his release, he explained his shift to
Lincoln.   His   rebel   guards   in   Charleston   “electioneered   with   him   for   McClellan.”   The  
paper  continued,  “Captain  Southerland  declares  that  he  never  could  nor  never  would  vote  
for   any   man   AT   THE   REQUEST   OF   ARMED   TRAITORS.”   The   story   ends   with   this
sneer  at  Democrats:  “Let  Peace  men  put  that  in  their  pipe  and  smoke  it.”51
A story in a different Republican paper described the proud defiance of Union
prisoners whose rebel captors dangled the promise of release in exchange for assurances
that they would  vote  for  McClellan  when  they  got  back  to  the  Union  lines.  “It  is  asserted  
that [Confederate General Joseph] Wheeler, the rebel guerilla chief, offered recently to
release a number of prisoners of the 115th Ohio, in his possession, if they would promise
to vote for McClellan. Soldier-like,  they  said  they  would  see  him  ‘d--d  first.”52
For vitriolic excess, no characterization of McClellan and his fellow Democrats as
traitors  could  match  this  Union  soldier’s  letter  to  the  pro-Lincoln Chicago Tribune:

50. Id. at 4.
51. Chattanooga Daily Gazette, October 13, 1864.
52. Mariettian (Marietta, OH), October 29, 1864.
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What an awful odor there is to the McClellan, Seymour [Horatio Seymour,
New  York’s  Governor],   and  Vallandigham   party!     It  is   enough  to   sicken  
the low-lived cannibals. After all our patriotic efforts, to see men stoop so
low as to take into their mouths the dirty toes of rebel graybacks and suck
away for a miserable, low down, degraded peace, peace, and then, to get
ignorant votes, delude people by proclaiming aloud, war, war. What an
open barefaced lie that white-livered  party  clings  to!  … From a McClellan
administration, my good Lord deliver us!53
The voice of soldiers accusing McClellan of treason also found its way into the
1864   campaign   debate   less   directly   through   the   device   known   as   the   “straw.”   A   straw  
was a straw poll – a small sampling of voter preference, akin to modern-day pre-election
opinion polling, without broad or statistically based sampling.

Straws were most

typically conducted among passengers on railroads or steamships, or among patients at
hospitals. In his study of political culture in the Civil War, Mark E. Neely, Jr. describes
straws as an invention of Civil War party enthusiasts, invariably used to prove that their
candidate enjoyed public support.54
Both   parties   regularly   published   straws   (sometimes   also   called   “canvasses”)  
showing their candidate doing splendidly with one group of citizens or another, and these
informal tallies routinely included soldiers. Partisan operatives often conducted straws
that combined civilian and soldier preferences on board passenger trains and steamboats.
Sometimes partisan soldiers would send straws to their home newspapers from camps or
hospitals at the front, and these had an exclusively military sampling.
For example, a pro-Lincoln paper in Cleveland reported, based on a letter from a
lieutenant of the 60th Ohio  Volunteers,  on  a  straw  conducted  at  breakfast  in  an  officers’  

53. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 16, 1864. (Emphasis in the original.)
54. Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Boundaries of American Political Culture in the Civil War Era (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 39-40. Neely argues that straws were one of many forms of
political messaging carried on at grass roots levels of party activism.
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hospital in Annapolis. Lincoln outpolled McClellan 332-32.   “You   can   judge   for  
yourself,”   wrote   the   lieutenant,   “McClellan   does   not   stand   the   ghost   a   sight   in   the  
army.”55 A pro-Lincoln paper in Philadelphia delighted in reporting, based again on a
soldier’s  letter,  that  Lincoln  had  outpolled  McClellan  1087-193 in a straw among soldiers
recuperating  at  “McClellan  Hospital”  in  Philadelphia.56
An   editor’s   note   accompanying   one straw acknowledged the obvious, that such
tallies  didn’t  matter  much:  “Of  course,  these  are  of  no  account,  but  ‘straws’  show  which  
way  the  wind  blows.”57 Straws of soldier preferences in the fall of 1864 showed the wind
blowing in both directions, as Democrats and Republicans alike produced an avalanche
of these tallies showing their respective man ahead. On a steamboat from Evansville,
Indiana on September 16, 1864, McClellan won the straw among the soldiers, 22 votes to
3.58 The next day, Lincoln won a straw at the Soldiers Hospital in Annapolis, Maryland,
garnering 237 votes to just 37 for McClellan.59 But the day after that, McClellan won a
straw among recuperating soldiers in a hospital at City Point, Virginia, 78 to 21.60 A
straw mixing soldier and civilian tallies on board a train from Milwaukee to Detroit on
September 20, 1864 favored McClellan over Lincoln, 53 to 39. 61 But on a Chicagobound train leaving Milwaukee the same day, Lincoln won the straw, 74 to 31. 62
Newspaper editors on both sides often   punctuated   the   straw’s   tabulation   with   some  
partisan commentary, such as (in the case of a straw showing that soldiers favored

55. Daily Cleveland Herald, September 6, 1864.
56. North American and United States Gazette (Philadelphia, PA), September 27, 1864. There was in
fact a hospital in Philadelphia named for McClellan.
57. Detroit Free Press, October 28, 1864.
58. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, September 16, 1864.
59. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 17, 1864.
60. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, September 18, 1864.
61. Detroit Free Press, September 21, 1864, describing a train that left Milwaukee the day before.
62. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 24, 1864, describing a train that left Milwaukee on September 20.
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McClellan),   “You   can   bet   high   that   our   boys,   with   a   few   exceptions,   are   for   ‘Little  
Mac,’”   or   (in   the   case   of   a   straw   showing   they   favored   Lincoln),   “[This]   is   a   fair  
expression  of  the  army….   Little  Mac  and  his   friends  had  better  be  preparing  their  craft  
and  taking  in  rations  for  a  trip  up  Salt  River,  for  they  are  bound  to  go  up,  sure.”63
A reader can almost detect the twinkle in the eyes of the newspaper editors who
sometimes used straws in their negative campaigning. The pro-McClellan Detroit Free
Press, for example, showed Lincoln winning in a straw among the inmates at the
Kalamazoo Insane Asylum.64 Similarly, the pro-Lincoln Chicago Tribune published a
straw   from   Chattanooga,   Tennessee   showing   McClellan   winning   among   “[b]ountyjumpers  used  for  policing  hospitals  as  a  penalty  for  their  conduct.”65
A particularly ubiquitous form of straw in pro-Lincoln papers conveyed the
message   of   McClellan’s   perfidy   by   reporting   McClellan’s   winning   tallies   among   rebel  
soldiers. It was another form of the Republican disloyalty syllogism: preference for
McClellan over Lincoln among rebels proved their common interest and hence
McClellan’s disloyalty. A pro-Lincoln Ohio paper set up its report about a straw among
rebel soldiers by first reporting a win by Lincoln over McClellan in a civilian straw on a
train to Cincinnati. When the pollster announced the result to passengers, a proMcClellan man claimed that on an earlier train he had ridden that day, McClellan had
won such a straw by 300 votes to 30. A pro-Lincoln man – described  as  “a  rousing  big  

63. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, October 1, 1864; Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 25, 1864.
In  the  contemporary  political  idiom,  to  “go  up  Salt  River”  meant  to  lose  an  election.
64. Detroit Free Press, September 5, 1864.
65. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 29, 1864.
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fellow”  – answered  the  McClellan  man  loudly,  “That’s  so!  I  was  on  that  train  myself,  and  
the 300  votes  were  rebel  prisoners,  and  the  30  Lincoln  votes  were  their  guards.’”66
Another paper quoted a Union soldier guarding rebel prisoners at the prison camp
in Elmira, New York. The guard described a straw conducted among the prisoners from a
Confederate  regiment.  “When  I  was  there,”  said  the  guard,  “there  was  a  vote  taken,  and  
every man in the regiment voted for McClellan but one, and he was ridden round the
camp   till   he   said   he   would   vote   for   Mac.”67 In a slight variation on the straw of rebel
soldiers, a Harrisburg paper reported that McClellan outpolled Lincoln 21-8   “among  
deserters  and  bounty  jumpers”  held  in  a  guardhouse.68

Republican  Messaging  in  the  Politics  of  Soldiers:  “McClellan  is  Incompetent”
Republican   claims   of   McClellan’s   disloyalty   were the most ubiquitous and
conspicuous of the weapons in their arsenal for tearing down his stature as a soldier.
Another, with the same purpose, was to claim he had been incompetent as a commander.
Allegations of his incompetence sometimes relied on the same evidence as assertions of
his disloyalty and of his cowardice. Republican attackers sometimes attributed his
battlefield  losses  to  his  ineptitude  (he  didn’t  know  how  to  lead  an  army),  sometimes  to  his  
disloyalty   (his   heart   wasn’t   in   the   fight   because   his loyalties lay with the South), and
sometimes to his cowardice (he chickened out of engaging the enemy). But all three
themes aimed to knock McClellan off the pedestal of military greatness that his
supporters worked hard to construct.

66. Daily Cleveland Herald, October 8, 1864, quoting the Dayton (OH) Journal.
67. Chattanooga Daily Gazette, October 16, 1864.
68. Daily Telegraph (Harrisburg, PA), October 12, 1864.
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McClellan was an easy target of charges of military incompetence, having led the
Union armies to many more defeats than victories during his eighteen months of
command. Rallies of the Union Party, as Republicans rebranded themselves to facilitate
alliance with war Democrats, routinely featured speeches elaborately celebrating
McClellan’s  string  of  military  failures,  preferably  by  a  speaker  who  was  a  military  figure.  
Former  union  general  and  now  congressman  John  F.  Farnsworth’s  appearance  at  a  party  
meeting in Newark was typical. According to the Newark Daily Advertiser, Farnsworth,
who had served under McClellan as a cavalry officer, gave an inspired speech detailing
the  many  times  McClellan  had  “completely  failed,”  including  a  string  of  setbacks  in  the  
Peninsula Campaign. McClellan had failed, for example, to follow up on good positions
gained   against   the   Rebels,   always   choosing   to   wait   or   retreat.      “Richmond   might   have  
been   taken   repeatedly   by   other   Generals,”   said   Farnsworth.      A   resolution   at   a   “grand  
Union  meeting”  in  Brooklyn  proclaimed  that  in  candidate  McClellan,  “we  have  a  General  
whose   history   is   an   apology,   and   whose   career   is   a   failure.”      Such   meetings   were   not  
deliberative gatherings, but the newspaper account dutifully reported that the resolution
was  “adopted  unanimously.”69
Republicans   delighted   in   reminding   voters   in   clever   ways   about   McClellan’s  
numerous embarrassments as commanding general, most of them familiar to newspaper
audiences   that   had   followed   the   war’s   progress   in   detail.   They   recalled,   for   example,
McClellan’s   having   been   duped   at   Yorktown   into   halting   his   already   slow   campaign  
because he believed a large artillery emplacement threatened his position. In fact, the
poorly equipped Confederates had merely cut down trees, painted the big logs black to

69. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 26, 1864, quoting a report from the Newark Daily Advertiser,
Sept. 19, 1864; New York Times, Sept. 23, 1864, p. 8.
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look   like   cannons,   and   pointed   the   harmless   logs   toward   the   Union   lines.      (“Quaker  
Guns,”   McClellan’s   detractors   called   the   phony   artillery.)      And   Republicans   enjoyed  
ridiculing the famous verbal contortions McClellan had devised at the end of the Seven
Days  battles  to  avoid  describing  his  army’s  movement  away  from  the  victorious  enemy  
as   a   retreat.      (He   had   not   retreated,   but   had   merely   “changed   his   base,”   he   reported  
euphemistically.) This was all the more mortifying because McClellan had promised at
the  outset  of  the  conflict  to  “drive  the  rebels  to  the  wall.”    A  Republican  campaign  poem  
wove together all these embarrassments, so familiar to Civil War audiences. Its refrain
mocked  McClellan’s   answer   “I  do  not   remember”  to   a  hostile  question  from   Congress’  
Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. The song included these stanzas about his
performance as a commander:
Was it your own mighty brain
Planned that wonderful campaign,
Where such myriads died in vain?
I  don’t  remember!
Did you, after Yorktown’s  fall,
“Drive  the  rebels  to  the  wall?”
Or  at  a  snail’s  pace  did  you  crawl?
I  don’t  remember!
Did  you  run  a  seven  day’s  race,
While  old  “Stonewall”  gave  you  chase?
Or  was  it  a  “change  of  base?’
I  don’t  remember!70
Another device for diminishing his reputation as a good soldier was to draw
comparisons between McClellan and other Union generals, always to the disadvantage of
McClellan, of course. This became easier as summer turned to fall in 1864, but when
McClellan was nominated in late August, his record did not stand out unfavorably in
70. Tribune (Chicago, IL), October 15, 1864.

209
comparisons with most other Union generals. At that time, the Union military effort
indeed appeared to have failed, just as the Democratic platform said. In the east, Lee had
locked Grant in a stalemate outside Petersburg,  Virginia,  after  Grant’s  army  had  suffered  
ghastly casualties in the campaign to get there. Sherman in the west seemed similarly
stalled in his slow push through northern Georgia toward Atlanta. The Confederate
strategy  of  exhausting  the  Union’s  will to fight seemed to be working. In the context of
the   Union’s   overall   military   frustration,   Democrats   could   plausibly   blame   anything  
lackluster   in   McClellan’s   record   from   1861-62 on the overarching failings of the
administration’s  conduct  of  the  war.    
That all changed abruptly in the late summer and early fall. Farragut took Mobile
Bay,  Sherman  took  Atlanta,  and  Sheridan  swept  the  Shenandoah  Valley.    As  the  Union’s  
military fortunes brightened, Republicans could point to an array of successful Union
generals with whom McClellan suffered in comparison. And it was particularly easy to
compare  McClellan  unfavorably  to  Lee.    McClellan’s  1862  campaign  against  Richmond,  
known now as the Peninsula Campaign but often referred to then as the Chickahominy
Campaign  (for  the  river  on  which  much  of  the  fighting  occurred)  was  McClellan’s  first  
and probably most ignominious setback.

Vastly outnumbered, Lee out-generaled

McClellan and sent the federals back north in frustration. Republicans in 1864 happily
seized on the debacle as campaign ammunition. One newspaper called McClellan the
“Chickahominy  grave-digger.”71 Another  quoted  General  Joe  Hooker’s  testimony  before  
the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War. Hooker had served under
McClellan in the Peninsula campaign. In late 1863, he gained celebrity status with his
victory in the Battle of Lookout Mountain, redeeming the damage his reputation suffered
71. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 1, 1864, p. 2.
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earlier that year at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Speaking with the authority of an
accomplished soldier, Hooker told the congressmen that the failure of the Peninsula
campaign   “was   due   to   the   incapacity   of   the   General   commanding.” 72 The general
commanding, of course, was McClellan.
Yet  another  Republican  paper,  lumping  McClellan’s  defeat  with  failures by other
Union generals of Democratic pedigree, compared them all with more successful
northern commanders:
McClellan’s  Chickahominy  campaign  was  a  failure.    [Failures  by  Generals  Buell  
and Banks, also well known Democrats, were also cited.]...Almost all [these
failures], without exception, have come from bad leadership---from the want of
either the right moral earnestness, or of the right military ability in the men to
whom the movements were committed...But under the Commanders which have
been found equal to their responsibilities, Grant and Sherman, and Farragut ... and
such men as Sheridan ... there has (sic) been no failures of any account – on the
other hand, a wonderful series of successes.73
When comparing him to other generals, his critics often played   on   McClellan’s  
famous ostentation, as when he paraded in front of his own troops, basking in their
adoration (which was genuine), and his caution, as when he drilled his men endlessly but
committed them to actual battles only grudgingly. Some of these criticisms, of course,
were unfair.

McClellan had taken over the Army of the Potomac at a time when

organization, drilling, and a lift in morale were exactly what the army needed most.
These he supplied, using his charisma and administrative talents to good effect. In his
Pulitzer Prize-winning history of the Civil War, James McPherson said of McClellan,
“He  instilled  discipline  and  pride  in  his  men,  who  repaid  him  with  an  admiration  they  felt  
toward no other General. McClellan forged the Army of the Potomac into a fighting

72. Milwaukee Daily Sentinel, September 17, 1864.
73. Id. October 3, 1864, p. 3.
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machine second to none – this was his important contribution to ultimate Union
victory....”74
But that contribution was less important to the electorate, and therefore less
valuable politically, than battlefield victories, of which McClellan could claim very few.
A New York Times editorial drew the unfavorable contrast between McClellan and other
generals effectively. It argued that early in the conflict, before the country had come to
understand the character and scale of the war,
when a man with epaulets who could ride a horse on parade was likely to be
hailed as great General, it was natural and excusable to mistake Gen. McClellan
for a new Napoleon. But that day of early innocence has passed away. The glitter
of regimentals has been tarnished. We have since then too much experience of
the realities of war to be longer deceived by its shams and shows. [Now] we have
had Generals who could fight the enemy as well as parade their own troops; who
could hurl fifty regiments of valiant men, like so many winged thunderbolts, upon
the enemy, as well as sit in camp and calculate the chances of defeat or ride to the
rear to look out a safe resting place for a beaten army.75
A Wisconsin paper ridiculed the notion that McClellan, who had cultivated the
nickname Little Napoleon, deserved to be associated with the great Frenchman.
McClellan,   the   paper   sneered,   is   “this   veteran   of   a   thousand   cheers   and   not   a   single  
charge,   greeted   by   Napoleon’s   huzzahs,   though   innocent   of   Napoleon’s   battles, this
calico  hero,  this  knight  in  pantalets  …  a  military  nobody.”76
Given the galvanizing effect of the fall of Atlanta on the public spirit, Republican
partisans were particularly eager to draw comparisons between McClellan and Sherman.
They found good material  for  tearing  down  McClellan  not  just  in  Sherman’s  better  war  
record, but also in the contrasting styles of the two men. For this, Republicans made the
most   of   McClellan’s   image   as   a   preening   bureaucrat   who   never   won   battles.      In   this  
74. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 349.
75. New York Times, Sept. 30, 1864, p. 4.
76. Wisconsin State Register, September 17, 1864.
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telling, when first   taking   on   his   assignment   at   the   head   of   the   Union’s   western   armies,  
Sherman,  “[s]till  diffident  of  himself,”  had  quietly  and  modestly  studied  his  assignment  
instead of setting himself to the task of studying partisan politics and official
impertinences.... He [Sherman] saw what was the scope of the duty. He got about
doing it--not as an ape, but as a man; not as a General by prescriptive right, but as
a plain, practical soldier.... Who shall be the exemplar for the soldiers of the
Republic hereafter? This plain, practical man, who... wins? or this partisan hero
in epaulets, who struts his brief hour as the martinet-in-chief of the camp, rushes
to the field with neither counsel nor discretion to guide him, and comes back
stripped of his feathers – a pretender among honest soldiers? The Georgia
campaigner or the juvenile Napoleon – which?77
Comparisons of the styles of the two men extended to their styles of writing.
While this subject had no relevance to the relative military skills of the two men,
Republican  polemicists  found  it  a  useful  way  to  revisit  the  fruitful  subject  of  McClellan’s  
infamous letter accepting the Democratic nomination (about which more is offered in the
discussion of cowardice, below). The Chicago Tribune, addressing an audience already
familiar   with   the   newspaper’s   low   opinion   of   McClellan’s   letter,   described   Sherman’s  
writing style in terms they knew would imply favorable comparisons with McClellan,
and  make  McClellan  look  less  soldierly  as  well.    Sherman’s  
letters are all to the point; he wastes no words, deals in no sophistry or
concealments, employs no honeyed phrases, and holds out no false promises to
friends or foe.... He writes as he would shoot a rifle – straight at the center of the
mark, and drives the nail every shot.78
When a pro-McClellan   paper   said   of   a   speech   the   general   gave   at   West   Point   that   “it  
placed him in the highest ranks of literature and oratory, the pro-Lincoln Daily Palladium
in   New   Haven   ridiculed   the   claim.   “We   think   he   ranks   about   as   near   to   Homer and
77. Id., Oct. 14, 1864, p. 4.
78. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 24, 1864,  p.  3.    This  editorial   was  based  on  Sherman’s   famous  
letter  of  September  12,  1864,  to  the  City  Council  of  Atlanta.    He  was  responding  to  the  Council’s  protests  
about  his  army’s  treatment  of  the   vanquished  city.    Sherman   took the occasion to lecture the city fathers
about  war.    “War  is  cruelty,  and  you  cannot  refine  it;;  and  those  who  brought  war  on  our  country  deserve  all  
the  curses  and  maledictions  a  people  can  pour  out.”    Sherman’s  letter  is  reprinted  in  its  entirety  in  this Sept.
24 edition of the Tribune.
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Shakespeare in literature, or Demosthenes and Cicero in oratory, as he does to
Marlborough  and  Napoleon  in  generalship.”79
The   contrasts   between   Sherman’s   correspondence   and   McClellan’s   letter   of  
acceptance  gained  currency  in  Republican’s  political communications, again in terms that
diminished   McClellan’s  stature   as   a   soldier.      One   advertisement invited Republicans to
“Compare the Soldier Sherman’s   Letter   and   the   Candidate McClellan’s   Letter,   then
Attend  the  Union  Mass  Meeting.”80
Republican outlets similarly drew comparisons between McClellan and Grant to
elevate   Grant   and   disparage   McClellan.      “[T]o   compare   the   Chickahominy   Campaign  
with   any   of   [Grant’s]   campaigns   is   at   once   pitiful   and   painful.” 81 Grant, himself a
Democrat before the war, helped the cause of diminishing McClellan with a letter to his
friend, Congressman Elihu Washburne of Illinois.

Washburne, who had sponsored

Grant’s  appointment  to  West  Point,  praised  him  regularly  in  House  speeches,  and  Grant  
must have known Washburne would make his letter public. In it, Grant described the
South’s   dwindling   resources   and   asserted   that   Northern   resolve   would   assure   Union  
success.

He then sounded a theme that Republicans would repeat throughout the

campaign to diminish McClellan.      “I   have   no   doubt but the enemy are exceedingly
anxious to hold out until after the Presidential election. They have many hopes from its
effects....  They  hope  the  election  of  the  peace  candidate.”82

79. Daily Palladium (New Haven, Conn.), June 28, 1864.
80. New York Times,   Sept.   26,   1864,   p.   5.      The   words   “soldier”   as   applied   here   to   Sherman   and  
“candidate”  as  applied  to  McClellan  appear  here  with  underscoring  added to draw attention to the contrast
intended by the newspaper. It is likely that the Sherman letter referred to here is the letter of Sept. 12,
described in note 78, infra.
81. Id., Oct. 9, 1864, p. 4.
82. Letter from Grant to E. B. Washburne, Aug. 6, 1864, New York Times, Sept. 9, 1864, p. 4. Grant
wrote  the  letter  before  McClellan’s  nomination,  but  at  a  time  when  McClellan  appeared  likely  to  become  
the Democratic nominee.
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The most comprehensive argument that McClellan was incompetent appeared as a
thirty two-page   pamphlet   entitled   “McClellan’s   Military   Career   Reviewed   and  
Exposed.” 83 A correspondent for the pro-Lincoln New York Times, William Swinton,
wrote it, and the Union Congressional Committee distributed it for the campaign. It is an
impressive piece of forensic history. Focusing mostly on the abortive Peninsula
Campaign, and relying heavily on official communiqués McClellan sent and received,
Swinton assails McClellan as a failed strategist and bungling field commander. He
regularly exaggerated the strength of the forces he faced, Swinton showed, was easily
duped   by   the   enemy’s   feints   and   deceptions,   failed   to   oversee   the   actions   of   his  
subordinates during battles, and approached his role with both pomposity (staging
“reviews,   parades,   and   sham   fights” 84 ) and timidity. Swinton spiced his attacks with
personal  insults:  McClellan  took  on  more  of  the  nation’s  command  responsibilities  than  
his  “pigmy  shoulders”  could  bear;;  his  offensive  efforts  were  “feeble;;”  he  moved  forward  
only  by  “elevating  his  mettle”  and  overcoming  his  own  “hesitating  and  cautious  spirit;;”  
he  “shirked  his  duty”  to  move  forward  pursuant  to  Lincoln’s  commands;;  and  he  indulged  
a  “wildly  puerile  ambition.”85

Republican  Messaging  in  the  Politics  of  Soldiers:  “McClellan  Is  A  Coward”
Compounding   the   disqualifying   effects   of   McClellan’s   disloyalty   and  
incompetence,   in   Republicans’   telling,   was   his   cowardice,   both   moral   and   physical.  
Charges that McClellan was a moral coward grew mostly out of the essential

83. William Swinton, McClellan’s  Military  Career  Reviewed  and  Exposed (Washington, D.C.: Lemuel
Towers, 1864). The pamphlet is available in reprint form from the University of California Libraries.
84. Id. at 9.
85. Id. at 10, 11, 16, 18, and 20.
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schizophrenia of the Democratic   nominating   convention   in   1864.      The   party’s   internal  
divisions made a coherent outcome unlikely from the start, but the convention that
nominated McClellan elevated incoherence to an art form. It was a gift to Republicans.
The gathering showcased the   party’s   profound   internal   differences   over   the   war,   once  
again exposing all Democrats to charges of disloyalty even as it opened their standard
bearer to charges of cowardice.
By the time the party leaders gathered in Chicago in August, pro-war Democrat
McClellan  was  the  clear  frontrunner  for  the  nomination.    But  the  party’s  most  prominent  
opponent   of   the   war,   Clement   Vallandigham,   stood   in   McClellan’s   way.   Earlier   in   the  
war,   Vallandigham’s   antiwar   zealotry   had   led   to   his   prosecution   in   a   military   tribunal,
which convicted him and sentenced him to confinement for the duration of the war. After
the Supreme Court declined to set aside the conviction, Lincoln modified the sentence by
ordering Vallandigham exiled to the South. He found his way to Canada and campaigned
from there for Governor of Ohio in 1863.86 His opponent, war Democrat John Brough,
won that election in a landslide, but Vallandigham had become the darling of peace
Democrats.

He returned to the United States in 1864 to attend the Democrats’  

nominating convention in Chicago, where he expected (and hoped) to be arrested.
Lincoln wisely chose to ignore him. Safely in Chicago, where he was introduced to the
convention   as   “the   Honorable   Exile   and   Patriot,”   Vallandigham   soon   became   George  
McClellan’s  problem.87

86. Id.; Frank L. Klement, The Limits of Dissent: Clement L. Vallandigham & The Civil War (New
York: Fordham University Press, 1998); Christopher Dell, Lincoln and the War Democrats: The Grand
Erosion of Conservative Freedom (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Press, 1975), 214.
87. Klement, The Limits of Dissent, 280.
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The convention received Vallandigham as a celebrity, and his fellow antiwar
Democrats – about half the total delegates – treated him as a hero.88 He was in a strong
position to advance his agenda, and he pushed the advantage. War Democrats faced a
quandary. They knew that victory in November required party unity, and they could not
afford to estrange the antiwar wing. But accommodating that wing posed dangers, too.
Vallandigham’s  agenda  jeopardized  the  party’s  chances  by  exposing  Democrats to even
more Republican charges of treason. Compromise of some sort seemed essential.
The compromises that emerged proved costly for McClellan, ultimately
exposing him to charges that he lacked the courage of his convictions – in modern
parlance that  he  was  a  “flip-flopper.”    First,  to  balance  his  spot  at  the  head  of  the  ticket,  
the party nominated George Pendleton as his running mate. Pendleton was a southernsympathizing, Vallandigham-style peace   Democrat   from   Ohio.” 89

For Republican

propagandists like Andrew Dickinson White, that alone tainted the entire ticket as
traitorous.      Second,   the   antiwar   wing   put   its   mark   on   the   party   platform   with   a   “peace  
plank”  that  Vallandigham  himself  had  drafted.    It  demanded  an  end  to  the  war:
...after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of
war,... justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that
immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view of
an ultimate convention of the States, or other peaceable means, to the
end that, at the earliest practical moment, peace may be restored on the
basis of the Federal Union of the States.90
These sentiments made Republican charges of Democratic defeatism and
disloyalty seem credible. Objective observers could reasonably  interpret   the  call  for  “a  
cessation  of  hostilities,”  without  preconditions,  to  mean  that  Democrats  placed  a  higher  
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217
priority on peace than on union.91 Unconstrained by objectivity, Republican partisans
gleefully characterized the platform as a total capitulation to the Confederacy. In an open
letter   to   “the   People   of   the   United   States,”   the   pro-Lincoln National Union Committee
said  of  the  Chicago  convention  that  it  “gives  a  silent  approval  of  the  rebellion  itself....    In  
all essential respects the action that convention took accords with the results the rebels
seek.    Both  desire  a  cessation  of  hostilities.”92 The Chicago Tribune, always vigorous in
supporting  Republicans,  called  the  Democratic  convention  “a  Richmond  concern.    It  got  
its shape and animus from the Confederacy. It was directed beforehand how to proceed,
and  it  obeyed.”93
As  the  convention  closed,  the  party’s  pro-war  leaders  saw  the  platform’s  glaring  
weakness. Anticipating the Republican attack, they set out to persuade McClellan to
“clarify”   the   platform   in   his   acceptance   message. 94 They had about a week to do it.
Unlike modern conventions, where the nominee attends as the headline attraction,
nineteenth-century candidates practiced the charade of detaching themselves from the
hurly-burly of partisan politics. They left the convention to their surrogates, received
written notice of the nomination after the convention ended, and accepted in a letter that
invariably   feigned   modest   reluctance.      McClellan’s   acceptance   letter,   his   pro-war
advisors   hoped,   would   serve   as   the   vehicle   for   escaping   the   hazards   of   the   platform’s  
antiwar theme.
McClellan needed little prodding. He saw the political danger clearly enough,
and  he  certainly  did   not   share  Vallandigham’s  loathing  of  the  war.    Whatever his other
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failings, George McClellan was thoroughly devoted to the army and to the cause of
restoring the Union. He wanted no association with implications that the war he had
fought  was  a  failed  “experiment”  or  that  the  soldiers  he  had  commanded  were  “failures,”  
which  was  precisely  the  gist  of  the  platform’s  message,  according  to  Republicans.
Another problem with the platform became evident to McClellan as he pondered
the wording of his acceptance letter. With timing that must have seemed diabolical to all
Democrats,  the  Union’s  military  fortunes  brightened  dramatically  almost  the  moment  the  
Chicago convention closed on August 29. Sherman captured Atlanta on September 3,
tremendously boosting the flagging war spirits of the North. Following shortly on the
heels  of  David  Farragut’s  naval  triumph  at  Mobile  Bay,  where  the  old  admiral  famously  
damned  the  torpedoes,  the  fall  of  Atlanta  made  the  platform’s  indictment  of  the  war  as  a  
“failure”  look premature, if not silly.
With all this, McClellan readily undertook a repositioning effort in his acceptance
letter. Written ten days after the close of the convention, it waffled masterfully. In
keeping with the bedrock principles of the faction of his party that supported the war but
opposed turning it into a fight against slavery, McClellan argued that the war should be
pursued  only  for  “the  preservation  of  our  Union  [which]  was  the  sole  avowed  purpose  for  
which   the   war   was   commenced.”      Making   no   mention   of   the   war’s   “failure”   or   of   a  
“cessation   of   hostilities,”   he   distanced   himself   from   the   peace   platform   without  
repudiating   it   directly.      Instead,   he   spoke   of   the   need   for   a   “spirit   of   conciliation   and  
compromise...in  the  hearts  of  the  people.”    He  urged  efforts  to  
...exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practiced by civilized nations,
and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with honor
and the interests of the country, to secure [the] peace, reestablish the
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Union, and guarantee the future of the Constitutional rights of every state.
The Union is the one condition of peace. We ask no more.95
It   was   fancy   political   footwork   and   an   artful   “clarification,”   effectively   shifting   the  
party’s   priority   from   peace   to   union.      McClellan   predicted   shortly   before   sending   his  
letter   that   it   “would be acceptable to all true patriots, & will only drive off the real
adherents  of  Jeff  Davis  this  side  of  the  line.”96
As to Democrats, he was right. After some initial grumbling and threats to start a
third party, even Vallandigham and the peace Democrats ended up supporting
McClellan.97 Republicans  were  having  none  of  it.    They  saw  in  McClellan’s  acceptance  
letter an opening to attack his fitness for office. They used it to build the case that
McClellan was irresolute – essentially a coward. The first step in constructing that
argument was to tether McClellan to the peace plank. He may not have drafted it, and he
may have wished convention delegates had drafted it differently, but Republicans insisted
that the Democratic candidate was stuck with both the party and its platform. The
Chicago  convention  became  “McClellan’s   convention,”  and  the  platform   – peace plank
and all – became   “McClellan’s   platform.” 98 At a Massachusetts rally, Republican
Senator Sumner made the point humorously. Referring to the spectacle of a candidate
retreating  from  his  own  party’s  platform,  Sumner  started  with  a  joke  that  became  a  staple  
of the campaign:
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from the platform, but he fell subject to criticism for waffling precisely because he did not denounce the
platform.
97. Paludan, A  People’s  Contest, 248-9; Dell, Lincoln and the War Democrats, 287-8.
98. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 28, 1864, p.2.

220
The cry of the railroad conductor is transferred to politics, -- “It   is  
dangerous  to  stand  on  the  platform.”    Nobody  has  made greater efforts to
get away from it than the Presidential candidate of the Democracy, who
forgets, that, as a candidate, he is born with the platform, and united to it,
as the Siamese twins are united together, so that the two cannot be
separated.99
After tarring him as disloyal for his ties to the convention, Republicans argued
that   McClellan’s   acceptance   letter   showed   the   character   failings   of   a   coward.      As  
Republicans constructed the argument, the letter proved that McClellan lacked precisely
those qualities that nineteenth-century Americans associated with good soldiering:
“manliness”  and  courage.    Rooted  in  powerful  currents  of  national  culture,  going  to  the  
heart of what it meant to be a man and a soldier, these arguments were forceful tools for
discrediting McClellan. Civil War scholarship exploring the motivation of the troops on
both sides has identified courage as the central value that soldiers were determined to
express in battle.

It was the most important of the soldierly virtues.

In their

correspondence   and   memoirs,   soldiers   used   the   terms   “courage”   and   “manhood”  
interchangeably.      They   spoke   of   courage   as   the   “manliest   of   virtues.”      Joshua  
Chamberlain, a hero of Gettysburg and winner of the Congressional Medal of Honor,
addressed the question of how men could bring themselves to stand up to enemy fire in
the  horrifying  way  required  by  Civil  War  battlefield  tactics.    “Simple  manhood”  was  the  
first of the motivations he identified.100
To   question   one’s   “manhood,”   then,   was   to   question   his   courage and by
implication   his   adequacy   as   a   soldier.      Republican   partisans   seized   on   McClellan’s  
waffling letter of acceptance to raise precisely that question. One pro-Lincoln editorial
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suggested that McClellan, widely known as a war Democrat for whom the   platform’s  
peace plank must have been unpalatable, should have written a letter forthrightly
rejecting  both  the  peace  platform  and  the  nomination.    “Had  Gen.  McClellan  thus  played  
the  man,”  wrote  the  New York Times, “he  would  have  won  to  himself  every  loyal heart in
the  land.”101 Another editorial seized on this concept of manhood in chiding McClellan
for   failing   either   to   agree   or   disagree   with   the   platform’s   two   most   controversial  
statements:      its   characterization   of   the   war   as   a   “failure,”   and   its   call   for an immediate
“cessation  to  hostilities:”    “A  candidate  of  thorough  manhood  would  have  met  both  with  
downright assent or dissent.... It is humiliating. What a pitiful exhibition this man, with
the epaulettes of a Major-General still on his shoulders makes as a party posturemaster.”102
An editorial in the pro-Lincoln Milwaukee Daily Sentinel tied   McClellan’s  
acceptance letter directly to his qualifications as a man and soldier:
Frankness has always been regarded as a prominent trait of the true soldier.
Frankness, sincerity and courage go naturally together, for the brave man needs
no disguise and will let all the world know his real sentiments whenever he
attempts to publish them at all. Gen. McClellan, in his letter of acceptance, seems
to have been deficient, temporarily at least, in these soldierly qualities.103
Similarly, the Boston Liberator called  the  acceptance  letter  “indirect  and  unmanly”  and  
an   example   of   McClellan’s   “characteristic   cowardly,   roundabout   way”   of   taking   a  
position.104 Harpers Weekly piled  on,  claiming  that  McClellan’s  letter  was  “confused  and  
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verbose: wanting both the manly directness of the soldier and the earnest conviction of
the  patriot.”105
Some   critics   described   the   waffling   character   of   McClellan’s   letter   in   terms  
suggesting that he was thereby taking cover in an un-soldierly way. The Civil War
culture of courage and manliness demanded that military officers demonstrate their
bravery  by  example  to  the  troops  under  them.    They  did  this  by  “conspicuous  exposure  to  
enemy   fire.” 106 To demonstrate courage, officers were expected under this model of
bravery to lead from the front, exposing themselves to the same perils as the men under
their command. At Gettysburg, just   before   Pickett’s   charge,   Union General Winfield
Scott Hancock cemented his place in American military lore by slowly and selfconsciously riding his horse along the entrenched lines on the crest of Cemetery Hill,
pretending to be indifferent to the explosion of Confederate artillery shells all around
him. He believed it would inspire his men to behave courageously if they saw the
“exemplary  performance”  of  their  General  exposing  himself  so  bravely. 107 A captain in
the  47th  Ohio,  describing  a  lesser  skirmish,  said  his  “boys  besought  me  to  take  cover,  but  
I knew what must be done, ... therefore I set the example by taking the most exposed
place.”108
The   unwillingness   “to   expose   himself,”   therefore,   carried   the   meaning   that   the  
actor was a coward – the antithesis of a soldier. So, when a writer to the New York Times
described   the   waffling   attendant   to   McClellan’s   letter   of   acceptance   as   the   behavior   of  
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“[t]he  General  who  does  not  like  to  expose  himself  by  a  personal  expression  of  opinions,”  
the suggestion of cowardice was hardly veiled.109 The intent was to diminish the stature
of McClellan as a soldier by suggesting, with a value-laden phrase carrying strong
meaning to readers, that he had failed the test of courage by which soldiers and officers
were measured.
Pennsylvania congressman Thaddeus Stevens delighted in undercutting
McClellan’s  manhood  and  didn’t  bother  with  subtlety  to  do  it.    Leaving  to  others  the  task  
of showing unmanliness in the acceptance letter, Stevens showed it by reference to
McClellan’s   body   parts.   He   effectively   feminized   McClellan   before   a   Union   League
audience in October 1864 by contrasting the physiques of Lincoln and McClellan. On
dress parade, Stevens said scornfully, McClellan made
a great sensation among the ladies. They call him dear little band-box Mac. In
these qualities, it must be confessed that Lincoln is no match for him. His
[Lincoln’s]   big   fists   were   not   made   to   wear   kid   gloves….   They   were   made   to  
grasp the oaken helve and swing the tempered steel of the woodman. His arms,
instead of being artistically rounded and tapered, are sinewy and long as
Cyclops’s. Nor is he a graceful horseman. His legs, instead of being padded to fit
a quilted saddle, are long, with joints like Hercules. Put him astride of
McClellan’s   prancing   parade   horse   and   you   would   think   he   was   walking   with   a  
frisky pony between   his   legs….   If   [McClellan   and   Lincoln]   should   encounter,  
either physically or mentally, the giant grip of the Rail Splitter will tear the
polished dandy from the ground and hurl him farther than an Indian shoots his
arrow. Which of these men will you choose to guide the rolling ship in the midst
of a storm?110
Pro-Lincoln   political   cartoonists  had  fun  with  McClellan’s  predicament   over  the  
platform,   sometimes   making   Stevens’   point   in   picture   form.   The   following   lithograph,  
published in Boston, compares  the  Republicans’  platform  with  the  Democrats’.  In  the  left  
panel, Ulysses Grant, David Farragut, and local favorite Charles Sumner carry Lincoln
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and Lady Liberty atop the Republican platform. On the right panel, Clement
Vallandigham shoves a reluctant and dwarfish McClellan up onto the Democratic
platform,   saying,   “Don’t   be   afraid,   little   Mac.   I’ll   support   you.”   McClellan   responds  
timorously,   “No,   Val;;   it   is   too   much,   such   a   frail,   slippery   box.   I’ll   certainly   break   my  
neck!”   Snakes   support   the   platform,   which is made of cheese. New York Democrats
Horatio   Seymour   and   Fernando   Wood   look   on,   the   latter   saying,   “All   true   friends   of  
slaves  and  their  masters  should  join  our  company.”  John  Bull,  representing  Great  Britain,  
reads a pro-McClellan issue of the London Times.

Illustration originally published by Louis Prang & Co., Boston, Platforms Illustrated, 1864. Library of
Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Collection: Cartoon Prints, American, Reproduction Number:
LC-USZ62-7176 .

A cartoon published in   New   York   is   less   playful.      Entitled   “How   Columbia  
receives   McClellan’s   Salutation   from   the   Chicago   Platform,”   it   shows   Pendleton  
preening,  observing  that  if  McClellan  dies,  “I  will  be  President,  and  will  make  everything  
sweet   for   my   Southern   friends.”   A host of peace Democrats, including George
Woodward and Clement Vallandigham, support the platform with McClellan on it.
McClellan  stands  on  his  letter  of  acceptance,  “with  which  he  fancies  he  has  concealed  the  
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Platform. He salutes Columbia, courting her smiles,”   but   to   no   avail.   She   spurns   him,  
saying,  “What  a  shame  that  a  man  who  was  educated  at  my  expense  [at  West  Point],  and  
whom I have since honored and petted, should have allowed himself to be allured by
ambition into such company, and upon such a Platform! His letter cannot conceal his real
ambition,   nor   hide   those   odious   ‘planks;;’   neither   can   it   reconcile   him   to   his   traitorous  
companions.  I  DISCARD  BOTH  HIM  AND  THEM  FOREVER.”  

Illustration originally published in New York, How Columbia receives McLellan's Salutation from the
Chicago Platform,1864, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Collection: Cartoon Prints,
American, Reproduction Number: LC-USZ62-40791.

It is one thing for a candidate to lack the courage of his convictions, as
Republicans  asserted  based  on  McClellan’s  acceptance  letter.    It  is  quite  another  to  claim  
that he lacks physical courage. Republicans leveled that charge, too. We can think of it,
almost  literally,  as  McClellan’s  “swift  boat”  problem,  a  nineteenth-century variant of the
accusations Republicans directed at Democrat John Kerry in the 2004 presidential
campaign.
William  Swinton’s  lengthy  attack  on  McClellan  for  his  failures  on  the  Peninsula  
included assertions that McClellan himself was never personally present during the
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several   engagements   with   Lee’s   forces,   while   his   own   troops   showed   valor   in   his  
absence. 111 The clear implication was that McClellan lacked backbone. The most
celebrated example of his supposed physical cowardice was an episode variously referred
in  political  attacks  as  the  “gunboat  episode,”  the  “ride  to  the  rear,”  or  the  “Galena  affair.”    
It   occurred   at   a   place   called   Harrison’s   Landing   toward   the   end   of   the   Peninsula  
Campaign  in  1862,  just  before  the  Union  army’s  ignominious  withdrawal.   Not far from
Harrison’s  Landing,  the  fierce  battle  of  Malvern  Hill  was  underway,  the  last  big  fight  of  
the   campaign.      In   the   Republicans’   telling,   McClellan   ran   away   to   save   his   own   skin,  
fleeing the battlefield for the safety of the gunboat Galena on the James River. William
Swinton  treats  the  episode  as  of  a  piece  with  McClellan’s  penchant  for  absenting  himself  
from the scene of any fighting.112 Other Republican partisans trumpeted the story in their
pro-Lincoln papers as Election Day approached. The Chicago Tribune, for example,
published  an  eyewitness  report  breathlessly  attesting  to  McClellan’s  panicky  escape  from  
the fighting. The witness described McClellan scurrying to board a departing gunboat
just as the battle of Malvern Hill began to rage.113 Describing the same incident, the New
York Times expressed   shock   that   at   the   height   of   the   battle,   McClellan   would   “...cower  
before the foe, and with his army deformed, demoralized and reduced to half its original
number, fly to the protection of the gunboats   at   Harrison’s   Landing,   strewing   his  
circuitous  route  with  the  dead  and  mutilated  bodies  of  his  devoted  soldiers.”114
Campaigning   for   Lincoln,   Thaddeus   Stevens   linked   McClellan’s   military  
ineffectiveness to his physical cowardice; McClellan failed to press the enemy because he
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was frightened. In the Peninsula campaign, Stevens told a raucous pro-Lincoln audience,
McClellan   “never   ventured   to   attack   the   enemy.   When   they   got   tired   of   waiting   and  
attacked him, he was seven days fighting and running until, far in advance of his army, he
found   a   safe   place   on   board   a   gunboat.”115 In   an   editorial   entitled   “The   Imbecility   of  
McClellan,”   a   pro-Lincoln paper made the same linkage. Referring to a succession of
battlefield setbacks during the Peninsula campaign, the paper  said,  “He  was  deficient  at  
Yorktown, absent at Williamsburg, surprised at Fair Oaks, taken in the flank and rear at
Gaines  Mill,  and  frightened  out  of  his  wits  at  Malvern  Hill.”116
Currier and Ives published this anti-McClellan political cartoon ridiculing the
candidate   for   his   gunboat   escapade.   Entitled   “The   Gunboat   Candidate,”   it   depicts  
McClellan on a saddle mounted on the spar of the Galena. Peering through a telescope at
the   distant   battle   at   Malvern   Hill,   McClellan   intones,   “Fight   on   my   brave   Soldiers and
push the enemy to the wall, from this spanker boom your beloved General looks down
upon  you.”  
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Illustration originally published by Currier and Ives, The gunboat candidate at the Battle of Malvern Hill,
1864. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Collection: Cartoon Prints, American,
Reproduction Number: LC-USZ62-92038.

A  Massachusetts  paper  joked  that  the  candidate’s  name,  G.B.  McClellan  stood  for  
“Gun   Boat   McClellan,” 117 while a Republican paper in Wisconsin deployed humor in
mocking McClellan with this poem:
Last, glorious Malvern taught the foe,
What deeds the Northmen dared;
Bold Mac, far off in gunboat lay, –
Of course he was not scared!
The hero scared? That could not be.
He heard no bullets whiz.
He always found in shooting times,
He  had  some  other  ‘biz.’118
This   tale   of   cowardice   rounded   out   the   Republicans’   portrait   of   McClellan   the  
milksop posing as hero. Not only was he disloyal and inept, but he also lacked guts.
Sometimes the message was cloaked in humor. The New York Times quipped that a
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portrait of McClellan displayed at a mass meeting of Democrats was probably exposed to
more  gunpowder  from  the  fireworks  at  the  gathering  than  the  General  himself  had  “ever  
smelt...in   the   whole   course   of   his   military   career.” 119 But fundamentally it was no
laughing matter to suggest that a commander was unwilling to face enemy fire. It
attacked his standing as a leader and soldier, and it was all part of the effort to topple
McClellan  from  his  perch  as  supposed  heir  to  America’s  tradition of military glory. And,
just as with charges that he was disloyal and militarily inept, accusations that McClellan
was a coward touched on subjects that soldiers could speak about with unique authority.
So  Republicans  and  Unionists  brought  soldiers’  voices to bear once again.
General John A Logan was one of those voices. Logan, for whom Logan Circle in
Washington D.C. is named, had served as an Illinois state senator before the war and
would serve in the U.S. House of Representatives after the war, was not shy about
entering   the   political   fray   on   Lincoln’s   behalf   even   while   serving   as   a   commissioned  
officer. At a pro-Lincoln   rally   in   Carbondale,   Illinois,   Logan   seized   on   McClellan’s  
acceptance letter as evidence that McClellan was un-soldierly and a coward. Referring to
the  “peace  plank”  of  the  Democratic  platform,  Logan  said  that  McClellan,  “or  any  man,  
who  ever  drew  a  sword  in  his  country’s  cause,  who  would  consent  to  take  any  position  on  
a platform of that kind, is unworthy to be called an American soldier.”    When  Democrats  
at the Chicago convention adopted the platform, Logan added in a remark that elicited
laughter  from  the  audience,  they  knew  “that  McClellan  would  write  a  soft  letter  – sort of
for war, saying that he knew the convention was for war, but  they  forgot  to  say  so.”120

119. Id., Sept. 18, 1864, p. 8.
120. Milwaukee Daily Sentinel, October 7, 1864.
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General Samuel Heintzelman was similarly outspoken against McClellan. A
West Point graduate, he had served in the Mexican War and commanded a corps under
McClellan in the Peninsula campaign. Now he lent his name and prestige to the thesis
that his former commander was a coward.

Newspapers carried an account of

Heintzelman’s   injecting   himself   in   a   conversation   between   two   men   discussing  
McClellan’s  supposed  lack  of  courage.  “How  do  you  know,  sir,  that  he  hasn’t  courage?”  
the general  asked  one  of  the  men.  “Never  judge  too  hastily,  sir,  of  a  man’s  courage.  Gen.  
McClellan   has   never   been   under   fire,   and   you   can’t   tell   whether   a   man   is   brave   or   not  
until  he  passes  that  ordeal.”121
The Chicago Tribune published an eyewitness report by an unnamed soldier
attesting  to  McClellan’s  hurried  and  premature  departure  from  the  fighting  at  the  Battle  
of  Malvern  Hill.    Under  the  Headline,  “He  Takes  A  Little  Nap  While  the  Fight  Is  Going  
On,”  the  soldier described McClellan scurrying to board a gunboat at a landing near the
battle  and  pushing  off,  just  as  the  battle  began  to  rage.    In  the  witness’s  words,  “A  boat  is  
manned, and, three cheers from officers and crew, off goes the man upon whom hangs
the  destiny  of  the  American  people.”122
Republicans used Democratic opposition to soldier-voting laws as part of its case
that their standard bearer was a coward. One Republican pamphleteer claimed that
“McClellan   Democrats”   cooked   up   their   supposed   concern   about   fraud   as   a   pretext   for  
opposing soldier voting. This   was   a   “pretended”   fear,   said   the   Republican   author.   The  
real   reason   for   opposing   the   law   was   that   “McClellan   Democrats”   knew   perfectly   well  
that soldiers would never vote for McClellan or other Democratic traitors. Hiding behind

121. Lowell (MA) Daily Citizen and News, June 8, 1864.
122. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 29, 1864.
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this pretext about fraud,   Democrats   mounted   “cowardly   assaults   in   the   rear   upon   the  
soldier”  by  opposing  laws  that  would  allow  the  troops  to  vote.123

Democratic Messaging in the Politics of Soldiers: Defending McClellan and
Attacking Lincoln
For their part, Democrats relied on voting soldiers to rebut the charge that their
man was disloyal, inept, or a coward and to mount charges of their own against Lincoln.
“Any   man   who   says   George   B.   McClellan   is   a   traitor,”   wrote   a   soldier   defiantly,   “is   a  
liar. I shall vote for him, and the soldiers who have served their country, as I have served
mine,  will  vote  for  him  too.”124 Another soldier, after telling a Democratic gathering in
Springfield, Illinois, about  losing  one  of  his  brothers  in  combat,  said  melodramatically,  “I  
am for McClellan because I know he would say let me be buried wrapped in the Stars and
Stripes,   with   not   one   star   wrestled   from   it   by   the   hand   of   treason.” 125

A soldier in

Virginia  wrote  glowingly  of  McClellan  to  a  New  York  newspaper.    “I  fought  under  him  
at Antietam,”  he  said,  “and  I  love  him.    You  need  not  ask  any  soldier  but  what  he  will  
say,  ‘I  go  for  Little  Mac  – you  bet.’”126 Another  wrote,  “If  General  McClellan  was  with  
the army again, you would see one of the happiest armies that ever was. Our boys will
vote for him to a man.”127 A soldier writing from Virginia said in heroic sounding tones,
“if  I  am  spared  to  live  till  the  election  comes  off,  and  I  get  a  chance  to  vote,  I  will  give  
my  voice  for  him  as  far  as  it  will  go.”128 An  Illinois  private  said  colorfully,  “The leaders

123. Chandler, The  Soldiers’  Right  to  Vote, 4.
124. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, September 16, 1864.
125. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, September 14, 1864.
126. As quoted in the Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, September 18, 1864.
127. Id. (Emphasis in the original.)
128. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, September 23, 1864.
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of the Republican party have stolen the robes of Heaven to serve the Devil in, and if you
don’t  look   sharp  they   will  succeed,  for  they  are   a  sharp  set   of  thieves.     I  thank   you  for  
your  attention  to  a  McClellan  soldier,  and  bid  you  good  night.”129
Fighting fire with fire, a Democratic campaign song took Republicans to task as
the real, albeit disguised, traitors:
All Hail DEMOCRACY! All ye who would be free!
Its base is COMPROMISE and PEACE, its hope is LIBERTY!
But TRAITORS cry for BLOOD, reject all COMPROMISE,
And  style  themselves  “THE  UNIONISTS,”  tho’  Traitors  in  disguise.130
An outspoken antiwar Democrat from Baltimore, Severn Teakle Wallis, who had been
arrested early in the war for suspicion of pro-secessionism, made a similar point in a
public   exchange   of   letters   with   Connecticut   Senator   John   Sherman.   “You   have   …  
borrowed  from  the  vocabulary  of  despotism  the  name  ‘disloyalty,’  he  wrote,  arguing  that  
heavy-handed unionists had abused the label of treason by applying it to those who
“question  … the  wisdom  …  or,  if  need  be,  resist  the  corruption  and  usurpation  of  those  
who temporarily hold  and  prostitute  power.”131
Speaking in Nashville, General Thomas F. Meagher, an Irish immigrant who
commanded   New   York’s   celebrated   “Irish   Brigade,”   stuck   up   for McClellan
pugnaciously.  “For  my  part,”  said  Meagher,  who  favored  Lincoln  over  McClellan,  “if  any  
man, in my presence, dare call General McClellan a traitor or a coward, I will not stop to
argue with him. I will at once knock him down. I will answer such assertions only with a

129. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, September 14, 1864.
130. Rev. William Potts, Campaign Songs for Christian Patriots and True Democrats (New York:
William Potts, 1864), 9-10, as quoted in Weber, Copperheads:  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  Lincoln’s  Opponents  in  
the North, 188.
131. Smith, No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North, 71.
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blow – and   an   Irishman’s   blow   at   that.”132 One soldier even claimed, in a sentiment
echoed by Democratic editorial writers, that Lincoln had disloyal, even murderous,
motives   for   having   fired   McClellan   from   his   army.   “The   removal   of   Gen. McClellan
from  the  command  of  this  army,”  wrote  the  soldier from his camp near the battleground
of   Petersburg,   “was   a   masterly   stroke   of   policy   on   the   part   of   the   administration,  
inasmuch  as  it  has  consigned  thousands  of  the  General’s  warmest  friends  and most ardent
admirers  to  the  tomb.”133
Democrats used this line of argument not only in defending McClellan against
charges of incompetence, but also in attacking Lincoln as an incompetent war leader. His
having sacked McClellan, they claimed, was just one measure of his ineptitude. Another
was that he was a bungling micromanager, meddling in the nuts and bolts of military
affairs about which he knew nothing. At a rally for McClellan in Philadelphia, the
featured speaker was a local attorney, Hiram Ketcham. Ketcham had served in the War
of  1812,  but  as  he  lit  into  Lincoln,  he  modestly  disclaimed  any  great  military  expertise.  “I  
don’t  know  anything  about  military  matters,”  said  the  old  veteran,  “but  I  know  as  much  
as   Abraham   Lincoln.”   The   president   “got   it into his head that because he was
commander-in-chief  he  should  be  a  general…  He  was  commander-in-chief of the navy;
but he might as well tell Farragut how to sail his ships as to tell McClellan how to fight
his  army.”134
A  variation  on  Ketcham’s  critique  found expression in a political cartoon entitled
“The   SPORTSMAN   upset   by   the   RECOIL   of   his   own   GUN,”   shown   below.   It   mocks  

132. The Advocate (Newark, OH), November 3, 1864. Interestingly, Meagher made these remarks at a
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133. Detroit Free Press, September 30, 1864.
134. The Press (Philadelphia, PA), September 19, 1864.
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Lincoln as a bumbling warrior, incapable of harming the enemy. Lincoln appears as an
Irish sportsman, wearing knee breeches and looking feeble. The shot from his
blunderbuss  misses  its  target,  a  bird  labeled  “CSA,”  and  the  gun’s  recoil  knocks  the  sillylooking Lincoln off his feet. The bird flaps its wings and thumbs its nose, and Lincoln is
reduced to wishing the defiant bird had suffered   the   recoil.   “Begorra,”   he   says   to   the  
unharmed  prey,  “if  ye  war  at  this  end  o’  th’  gun,  ye  wouldn’t  flap  yer  wings  that  way,  ye  
vill’in.”  Edwin  Stanton  appears  in  the  lower  right  as  a  useless  hunting  dog.  The  message  
is  that  Lincoln  didn’t  know  what  he was doing as a wartime commander.

Illustration originally published in 1864, The sportsman upset by the recoil of his own gun (Jo. Miller,)
Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Collection: Cartoon Prints, American, Reproduction
Number: LC-USZ62-55785.  The  wording  on  Lincoln’s  gun  reads,  “To  Whom  It  May  Concern,”  a  reference  
to the opening of a celebrated letter Lincoln wrote for Horace Greeley to use in meeting a Confederate
peace  delegation.  Nothing  came  of  Greely’s  project.
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Democratic  Messaging  in  the  Politics  of  Soldiers:  “Lincoln  Neglects  Soldiers”
Micromanaging   and   klutziness   were   only   part   of   Lincoln’s   incompetence   as   a  
commander, Democrats claimed. He failed more profoundly, they said, when he made
emancipation a war aim, since that blunder had the effect of hardening the resistance of
the  Confederacy  and  putting  the  Union’s  soldiers  at  unnecessary  risk.    Robert  Winthrop,  
once a Whig congressman but now a pro-McClellan Democrat, made this point in a
rousing speech before the party faithful in New York City late in the 1864 election
season. By expanding the war effort to include an assault on slavery, Winthrop argued,
Lincoln had backed Southerners into a corner and forced them to resist reunion more
ferociously. This put the nation’s  troops  at  heightened  risk.    Lincoln’s  pro-Negro policy,
said   Winthrop,   “by   inspiring   this   spirit   of   desperation   and   hatred,   has   rendered   the  
victories of our armies a hundred-fold   harder   to   achieve….   For   never,   my   friends,   do  
victories cost so much, and come to so little, as when they are wrung from a foe who has
been   goaded   and   maddened   to   despair.”      A   wise   commander-in-chief, in the mold of
Washington and Jackson, would have avoided that blunder, Winthrop claimed. Lincoln
did not fit the mold, but  McClellan  did.   “Let   us   rally,  then,  to   the  support   of  that  great  
principle of unconditional Unionism which is common to Washington, Jackson, and
McClellan.”135
Soldiers   paid   the   steep   price   of   Lincoln’s   misguided   policy   choices,   Democrats  
insisted. The party  adapted  that  message  to  song.  One  evoked  the  memory  of  Lincoln’s  
martyred victims:
We are coming Abraham Lincoln,
135.   Robert   C.   Winthrop,   “Speech   in   support   of   the   Democratic   ticket   at   the New York Ratification
Meeting,”  Sept.  19,  1864,  in  Pamphlets in American History, (Boston: J.E. Farwell and Company, 1864),
No. CW 392, p. 13, microfiche.
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From mountain, wood and glen,
We are coming Abraham Lincoln,
With the ghosts of murdered men.136
Another made the same point as a reason to vote for McClellan:
The cruel war must have an end;
I'll tell you what we'll do;
We'll cast our votes for "Little Mac,"
We're bound to put him through.
The widow's wails and orphan's tears
Prevailing o'er the land
Pray heaven to send a rare relief-McClellan is the man.137
A pro-McClellan   campaign   song   claimed   that   Lincoln’s   war   policy   jeopardized  
not only the Constitution but also the lives of millions of white soldiers. Addressing itself
to  “Freemen  of  the  Union,”  it  posed  rhetorical  questions:
Would you have preserved intact
The CONSTITUTION and be free?
And secure in word and fact
UNION, PEACE, and Liberty?
Would [you] TWELVE MILLIONS WHITE MEN SLAY
To  make  FOUR  MILLIONS  NEGROES  FREE?”138
As this song makes clear, when Democrats stuck up for soldiers in attacking
Lincoln, it was white soldiers they had in mind. Democrats enlisted soldiers to
communicate this anti-Lincoln message to Northern audiences, making explicit what
Winthrop  and  these  songsters  had  implied:   that  Lincoln’s  policy  choices  victimized not
just soldiers generally, but white soldiers in particular.

The Cincinnati Daily Enquirer

published  a  letter  from  a  Union  private  in  Tennessee  who  complained,  “We  volunteered  
to  put  down  the  rebellion  and  preserve  the  Union  under  the  Constitution….   We did not
136. Baker, Affairs of Party, 303.
137.   William   Shakespeare   Hays,   “McClellan   is   the   Man”(song   lyrics), accessed October 9, 2013,
http://www.civilwarpoetry.org/union/songs/mcclellan.html.
138. Potts, Campaign Songs for Christian Patriots and True Democrats, 5.
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hire ourselves to the Government to free negroes, and we do not wish to see thousands of
our  own  race  fall  by  disease  and  in   battle  to   sustain   that  famous  proclamation.”139 The
Enquirer also printed a letter from a soldier in the Army of the Cumberland to the same
effect.    “I  could  not  be  contented,”  he  said,  “to  remain  in  this  unholy war. If things were
as when I enlisted I could be contented, but since the Administration has declared the
negroes free, and on equality with the white man, I will not support it in Abolition
principles.” 140 One   resentful   soldier   wrote   to   complain   about   the   administration’s  
pampering  of  African  Americans.    “Around  the  soldier,”  wrote  the  trooper  from  his  post  
in Louisiana in an odd third person style,
every-where he beheld the negro feasting and banqueting at the expense of our
Government. The negro could be paid regularly every week, he could be
furnished with clothing when needed. But not so with the soldier; the wife and
child of his home, who were dependent upon the husband for support, were
pinched with hunger, penury and want.141
White supremacy was a unifying article of faith among nineteenth-century
Democrats.    It  became  a  political  rallying  cry  after  Lincoln’s  Emancipation  Proclamation  
made abolition a Northern war aim in 1863.

Prosecuting war on behalf of blacks

squandered white blood, they insisted, and they argued that Lincoln the abolitionist was
the enemy of the fighting man. As the election approached, Democrats developed three
additional lines of attack based on that message. The first involved the draft, the second
prisoner exchanges, and the third – almost surrealistically – a minstrel song.
The   law   authorizing   a   draft,   enacted   in   1863,   applied   to   “able-bodied male
citizens of   the   United   States.”      That limited its scope to white men.

Democrats

complained   that   Lincoln’s   draft   traded   white   lives   for   black   freedom,   a   despicable  
139. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, February 21, 1863.
140. Id., October 4, 1864 (emphasis in the original).
141. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, February 27, 1863.
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bargain by Democratic reckoning. And white men lucky enough to survive their forced
military ordeal faced destitution on their return home, Democrats predicted, since blacks
moving in from the South would fill their civilian jobs. Class injustice compounded the
racial outrage for Democrats, because the law allowed men to avoid service by paying a
commutation fee of $300, a price  beyond  a  poor  man’s  reach.    The  issue  stirred  strong  
passions, particularly in urban centers where Democrats usually polled well. Lower class
whites protested violently in the notorious New York City draft riots of July 1863, and
white resentments remained strong enough in 1864 to give Democrats a good campaign
issue.    They  seized  it,  adopting  the  theme  that  white  soldiers  were  victims  of  Lincoln’s  
pro-black, pro-rich draft.142 Democratic  papers  called  Lincoln  “the  widow-maker”  whose  
“abolition  plan”  would  feed  conscripts  to  enemy  guns  and  leave  them  “scattered  corpses  
over   a   thousand   battlefields.”      A   banner   in   a   pro-McClellan torchlight parade in
Cincinnati   asked,   “How   are   you,   Conscript?”      Then   it   answered   its   own   question,  
showing the skull and crossbones. When the administration issued a supplemental draft
call shortly before the 1864 election, a Democratic newspaper editor confidently
predicted,  “Lincoln  is  deader  than  dead.”143
Prisoner exchanges were routine through the first half of the war.

But the

enlistment of blacks into the Union army, totaling some 180,000 by the end of 1864,
disrupted that routine. The Confederacy, refusing to recognize blacks as legitimate
soldiers, excluded captured black troops from the POW swaps.

The Lincoln

administration responded by ending prisoner exchanges altogether, a costly decision for

142. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 600-611, 758; Iver Bernstein, The New York City Draft Riots
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the thousands of men confined in ghastly POW camps like the notorious Andersonville in
Georgia.144 To Democrats, the gesture demeaned whites, and they lashed out at Lincoln
in a drumbeat   of   campaign   attacks.      “Lincoln   and   [Secretary   of   War]   Stanton   refuse   to  
effect an exchange of prisoners unless the Southerners will act on their notion, that a
negro   is   just   as   good,”   charged   the   anti-Lincoln Detroit Free Press in a typical
Democratic attack. “Let   soldiers   everywhere   remember   that   Lincoln   and   Stanton   look  
upon them as no better than negroes, and that they allow white men to rot in prison rather
than  take  the  risk  of  having  any  disrespect   offered  to   Sambo.”145 Addressing its white,
Democratic leadership, the Free Press at one point calculated that forty thousand white
soldiers   languished   in   confederate   prison   camps   solely   because   of   Lincoln’s   policy.  
“Behold   the   costly   sacrifice   at   the   shrine   of   the   negro,”   mocked   the   editors,   “and  
commend  Lincoln  for  them,  and  support  him  if  you  can.”146
Adding to the   Democrats’   use   of   the   draft   and   the   prisoner   exchange   policy   to  
portray Lincoln as indifferent to white soldiers were the attacks based on the tale of
Lincoln’s   “Negro   song”   at   the   Antietam battlefield.

That episode arose out of the

president’s  visit  to  the  Maryland  battle  site  in  October  1862,  just  weeks  after  the  Union  
victory there in what remains the bloodiest single day in American military history. As
Democrats related the event, Lincoln demonstrated his heartlessness while touring the
battlegrounds. They claimed that Lincoln – as was his wont – called on his bodyguard
and longtime friend, Ward Lamont, to strike up a tune on his banjo, apparently to take the
president’s  mind  off  the  grisly facts of the battle. Lamont chose a comical song called

144. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 792.
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“Picayune  Butler,”  named  for  a  black  minstrel  character.    As  Lincoln’s  wagon  carried  the  
president past scenes of the recent carnage, the banjo-playing bodyguard bellowed out
this jaunty show tune.147
The   Democrats’   spin   masters   turned   the   story   into   propaganda   for   assaulting  
Lincoln once again as pro-black and anti-soldier. He had affronted white troops and
insulted   the   Union   war   dead,   they   claimed,   by   calling   for   “a   negro   song”   at   the   site   of  
(white) soldierly sacrifice. One speaker at the Democratic convention in Chicago used
the  episode  as  proof  that  Lincoln  was  a  “cold  blooded  joker”  who,  unlike  McClellan,  did  
not  “entertain  a  proper  appreciation  of  [soldiers’]  suffering.”148 The episode became the
theme   of   a   poem   entitled   “Lincoln   at   Antietam,”   which   embellished   the   facts   and   ran  
repeatedly in Democratic papers:
Dead upon dead were huddled thick,
The very air with death was sick,
The wounded waited with ebbing life,
Their turn for the surgeon’s  tired  knife.
But carelessly rode old Abe along
And called in that scene for a negro song.
Youth and manhood lay weltering there,
With the sweat of agony matting their hair.
And the bravest in battle heard with awe
The crushing sound of the busy saw.
But carelessly rode old Abe along
And called in such scene for a negro song.149
A political cartoon captured the anti-Lincoln indignation stirred up by the
Antietam  battlefield  episode  and  tied  it  to  soldier  voting.    Entitled,  “The  COMMANDER-
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IN-CHIEF conciliating   the   SOLDIER’s   VOTES   on   the   Battle   Field,”   the   lithograph  
(below) shows Lincoln standing on the battlefield surrounded by dead and wounded
Union soldiers. As a nearby fallen soldier looks on, sadly clutching an American flag,
Lincoln directs Lamont (standing in the foreground, his back turned to the viewer) to
“sing  

us  

‘Picayune  

Butler,’  

or  

something  

else  

that’s  

funny.”

Illustration originally published in 1864, The Commander-in-Chief conciliating the soldier's votes on the
battle field, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Collection: Cartoon Prints, American,
Reproduction Number: LC-USZ62-89731.

The message captured in this picture – that Lincoln was clueless about the sufferings of
soldiers – became a rejoinder to Republican claims that Democrats in general and
McClellan  in  particular  were  no  “friends  to  the  soldiers.”    While  Andrew  Dickson  White  
and   William   E.   Chandler   pointed   to   Democrats’   opposition   to   soldier-voting laws as
proof of their antipathy to soldiers, this lithographer   mocks   the   heartless   Lincoln’s  
pretensions about soldier voting as rank hypocrisy. Both messages highlighted the
urgency  the  parties  attached  to  seizing  the  mantel  of  “the  soldiers’  friend.”  
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Soldiers were indispensable messengers of the core campaign themes of both
parties. For Republicans, those themes were that Democrats and McClellan were disloyal,
that McClellan was inept as a military commander, and that he was a coward, both
morally and physically. For Democrats, the core themes were that Lincoln bungled his
role as commander-in-chief and that he mistreated white troops. Soldiers could speak to
each of these themes with authority. They were experts on loyalty, courage, military
effectiveness, and compassion for troops. So both parties enlisted soldiers in the
messaging, either directly as spokesmen of the themes, or indirectly as the central
characters of the same themes spoken by politicians, newspaper editors, pamphleteers,
songsters, and cartoonists. Civil War politics in this sense was a politics of soldiers.
To prevail in the politics of soldiers, both parties had to position themselves as the
friend of the soldier. Deploying the voices of fictional soldiers, Andrew Dickson White
argued in his 1864 pamphlet that Democrats had forfeited any claim to that status by their
opposition to soldier-voting laws.

That opposition proved not only that Democrats

favored   “disfranchising”   soldiers,   as   White   would   have   readers   believe,   but   also   that  
Democrats traitorously aligned themselves with the enemy. It was potent stuff, and it was
an allegation that put Democrats in a bind.
As we shall see in the next chapter, soldier-voting laws were a lose-lose
proposition for Democrats. They lost if they supported the laws, because they were sure
that the Republican administration would manipulate voting in the field. And they lost if
they opposed the laws, because then Republicans would paint them as anti-soldier.
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CHAPTER 5
THE  DEMOCRATS’  PREDICAMENT
The pattern of Republican support and Democratic opposition to soldier voting
took shape gradually and did not coalesce before 1863.1 When it did coalesce, Democrats
found themselves in a box – associated with opposition to soldier-voting laws even in
states where they had supported the laws, damned as anti-soldier for their opposition in
states without soldier-voting laws, and damned by the results of soldier voting in states
wherever such laws passed.
An election in November 1862 for a congressional seat in Minnesota illustrated
the emerging problem Democrats faced. Earlier that year, well before the partisan lines
over soldier voting had taken shape. Minnesota enacted its soldier-voting law. Democrats
deserved as much credit as Republicans; the bill passed with bipartisan support in the
state legislature, including unanimous support in the state senate. In the November
election for a congressional seat Democrat William Cullen lost to Republican Ignatius
Donnelly. Cullen believed that the soldier votes for Donnelly cost him the election, so he
took steps to mount a challenge   to   the   law’s   constitutionality.   (Proofs   in   an   election  
contest  would  have  been  difficult,  since  Minnesota’s  mail-in version of absentee voting
did   not   permit   separate   tallies   of   soldiers’   ballots.)   Almost   before   his   challenge   got   off  
the ground, the Republican press came after him, one mocking Cullen under the headline,
“Who   Now   Is   the   Friend   of   the   Soldier”?   Fearing   the   loss   of   future   political   viability,  

1.  White,  “Citizens  and  Soldiers,”  47,  50;;  Williams,  “Voters  in  Blue,”  192, 201.
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Cullen abandoned his challenge, and the law stood. 2 While there is no evidence that
concerns about  the  law’s  unconstitutionality  were  any  more  prevalent  among  Democrats  
than Republicans at that early stage, and neither party had a greater claim than the other
for   the   law’s   existence,   Cullen’s   experience   was   a   toe   in   the   water   for   Democrats  
everywhere. On the one hand, winning the soldier vote was improbable for Democrats,
notwithstanding their early support for soldier-voting laws. On the other hand, fighting
the  laws,  or  the  laws’  electoral  effects,  was  politically  expensive.  
As the war progressed and Republicans increasingly asserted ever more control
over the military command structure, Democrats grew increasingly pessimistic about
their chances of winning the soldier vote. They frequently invoked the voice of the
soldier in trying to cope with the problem, claiming that through its surrogates in the
military command, the Lincoln administration bullied soldiers by coercing pro-Lincoln
votes in the field or by interfering with the voting rights of soldiers showing proMcClellan proclivities. But that tactic never gained great traction, and Democrats never
really escaped the box that the soldier-voting issue put them in.
The  Democrats’  lose-lose dilemma became particularly evident in the contrasting
experiences of Pennsylvania and Ohio. As we have seen, there was no clear partisan
divide   about   soldier   voting   in   Pennsylvania’s   1861   elections,   in   which   absent   soldiers  
participated   under   the   state’s   prewar   soldier-voting law. In the early stages of the war,
there was bipartisan ambivalence in Pennsylvania  about   soldiers’  exercising  their  rights  

2. The newspaper was the St Paul Daily Union, December  14,  1862,  as  quoted  in.  Downs,  “The  Soldier  
Vote,”  187,  198-199.
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under that law. In various election contests, candidates of both parties challenged the
participation of absent soldiers, influenced in doing so only by short-term electoral
expediency, not by ideological or partisan positions about the legitimacy of absentee
voting. When the prewar law came before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1862, a
bipartisan  majority  of  justices  voted  to  strike  it  down,  with  both  of  the  court’s  Republican  
justices joining two of its three Democrats in finding the law unconstitutional.
Objectively, then, Pennsylvania Democrats were no more hostile to the law when it was
in  force,  and  no  more  responsible  for  the  law’s  demise,  than  were  the  state’s  Republicans.  
But in the politics of 1863 and 1864 – the politics of the soldier – Democrats took the
blame for killing the law, and Republicans managed to use the issue to brand their
candidates  as  “the  soldiers’  friend.”  After  the  court’s  decision,  even  without  a  way  to  vote  
“in   the   field,”   Pennsylvania soldiers made their voices heard loudly for Republican
gubernatorial candidate Andrew Curtin, either as voters home on furlough or as distant
spokesmen for Curtin in the political messaging war for civilian votes.
If 1863 Pennsylvania demonstrated the danger of the soldier-voting issue in a
state where soldiers could not vote in the field, Ohio demonstrated that danger in a state
where they could. Early on, Ohio Democrats supported soldier-voting legislation over
Republican objections. Not long after their efforts bore legislative fruit in 1863, those
same Democrats came to regret their supportive role. The reason for Democratic support
and Republican opposition early in the war was the mirror image of the circumstances
that explained the reversal of the  parties’  positions  later  in  the  war:  suspicion  of  what  the  
other party might do to cheat. Just as Democrats by late-1863 doubted that their
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candidates  could  compete  fairly  for  soldier  votes  given  the  administration’s  firm  control  
over the army, so Republicans before 1863 doubted the fairness of soldier voting in an
army dominated in the early going by Democrats – men like George McClellan, Henry
Halleck, Don Carlos Buell, and William Rosecrans. In addition to suspecting most
Democratic generals of harboring Confederate sympathies and plotting to overthrow the
Republican   administration,   Republicans   believed   that   these   “West   Point   Democrats”  
actively prevented the circulation of Republican newspapers in the military camps. 3
Those suspicions led the Republican controlled legislature in Ohio to defeat a proposed
soldier-voting law in 1862. Democrats seized on that vote to criticize Republicans in the
1862 elections, paving the way for bi-partisan  passage  of   Ohio’s  soldier-voting law the
following year.4
Objectively, then, Democrats deserved more credit than Republicans for the
Ohio’s   law’s   existence,   but   that   didn’t   protect   them   in   the   politics   of   soldiers   that  
emerged  in  late  1863.  Unlike  Pennsylvania’s  prewar  law,  Ohio’s  statute  survived  its  court  
challenge,   and   Ohio’s   absent   soldiers   used   the   law   to   vote   in   the   state’s   1863  
gubernatorial contest between Union Party candidate John Brough and Democrat
Clement Vallandigham. Far from rewarding Democrats for their support of the soldiervoting law, soldiers voted overwhelmingly (and in some cases fraudulently) for the
Union Party candidate.
So, from the 1862 election in Minnesota and the 1863 elections in Ohio and
Pennsylvania, both parties had learned the political danger of opposing, or appearing to
3. Williams, Voters in Blue, 201.
4.  Young,  “Soldier  Voting  in  Ohio  During  the  Civil  War”,  7.
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oppose, soldier voting. But Democrats were also coming to understand that there was no
political safe harbor for them in supporting the laws, as they became convinced that their
candidates could not compete on a level playing field for the soldier vote. Democrats saw
specific evidence that appeared to validate their pessimism. As the war progressed,
Democrats became alarmed about what they saw as a clear and growing pattern of
electoral abuses by military officers for Republican partisan benefit. It included military
interference  with  civilian  political  gatherings  and  elections,  denial  of  soldiers’  access  to  
Democratic newspapers, and coercion of soldiers to cast pro-Republican votes. This
pattern deeply troubled Democrats and shaped their growing but necessarily muted
antipathy to soldier voting.
Adam I.P Smith documents the ubiquity of intimidation of Democrats by soldiers
taking it upon themselves to enforce the wartime political culture of no-partyism. In just
one of many examples Smith cites, a group of soldiers in St. Louis stoned the platform
where pro-Democratic speakers criticized the Lincoln administration and destroyed antiLincoln campaign paraphernalia.5 Military influence – abuse, in the eyes of Democrats –
in civilian elections was also common. In the Border States, Union military commanders
had  issued  orders  barring  “disloyal”  men  from  the  polls  and  requiring  loyalty  oaths  as  a  
condition to voting. In Kentucky, the commanding general ordered the judges of local
elections   to   “allow   no   one   to   vote   …unless   he   is   known   to   them   to   be   an   undoubtedly  
loyal  citizen.”    In  Maryland,  the  military  commanders  required  prospective  voters  each  to  
swear   “that   I   will   in   all   things   deport   myself   as   a   good   and   loyal   citizen   of   the   United  

5. Smith, No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North, 99.
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States.”6 A letter to the Cincinnati Enquirer, a fervently Democratic newspaper, reported
that  “inoffensive  citizens”  in  Delaware  appearing  at  the  polls  to  vote  had  been  “stabbed  
with  bayonets”  and  that  “peaceful,  patriotic  men,  whose  fidelity  to  the  Union  no  man  may  
gainsay [were] charged by the military and through fear of bodily injury, deterred from
voting.”7
A   contested   election   for   Missouri’s   5th Congressional District in 1862 elicited
evidence of similar military highhandedness at the expense of Democrats. Republican
Joseph W. McClurg won the seat over Democrat Thomas L. Price, and Price challenged
the outcome. At the hearing ordered by the House of Representatives, witnesses for Price
testified   to   a   long   trail   of   abuses   that   tilted   the   outcome   in   McClurg’s   favor.   Several  
witnesses claimed that soldiers had gathered at polling sites to menace Price voters. One
witness,   a   man   named   Henry   “Speed”   Guyer,   claimed   that   after   he   voted   for   Price,   the  
provost marshal ordered him into military service. Others claimed that they were arrested
for voting for Price. H.H. Hudson, another Price voter, testified that soldiers had gathered
around his voting site in Linn Township with Price ballots speared on their bayonets. Yet
another Price man, Henry Bradley, said that the captain of the militia had threatened to
order  his  militia  unit  to  forage  off  Bradley’s  land  if  he  persisted  in  supporting  Price.    And  
Joseph Eads claimed that soldiers stoned prospective Price voters as they approached the
polls.8 (Price lost his challenge.)

6. CONG. GLOBE APPENDIX, 38th Cong., 1st sess., 70-71 (1864).
7. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, April 2, 1863.
8. THOMAS L. PRICE VS. JOSEPH W. MCCLURG, MEMORIAL CONTESTING THE SEAT OF THE HONORABLE
JOSEPH W. MCCLURG, H.R MISC, DOC. NO. 16, 38th Congress, 1st Sess. 10, 71, 89, 92, and 151 (1863).
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In his account of mid-nineteenth century voting practices, Richard Bensel details
similar   election   abuses   in   Missouri’s   6th and 7th Congressional Districts. State militia
forces worked as virtual guarantors of Republican victory. Suspected Democratic voters
were intimidated and sometimes arrested, their lands used for foraging, and their
candidates silenced.

Bensel describes one particularly egregious example in which the

militia commander for Carroll County interrupted a speech by James Birch, the
Democratic candidate for the seat in the 6th Congressional District. The commander
proclaimed   that   Birch   was   giving   a   “secession   speech   …   calculated   to   fan   afresh   the  
flames  of  rebellion  and  bushwhacking.”  He  ordered  Birch  to  stop  his  speech  and  never  to  
speak publically again in Carroll County. Recognizing discretion as the better part of
valor, Birch complied. Unsurprisingly, he lost the election.9
The clash over loyalty oaths grew out of intractable differences between the
parties about the meaning of loyalty. On this question, Republicans and Democrats were
like ships passing in the night. Democrats who opposed the war sincerely believed they
were just as loyal as Republicans, and Republicans believed just as sincerely that to
oppose the Republican administration was proof of disloyalty. Bensel argues persuasively
that because the Republican Party provided the only organized support for the war in
many border regions, Republicans there came to see support for the party as tantamount
to support for the Union. Bensel calls  it  a  “conflation  of  party  and  national  loyalty.”10
That conflation was on vivid display in an election contest for the seat
representing   Missouri’s   third   congressional   district. The contest hinged in part on the
9. Bensel, The American Ballot Box , 242-243.
10. Id. at 218.
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sincerity of voters giving the loyalty oath required as a condition of voting under an
ordinance  of  Missouri’s  provisional  government.  The  contested  seat  had  become  vacant  
on the death of incumbent John Noell, a former Democrat who won the seat running as
an   “Unconditional   Unionist.”   Losing   Republican candidate James Lindsay challenged
many  of  the  votes  cast  for  the  putative  winner,  John  Scott,  a  Democrat.    Some  of  Scott’s  
voters, according to the challenge, had falsely sworn the loyalty oath. The provost
marshal of St. Genevieve County was the face of the military in the county. Called to
testify  in  support  of  Lindsay’s  challenge,  he  claimed  that  he  knew  for  certain  that  some  of  
Scott’s  voters  were  in  fact  disloyal.  Among  them  were  voters  whose  disloyalty,  according  
to the witness, consisted of personally opposing the Emancipation Proclamation. Crossexamined  by  Scott’s  attorney,  the  witness  elaborated  on  his  definition  of  loyalty:
Q: Cannot a person be opposed to the measures of the administration and yet be
loyal to the government of the United States?
A: Not at this time, when such measures are the means of enforcing the laws and
suppressing  rebellion  and  treason…
Q: Cannot a person differ with the President as to what measures are necessary to
put down the rebellion, and yet be loyal?
A: Not if such differing would give any encouragement to rebels and traitors.
Q: How would it be if such differing did not encourage rebels and traitors?
A: I consider all such differings as calculated to embarrass the government, and
will always more or less give encouragement to rebels.11
Another  witness  for  Lindsay,  also  attached  to  the  provost  marshal,  was  asked,  “What  is  
the  reputation  of  the  voters  of  this  county  for  loyalty,  who  voted  for  John  G.  Scott?”  He  

11. H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 43, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 120-121 (1864). (I acknowledge Smith, No Party
Now: Politics in the Civil War North at 38-39 for highlighting the quoted passage from the record of this
election  contest.  Smith’s  work  prompted  further  examination  of  the  proceeding  for  this  chapter.)
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answered,   “The   undoubted   loyal   men   of   the   county look upon all those who voted for
Scott  as  being,  to  some  extent,  disloyal…”12
This attitude of course maddened Democrats.

Jean Baker aptly describes

Democrats’   self   identification   during   the   war   as   the   “loyal   opposition.” 13 Joel Silbey
makes the same point   in   describing   the   essential   continuity   in   parties’   oppositional  
attitudes and habits from 1838 through 1893, with no disruption during the Civil War.14
Democrats had always seen themselves as loyal Americans, and they still did. So they
naturally bristled at Republican wartime assertions that they were traitors. Their idea of
loyalty   was   devotion   to   the   “Union   as   it   was”   before   the   war,   under   an   unchanging  
constitution. To their mind, Lincoln and Republicans, having embraced transformative
war aims after the Emancipation Proclamation, had no legitimate claim to their support.15
That made Democrats traitors, as far as Republicans were concerned. Adam I.P.
Smith argues in his study of Northern politics in the Civil War that the Republican
organization, having enlisted war Democrats under the Union Party label, believed that
“antipartyism”  was  the  key  to  national  survival.16 By that logic, opposition to Republican
candidates was tantamount to opposition to the Union’s  existence.    This  presented  Border  

12. Id. at 124. On the recommendation of the investigating committee, the House decided the election
contest  in  Scott’s  favor.  HOUSE COMM ON ELECTIONS, JAMES LINDSAY VS. JOHN G. SCOTT, H.R. REP. NO.
117, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., (1864).
13. Baker, Affairs of Party, 132-140.
14. Silbey, The American Political Nation, 139.
15. Bensel, The American Ballot Box, 225.
16. Smith, No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North, 160-162. In his discussion of antipartyism,
Smith provides a useful historiography on the debate about whether partisan conflict helped or hurt the
Northern war effort. Smith himself carves out a hybrid position, embracing some but not all of the
competing arguments of Eric McKitrick (who argues that two-party conflict helped the war effort) and
Mark E. Neely, Jr. (who argues that it was a hindrance). Id. at 158-162.
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State Democrats   with   a   Hobson’s   choice:   fall   in   line   with   Republicanism   or   accept   the  
label  “traitor.”    Naturally  they  resisted.
The problem extended beyond the Border States.

In Ohio, a Union soldier

purportedly threatened to hang a Democrat returning from a party rally unless he took a
loyalty oath and promised not to vote for the Democratic candidate. 17 In an election in
Indianapolis early in 1863, Democrats claimed that soldiers who appeared at the polls
gave license to Republican thugs intimidating Democratic voters.
The appearance of the soldiers was the signal for loud talk and bluster on the part
of   the   bullies   who   always   frequent   such   places….   Men   who   held   Democratic  
tickets…were  compelled  to  leave.    If  they  hesitated,  it  would  be  proclaimed  that  
they had uttered a disloyal sentiment and the mob would run howling after them.
The soldiers were used by the cowardly political tricksters for this purpose.18
The takeaway for Democrats was that where voters were subject to military
oversight Democrats faced disfranchisement by virtue of being Democrats. How could
absentee soldier voting possibly be fair in such an atmosphere, they surely wondered. If
military authorities abused their power in civilian elections, Democrats reasoned, they
would surely cheat with soldier voting as well.

Democrats saw evidence of that

inclination, first, in illegal voting by soldiers stationed or furloughed in Northern states.
In   a   story   headed   “Election   Carried   by   Palpable   Fraud,”   The   Detroit Free Press, a
vigorously pro-Democratic paper, described voting irregularities at a local election in
Detroit’s  10th  Ward  in  November  1863.    Soldiers  from  the  local  provost  guard  had  voted  
in large numbers, and Democrats alleged fraud. At a hearing called to investigate the
allegations, a lieutenant testified that he led the troops to the polls and that before leaving
17. Shankman, “Soldier  Votes  and  Clement  L.  Vallandigham,”  97.  
18. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, April 9, 1863.
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the  barracks,  “I  distributed  the  republican  ticket  to  all  that  marched  out  of  the  gate;;  I  did  
so  in  obedience  to  orders.”    The  lieutenant  added,  “My  own  politics  are  democratic and
always  have  been.”19 A few days later, still covering the story, the Free Press published
a copy of an order from the captain commanding the provost guard unit to his troops. It
said,  in  part,  “While  your  commander  would  not  attempt  to  dictate  the  manner in which
the members of the Provost Guard shall vote, I may, perhaps, say, that it is very desirable,
in fact, our duty, to sustain the administration, both by word and deeds.”20
Democrats made similar complaints about local elections in New Hampshire and
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in 1863.

The Detroit Free Press and the like minded

Cincinnati Enquirer both published at various times a copy of a damning 1862 military
order   stating,   “By   order   of   the   President,   the   following   officers   are   hereby   dismissed
[from]   the   service   of   the   United   States:   …   Lieut.   A.G.   Edgerly,   4th New Hampshire
Volunteers,   for   circulating   copperhead   tickets.”

21

Republican troops from New

Hampshire, they claimed, received preferential furloughs to travel home to vote. (New
Hampshire’s  absentee  soldier  voting  law  was  not  yet  in  effect.)    Meanwhile,  Democrats  
asserted, Democratic troops stationed in Harrisburg who enjoyed voting rights as local
residents, were ordered away from town the night before the election so that they could
not  vote.    “When  it  suits  their  purposes,”  the  Cincinnati Enquirer complained,  “as  in  the  
case of the late New Hampshire election, an entire regiment are sent home to vote the

19. Detroit Free Press, January 27, 1864.
20. Detroit Free Press, February 3, 1864, (emphasis in the original).
21. Detroit Free Press, September 3, 1864; Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, April 15, 1863, November 11,
1864.
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Abolition ticket, and an entire company are sent away from Harrisburg because they
desire  to  vote  at  her  municipal  election  for  the  Democratic  Union.”22
Democrats took their outrage over this military heavy handedness to Congress,
where in 1864 Democratic senators introduced a bill to require federal troops on election
days to stay at least   a   mile   from   the   polls   and   prohibiting   them   “by   force   or   threat   or  
intimidation”   from   interfering   with   civilian   voting.23 Democratic Senator Saulsbury of
Delaware, a strong advocate of the legislation, described his own voting experience.
“And   at   the   previous election in my State, I, sir, had to vote under crossed bayonets;
soldiers were stationed at the polls, and at some of the voting places peaceable citizens
were   assaulted   by   your   soldiery.” 24 He added that by interfering with free civilian
elections,  “Mr.  Lincoln  is  but  following  in  the  footsteps  of  Caesar.”25 Senator Powell, a
Democrat   from   Kentucky,   added   that   he   had   seen   an   officer   “arrest   two   citizens   for  
exercising   the   right   of   suffrage   and   put   them   in   prison.”   He   added   that   other   military  
officers   “went   and   took   their   pens   and   struck   from   the   poll-book every Democratic
candidate.”26 Democrats added to the record a litany of specific allegations of this sort
from a lengthy report a Delaware legislative committee had prepared.
Unmoved, Republicans defended the need for loyalty oaths in Border State
elections. It was a staple of Republican dogma, in the words of historian Mark Neely,
“that  large  and  dangerous  groups  of  disloyal  citizens  lurked  in  the  North  during  the  war,”  
22. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, March 26, 1863.
23.  Denominated  “S  37”  as  introduced  in  the  Senate,  the  bill  was  entitled,  “A  Bill  to  Prevent  Officers  of  
the Army and Navy, and other persons engaged in the military and naval services of the United States, from
interfering  in  elections  in  the  States.”    CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 101 (1864).
24. Id. at 102.
25. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.1282 (1864).
26. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 101 (1864).
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and Republicans perceived an even stronger peril in the Border States.27 Senator Wilson
of Massachusetts saw loyalty oaths as a matter of simple necessity for elections in Border
States, where so many citizens had confederate sympathies. Senator Howard of Michigan
argued that soldiers had the duty to prevent disloyal people from voting as a safeguard
against  “the  pollution  of  the  ballot  box.”28 Republican newspapers supported this view.
The Chicago Tribune argued that loyalty oaths were needed to keep Confederate soldiers
from entering  the  Border  States  to  vote.    “The  rebels  would  be  glad  to  vote  for  McClellan  
against   Lincoln,   if   they   could   do   so   without   taking   the   oath   of   allegiance.”29 Besides,
Republicans noted gleefully, McClellan himself, as a general earlier in the war, had
deployed troops to state election sites in Maryland to prevent, in the words of his order,
“an  attempt  at   interference  with   …  rights   of  suffrage  by  disunion   citizens.”    McClellan  
had  even  authorized  his  troops  carrying  out  the  order  to  “suspend  the  habeas corpus.”30
While they had no great appetite for the bill, most Republicans found it hard to
defend  military  “intimidation”  and  “coercion”  of  civilian  voters,  which  the  bill  proposed  
to forbid. So they watered the bill down with an exception that permitted the presence of
troops  “when  necessary  to  keep  the  peace  at  the  polls.”  The  Senate  then  passed  the  bill  on  
June 28, 1864. House Republicans helpfully avoided voting on the bill before the fall

27. Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991), xii.
28. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3159 (1864).
29. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 14, 1864.
30. CONG. GLOBE APPENDIX, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1864).
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elections, then passed it quietly on February 1865, probably aware and contented that it
no longer mattered.31
Increasingly, these experiences with pro-administration bias in the military taught
Democrats to doubt that their candidates had a fair shot at garnering soldier votes in the
field. Their misgivings colored their reaction to proposed soldier-voting laws. Mindful
of the need to project an unambiguously pro-soldier sentiment, Democrats had to temper
their attacks on proposals to let absent soldiers vote. We can see the absorption of this
lesson by New York’s   Governor   Horatio   Seymour,   a   Democrat.   In   response   to   the  
soldier-voting bill presented to him for signature in 1863, which he vetoed, Seymour
argued that soldier voting, apart from its unconstitutionality, was antithetical to
republicanism and to military effectiveness:
The great danger is that if the soldier is allowed to vote upon matters of
governmental policy, he will be rendered corrupt and licentious, and instead of
lending strength to the Government to suppress the rebellion, he would be the
means   of   increasing   disorder   and   confusion….   The   moment   that   the   door   is  
thrown open to political influences in the army, that moment there is danger that
the troops would be rendered worthless as soldiers, and corrupted and depraved
as citizens.32
The 1863 election in Pennsylvania showed how, in the hands of Republican
propagandists, that argument was risky to articulate in public, too easily characterized as
denigrating the character of soldiers. Absorbing that lesson, Seymour signed the soldiervoting bill passed in the New York legislature in 1864, following a constitutional

31. CONG. GLOBE APPENDIX, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3158 (1864); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess.
1007 (1865).
32. The New York Times, April 19, 1863.
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amendment, even though the policy objections he made in the above-quoted passage in
1863 should have applied with equal force to the 1864 bill.
Democrats persisting in their opposition adopted two tactics more nuanced than
outspoken resistance, both designed to weaken the appeal of the proposed laws. First,
they publicized the legal battles in other states over the constitutional issues raised by the
laws’  opponents  and  suggested  whenever they could, without clearly saying, that soldier
voting was generally illegal.

Second, they published accounts of military electoral

abuses, hoping their readers would conclude that new soldier voting laws would
inevitably lead to more abuse.
In February 1863, with a proposed soldier bill under consideration in Columbus,
the pro-Democratic Cincinnati Daily Enquirer reported that the supreme courts in
Pennsylvania and Connecticut had found their respective soldier voting laws
unconstitutional, adding that  “experience  has  shown  in  Iowa,  Wisconsin  and  Illinois  how  
the   party   in   power   can   commit   gross   frauds   upon   the   soldiers’   elective   franchise   by  
threatening with with (sic) bad treatment if he does not vote the Abolition ticket, and
promising the officer promotion  if  he  would  exert  his  influence  for  it….33 Later the same
month, the paper published an account of soldier voting irregularities in a St. Louis
election,   punctuating   its   report   with   the   reminder   that   “In   Iowa   and   Wisconsin   similar  
frauds were perpetrated,  by  which  Abolitionists  were  elected  to  office.”34 In March, the
paper reported that a legislative committee in Michigan had tabled a proposed soldier
voting law there, finding it was unconstitutional. As if to encourage readers to see that
33. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, February 6, 1863.
34. Id., February 22, 1863.
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Ohio would be in good company if it too rejected the proposed soldier voting law, the
paper  added  that  Ohio  law  (without  soldier  voting)  “is  not  materially  different  from  what  
it  is  in  Michigan.”35 In April, two days before Ohio enacted its law, the Daily Enquirer
reprinted a story from a pro-Democratic paper in Connecticut about bias in granting
furloughs to troops from that state. Military authorities in Virginia, the Connecticut
paper   claimed,   “will   not   permit   [even]   one   of   the   Democratic   soldiers   to   come   back to
vote; but they send a couple thousand of Republican soldiers back here for that purpose.
The  War  Department  has  agreed  to  aid  this  scheme.”36
The next day, the Cincinnati Daily Enquirer reported that an Iowa court had ruled
that   state’s   soldier   voting law unconstitutional. In the same edition, the paper bristled
defensively when a rival, the Sandusky Register, accused it of merely pretending to favor
soldier voting. The paper answered its critic by begging the question in a way that failed
to disguise   its   antipathy   to   soldier   voting   laws.      “The   Enquirer,”   said the paper about
itself,  “is   in   favor  of  legal   voting  and  opposed  to   illegal   voting.    Where  a  soldier  has   a  
right under the law of the State to vote, we are in favor of his voting; when he has no
right to vote, we are opposed to it. Can the Register understand  this  distinction?”37
The pro-Democratic Detroit Free Press behaved much the same way during the
special  legislative  session  in  January  and  February  1864,  when  that  state’s  soldier  voting  
law was under consideration in Lansing. The paper ran a succession of stories detailing
alleged  election  fraud  in  Detroit’s  10th Ward (discussed above). On January 16, 1864 the
35. Id., March 19, 1863. Michigan finally enacted its soldier voting law the following year, on February
5, 1864.
36. Id., April 11, 1863.
37. Id., April  12,  1863.    The  Iowa  Supreme  Court  upheld  that  state’s  soldier  voting  law  later  that  year.    
Morrison, 15 Iowa at 304.
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paper responded to criticism from the pro-Lincoln Chicago Tribune, which stated,  “The  
democrats take a very queer position in this thing of voting by soldiers. It does not seem
to  occur  to  them  that  they  are  belying  the  very  name  by  which  they  seek  to  be  known….  
Could they control the case as they wish, not a soldier would be allowed to cast his vote
for  any  candidate  to  office,  State  or  national.”    The  Free Press responded defensively in
an editorial,
the party in power not only can but has made use of the army for furthering its
own  partisan  schemes….  [O]nly  such  newspapers  are  allowed to circulate as may
be  favorable  to  the  Washington  authorities….Could  there  be  an  elimination  of  all  
undue  influences  to  control  the  soldiers’  vote  for  any  particular  party,  there  would  
be no more vigorous supporters of extending the fullest possible voting privileges
to every soldier in the army than the democracy.38
The paper could barely conceal its antipathy toward soldier voting in an editorial a few
days  later.  “If  the  right  of  suffrage  can  be  constitutionally extended to our soldiers in the
field,”  the  editorial  said  defensively,  “we  have  no  objection  to  its  being  done….”39 When
Democrats’  complaints  about  the  unconstitutionality  of  soldier-voting laws rang hollow,
as they did in states where Republicans proposed to amend constitutions to accommodate
absentee voting, Democrats shifted the rationale for their opposition. In Connecticut, for
example,  Democrats  who  had  opposed  that  the  state’s  first  soldier-voting law on grounds
of unconstitutionality persisted in their opposition even after Republicans launched a
successful drive to amend the constitution. Now the problem was that voting soldiers
would do the bidding of their despotic commander-in-chief.      They   would   become   “the  
armed   cohort   of   despotism,”   they   claimed,   and   “the   effect   of   their   voting was like the

38. Detroit Free Press, January 16, 1864.
39. Detroit Free Press, January 20, 1864 (emphasis in the original).

260

disgraceful sale of the imperial purple by the praetorian guard in the latter days of the
Roman  Empire.”40
As 1863 wore on, Democrats saw more and more hard evidence vindicating their
misgivings about soldier voting. The severity of the problems they faced became
unmistakably clear in the 1863 election for governor of Ohio, the first election in which
Ohio’s   soldiers   could   vote   in   the   field.      The   Democratic   candidate   was   Clement  
Vallandigham, from the extreme anti-war wing of the party and an outspoken critic of the
war. To anti-war Democrats, Vallandigham was a genuine martyr, a victim of a bullying
central government that the misguided war had so predictably spawned. But to many
Ohio  soldiers,  allowed  to  vote  in  the  field  by  Ohio’s  1863  law, he was a detestable traitor.
He won 42% of the home votes and 39% of the overall votes, but only 5% of the soldier
votes.41 The victorious candidate, John Brough, had been a pro-war Democrat before the
Republicans (who renamed themselves the Union Party during the war) nominated him in
preference to an incumbent who was unpopular with the troops. Still, Vallandigham
supporters and conservative Democratic organs blamed the disproportion of the soldier
votes on actions they claimed federal officials had taken to keep Democratic newspapers
out  of  the  soldiers’  hands  and  on  coercion  and  intimidation  of  the  troops.    The  Cincinnati
Enquirer printed   a   soldier’s   letter   claiming   that   officers   had   cancelled   furloughs   of  
soldiers favoring Vallandigham and threatened to charge them with disloyalty. 42 In a
letter to an Akron newspaper, a Union captain admitted that he would have destroyed

40. As quoted in Benton, Voting in the Field, 177.
41.  Shankman,  “Soldier  Votes  and  Clement  L.  Vallandigham,”  88,  104.
42. Id. at 98.
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Democratic  tickets  if  they  had  been  sent  to  his  camp.    “I  would  have  thrown  them  into  the  
fire;;   …   I   never   would   be   caught   peddling   tickets   for   a   traitor.” 43 Indeed, evidence
suggests that while Unionists had no trouble distributing their campaign materials,
Democratic tickets and Democratic newspapers often failed to find their way to the
troops.   “There   are   about   one-half the troops in this department who would vote the
Democratic   ticket,”   wrote   one   Ohio   soldier,   “if   they   could   only   get   a   Democratic  
newspaper   occasionally.”      A   Cincinnati   newspaper   reported   that   army   officials   stopped  
Democratic operatives trying to supply Democratic tickets to Ohio regiments, viewing
them  as  “Vallandigham  missionaries.”44
Democrats could not complain that fraud in the soldier vote tipped the balance in
the 1863 Ohio elections. The returns showed that Vallandigham would have lost by six
percentage points (instead of twenty two) even if all the soldiers who voted had cast their
ballots for him.45 Nevertheless, there were stunning disparities between civilian support
for Vallandigham – 42% overall – and his far lower support among absent soldiers. As
Arnold Shankman shows in his county-by-county analysis of the returns, Vallandigham
won, in Williams County, Vallandigham garnered 40% of the civilian vote and less than
1% of the soldier vote. In Mahoning County, the numbers were even more unlikely: 43%
of the civilian vote and 0.2% of the soldier vote. In two counties, Lake and Paulding,
Vallandigham did not garner even a single soldier vote.46 These outcomes heightened

43. Id. at 99.
44. Id. at 95.
45. The total vote for Brough was 288,761, of which 41,467 were soldier votes. Vallandigham had
186,672   total   votes,   of   which   2,298   were   soldier   votes.   Shankman,   “Soldier Votes and Clement L.
Vallandigham,” 104.
46.  Shankman,  “Soldier  Votes  and  Clement  L.  Vallandigham,”  103-104.
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Democrats’   growing   fears   that   their   candidates   faced   substantial   and   corrupt  
disadvantages trying to win the soldier vote. They worried that even with a well-liked
military figure like McClellan heading the ticket, Democrats might be unable to
overcome these disadvantages.
Democrats   increasingly   relied   on   the   military’s   electoral   abuse   as   a   campaign
theme   in   itself,   hoping   to   rouse   enough   indignation   to   overcome   the   campaign’s   more  
fundamental  difficulties.    A  plank  of  the  party’s  campaign  platform  condemned  military  
interference  with  civilian  elections  as  a  “shameful  violation  of  the  Constitution.”47 And
party newspapers complained more and more stridently about cheating in the soldier
vote.  “All  those  who  have  served  in  the  army,”  asserted  the  pro-Democratic Detroit Free
Press in  an  editorial,  “know  how  easily  men  who  are  independent  in  their views can be
put  out  of  the  way,  on  detached  service,  on  picket  duty,  as  sentries.”48 They found ample
evidence to support their complaints, and they enlisted the voice of soldiers to present the
evidence. In October 1864, a soldier reported in a letter to the Detroit Free Press about
abuse  meted  out  to  Democratic  troops.    “Two  soldiers  hurrahed  for  McClellan,”  he  wrote,  
“and  they  put  them  under  arrest,  a  barrel  was  hung  on  their  shoulders  all  day,  and  at  night  
they  were  sent  to  the  front….”49 A colonel in a Michigan unit reportedly told his men,
If, after [the] election, I discover that a single non-commissioned officer of my
regiment has voted for McClellan, I will reduce him to the ranks. Every private in
this regiment that votes for McClellan shall hereafter in every fight be sent as near
the front as I can send him, that he may receive the compliments of his friends,
the rebels.50
47. Porter, National Party Platforms, 59.
48. Detroit Free Press, October 25, 1864.
49. Detroit Free Press, October 14, 1864.
50. Detroit Free Press, November 7, 1864.
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How routinely Democrats actually suffered these alleged abuses is unclear, but
modern scholarship backs up the Democrats’   grievances   anecdotally.   Richard   Bensel,  
Joseph Allen Frank, and William Frank Zarnow marshal substantial evidence that
Democratic   soldiers   indeed   suffered   systemic   discrimination.   “Soldiers   cared  
passionately  about  the  outcome  of  an  election,”  Bensel  observes,  “knew  exactly  how  their  
comrades voted, and carried guns (regularly using them to kill other men). In such a
situation, it is not at all surprising that few votes cast in the army opposed the Republican
Party.” 51 In his study of the intensity of radical political sentiment within the army,
Frank  confirms  Bensel’s  assessment,  describing   episode  after   episode  in   which  soldiers  
were prosecuted or punished for speaking disrespectfully about Republican political
leaders. Officers often took it as their duty to monitor the political attitudes of their
subordinates and to induce soldiers to exercise their new absentee voting rights in favor
of the administration, Frank demonstrates.

Not only did Republican commanders

routinely block distribution to the troops of Democratic newspapers and Democratic
ballots, but they also imposed career penalties on Democratic officers who dared speak
out publicly against the administration, according to Frank. Enough were arrested and
dismissed for doing so to chill dissent within the officer ranks generally.52 In his study of
Lincoln’s  reelection  effort,  Zornow  confirms  Frank’s point, arguing that by 1864, Union
officers  had  come  to  understand  that  allowing  their  names  to  be  linked  with  McClellan’s  
“was  to  lose  all  chance  of  advancement.”53
51. Bensel, The American Ballot Box, 219.
52. Frank, With Ballots and Bayonets, 102, 120, 133, 137-140.
53. William Frank Zornow, Lincoln & the Party Divided (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press,
1954), 200.
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While Democrats continued publishing stories about these abuses throughout the
election season, coverage on both sides increasingly took cognizance of actual voting
results as the November elections approached. In September and October 1864, with the
national election just around the corner, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont, held elections
for Congressional seats or state office under new state laws permitting their absent
soldiers to vote. New York and Vermont soldiers began voting in the field for president
and vice president over a period of several weeks before the November 8 general
election. The results trickling in from this early voting provided hard evidence that
Republicans would handily win the soldier vote in November.
During the final few weeks of the campaign, papers for both parties gave these
state elections extensive coverage. Republican papers covered them with a tone of
triumph. Day after day, they reported pro-Republican returns from soldier voting in the
field. Reporting that Republican candidates had outpolled Democrats 285 to 9 in one
Vermont brigade, the Chicago Tribune gloated,  “Our  brave  soldiers  evidently  know  what  
they  are  voting  for.”54 Democrats, in contrast, pointed to the early results to harden their
theme that Republicans were stealing the soldier vote. Lincoln operatives in the post
offices, they claimed, intercepted McClellan ballots sent home from the front under New
York’s  law  and  replaced  them  with  Lincoln  ballots.    They  reported  that  one  Pennsylvania  
soldier, after casting his McClellan ballot in the field and sending it home to his proxy, as
Pennsylvania’s  new  law  provided,  returned  home  on  unexpected  furlough  in  time  for  the  
actual election. Canceling his proxy so he could vote locally, he discovered that someone

54. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 18, 1864.
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had switched his ballot to a vote for Lincoln.55 A wounded New York soldier, similarly
home on furlough after forwarding his McClellan proxy from the field, made the same
discovery. 56

Speaking of in-the-field voting by Ohio and Pennsylvania troops, a

Democrat   on   the   scene   complained,   “It   is   a   notorious   fact   that   any   soldier   or   teamster  
could have voted at the polls here yesterday, if he intended to vote the so-called Union
ticket, without any question being asked with regard to his right to vote  at  all.”57
Democrats reported abuses in the navy, as well. A New York sailor on blockade
duty claimed that on the day appointed for voting on the ship, naval officers told the
assembled  sailors,  “That  if  they  wanted  to  vote  for  the  present  administration they might
vote,  but  if  they  wished  to  vote  to  the  contrary  they  could  not  be  allowed  the  privilege.”58
Occasionally Democrats couched their objections to these purported abuses in threatening
language. In a Philadelphia speech in which he lamented   the   fiscal   damage   Lincoln’s  
policies were inflicting on the country, John Van Buren turned his attention ominously to
the issue of soldier voting:
The Republicans intend to defeat General McClellan, they say, by the soldiers,
and they do not conceal the fact that they will do it by fraud. But you cannot cheat
the  soldiers.  If  they  are  not  heard,  and  if  their  votes  don’t  reach  Washington,  it  is  
probable their muskets will.59
Everywhere Democrats reiterated their complaints that military authorities denied
Union soldiers access to Democratic newspapers or election tickets. An Ohio soldier

55. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, November 3, 1864.
56. Id., November 7, 1864.
57. Detroit Free Press, October 16, 1864.
58. Detroit Free Press, October 31, 1864. Joseph Allan Frank compiles additional evidence from the
field   substantiating   the   proposition,   in   his   words,   that   officers   “made   sure   that Democratic ballots never
reached  the  troops.”  With Ballot and Bayonet, 140.
59. The Press (Philadelphia, PA), October 8, 1864.
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voting  in   Vicksburg  wrote  to   complain,   “Notwithstanding  that  one-half of the voters of
the   battery   were   Democrats,   ‘Union’   tickets   were   produced   in   abundance,   and   runners
employed to distribute them, whilst not a single Democratic ticket could be seen
anywhere.”60 Another   complained,   “We   get   nothing   to   read   here   but   abolition   papers;;  
please  send  me  something  sound  to   read,  and  oblige  a   friend.”61 A Democratic reporter
from New  York  wrote  with  a  tone  of  authority  from  Washington,  “We  charge,  and  it  can  
be proved, that letters from democrats here to soldiers in the army, containing McClellan
electoral tickets, have been opened, the McClellan tickets taken out and Lincoln tickets
put  in.”62 A pro-McClellan soldier from New York echoed this theme with a particular
note  of  desperation.    “Send  me  more  tickets.    Terrorism  is  attempted  in  my  company  and  
throughout  the  regiment.”63
Much of the attention of the press in the last month of the 1864 campaign focused
on celebrated cases in Indiana and New York, in which hard evidence substantiated
allegations of systematic fraud, though not all of it by Republicans. Indiana had no
soldier-voting   law.      In   the   governor’s   race,   Republican   incumbent Governor Oliver
Morton, a pro-Lincoln stalwart, stood for reelection. The election took place in October,
and both parties viewed the battle as an early opportunity to influence the outcome of
November’s  presidential  contest  by  proving  Lincoln’s  strength or weakness. Morton won
handily, and Democrats cried foul. They cited two forms of Republican mischief. One,
which Democrats believed their rivals used in all states lacking provision for soldier
60. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, November 6, 1864.
61. Id., October 4, 1864.
62. Detroit Free Press November 1, 1864.
63. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, November 1, 1864.
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voting, was to discriminate in the granting of furloughs, arranging for Republican soldiers
to return home to vote and leaving Democratic soldiers in the field, disfranchised. The
other was to use soldiers to stuff ballot boxes. Secretary of War Stanton issued a
furlough order neutral on its face, directing   that   “all   sick   and   wounded   soldiers   of  
Indiana”   receive   furloughs   and   transportation   home   “to   enable   them   to   exercise   the  
elective   franchise   at   the   State   election.”      But   Democrats   saw   skullduggery   in   the  
implementation.      “What   a   frightful   wrong   was   done to   the   Democracy,”   howled   the  
Cincinnati Daily Enquirer,  “and  to   fair  play,   and  to   free  institutions,  in  furloughing  the  
sick  and  wounded  Indiana  soldiers!  …  The  complaint  is,  that  it  was  so  carried  out,  that  no
soldier was allowed to go home to vote who would pledge himself to vote for Morton.”64
The Detroit Free Press echoed  the  complaint.  “Republican  soldiers  have  been  furloughed  
by thousands and sent home to vote, while democratic soldiers have been kept in the field
on  duty  and  refused  furloughs.”65
Arriving at the Indiana polls, Democrats asserted, the soldiers stuffed the ballot
boxes. According to the Cincinnati Daily Enquirer,
On election day a train of three cars filled with soldiers – not one of whom
probably was entitled to vote – passed over the railroad from Toledo to
Kendallville, and the men voted at four different places. The three cars would
contain at least 175 men, each of whom voting four times would make 700
votes….   It   is   by   such   means   that   the   Democrats   have   been   beat,   not   in   this  
District  alone,  but  throughout  the  state….  Morton  and  his  whole  state  ticket  were  
partakers in the fraud.66

64. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, October 20, 1864 (emphasis in the original).
65. Detroit Free Press, October 23, 1864.
66. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, October 22, 1864.
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The Detroit Free Press joined   in   the   complaint.      “In   one   place   a   whole   regiment   of  
Massachusetts soldiers voted, and in other places soldiers voted several times round,
without  disguising  it.”67 In his study of soldier voting, Oscar Winther published soldier
letters corroborating the Democratic charge. One soldier writing to his brother asked,
Did you ever attend an election out west? It is a big thing! The people are more
enlightened, of course; it is a natural consequence that there is more liberty and
freedom than in Massachusetts and benighted lands; so much so that people vote
as many times as they please, and allow their friends to do the same, provided
they   are   “sound   on   the   goose.”      It   is   estimated   that   the   Sixtieth   Massachusetts  
Regiment cast about 6,000 votes for Governor Morton last Tuesday. And I know
that some boys in Company I voted ten and twelve times each one.68
Another Massachusetts  soldier  claiming  to  have  voted  in  Indiana  bragged,  “Some  of  the  
boys voted twenty-five  times  each….69
A pro-McClellan political cartoon (shown below) tapped into racial resentments
in  depicting  fraud  in  soldier  voting.  Entitled,  “HOW  FREE  BALLOT  IS  PROTECTED,”  
it depicts a clownish African-American soldier, a flask of whiskey on his hip, pointing his
bayonet in the direction of a crippled veteran who wants to vote for McClellan. The black
soldier  addresses  the  veteran,  “Hallo,  dar!  you  cant  put  in  dat  you copperhead traitor, nor
any  oder  ‘cept   Massa   Lincoln.”  The  veteran  retorts,  “I  am   an  American   citizen  and  did  
not   think   I   had   fought   and   bled   for   this.   Alas   my   country!”   In   the   background,   two  
election  workers  look  on.  One  says,  “I’m  afraid  we  shall  have trouble if that soldier is not
allowed  to  vote.”  The  other  responds,  “Gammon,  Hem  just  turn  around.  You  just  pretend  
you  see  nothing  of  the  kind  going  on,  and  keep  on  counting  your  votes.”

67. Detroit Free Press, October 22, 1864.
68.  Winther,  “The Soldier  Vote  in  the  Election  of  1864,”  453.
69. Id.
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Republicans had the upper hand in the blizzard of fraud charges and
countercharges growing out of the New York soldier vote in the weeks shortly before the
November  1864  election.      That  state’s  law  provided  for  shipping  sealed  soldier  ballots  
from  the  field  to  the  soldier’s  home  district,  there  to  be  cast  by  a  proxy  designated  by  the  
soldier.

In two separate cases, federal authorities arrested agents stationed (one in

Baltimore, another in Washington) to receive and forward soldier ballots from the Army
of   the   Potomac.      In   one   case   the   defendant,   Moses   Ferry,   an   appointee   of   New   York’s  
Democratic Governor Seymour (himself a candidate for reelection), confessed to forging
the names and ballots of soldiers, some of them dead. He was convicted and served a
prison term. The other case resulted in acquittal. Republicans pounced on both cases as
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proof of endemic Democratic cheating. Reminding readers that Seymour had used his
veto to tailor the New York law to his liking, Republicans charged that he had designed
the law to facilitate exactly the kind of cheating that occurred. After summarizing the
law’s  complicated  procedures and claiming that its  complexity  “opens  the  widest  door  to  
fraud,”  the  pro-Lincoln New York Times, in an editorial just five days before the election,
pinned   the   responsibility   on   Seymour.      “The   Union   men   in   the   New   York   Legislature  
passed the bill because they could not get a better [one], as it was openly declared that
Gov. Seymour would veto any bill unless it accorded in all respects with his own
views.”70 A few days later, directing its scorn at Seymour, the Times asked its readers
rhetorically,   “What   security   have   honest   men   under   an   administration   [i.e.,   Seymour’s]  
elected by forging the votes of dead soldiers, swindling the living of their suffrage, and
importing Butternuts from Canada and Missouri to carry the elections by force and
fraud?”71
Democratic papers defensively claimed that Republicans had trumped up the
charges in New York and that administration lackeys had coerced the confessions. They
went so far as to assert that federal agents intercepted the shipped ballots in order to
substitute phony  Lincoln  ballots  for  genuine  McClellan  votes.    “Of  course  they  have  been  
seized   by   Lincoln’s   agents,”   wrote   the   Cincinnati Daily Enquirer in a tone suggesting
that  only  the  naïve  could  expect  otherwise.    “Lincoln  ballots  will  be  put  in  the  place  of  
McClellan  ballots,  and  the  soldiers  will  be  cheated  of  their  votes.”72 But the Republicans
70. New York Times, November 3, 1864.
71. New York Times, November 8, 1864.
72. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, November 3, 1864. The Detroit Free Press published several stories to
the same effect. See, for example, November 1, 2,and 6, 1864.
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had the better of the debate on the New York soldier vote. To the extent that fraud and
cheating   by   the   military   had   become   a   centerpiece   of   the   Democrats’   campaign   by  
September and October, the New York case severely weakened their argument as well as
their prospects in November.73
When   Republicans   weren’t   bragging   about   winning   the   early   soldier   vote   in  
September and October 1864 or about Democratic fraud in the early New York soldier
vote, they accused Democrats of standing in the way of soldier voting laws wherever they
could. Indeed, of the six Northern states without laws for soldier voting in 1864, four had
Democratic legislatures. In particular, Delaware, New Jersey  (McClellan’s  home  state),  
Illinois, and Indiana each had Democratic legislatures and no soldier voting law. 74 The
pro-Lincoln Chicago Tribune made much of this fact in its effort to undermine the
Democrats’   appeal   to   soldiers   and   to   associate   Democrats with the rebellion. In an
editorial, the Tribune vilified the legislatures of Illinois and Indiana for not having
provided for soldier voting. Referring to the legislators, the paper proclaimed,   “These  
bodies of men set themselves at work to aid their Southern partners in every way their
73.  In  other  states,  too,  Republicans  tried  to  steal  the  Democrats’  thunder  about  fraud  in  soldier  voting.    
The pro-Lincoln Tribune, citing “trustworthy  sources,”  described  an  elaborate  Democratic  cheating  scheme  
in  Ohio.  “Their  plan  is  to  vote  early  in  the  day  in  citizen’s  dress,  and  then  at  a  later  hour  don  a  soldier’s  
uniform, and smuggle into the ballot box another vote, either at the same or some adjoining poll, under the
control  of  their  friends.”     Tribune (Chicago, IL), November 3, 1864.Republicans also alleged Democratic
fraud in Indiana. While they cited no instances of pro-Democratic fraud by soldiers, they did cite enough
cases of fraud in the civilian vote to feel justified in brushing aside the Democratic allegations about
fraudulent soldier voting there. After one recital of various frauds committed by Democrats, the proLincoln Tribune concluded  scornfully,  “In  the  face  of  these  unblushing  frauds,  the  Copperhead  press  have  
the audacity to coin stories of Republican  frauds  in  Indiana.” Tribune (Chicago, IL), November 1, 1864.
74. As elaborated in Chapter 1 and in the Appendix, Illinois would eventually enact such a law, but not
until 1865. Oregon had no soldier voting law, but also had almost no soldiers serving. (Winther,   “The  
Soldier  Vote,”  448.)  Massachusetts  was  the  exception  that  proved  the  rule,  having  failed  to  enact  a  soldiervoting law notwithstanding Republican control of state government. According to Benton, state
Republicans inexplicably neglected to mobilize efforts to amend the state constitution to authorize absentee
voting. (Benton, Voting in the Field, 293-294.)
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ingenuity could invent, and their courage dare undertake.

They spent half of their

sessions  in  plotting  to  carry  these  States  out  of  the  Union.”75 The paper later published a
letter from an Illinois soldier stationed in Memphis, who claimed that he and his
colleagues  “would  like  to  show  our  friends  at  home  that  we  are  for  ‘Uncle  Abe,’  first,  last  
and all the time.

Although we have not the privilege of casting our votes at the

November election for any candidate. For which our Legislature will please accept our
everlasting contempt.”76 The Tribune blasted the Indiana legislature in another editorial
that chided Democrats for complaining about the votes of furloughed soldiers and
claimed that Republicans, not Democrats, were cheated in the Indiana vote.
In order still more effectively to bind the slaves hand and foot at the feet of Jeff
Davis, [Democrats] disfranchised so far as they could [the] 150,000 soldiers of
Indiana, by preventing them from voting at the post of duty, and compelling them
to   turn   their   backs   to   the   rebels   in   order   to   face   the   copperheads….   Many  
thousands of brave Indiana boys were actually disfranchised by these professed
advocates  of  ‘free  elections’….”77
While no available measure of public opinion reveals how much damage
Democrats suffered in the debate about soldier voting, the party clearly never found a
way out of the box the issue put it in. On the one hand, Democrats lost when soldiers
voted, because Republicans undoubtedly cheated at least some of the time and because
most voting soldiers genuinely preferred Republican candidates, who favored fighting the
75. Tribune (Chicago, IL), September 16, 1864.
76. Tribune (Chicago, IL), October 2, 1864 (emphasis in the original). In the same vein, the Tribune
later  published  a   “resolution”  adopted  by  a  unit  of  Illinois  soldiers  stationed  in  Missouri   who   wanted  the  
Illinois  governor  to  grant  them  furloughs  to  return  home  to  vote.    The  “whereas”  clause  of  their  resolution  
stated,   “WHEREAS,   The   Legislature of the State of Illinois, at its last session, failing to make any
provision  for  soldiers  in  the  field  to  exercise  their  right  of  suffrage….”  Tribune (Chicago, IL), October 22,
1864.
77. Tribune (Chicago, IL), October 13, 1864.
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war until the Confederacy surrendered. On the other hand, Democrats also lost when
they opposed soldier voting, however muted their opposition, because Republicans then
painted them as anti-soldier or even pro-rebel, an image Democrats desperately sought to
avoid. So Democrats equivocated about soldier voting laws and hoped their incessant
charges of Republican cheating would anger voters enough to overcome the Republican
advantages. It was a futile hope.
Finally,   it   is   worth   reflecting   on   whether   Democrats’   assertions   of  
administration cheating in the soldier voting find anything more than anecdotal support.
Some interesting evidence deserves more attention than it has received.

In his

examination of voting data, James McPherson concluded that half the soldiers who
entered the Civil War as Democrats ended up voting for Lincoln in 1864.78 He reached
his conclusion by juxtaposing two pieces of fairly hard data. First, 40% to 45% of Civil
War soldiers entered the war as Democrats, leaving 55% to 60% who entered as
Republicans. Second, Lincoln won 78% of the total soldier votes. Assuming that
Lincoln must have won virtually all the 55% to 60% cohort who were Republicans,
McPherson reasons that Lincoln must have won about half the Democratic soldier votes
in order to have reached the 78% total.
This  demonstrates  sound  arithmetic,  but  dubious  logic.    McPherson’s  calculation  
holds water only if we also assume that soldiers of both parties participated in the turnout
in proportions equal to their representation in the army. If, in other words, 40% - 45% of
soldier who voted were Democrats (equal to their percentage of the army population),

78. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades, 176-7.
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then indeed Lincoln could not have won 78% of the total soldier vote without winning
the votes of half the voting Democratic soldiers. What if relatively fewer Democratic
soldiers voted, either because they had no enthusiasm for either candidate or because, as
so many alleged, their Republican officers and fellow soldiers interfered with their voting
rights? In that case, with Republican soldiers overrepresented in pool of the absentee
voters,   Lincoln’s   78%   of   the   total   looks   less   impressive.      This   possibility, which
McPherson left unexplored, finds some support in the fact that turnout among soldiers
was indeed low. 79 In the Army of the Potomac, for example, out of about 120,000
soldiers, only about 19,000 voted (13,500 of them for Lincoln).80 The exigencies of war
explain this in part; we know that implementation of absentee for widely dispersed and
mobile military units faced logistical challenges that voting precincts back home never
encountered. This undoubtedly held down turnout. Moreover, some of the 120,000
soldiers were ineligible to vote, including African-Americans, soldiers younger than
twenty-one, and those from states that lacked soldier-voting laws. But coercion and
interference surely played at least some part in the low turnout and therefore at least some
part  in  Lincoln’s  lopsided  victory  among  voting  soldiers.  
McPherson  is   not   alone   in   slighting   evidence  supporting  Democrats’  complaints  
of injustice in the soldier vote. Oscar Winther, whose article remains an essential
resource for any examination of soldier voting, similarly gives short shrift to evidence of
fraud.

While describing the New York cases and episodes of Republican fraud in

79. In a separate examination of the soldier vote, McPherson states, without elaboration, that the soldier
vote  in  1864  “was  about  as  fair  and  honest  as  19th-century  elections  generally  were,  and  Lincoln’s  majority  
was probably an accurate  reflection  of  soldier  sentiment.”    McPherson,   Battle Cry of Freedom, 805, note
69.
80.  Winther,  “Soldier  Voting,”  454.
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Indiana, he ignores the countless newspaper accounts of Republican fraud elsewhere,
stating without explanation  or  citation  that  evidence  of  abuse  “is  very  meager.”81
In fact, it is far from meager. It abounds. We see it in the countless lamentations
of frustrated Democratic soldiers describing their personal experiences in letters to
newspapers back home. We see it in the boasting of Republican soldiers who saw
nothing   particularly   wrong   in   cheating   at   the   expense   of   disloyal   “Copperhead”  
candidates. We see it in the unanimous and bipartisan opinion of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court finding rampant fraud in absentee soldier voting in the case of Hulseman
and Brinkworth v. Rems and Siner. 82 And, where county-by-county voting data are
available, as in Ohio and Michigan, we see it in the implausibly lopsided disparities
between the low Democratic share of votes in the field – as low as 0% in some Ohio
counties – compared to their far higher share of the home vote in those same counties.83
This not to say that Democrats lost a great many contests they would have won
but for fraud in the soldier vote. It is hardly debatable that substantial majorities of
Union soldiers genuinely preferred Lincoln to McClellan, but Lincoln would have beaten
McClellan  even  if  “Little  Mac”  had  won  all  the  soldier  votes.  Still,  we  have  seen  that  the  
soldier vote was decisive in some down-ballot elections, as shown in the court decisions
reviewed in Chapter 2. Soldier-voting fraud in those and similar cases very likely turned
some Democratic wins into losses.

And in the larger messaging war, in which

81. Id.
82. Hulseman, 41 Pa. 396 (1861). The case is discussed more fully in chapter 1.
83 . Shankman,   “Soldier   Votes   and   Clement   L.   Vallandigham,”   88,   104.   Similarly,   a   Democrat  
newspaper   in   Clearfield,   Pennsylvania   reported   after   the   1864   election   that   McClellan   won   the   county’s  
civilian vote by better than two to one (2762-1371) while losing the soldier vote by more than four to one
(135-30). Clearfield Democratic Banner, Nov. 30, 1864.
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propagandists used the ostensible preference of soldiers to influence civilian votes, the
indirect cost of losing the soldier vote was even bigger.
More importantly, the reality of corruption in at least some of the soldier vote
illuminates the dilemma Democrats faced. The issue of soldier voting handicapped
Democrats   in   the   “politics   of   soldiers”   of   1863-1864, cornering them in a predicament
they could not escape. They could afford neither to support nor to oppose soldier-voting
laws. Starting in the 1863 Curtin-Woodward gubernatorial contest in Pennsylvania,
Democrats learned that Republicans would tar them as anti-soldier when they even
appeared to oppose soldier-voting laws. That was a heavy burden to bear in the politics of
soldiers of 1863-1864. On the flip side of the lose-lose coin, Democrats learned that when
such laws took effect, their candidates would not win among voting soldiers. They
believed  that  their  candidates’  poor  showing  in  the  soldier  vote  resulted  from  successful  
and corrupt efforts by the military command structure to tilt the playing field. This was
undoubtedly less true than Democrats imagined; at least a majority of soldiers truly
favored republican candidates, as scholars from James McPherson to Joseph Allan Frank
amply document. But Democrats were not entirely wrong about the fraud committed at
their expense.
And right or wrong about the fraud, the loss in the soldier-vote count inflicted a
double whammy on Democrats. The direct cost meant, of course, fewer Democratic
votes in the tally of total votes that determined winners and losers. The indirect cost
meant that Republicans, pointing to the ostensible preference of soldiers for Republican
candidates, could present those candidates to civilian voters   as   the   “friend   of   the  

277

soldiers.”  In  the  politics  of  soldiers,  this advantage may have had greater importance in
electoral outcomes than the relatively meager number of direct soldier votes. It weakened
Democrats’  efforts  to  rebut  Republican  claims  that  McClellan  (and  Democrats  generally)  
were traitors; that McClellan was unsoldierly and inept; and that McClellan was a
coward. And it weakened their attack themes against Lincoln: that he was an incompetent
commander-in-chief; that he neglected his troops; and that he subordinated the well being
of white soldiers to his pro-Negro policies.
Soldier voting, in short, served as a political trap for Democrats. They found no
way to escape.
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CONCLUSION

War has always been a crucible for suffrage reforms in American history. The
Revolutionary War ushered in a liberalization of suffrage rights in favor of otherwise
unqualified men who provided military service either in the continental army or in state
militias.1 The War of 1812 sparked a surge in popular demands for suffrage expansion,
accelerating erosion of the property qualification in many states.2 All three of the U.S.
Constitution’s   suffrage   amendments   occurred   against   the   backdrop   of   a   major   war:   the  
15th amendment (African-American men) followed the Civil War, the 19th (women)
followed World War I, and the 26th (eighteen year-olds) was adopted during the Vietnam
War. The Soldier Voting Act of 1942 gave absent soldiers limited voting rights during
World War II.3 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was propelled in part by World War II,
the Korean War, and the Cold War.4
In each case, war mattered in catalyzing the suffrage change. In surveying the
development of political rights from the colonial period through the Reagan era, Marc
Kruman   notes   the   importance   of   war.      “War   has   shaped   legislative   decision-making
regarding political  rights,”  Kruman  writes.    “The  Revolution,  the  Civil  War,  World  War  
I,   and   the   Vietnam   War   all   sparked   dramatic   changes   in   suffrage   qualifications.” 5
Alexander   Keyssar,   picking   up   on   Kruman’s   observation,   makes   much   the   same   point  
about the striking correlation between war and expanded suffrage in American history.

1. Williamson, American Suffrage from Property to Democracy, 82-83.
2.  J.R.  Pole,  “Representation  and  Authority  in  Virginia  from  the  Revolution  to  Reform,”  The Journal of
Southern History 24, no.1 (February 1958): 33; Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 35.
3. Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time, 195-222.
4. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61-120 (1988).
5.  Kruman,  “Legislatures  and  Political  Rights,”  1235.
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Indeed,  in  Keysaar’s  view  war  played  a  greater  role  in  shaping  American  democracy  than  
other, more celebrated factors, such as the dynamics of the frontier.6
The invention of absentee voting opportunities during the Civil War fits the
pattern, though uneasily. Keyssar suggests, in agreement with Chilton Williamson, that
the needs of national security have sometimes motivated suffrage expansions benefiting
soldiers or veterans, on the theory that rewarding soldiers in this way would facilitate
military recruiting for the next war.7 That is not a satisfactory explanation of the soldiervoting phenomenon in the Civil War. If facilitating future recruiting had been a
significant motivator for these laws, one might expect that at least some of the
constitutional amendments authorizing absentee voting for soldiers to have extended
voting rights to some disfranchised soldiers, including non-citizens, men under 21, and
African-Americans. None did.

And one would expect states to have preserved the

soldier-voting laws after the Civil War. Most did not. Moreover, recruiting goals find
little or no expression in the evidence.8
An   alternative   to   Williamson’s   and   Keysaar’s   theory   fits   the   soldier-voting
phenomenon better. It roots the connection between war and suffrage in an enduring
political culture with ancient antecedents. That culture treats citizen-soldiers as special,
holding a uniquely powerful claim on national affection and accommodation. In her study
of  women’s  efforts  to  gain  access  to  positions  in  the  armed  forces,  Linda  Kerber  quotes  a  
6. Keyssar, The Right to Vote, xxi. See also, Krebs, Fighting for Rights.
7. Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 37, 137; Williamson, American Suffrage from Property to Democracy,
82-83.
8. Josiah Benton, whose book examined the legislative history of every soldier-voting law in every
state, cites no mention of it in his study, and no evidence of it surfaced in the contemporary newspaper
accounts reviewed for this project.

280

toast offered during a celebration of the first anniversary of the Declaration of
Independence.    “May  only  those  Americans  enjoy   freedom   who  are  ready   to   die for its
defense.”    In  a  similar  spirit  and  a  similar  setting,  John  Jay’s  wife,  Sarah  Livingston  Jay,  
offered  this  toast  at  a  ball  celebrating  the  conclusion  of  the  Revolutionary  War:  “May  all  
our   Citizens   be   Soldiers,   and   all   our   Soldier   Citizens.” 9

Another scholar aptly

characterizes  the  battlefield  as  “the  proving  ground  of  national  belonging.”10 Again and
again  America  has  confirmed  the  priority  of  soldiers’  claims  on  the  rights  of  citizenship  
by elevating its military heroes – from Washington to Eisenhower – to the presidency.
Democrats in 1864 hoped to tap into that heritage when they nominated George
McClellan for president.
The symbiosis between citizenship rights and military service in American
political culture and political theory may help account   for   the   country’s   strong   appetite  
for permitting absent Civil War soldiers to vote, even when doing so meant abandoning
or diluting the tradition that had always connected elections physically to a place in a
community. Yet in at least three ways the Civil War soldier-voting phenomenon fits at
best awkwardly within this broader pattern. First, unlike every other example in the
pattern, this one involved no enlargement of the circle of qualified voters. Without
exception, soldier-voting laws gave a new right – the right to vote away from home –
only to men who already qualified as voters under their prewar state constitutions.
Soldiers constitutionally excluded from suffrage, by race, citizenship, or age, for

9. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be A Lady, 236, 240.
10. Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at
Home and Abroad, 1876-1917 (New York: Hull and Wang, 2000), 248.
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example, remained excluded under the new laws. Even the eight states that amended their
constitutions to eliminate obstacles to absentee voting preserved prewar exclusions that
left intact the prewar disfranchisement of many soldiers.
A second area of difference, related to the first, is that unlike propertyless men,
African-Americans, women, and young people who pushed to break down barriers to
their voting rights, Civil War soldiers did not provide the main impetus for soldier-voting
legislation. To be sure, soldiers spoke out harshly against politicians who opposed the
new laws. But, for understandable reasons, there is a notable dearth of evidence of
soldiers’  clamoring  for  the  right  to  cast  absentee  ballots.  While  arguably  disfranchised  by  
their (often involuntary) absence from home, these men enjoyed voting rights at home.
They were not outside the community of full citizenship in the same way as AfricanAmericans and women were, for example, so they had correspondingly less to fight for in
the way of suffrage rights. Moreover, the enactment of absentee voting rights was a
mixed blessing for soldiers. The alternative to absentee voting under a soldier-voting law
was something even better from their perspective: returning home to vote on furlough.
Soldiers cherished furloughs, which thousands of them received precisely because their
states had not enacted soldier-voting laws allowing them to vote in the field. 11 The
enactment of such laws must have disappointed a good number of servicemen who would
have   preferred   a   furlough’s   respite   from   the   hazards and drudgery of military life. No
wonder, then, that grass roots support for the laws among absent soldiers was muted.

11 .   McSeveney,   “Re-electing Lincoln: The Union Party Campaign and the Military Vote in
Connecticut,”  147.
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A third area of dissonance between the Civil War soldier-voting phenomenon and
the broader pattern of linkage between war and suffrage was in the duration of the
change. The 15th, 19th, and 26th Amendments, as well as the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
brought permanent expansion of voting rights within the federal sphere of law they
occupied. States found ways to frustrate the spirit of the federal initiative in the case of
the 15th Amendment, but there were no post-war retreats from the initiatives within
federal law. 12 The change wrought by the soldier-voting laws, in contrast, was more
fleeting. Only five of the twenty soldier-voting arrangements that came into existence
during the Civil War survived very long past the war. The relatively short life span of
most of these laws calls into question whether the soldier-voting phenomenon qualified
as a reform at all. Why would states endure the legal and constitutional upheavals
associated with enactment only to erase the laws from the books shortly after the war?
Putting  aside  for  the  moment  the  parties’  obvious  political  appetite  for  the  votes  
of absent soldiers, and taking contemporary proponents at their word, an important object
of the laws was simple justice. In state after state, as we have seen, a rallying cry for
enactment was that justice to soldiers (albeit only soldiers who already qualified for
suffrage) demanded it. Some advocates cited the requirements of justice directly. Others
did   so   indirectly   by   decrying   the   “disfranchising”   effect   of   not   passing   such   a   law;;   as  
applied   to   white   males,   the   very   word   “disfranchise”   spoke   for   itself   as   a   synonym   for  
injustice. But if simple justice demanded a loosening of election rules to accommodate
the  absence  of  the  states’  best  citizens,  why  cancel  the  accommodation  at  this  war’s  end?    

12. Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 106-107, 267.
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Future wars with future absent soldiers would demand the same accommodation. While
the Civil War era laws (including those that expired after the war) set precedents for
soldier-voting laws enacted during subsequent wars and in that way laid the groundwork
for future justice, in the short term the innovation did not survive in most states. 13 It
fizzled out with the end of hostilities, calling into question the degree to which the pursuit
of justice explains the phenomenon.
The demands of justice were certainly part of the picture, as was the immediate
political appetite for the votes of absent soldiers. But the picture becomes more complete
only when it takes account of the role played by the unique circumstances of national
politics in 1863-1864,   dubbed   here   the   “politics   of   soldiers.”      Quite   apart   from   their  
importance as voters, soldiers enjoyed unequaled credibility in communicating the core
messages of both parties to civilian voters, which is why both parties enlisted the voice of
soldiers in their messaging wars.

For Republicans, the core messages were that

Democrats were disloyal and that McClellan was both incompetent and a coward. For
Democrats,   the   themes   were   Lincoln’s   ineptitude   as   a   commander-in-chief and his
neglect of white soldiers. Servicemen spoke with authority on all these subjects, making
them  ideal  spokesmen  for  the  parties’  messaging.  
The   parties   learned   in   1863,   particularly   from   Pennsylvania’s   gubernatorial  
contest between George Woodward and Andrew Curtin, that the politics of soldiers
required   the   parties   to   project   affinity   with   servicemen   and   to   stake   a   claim   as   “the  
soldiers’  friend.”    Support  for  soldier-voting laws served that end, while opposition risked

13. Miller, Absentee Voter and Suffrage Laws, 35.
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being  labeled  the  soldiers’  enemy.    By  late  1863,  both  parties  recognized  that  reality,  but  
only Republicans could act on it with unalloyed support for the laws. Experience showed
both   parties   that   Republicans   would   garner   the   lion’s   share   of   soldier   votes,   either   (as  
Republicans would have it) because soldiers genuinely favored Republican candidates or
(as  Democrats  would  have  it)  because  Republicans  used  the  army’s  command  structure to
cheat. Either way, the issue was a winner for Republicans. Democrats lost the soldier
vote in states that enacted soldier-voting laws, and they appeared hostile to soldiers when
they opposed enactment, costing them civilian votes. With Republicans wielding greater
power than Democrats in state governments, and with Democrats boxed in defensively on
the issue, soldier-voting laws swept the country in 1864. Even more important than the
votes this yielded for Lincoln and Republicans from soldiers in the field, it helped cement
Republicans’  status  as  the  soldiers’  friend,  to  the  party’s  great  advantage  among  civilian  
voters in the politics of soldiers.
The politics of soldiers ended with the war. In most states, the novel legal
arrangements for absentee voting by soldiers collapsed at about the same time, with no
allowance for reactivation in future wars, notwithstanding the abstract demands of justice
for soldiers of those wars. This underscores not only the power of the politics of soldiers
briefly to effect radical change, but also the atavistic pull of the prewar communal habit
of elections. Absent the imperatives of the politics of soldiers, postwar election forms
moved not in new directions hinted at by the short-lived novelty of absentee voting for
soldiers – toward portable, individualized voting rights so familiar to modern Americans
– but back to where they started before the novelty. Communities were back in charge for
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all voters, with all voters expected in time-honored fashion to appear in person before
local election supervisors and in the presence of their neighbors. It would take the better
part of another century, and more wars, for absentee voting to take hold as a routine part
of American elections.
The  modern  perspective  of  “rights consciousness”  may  color  current  perspectives  
on the soldier-voting phenomenon, inviting the conclusion that it was a generally modest
and conservative shift, or even a missed opportunity for genuine reform. It did not
enlarge the electoral franchise beyond prewar limits, and it did not effect lasting change
in the direction of making suffrage a portable and personal right. The late constitutional
scholar  Ronald   Dworkin  observed  about   modern  political   thought   that  the  “language  of  
rights now dominates political   debate   in   the   United   States.” 14

A student of that

phenomenon,  Hendrik  Hartog  traces  rights  consciousness  to  “an  American  emancipatory  
tradition   of   constitutional   meaning”   that   began   with   passage   of   the   Civil   War  
constitutional amendments and has become   in   modern   times   “the   most   salient   and  
interesting  feature  of  American  public  culture.”15 Rights consciousness has left its mark
on the historiography of American election law, as well. The closest thing to a
comprehensive survey of that subject, Alexander  Keysaar’s  The Right to Vote, brings this
perspective to the subject, treating the general (though unsteady) shrinking of
disfranchisement over time as the essential fact of voting rights.

14 .   As   quoted   in   Thomas   L.   Haskell,   “The   Curious   Persistence   of   Rights   Talk   in   the   ‘Age   of  
Interpretation,’”  Journal of American History 74, no. 3 (December 3, 1987): 988.
15.  Hendrik  Hartog,  “The  Constitution  of  Aspiration  and  ‘The  Rights  That  Belong  to  Us  All,’”  in   The
Constitution and American Life , ed. David Thelen (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 357-359.
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Measured   by   the   standards   of   rights   consciousness   and   Hartog’s   “emancipatory
tradition,”  the  Civil  War  soldier-voting phenomenon indeed emerges as a halting, mostly
conservative step in the evolution of election law. For groups disfranchised before the
war,   there   was   nothing   “emancipatory”   about   it,   since   all   those   groups remained
disfranchised   even   with   the   laws’   enactments.   To   the   extent   that   it   enlarged   voting  
opportunities for some (already enfranchised) citizens, that enlargement was short-lived.
By this reckoning, the soldier-voting phenomenon was small potatoes, a footnote in the
legal history of voting.
But that perspective blinds us to the contemporary radicalism of the legal and
constitutional phenomenon. Rights consciousness presupposes personal autonomy in
voting,   so   a   “reform”   that   leaves   intact   prior   exclusions from the franchise and merely
enlarges the geography within which an enfranchised elector may exercise his electoral
autonomy   may   seem   to   change   the   “right   to   vote”   hardly   at   all.      Soldier-voting laws,
however, did not take the personal autonomy of enfranchised voters as a point of
departure. To the contrary, we may properly view the laws as inventing the notion of
voters as fully autonomous actors, transforming (albeit only temporarily) an earlier and
very different idea of the role of the individual voter in the election process.
Ohio Supreme Court Justice Rufus Ranney captured the before and after contrast
in his dissenting opinion in Lehman v. McBride. The picture of voting after the law, to
Ranney’s  chagrin,  was  as  a  “personal  privilege,  carried   by the elector wherever he may
go  and  properly  exercised  wherever  he  may  be.”  (Ranney  qualified  “personal  privilege”  
in   this   passage  with   the  adjective  “mere,”  signaling  his   sense  that  this  effect   of  the  law  
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was self-evidently unsatisfactory.) The contrasting pre-legislation picture of voting,
which   Ranney   saw   as   constitutionally   required,   was   “the   joint performance of a high
public  duty”  at  a  public  gathering  of  electors  in  their  place  of  residence.  Far  from  being  a  
personal and individual power, Ranney said,  the  constitutional  right  to  vote  is  “a  public
franchise, belonging to the whole community, conferred upon about one fifth of its
members, to be exercised for the common benefit of the whole, and under such proper
safeguards against abuse and perversion, as the fundamental laws of the community have
provided.”16
This view of the nature of voting, which Ranney believed the Ohio law
unconstitutionally altered, is antithetical to a rights conscious claim on the franchise by
individual, autonomous actors. It is also ubiquitous in the arguments mounted against
absentee   voting.   The   new   laws’   supporters   did   not   disagree   with   the   opponents’  
characterization of prewar elections; they simply saw nothing constitutionally compelling
about that prewar reality. If legislators wanted to alter the relationship between
community and voter, even risking greater fraud by doing so, that was their prerogative
unless constitutional text expressly and unambiguously tied their hands, which in most
states they believed it did not.
One   need   not   agree   with   Ranney’s   conclusion   that   Ohio’s   soldier-voting   law’s  
departure from prewar election legal norms was unconstitutional to agree with him that it
was radical. Its radicalism, however, lay not in any change it wrought in who could enjoy
the   franchise.   Instead   its   radicalism   lay   in   the   law’s   transformation   of   what   an   election  

16. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. 631, 649 (italics in the original).
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was. The law upended the prewar notion of the right to vote as a collective possession
controlled by the community where it took place, replacing it – temporarily and for a
limited few – with the very different notion that voting rights were personal, to be
wielded individually and portably. It was a change that the yardstick of rights
consciousness is ill equipped to measure, making it correspondingly easy for modern
observers to overlook.
Even   allowing   for   a   weakening   of   migratory   Americans’   attachment   to  
communities in the first half of the nineteenth century, it took a force of considerable
power to displace the longstanding identification of an election as a communitarian
process   with   a   fixed   location   in   the   voter’s   hometown.17 The politics of soldiers from
1863-1864 carried sufficient power to accomplish the displacement, but not enough to
accomplish it permanently. When the politics of soldiers ended, the prewar
communitarian sense of elections reasserted itself, and arguments about the demands of
justice for future soldiers in future wars were too remote to resist its reassertion.
Rights consciousness also helps obscure the role local residency requirements
played   in   the   prewar   way   of   voting.   All   sides   of   the   debate   agreed   that   a   soldier’s  
temporary absence from home did nothing to weaken his status as a resident of his
hometown for suffrage purposes. Proponents of the laws viewed the residency
qualification as bearing only on who could vote, such that a soldier meeting the
qualification could vote anywhere the legislature allowed. That view corresponds to the

17. Joel Silbey, Alexander Keyssar, and Kenneth Winkle all attribute political effects to the ubiquity of
migration over the course of the nineteenth century. Silbey, The American Political Nation, 148-149;
Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 300; Winkle, The Politics of Community, 48-70.
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modern rights conscious way of thinking: the important fact about residency is that it
reflects the autonomous   elector’s   choice   about   where   to   participate   as   a   citizen;;   once  
earned the qualification travels with him. Opponents viewed it very differently. They
agreed   that   the   voter’s   choice   of   residency   was   critical   to   identifying   the   place   where  
election judges applied the yardstick of the durational minimum set by law as a
precondition to voting.

But they also saw the residency qualification as serving a

communal purpose. As the cases evaluating the constitutionality of soldier-voting laws
demonstrate, theses men saw residency requirements as having come into existence not to
provide  individuals  with   a  choice  of   where  they   could   “belong”  as  citizens,  but   to   help  
communities  preserve  electoral  “purity.”  The  residency  qualification  provided  a  policing  
mechanism to assure, in the words of Justice James Campbell of Michigan, that each
individual  elector  participate  “at  his  own  place  of  abode,  [where]  his  neighbors  will  know  
his   person,   and   will   be   likely   to   know   his   qualifications.” 18 Of course, that policing
mechanism presupposed that the voter would appear personally to cast his ballot at the
local voting site. Separating the locus of balloting from the place of residence arguably
disabled the policing mechanism. That either violated the constitution by rendering
suffrage qualifications unenforceable – “eviscerating”   them,   as   Rufus   Ranney,   Isaac  
Christiancy, and like-minded justices would have it – or  it  was  a  matter  of  mere  “policy  
and   expediency,”   for   legislators   to   adjust   in   light   of   exigencies   that   wise   constitutional

18. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 123, 144.
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construction   should   accommodate,   as   Michigan’s   Chief   Justice   George   Martin   and   the  
laws’  other  judicial  supporters  would  have  it.19
Neither view supports a modern interpretation that soldier-voting laws relaxed
residency qualifications. They did no  such  thing.  The  laws’  legal  significance  was  their  
departure from the communal tradition of voting embedded in prewar law and generally
restored in post-war law. The brief but irresistible pull of Civil War politics, and
particularly the politics of soldiers, explains the temporary legal upheaval.

19. Id. at 185.
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APPENDIX
This appendix describes the Civil War soldier-voting laws, state by state. It
divides the states that allowed absent soldiers to vote into four groups. Iowa and
Minnesota constitute the first group. They established the two prevailing models of
absentee   voting:   opening   election   sites   in   the   field   (Iowa),   and   sending   soldiers’   sealed  
ballots home from the field (Minnesota). All other states adopted forms of one or the
other model (except Pennsylvania, which adopted both). The second group consists of the
nine states that enacted soldier-voting laws and that achieved statehood before 1800.
They   are   labeled   here   the   “Senior   States.”   The   novelty   of   absentee   voting   faced   higher  
constitutional hurdles in these older, mostly eastern states than it did in the eleven newer,
generally more westerly states that achieved statehood between 1800 and 1864. All nine
had to either amend their constitutions to accommodate absentee voting (in four instances
after a court  found  the  statute  unconstitutional,  and  once  after  a  governor’s  veto),  or  limit  
absentee voting to elections for federal offices (twice in response to court rulings against
laws with a broader scope), or both. Not a single high court in this group sustained a
soldier-voting law against constitutional challenge. Moreover, three of the eleven
Northern states organized before 1800 never enacted a soldier-voting law at all
(Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Delaware). And only one of the soldier-voting laws
enacted in these senior states survived long after the war (New Hampshire).
The post-1800 states that provided for soldier voting (other than Iowa and
Minnesota) comprise the third group, called here the  “Junior  States.”  Only  two  Northern
states organized after 1800 never provided for absent-soldier voting at all during the Civil
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War (Indiana and Oregon). The enacted laws when challenged in these younger states
were sustained by three of the five high courts that reviewed them. And four of the
country’s  five soldier-voting laws that lasted well past the war are from these junior states
(Kansas, Maine, Michigan, and Nevada).
The tougher constitutional sledding for soldier-voting laws in the pre-1800 states
compared to the younger group likely owes to the longer habits in the older states of
traditional, communal ways of voting. Traditional elections had deeper roots in these
mostly eastern states, and that older tradition collided more joltingly with the novel
concept of absentee voting. Judges in the older states were correspondingly more likely
than their counterparts in the post-1800 states to give constitutional weight to historical
experience. They were more likely to search history for definitions of words that framers
used in state constitutions, words like   “election”   and   “vote.”   History   was   shorter   in  
newcomer states, of course, so the weight of tradition interfered less with legislative
innovations.
Grouping the states this way risks overstating the differences between them. The
line demarking one group from the other is hazier than the categorization may suggest.
The invention of absentee voting was a legal innovation in the junior states, even if the
innovation there collided with constitutions less frequently than in the more senior group.
And a degree of contingency accounts for some of the difference. For example, we
cannot  know  whether  the  Wisconsin  Supreme  Court’s  unanimous  decision  upholding  that  
state’s  soldier-voting law resulted from legislative intimidation, as one scholar suggests.
By amending the law to permit absent soldiers to vote in judicial elections, historian
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Frank Klement argues, the legislature put a finger on the scale of justice, pressuring the
jurists into supporting the new law out of political self-interest. And perhaps the
Minnesota statute would have faced fatal judicial scrutiny if the losing Democratic
candidate   for   the   state’s   congressional   seat   had   pursued   an   election   contest.   Instead,   he  
backed off when the Republican press threatened to ruin him politically by branding him
anti-soldier. That law never faced a test in the high court. Moreover, the California high
court,  in  striking  down  that  state’s  law,  blurred  the  boundary  between  old  and  young  by  
looking to the history of eastern states in defining words in California’s   1849  
constitution. California settlers imported their legal understandings from the states of
their origins, ruled Chief Justice Lorenzo Sawyer, and in those eastern states, an elector
could  “vote”  only  by  being  personally  present  in  his  local  residence. Sawyer concluded
that  California’s  framers  had  in  mind  that  definition  of  “vote”  when  they  drafted  the  state  
constitution.
So, while the senior-junior taxonomy is not problem free, it remains true as a
general proposition that the novelty of soldier voting survived the gauntlet of
constitutional challenge more successfully in the junior states than in the senior states to
east, a distinction that the differing weight of election-law history at least partly explains.
A subset of the junior group are three  “outlier”  states:  Missouri,  where  the  soldiervoting provision arguably lacked legitimacy because it came into existence nonlegislatively during an internecine war that destroyed civil government; Nevada, which
entered the union barely a week before the 1864 elections and did so with a jerry-rigged
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soldier-voting provision of debatable legitimacy; and Illinois, which enacted a soldiervoting law only in 1865, when it no longer mattered politically.

THE MODEL STATES
Iowa and Minnesota
All soldier-voting laws adopted one of two models, designated here as the Iowa
and Minnesota models. (Pennsylvania adopted a hybrid of both models). Laws following
the Iowa model provided for election sites to be set up in military encampments where
soldiers served. Laws following the Minnesota model allowed absent soldiers to complete
their ballots and forward them back to their voting precincts to be counted with civilian
ballots.
The choice of Iowa as a model for its form of absentee voting is debatable.
Pennsylvania had enacted a soldier-voting law in 1813 that called for establishing voting
sites  “in  the  field”  for  absent  Pennsylvania  soldiers.  So,  while  the  state  supreme  court  set  
that law aside early in 1862 before any other state had acted, the 1813 law arguably
deserves the honor of designation as a model. Missouri provided for absentee voting
before Iowa did, following a similar model, but Missouri acted non-legislatively and
arguably illegitimately in doing so.
As the first state to adopt this model legislatively during the Civil War, Iowa gets
the nod as the model for purposes of this survey.
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Iowa
The Hawkeye State enacted its soldier-voting law on September 11, 1862, the first
state legislature to do so during the war.1 Voting under the law occurred at election sites
created   “at   every   place   where   a   Regiment,   Battalion,   Battery   or   Company   of   Iowa  
soldiers  may  be  found  or  stationed.”2 That formulation effectively excluded sailors in the
navy, since naval organization included none of the listed designations. But all other
servicemen   were   covered,   including   not   just   volunteers,   but   also   every   “soldier   in   the  
military   service   of   this   state   or   the   United   States.”   That   included   draftees   and   army  
regulars. This coverage provision also specified surgeons and chaplains. 3 By an 1864
amendment, the state added hospitals to the locations where absentee voting locations
were to be set up.4
Setting the template for many military suffrage laws, this one dictated that the
provisions of the general election law would apply to   voting   in   the   field,   “so   far   as  
applicable,   and   not   qualified   by   the   provisions   of   this   Act.” 5 The law specified the
elections  in  which  Iowa’s  absent  soldiers  were  eligible  to  vote.  With  the  exception  of  a  
few county-level offices (constables, county and township supervisors, and justices of the
peace),   the   law’s   absentee-voting mechanism applied to elections for all state, federal,
and local offices.6 This included elections for presidential and vice-presidential electors.

1. An Act to Amend Title IV of the Revision of 1860 so as to Enable the Qualified Electors of this State
in the Military Service, to Vote at Certain Elections, ch. 29, 1862 Iowa Acts 28.
2. Id. at § 8.
3. Id. at § 2.
4. An Act to Amend Chapter 29 of the Laws of the Extra Session of the Ninth General Assembly, ch.
28, § 2, 1864 Iowa Acts 26, 27.
5. Id. at § 6.
6. Id. at § 5.
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Polling sites were to be opened for each Iowa regiment. If that failed to make it
“practicable   for   all   to   vote   together,”   as   when   part   of   the   regiment   was   on   “detached  
service,”   then   the   detached   unit   could   open   its   own   polling   site. 7 The eligible Iowa
soldiers at each site elected three election judges, who in turn appointed election clerks.
The only qualification was that the judges (though not necessarily the clerks) had to be
eligible Iowa voters.8 That meant they had to be white males, at least 21 years old, U.S.
citizens, with at least six months of residence in Iowa and 60 days of county residency.9
As in elections back home, judges and clerks swore oaths, promising among other
things   to   “studiously   endeavor   to   prevent   fraud,   deceit   and   abuse”   in   the   election. 10 To
assist the election judges and clerks, the law provided for commissioners to travel from
Iowa with necessary election paraphernalia: copies of the law, forms of poll lists and
returns, and the text of oaths to administer to judges, clerks, and challenged voters.
Commissioners also carried the election returns back home to Iowa.

11

The

commissioners, appointed by the state census board, had to be qualified electors. They
were assigned one per regiment, although the law authorized the governor to supplement
that allocation with more commissioners if he thought it necessary. Commissioners had
to   swear   an   oath   that   included   the   promise   to   perform   their   responsibilities   “without  

7. Id.at § 9.
8. Id.
9. Id. at § 1.
10. Id. at § 11.
11. Id. at §§ 25, 26.
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reference   to   political   preferences,”   and,   like   election   judges   and   clerks,   to   “studiously  
endeavor to  prevent  fraud,  deceit  and  abuse.”12
The statute specified the information that each ballot had to include, starting with
the  voter’s  home  county  and  followed  by  the  preferred  candidate’s  name  for  each  office.  
The ballot had to be on a single piece of paper, though it could cover a long list of
offices. The offices up for election, and the preferred candidates names, could be printed
in advance on the ballot (assuming that the party organization found a way to deliver
such prepared ballots to the military camps) or written by hand by the voter.13
Soldiers announced themselves to the judges and clerks, by name, county of
residence, and military attachment. The clerks entered all this information in the poll
books.14 If no one challenged the voter, the soldier placed his ballot in the ballot box.15 If
there was a challenge, the judges administered an oath to the soldier testing all elements
of eligibility – U.S. citizenship, state and county residency, and age. (As to age, the oath
read,   “Do   you   solemnly   swear   …   that   you   are   twenty   one   years   of   age,   as   you   verily  
believe?”)  If  the  soldier  swore  the  oath,  his  vote  was  accepted.16
At the close of voting, the judges tallied the votes, the clerks double-checked the
tally, and the judges entered the final result on the return form. Then the returns, together
with the poll books and ballots, were given to a commissioner (or if no commissioner was
12. Id. at §§ 29, 30; An Act to Amend Chapter 29 of the Laws of the Extra Session of the Ninth General
Assembly, ch. 28, § 1, 1864 Iowa Acts 26, 26.
13. An Act to Amend Title IV of the Revision of 1860 so as to Enable the Qualified Electors of this
State in the Military Service, to Vote at Certain Elections, §15. In two states, Minnesota and Connecticut,
the soldier-voting   laws   expressly   allowed   commissioners   to   carry   ballots   to   the   states’   military  
encampments, but only if the political parties provided the ballots. (See discussion of those states, infra.)
Iowa’s  statute  did  not  so  state.  
14. Id. at § 16.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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on  hand,  placed  in  the  mail  “or  other  safe  mode”)  for  delivery  to  the  Board  of  Canvassers  
in Iowa. There the results of the soldier voting were added to the civilian results to
determine election winners.
In  the  elections  of  October  1862,  shortly  after  enactment  of  Iowa’s  law,  a  losing  
candidate   for   clerk   of   the   district   court   in   Iowa   County   challenged   the   statute’s  
constitutionality.  He  relied  on  the  way  the  state’s  constitution  articulated  the  requirement  
of county residence. Eligibility, the 1857 constitution said, required that the citizen have
been  for  at  least  60  days  a  resident  “of  the  county  in  which  he  claims  his  vote.”17 This,
argued  the  challenger’s  counsel,  fixed  the  required  location  of  the  voting.  To  “claim”  his  
vote,   according   to   the   lawyer’s   argument,   a   citizen   had   to   be   physically   present   at   the  
voting site in the county.
The case went to the Iowa Supreme Court, which ruled in 1863 that the law was
constitutional. 18 Justice   George   Wright,   a   Republican,   wrote   the   court’s   unanimous  
opinion.19 Justice  Wright  turned  away  the  challenger’s  argument,  ruling  that  the  disputed  
constitutional language defined who could not, but did not fix where he could vote. The
word  “claim”  meant  that  a  voter  could  not  claim  to  be  an  elector  of  a  county  other  than  
the county where he resided, but it did not mean that he had to be physically present in
the county when he voted. The legislature  was  free  to  set  the  “time,  place,  and  manner”  
of voting, including out-of-state locations, Wright concluded.

With some modesty,

17. IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. II, § 1.
18. Morrison, 15 Iowa at 304.
19.  “George  Grover  Wright.”  Biographical  Directory  of the United States Congress. Accessed May 29,
2013. http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=W000759.
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Wright   allowed   that   the   issue   was   a   close   call,   but   the   court’s   duty   was   to   call   close  
questions  in  favor  of  a  law’s  constitutionality.20
Two  other  states’  high  courts,  in  reviewing  the  constitutionality  of  soldier-voting
laws,   commented   on   the   Iowa   Supreme   Court   decision.   Both   found   Wright’s   decision  
unpersuasive.   Vermont’s   Supreme   Court,   concluding   that   the   constitution of that state
barred absentee voting laws covering state (but not federal) elections, expressly declined
to  adopt  the  Iowa  court’s  reasoning,  declaring  “we  are  not  prepared  to  say  it  is  sound.”21
California’s   high   court,   in   striking   down   that   state’s   law, said in somewhat harsher
language  that  adopting  the  reasoning  of  their  Iowa  brethren  would  “throw  the  whole  law  
relating  to  the  construction  of  written  instruments  into  hopeless  confusion.”22
The Iowa law did not expire by its terms at the end of the war, but soldier-voting
provisions  were  omitted  from  the  state’s  first  post-war codification of its laws in 1880. In
fact,   the   general   election  law  of  1880  stated,  “no  person  is   entitled  to   vote  at   any  other  
place than in the township in which he resides at the  time  he  offers  to  vote.”23

Minnesota
Minnesota enacted its soldier-voting law on September 27, 1862. Unlike Iowa,
Minnesota  did  not  try  to  open  election  sites  “in  the  field,”  opting  instead  for  a  system  that  

20. Morrison 15 Iowa at 348.
21. Opinion of the Judges of   the   Supreme   Court   on   the   Constitutionality   of   “An   Act   Providing   for  
Soldier  Voting,”  37  Vt.  665,  674(1864).
22. Bourland, 26 Cal. 161, 206 (1864).
23. IOWA CODE, Ch. 32, § 492 (1880).
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allowed soldiers to send completed ballots from their military encampment back home to
their election districts in Minnesota. It was the first state to do so.24
Perhaps   to   preempt   anticipated   legal   challenges,   the   act’s   title   indulged   a   legal  
fiction, pronouncing that the law enabled absent servicemen “to   vote   in   the   Election  
District  in  which  they  reside,”  as  if  saying  it  that  way  made  it  so.    This  was  a  clear  effort  
to conform to the language of the state constitution. In its suffrage provision, the
constitution of 1857 stated the local residence requirement in terms that certainly could
be  construed  as  requiring  the  voter’s  physical  presence  in  his  Minnesota  election  district.  
It  granted  the  right  to  vote  “in  the  election  district  in  which  he  [the  voter]  shall  at  the  time  
have been for ten days a resident.”25
In Minnesota and the states following its model of military suffrage legislation,
soldiers filled out their ballots at the site of their military attachment and forwarded the
completed ballot back to their voting district in Minnesota. The law covered military
personnel comprehensively, allowing  absentee  voting  by  “all  persons  …  in  the  military  or  
naval   service,”   provided   they   were   eligible   electors   “when   they   mustered   into   the  
service.”26 This included volunteers, draftees, regulars, and sailors in the navy. The law
went a step further, authorizing voting by servicemen who turned 21 during their military
service, provided they qualified as residents before enrolling. The law applied

24. An Act to Enable Citizens of this State, who are or may be Engaged in the Military or Naval Service
of the United States, to Vote in the Election Districts where they Reside, at the General Election to be held
in the Month of November, 1862 and all Subsequent General Elections, during the Continuance of the
Present War, ch.   1,   1862   (extra   session)   Minn.   Laws   13.   (Hereafter   referred   to   as   “Minnesota   SoldierVoting  Law  of  1862.”)
25. M INN. CONST. of 1857, art. VII, § 1.
26. Minnesota Soldier-Voting Law of 1862, § 1.
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comprehensively to elections, as well, authorizing absent soldiers to  vote  in  “all”  annual  
elections,  starting  in  1862,  but  only  “during  the  continuance  of  the  present  war.”27
Commissioners  were  key  to  the  law’s  functioning.  The  governor,  with  the  advice  
and consent of the state senate, appointed the commissioners. They were stretched thin, a
total of eight commissioners being assigned for all the states where Minnesota
servicemen were stationed. By the terms of the law, four commissioners were Democrats
and four Republicans.28
The law allowed the two political parties to supply their pre-printed ballots to the
commissioners,   who   then   provided   the   ballots   to   the   voting   soldiers.   The   soldier’s  
completed ballot would get forwarded home to Minnesota only after he first swore an
oath, which a commissioner administered in person. The oath touched on the elements of
voting eligibility other than race and gender. It covered age (21), residence (four months
in Minnesota and ten days in the election district), and U.S. citizenship. Minnesota was
unusually generous in its citizenship qualification for suffrage, enfranchising not only
then-current  United  States  citizens,  but  also  foreigners  who  had  declared  their  “intention  
to become such citizen, conformably to the laws of the United States on the subject of
naturalization.”29 The oath covered both citizenship categories.30

27. Id.
28. Id. at § 6.
29. M INN. CONST. of 1857, art. VII, § 1. The constitutions of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Kansas
similarly allowed prospective citizens to vote. (See discussion of those states, infra.) The Minnesota oath
did not address the two categories of Native Americans allowed to vote under this section of the
constitution.  One  was  “Persons  of  mixed  white  and  indian  blood  who  have  adopted  the  customs  and  habits  
of   civilization.”   The   other   was   those   Indians   found   by   a   court   to   be   “capable   of   enjoying   the   rights   of  
citizenship  within  this  State.”  
30. Minnesota Soldier-Voting Law of 1862, § 3.
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The soldier would complete his ballot, place it in an envelope supplied by the
commissioner,   “seal   the   same   with   sealing   wax”   (also   provided   by   the   commissioner),  
and swear the above oath. The commissioner then signed a form in the nature of a
notarization on the back of the sealed envelope. It attested to the name of the soldier, the
name   of   the   commissioner,   the   soldier’s   military   attachment,   the   fact   that   soldier   had  
taken   the   oath,   and   the   commissioner’s   assurance   that   the   soldier’s   vote   was   “free   and  
voluntary.”31
The   commissioner   then   mailed   the   envelope   to   the   soldier’s   voting   district   in  
Minnesota. The election judges there, after confirming that the soldier named on the
envelope   was   on   the   district’s   voting registry, opened the envelope and added the
enclosed ballot to the civilian votes in the ballot box. This meant that there could be no
separate tally of the soldier votes.32
Minnesota’s   statute   never   came   under   review   by   the   state’s   supreme   court.  
According to the leading scholar on this law, a likely court challenge was forestalled
when   the   losing   candidate   for   Minnesota’s   congressional   seat   backed   away   from   his  
initial intention to contest the election. The candidate, Democrat William Cullen,
believed he would have won the election if the soldier vote had been excluded. Cullen
started the process of mounting a challenge, then reconsidered when the Republican press
had a field day claiming he was anti-soldier.33 Cullen’s  retreat  meant  Minnesota  was  one  
of only five states to have enacted a soldier-voting law without either amending its
31. Id.
32. Id. § 4.
33.  Downs,  “The  Soldier  Vote  and  Minnesota  Politics,”  198-199. Because soldier votes were not tallied
separately from civilian votes, Cullen would likely have faced a difficult problem of proving his case if he
had proceeded to contest the election.
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constitution or experiencing a high court review, or both. The other three states were
Kentucky (which forestalled a constitutional challenge by limiting soldier-voting rights to
federal elections, an approach which high courts in Vermont and New Hampshire had
sanctioned), Missouri (where the soldier-voting law lacked clear legitimacy and courts
were unavailable for election contests), Nevada (which became a state only days before
the election of 1864), and Illinois (which enacted its soldier-voting law in 1865, when it
no longer mattered politically).
Minnesota removed its soldier-voting law in the revision of its statutes in 1868.34

SENIOR STATES
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Kentucky, Maryland, and New York
These eight states became part of the United States before 1800, and all remained
in the Union during the Civil War. Between 1862 and 1864, all enacted provisions
allowing absent soldiers to vote. All nine had to clear difficult constitutional hurdles to do
so. Six of the eight (Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island) did so only after amending their constitutions. The other three (Vermont, New
Hampshire, and Kentucky), following a path suggested by the Vermont Supreme Court,
avoided constitutional obstacles by limiting absentee voting rights to elections for federal
offices. The four state supreme courts in this group that reviewed absentee voting laws

34. MINN. STAT. Ch. 1 (1868).
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(Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Vermont, and New Hampshire), all struck down the laws, in
whole  or  in  part.  (Pennsylvania’s  and  Connecticut’s  constitutional  amendments followed
their courts’   adverse court rulings.) And in only one state of this senior group did a
soldier-voting law survive much past the end of the war. (New Hampshire).

Pennsylvania
The first state to confront the legality of soldier-voting laws was Pennsylvania,
the only state in the Union with a soldier-voting law on the books at the outset of the war.
That law was first enacted in 1813 and was retained, in a slightly revised form, as a brief
section in a comprehensive election law passed  in   1839.     It   allowed  absent   soldiers  “to  
exercise the right of suffrage at such place as may be appointed by the commanding
officer of the troop, or company, to which they shall respectively belong, as fully as if
they   were   present   at   the   usual   place   of   election.” 35 A precursor to Civil War soldiervoting laws on the Iowa model, it called for election sites to open at the encampments
where soldiers served, overseen by officers of each company.36 Before the Civil War, the
law never received judicial attention, if indeed it was ever used at all.37 But it was used in
elections in 1861, and in some of those elections it was decisive.

35. An Act Relating to the Elections of this Commonwealth, P. L. No. 192, § 43, 1839 Pa. Laws 519,
528  (hereafter  cited  as  “Pennsylvania  Soldier-Voting  Law  of  1839”).
36. Id. at § 44.
37. In attacking Democrats in general, and Democrat George Woodward in particular, for opposing
soldier voting, Republicans in 1864 charged in an election pamphlet that Pennsylvania soldiers had voted
under the law during the Mexican War. Chandler, The  Soldiers’  Right  To  Vote, 8. Neither Josiah Benton
nor Jonathan White, in writing about the Pennsylvania soldier-voting law of 1864, corroborate that
assertion.
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The first challenge to the law that found its way to the state Supreme Court did
not  call  into  question  the  law’s  constitutionality.  In  the  case  of  Hulseman and Brinkworth
v. Rems and Siner, two losing candidates for the Common Council of Philadelphia asked
the high court to enjoin the two winning candidates from taking their seats. Election
returns  from  a  Pennsylvania  regiment  stationed  in  Virginia  were  decisive  in  the  winners’  
victory, and the challengers claimed that those returns were entirely bogus. No election
had actually occurred at the regiment, the losing candidates asserted, and the returns
purporting to show the tally of soldier votes were forgeries.38
The unanimous Supreme Court agreed that forged returns tarnished the election,
but it declined to set aside the results. Chief Justice Walter Lowrie, a Democrat, wrote the
opinion.   He   lamented   the   forgeries   as   a   “gross   fraud”   and   deplored   the   sorry   state   of  
partisan   strife,   in   which   “opposing   parties   treat   each   other   as   enemies”   who   “come   to  
think  that  tricks  and  lies,  fraud,  forgery  and  perjury  are  legitimate  strategies.”  But  it  was  
not  the  Supreme  Court’s  job  to  remedy  election  fraud,  said  Lowrie.  That  job  belonged  in  
this case to the Philadelphia Common Council, and the challengers erred in failing to take
their challenge to that body before seeking relief from the high court.39
The Hulseman and Brinkworth decision did not address the constitutionality of
the 1839 soldier-voting  law.  That  issue  first  came  before  Pennsylvania’s  high court in the
case of Chase v. Miller, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. In the 1861 race for district
attorney of Luzerne County, Democrat Ezra Chase outpolled Republican Jerome Miller
among the voters casting their ballots in the county. But Miller handily beat Chase in the
38. Hulseman, 41 Pa. at 397.
39. Id. at 400-402.
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votes of absent soldiers, more than making up his deficit in the home vote. The return
judges in Luzerne County, however, excluded the soldier votes and declared Chase the
winner.40
Miller supporters contested the results, claiming that the return judges should
have counted soldier votes as provided in the soldier-voting law of 1839. The lower
court judge, a Democrat named John Conyngham, agreed. The exclusion of the proMiller  military  vote,  which  “disfranchised”  soldiers,  in  Conyngham’s  opinion,  also  flew  
in   the  face  of  the  legislature’s  decision.  Upholding  the  exclusion  “would  be  a  denial  of  
sovereignty,”   Conyngham   ruled. 41 The decision made Republican Miller the winner.
Chase appealed to the state Supreme Court.
Democrat George Woodward  authored  the  high  court’s  4-1 decision in May 1862
overruling  the  lower  court  and  reinstalling  Chase  as   Luzerne  County’s  district   attorney.  
The court ruled that the 1839 soldier-voting  law  violated  Pennsylvania’s  constitution.  The  
decision hinged on   the   meaning   of   the   suffrage   provision   of   Pennsylvania’s   1838  
constitution.    Article  III,  section  1  of  that  instrument  granted  voting  rights  to  “every  white  
freeman of the age of twenty-one years, having resided in the State one year, and in the
election district where he offers to vote, ten days immediately preceding such
election….”42 The central question was whether the language italicized here imposed a
constitutional requirement that voters cast their ballots in person within their

40 . Chase, 41 Pa. at 414. A fair assumption is that the election officials acted based on their
interpretation of the Pennsylvania constitution, but no record of their reasoning has survived.
41. Philadelphia Inquirer, January 16, 1862.
42. P A. CONST. of 1838, art. III, § 1, italics added. The same section also conditioned the suffrage on
the  payment  of  a  tax.  Specifically,  the  prospective  voter  must  have  “within  two  years  paid  a  State  or  county  
tax,  which  shall  have  been  assessed  at  least  ten  days  before  the  election….”      
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Pennsylvania election districts. If so, the legislature acted beyond its authority in
authorizing absentee voting. If not – if, in other words, the italicized words merely
established who could vote, leaving the legislature to establish where – then the absentee
voting law was a legitimate exercise of legislative power.
Jerome   Miller’s   lawyers,   seeking   to   have   the   law   upheld,   argued   that   the  
constitution   required   only   that   the   ballot   ultimately   be   “polled”   (i.e.,   counted)   in   the  
election district where the voter meets the residency requirement. In this interpretation,
no   matter   where   a   soldier   physically   cast   his   ballot,   he   “offered”   his   vote   in   his   home  
election district if his vote was polled there. The legislature could fix the time and place
of   the   soldier’s   voting   as   it   pleased.      Any   other   interpretation,   Miller’s   counsel   argued,  
would  frustrate  “the  great  cardinal  principle”  that  the  constitution  was  meant  to  advance:  
the  right  to  vote,  which  “is  the  corner-stone  of  the  political  edifice.”43
Chase’s   lawyers,   challenging   the law’s   constitutionality,   argued   for   a   different  
“cardinal   principle”:   the   need   to   prevent   voting   fraud.   They   cited   court   precedents  
defining   the   constitution’s   reference   to   “election   district”   to   mean   the   place   established  
by  law  where  “citizens  assemble  to  vote.”  Each  district  came  into  existence  by  statute  as  
a subdivision of the state, and the legislature could not constitutionally establish a
“district”   outside   Pennsylvania.   Nor   could   a   voter   qualify   to   vote   in   more   than   one  
district,   Chase’s   lawyers   argued. The soldier-voting law in effect attempted –
unconstitutionally, counsel insisted – to establish, for each eligible soldier, a second
location  where  he  could  cast  his  ballot,  namely  the  indeterminate  place  “appointed  by  the  

43. Chase, 41 Pa. at 408.
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commanding  officer,”  in  the words of the old statute. Moreover, they asserted, absentee
voting would create the very risk of fraud that Pennsylvania election districts existed to
prevent. Unlike election judges and inspectors in districts within the state, officers
supervising elections in the field were not subject to sanctions of Pennsylvania law and
had no way to test the qualifications of voters; they might not themselves even be
residents   of   Pennsylvania   or   citizens   of   the   United   States.   In   short,   Chase’s   attorneys  
insisted, the   law   invited   fraud,   in   violation   of   the   constitution’s   design   for   assuring  
“purity”  in  elections.44
Woodward’s  decision  embraced  the  constitutional  interpretation  urged  by  Chase’s  
lawyers. He approached the matter as a subject of historical inquiry, an effort to answer
the central question based on the meaning the framers of the constitution attached to the
text of the instrument. In this he had the advantage of having been one of the framers
himself, although his authority on questions of original intent was presumably no greater
than  James  Thompson’s,  a  fellow  Democrat  on  Pennsylvania’s  high  court.  Thompson  too  
was a delegate to the 1838 convention that drafted the constitution.45 He dissented from
Woodward’s   opinion   for   the   4-1 Chase majority, although, because he did not file an
explanatory dissenting opinion, we are left to guess at his reasons.
The framers of the 1838 constitution, Woodward ruled, went beyond deciding
who could vote (white, 21-year old men meeting residency and taxpaying requirements)
44. Chase, 41 Pa. at 406.
45. Woodward participated actively at the convention. On the suffrage provision of the new instrument,
Woodward  supported  the  addition  of  “white”  as  a  qualification  for  voting.  Giving  Negroes  the  vote,  he  was  
reported to have said in a convention   speech,   would   “offend   against   nature.”   Democratic Banner
(Clearfield,  PA),   August  26,  1863,  p.  2;;  For  Thompson’s   position  as  a  delegate,  see   “James  Thompson,”  
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, accessed November 26, 2013,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=T000204 .
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and purposely made the precise place of elections a constitutional element of suffrage,
thereby putting the subject beyond the reach of legislation to alter. The framers did this
in  Article  III,  §  1  by  linking  voting  to  the  election  “district”  in  which  the voter met the
10-day residency requirement. It was in that district, and only in that district, that the
voter  could  “offer”  his  vote  by  appearing  there  in  person  to  cast  his  ballot.
The   constitution   did   not   define   the   word   “district,”   but   by   1838   that   word had
taken  on  a  clear  meaning  from  the  state’s  long  history  of  election  laws.  Year  after  year,  
starting long before the 1838 constitution, legislation had specified the places of voting
and called those places – always within Pennsylvania, of course – “election  districts.”  By  
law, the word had come to mean the location where voters convened to cast their ballots.
The  framers  had  that  definition  in  mind  when  they  used  the  word  “district”  in  Article  III,  
§ 1, according to Woodward.46
Why did the 1838 framers decide to tie voting rights to election districts for the
first time, according to Woodward? It was just the most recent step of a consistent trend
in  the  state’s  constitutional  history,  he wrote. Tracing the evolution of suffrage under the
state’s   three constitutions – 1776, 1790, and 1838 – Woodward identified a consistent
policy of tightening voting practices to guard against fraud. The purpose of fixing voting
in election districts in 1838, he said, was to accomplish statewide what Philadelphia had
accomplished   by   creating   a   voter   registry   in   1836:   a   way   “to   exclude   disqualified  
pretenders  and  fraudulent  voters  of  all  kinds.”  Tethering  voting  to  local  districts  served  as  
46. Chase, 41 Pa. at 421.  The  constitution  did  not  limit  the  legislature’s  authority  to  create  new  districts,  
Woodward wrote, including a district defined as a specific military encampment within the state, if they
wished. But the 1839 soldier-voting  law  did  no  such  thing.  It  simply  ignored  the  constitution’s  requirement  
of voting in a district, saying instead that absent   soldiers   could   vote   “at   such   place”   as   the   soldier’s  
commanding officer shall appoint. This violated Article III, § 1. Id.
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a  mechanism  to  provide  notice  of  where  to  vote  and,  through  the  presence  of  “magistrates
and   constables,”   provide   a   way   for   the   process   of   voting   “to   be   guarded.”   The   soldiervoting   law   offered   none   of   these   protections.   It   “opens   a   wide   door   for   most   odious  
frauds,”   Woodward   wrote,   by   allowing   soldiers   to   vote   “where   the   evidence   of their
qualifications is not at hand and where our civil police cannot attend to protect the legal
voter,   to   repel   the   rioter,   and   to   guard   the   ballots   after   they   have   been   cast.”   All   this  
collided  with  what  Woodward  called  “the  labour  of  the  constitution,”  which  was  to  assure  
that  suffrage  rights  “be  preserved  from  abuse  and  perversion.”47
Woodward treated the fraud attendant on soldier voting not as a hypothetical risk,
but as a documented certainty. With the record of the recently decided Hulseman case
apparently in mind (though he did not cite that case in his Chase opinion), Woodward
said,  “the  cases  of  fraud  that  have  been  before  us”  proved  that  soldier  voting  was  subject  
to cheating and manipulation. He was careful to absolve the soldiers themselves from
culpability for the fraud, noting – again undoubtedly from the Hulseman record – that the
actual   culprits   “were   political   speculators,   who   prowled   about   the   military   camps  
watching for opportunities to destroy true ballots and substitute false ones, to forge and
falsify returns, and to cheat citizen and soldier alike out of the fair and equal election
provided  for  by  law.”48
The   virtual   certainty   of   fraud   in   soldier   voting,   coupled   with   the   framers’  
overarching goal to guard against fraud through the device of a local residency
requirement tied to election districts, made it clear to Woodward that any law granting
47. Id. at 425 - 427.
48. Id.
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soldiers   absentee   voting   rights   was   decidedly   out   of   step   with   the   constitution.   “We  
cannot be persuaded that the constitution ever contemplated  any  such  mode  of  voting,”  he  
wrote in concluding that the law could not stand.49
How did Woodward square that statement with the fact that by 1838, when the
constitution was drafted, a voting law for absent Pennsylvania soldiers had been on the
books for a quarter of a century? The 1813 soldier-voting law, he explained, had been
enacted under an earlier constitution. The suffrage provision of the constitution of 1790
required two years of residence in the state, but it had no local residency requirement and
made no mention of election districts. 50 It therefore created no bar to legislation
permitting absent soldiers to vote. But Woodward treated that law as having been a dead
letter for a long time. Its reenactment, with modest revisions, as one section in the
comprehensive election law of 1839, lost sight of the newly ratified constitution of 1838
and was simply the product of sloppiness and haste, according to Woodward. A
legislative committee in 1834 had recommended slight revisions to the 1813 law, but
those recommendations had remained dormant until 1839, when the legislature
mindlessly dropped them into the new comprehensive election law without regard to the
fact   that   a  revised  constitution   now  controlled;;   it  was  “careless  legislation,”  Woodward  
concluded.51
As proof that legislators had made a hash of the 1839 law, Woodward pointed to
other sections of the statute that were at odds with the soldier-voting provision, including
49. Id. at 418-419, 424-425.
50. P A. CONST. of 1790, art. III, § 1. The 1790 suffrage provision also differed from the 1838 version in
not excluding African-Americans from the suffrage. The qualification of whiteness was added in 1838.
51. Chase, 41 Pa. at 417.
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a   section   prohibiting   “any   body   of   troops   …   either   armed   or   unarmed”   from   being
present  “at  any  place  of  election.”52 That effectively prohibited the very style of election
that the soldier-voting provision of the same law authorized. To permit soldier voting in
one section of a statute that elsewhere prohibited it not only collided with the
constitution, but also bespoke statutory incoherence. Legislation ordinarily enjoyed a
presumption of constitutionality, as Woodward conceded, but this self-contradictory law
was such a mess and ran so clearly afoul of constitutional limits that the court could not
be expected to give it effect, Woodward ruled, in reversing the lower court and
pronouncing Chase the winner.53
The Chase decision sparked a successful initiative to amend the constitution so as
to permit soldier voting.

Acting under its now clear authority, the Pennsylvania

legislature enacted a soldier-voting law in time for the 1864 elections.54 The law applied
to all servicemen, including sailors in the navy, with no exclusion for regulars and with
bounty men expressly included.55 Unique among the twenty states that changed their laws
to permit absent soldiers to vote, Pennsylvania adopted a hybrid combination of the Iowa
and Minnesota models, with the Minnesota system of mail-in balloting available for
soldiers unable to avail themselves of voting at in-the-field election sites set up under the
Iowa model. Under the law, polls opened at the headquarters of each company
“composed  in  whole  or  in  part”  of  Pennsylvania  men.  All  qualified  voters  belonging  to  
the company and within one mile of the polling site had to vote there. Others could vote
52. Pennsylvania Soldier-Voting Law of 1839, § 95; Chase, 41 Pa. at 424.
53. Chase, 41 Pa. at 421.
54. An Act to Regulate Elections by Soldiers in Actual Military Service, P.L. No. 871, 1864 Pa. Laws
990.  (hereafter  cited  as  “Pennsylvania  Soldier-Voting  Law  of  1864”).
55. Id. at §§ 1, 2.
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at   any   “convenient”   polling   site,   including   officers   not   attached   to   a   company,   soldiers  
detached and absent from their companies, men in hospitals, and men on vessels or in
navy yards. Or, a group of ten or more servicemen gathered anywhere else could open
their own polling site.56
Gathered at the polling site, the men chose three election judges, who in turn
appointed two election clerks. Election judges and clerks had to be qualified
Pennsylvania voters.57 As in most states, the election judges and clerks had to take an
oath  swearing  to  “studiously  endeavor  to  prevent  fraud,  deceit,  or  abuse”  in  the  voting.58
In   the   event   of   a   challenge   to   a   voter’s   eligibility,   an   election   judge   could   question   the
applicant   about   his   qualifications   and   could   accept   his   ballot   only   if   the   judge   “be  
satisfied”  that  the  applicant  was  qualified.59
Pennsylvania’s   election   judges   and   clerks   faced   logistical   challenges   similar   to  
those their Ohio counterparts faced, as described in Chapter 1. They had to keep separate
(and duplicate) poll books and voter lists for each Pennsylvania city or county
represented by a voter at the polling site. 60 The soldier prepared his written ballot
identifying all the candidates voted for and presented that ballot to an election judge. The
judge  announced  the  soldier’s  name,  which  the  clerks  entered  in  the  duplicate  poll  books  
for each city and county.61 Critics of the law pointed out how cumbersome this process
could be. One newspaper, claiming that some regiments had men from every county in

56. Id. at § 2.
57. Id. at § 4.
58. Id. at § 5.
59. Id. at § 6.
60. Id. at § 7.
61. Id. at § 9.
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Pennsylvania, complained that elections would require from 150 to 200 different poll
books,  each  of  which  was  “ponderous.”62
When the polls closed, the judges and clerks signed the poll books, opened the
ballot box, and began tallying the results. Ballot by ballot, each of the three judges in turn
announced the names of the candidates voted for on each ballot while the clerks kept
count on tally sheets, keeping separate tallies for each city and county. The third judge to
handle each ballot strung it on a thread, separating the ballots from different cities and
counties on separate threads.63
The statute included the form for poll books and tally sheets, which the Secretary
of the Commonwealth provided for each company and military hospital, delivering them
through commissioners whom the governor appointed, one per regiment. 64 At the
conclusion of the voting, the judges packed one of the duplicate poll books and tally
sheets for each city and county to that jurisdiction’s   court   of   common   pleas.   They  
delivered the duplicate copies to the commissioner, or if the commissioner was
unavailable, mailed them to the Secretary of the Commonwealth.65
The fallback process of mail-in balloting was available for men in four
circumstances that would leave them out of the voting above process, namely men
gathered away from company headquarters in groups of less than 10, individuals
separated from their companies, Pennsylvania soldiers attached to units of other states,

62. Daily Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia, Pa.), November 26, 1864.
63. Pennsylvania Soldier-Voting Law of 1864, §§ 10, 11, 13.
64. Id. at §§ 15, 16, 23, 24, 25.
65. Id. at § 17.
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and men on recruiting or provost duty. 66 Each man in these circumstances sent his
completed ballot to a proxy in his hometown. The proxy had to be a qualified voter. In
the same envelope containing his ballot, the soldier had to include 1) a statement (signed
by an officer) identifying the soldier and his military unit, 2) a document authorizing his
proxy, and 3) an affidavit attesting to his qualifications and promising that he had not and
would not vote in any other fashion. 67 The Secretary of the Commonwealth prepared
forms  of  these  documents  and,  “furnish  the  same  for  the  use  of”  the  soldiers  who  needed  
them, though the statute did not specify the means of distributing them to soldiers.68 The
proxy’s   job   was   to   deliver   the   envelope   containing   the   ballot   and   all   these documents,
unopened, to the hometown election site, where election officials added the ballot to the
civilian  ballot  box  if  the  soldier’s  name  appeared  on  the  voting  list.69
The  law  also  addressed  a  loose  end  created  by  the  constitution’s  requirement  that
voters pay a tax assessed 10 days before the election.70 (In 1864, the tax was ten cents.)
The soldier-voting law obligated the tax collector to accept payment of the tax from other
people  acting  on  the  soldiers’  behalf.71 Both political parties exhorted the party faithful
to  pay  soldiers’  assessments,  and  evidence  is  that  the  faithful  responded.72
The susceptibility of fraud in soldier voting was predicted, not only by George
Woodward in his opinion about the 1839 law in the Chase case, but also by people most

66. Id. at § 32.
67. Id. at § 33.
68. Id. at § 38.
69. Id. at § 34.
70. P A. CONST. of 1838, art. III, § 1.
71. Pennsylvania Soldier-Voting Law of 1864, § 40.
72. Daily Telegraph (Harrisburg, PA), October 15, 1864; Daily Gazette and Advertiser, (Pittsburgh,
PA) October 21, 1864.
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closely associated with the 1864 law, including Governor Andrew Curtin. According to
Alexander   McClure,   Curtin’s   advisor   and   close   confidant,   the   governor   agreed   with  
McClure’s   assessment   that   the   law   “bristled   with   invitations   to   fraud   and   opened   the
widest   doors   to   its   perpetration.”   Disapproving   of   the   bill’s   weaknesses   in   this   regard,  
Curtin tried to persuade legislators to revise the bill. After they rebuffed him, he signed
the bill into law anyway.73

Connecticut
Connecticut is one of several states  that  found  a  “do-over”  necessary  in  trying  to  
secure voting rights for its absent Civil War soldiers. It enacted one military suffrage law
in December 1862 and another in July 1864 after the state supreme court found the first
law constitutionally defective. In the interim, Connecticut amended its state constitution
to remove the legal obstacle that the first law had encountered.
The legislature understood that its 1862 effort was constitutionally problematic
even before the state supreme court said so. It passed a supplemental bill instructing the
governor to seek to seek an advisory opinion about the law from the state supreme court
before taking steps to implement it.74 The lawmakers were right to be concerned. The
court found the 1862 law defective.75 The law followed the Iowa model of calling for
election sites to open at out-of-state encampments where Connecticut soldiers served.76

73. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, 2: 129.
74. An Act in Relation to an Act Herein Named, ch.18, 1862 Conn. Pub. Acts 22.
75.      Opinion   of   the   Judges   of   the   Supreme   Court,   30   Conn.   591   (1862)   (hereafter   cited   “Connecticut  
Supreme  Court  1863  Advisory  Opinion”).
76. An act in Addition  to  an  Act  Entitled  “An  act  relating  to  Electors  and  Elections,”  ch.  17,  1862  Conn.  
Pub.  Acts  15.  (hereafter  cited  as  “Connecticut  Soldier-Voting  Law  of  1862”).  
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The  problem,  the  court  held,  was  that  the  state’s  constitution  quite  clearly  fixed  the  place  
for holding elections in “electors’   meetings”   held   in   town.      The   court   reached   this  
conclusion   by   an   analysis   of   the   state’s   history.   Dating   from   its   colonial   charter,   and  
continuing   through   its   most   recent   amendment   to   the   state’s   constitution   in   1836,  
“elections”   were   virtually synonymous with town meetings, such that an election held
elsewhere than in a town meeting, let alone out of state, was a constitutional
impossibility.77
To skirt that problem, the 1862 statute attempted a creative legal fiction. It simply
declared that soldiers’  out-of-state  voting  under  the  law  was  to  “be  considered,  taken  and  
held  to  have  been  given  by  them  in  the  respective  towns  of  which  they  are  residents.”78
This effort did not persuade the court. Voting under the 1862 act, the court found, clearly
meant  voting  away  from  Connecticut,  and  the  legislature’s  effort  to  call  it  something  else  
was  the  equivalent  of  “legislative  alchemy.”  In  short,  the  court  concluded  that  the  1862  
law  violated  Connecticut’s  constitution.79
This triggered an immediate effort to amend the constitution. Doing so required
that the state house of representatives propose an amendment in identical form in two
successive legislative sessions, with two-thirds approval by both houses in the second
session, whereupon the proposed amendment went to the people for ratification in their
town meetings.80 The legislature did its part in 1863 and 1864 sessions, and ratification
followed promptly. The amendment provided that eligible electors serving in the military
77. Connecticut Supreme Court 1863 Advisory Opinion , 30 Conn. at 596-600.
78. Connecticut Soldier-Voting Law of 1862, § 8.
79. Connecticut Supreme Court 1863 Advisory Opinion, 30 Conn at 602.
80. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. XI.
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outside the state (other than regulars) had the same right to vote as he would if he were
present for the election in the town where he resided. It authorized the legislature to
prescribe how and when soldier voting would occur.81
The legislature enacted the new soldier voting law even before the constitutional
amendment   was   ratified,  stating  at   the  outset  of  the  statute  that  it  would  take  effect   “in  
case of the adoption by the people of the proposed amendment to the Constitution of this
State.”82 It took effect in time for the 1864 elections. Unlike the failed 1862 law, which
followed the Iowa model of setting up election sites in the military encampments, the
new act followed the Minnesota model of providing for the forwarding of soldier ballots
from the out-of-state encampments back to Connecticut.
The  act  covered  both  volunteers  and  draftees,  but  not  “persons  in  the  regular  army  
of  the  United  States.”83 Navy personnel seem not to have been included either, as the law
called   for   balloting   only   where   “Connecticut   regiments,   batteries,   or   battalions are
stationed….” 84 The act applied to both state and federal elections. 85 Like the laws in
Minnesota, Iowa, and Michigan, the Connecticut law provided for commissioners to
travel to the military encampments to implement the law. Their job was to provide the

81. Proposed Amendment to the Constitution dated November 3, 1863, 1864 Conn. Acts 15 (Spec.
Sess.); An Act Relating to the Proposed Amendment to the Constitution, ch. 11, 1864 Conn. Pub. Acts
24.Ratification was secured in August 1864. Benton, Voting in the Field, 179.
82. An Act to Secure the Elective Franchise to Soldiers in the Field, ch. 37, § 1, 1864 Conn. Pub. Acts
51, 51.
83. Id.
84. Id. at § 2.
85. Id.at § 1.
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encampments with copies of the act, envelopes for returning ballots, and, if the political
parties or someone else furnished them, the ballots themselves.86
The governor appointed the commissioners, with no requirement that he do so
with an equal balance of Republicans and Democrats, as the Minnesota governor had to
do. Also unlike Minnesota, the law capped the number of commissioners who could visit
“the  same  camp,  post,  or  fortress”  at  two.87
As with the Minnesota law, the soldier sealed his completed ballot in an envelope
(there is no mention of sealing wax) and turned it over to the commissioner. On the back
of   the   envelope,   the   commissioner   wrote   the   soldier’s   name,   military   attachment,   and  
home town, then signed his own name as commissioner. The commissioners then carried
all the sealed envelopes back to Connecticut for delivery to the respective towns, with a
certification  that  the  commissioner  had  not  tried  to  influence  any  soldier’s  vote.  There  the  
soldier named on the back of the envelope was checked against the voter registry and, if
the  name  appeared  there,  the  soldier’s  ticket   was  placed  added  to   civilian  ballots   in   the  
town’s  ballot  box.88
The  Connecticut  law  took  less  care  than  Minnesota’s  in  trying  to  assure  that  only  
eligible Connecticut soldiers voted. There was no requirement in the Connecticut law for
the soldier to swear an oath that he was indeed a qualified voter, and nowhere did the
commissioner certify that the soldier named on the envelope was the man who completed

86. Id. at § 3.
87. Id. at §§ 2, 3.
88. Id. at §§ 4 - 7.
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the ballot.  The  commissioners  had  to  receive  sealed  envelopes  from  any  soldier  “claiming  
to  vote,”  with  no  provision  for  confirming  the  voter’s  identity.89
By   its   terms,   the   Connecticut   law   remained   in   effect   only   “during   the   present  
rebellion.”90

Vermont
Vermont’s   experience   with   military   suffrage   legislation   was   similar   to  
Connecticut’s.   The   legislature   wanted   to   give   its   absent   soldiers   a   way   to   vote,   but   the  
state constitution posed apparent obstacles. Lawmakers tried to work around the obstacles
with a statute they enacted in November 1863, but they hedged their bet by pronouncing
in the statute itself that its provisions would take effect only after the governor posed a
specific question to the state supreme court -- “Are   the   provisions   of   this act
constitutional?”   – and got back an affirmative answer. The statute provided that if the
court approved some portions of the law but rejected others, then only those portions of
the law found to be constitutional could go into effect.91
The governor dutifully asked the required question, and the Supreme Court
answered   with   an   advisory   opinion   in   April   1864.   The   court   concluded   that   Vermont’s  
constitution barred absentee voting for state officials, but that the bar did not apply to
voting in federal elections. 92 The upshot was absentee voting by Vermont soldiers in

89. Id. at § 3.
90. Id. at § 1.
91. An Act Providing for Soldier Voting, P. L. No. 5, § 12, 1863 Vt. Laws 7, 10 (hereafter cited as
“Vermont  Soldier-Voting Law of 1863.”)
92. Opinion   of   the   Judges   of   the   Supreme   Court   on   the   Constitutionality   of   “An   Act   Providing   for  
Soldier  Voting,”  37  Vt.  665(1864)  (hereafter  cited  as  Vermont  Advisory  Opinion).
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1864, but only for their representatives to Congress and for electors for U.S. president
and vice-president. It was a novel but legally sound way around a thorny issue of state
constitutional law, and other states took note in fashioning their own military suffrage
law.
The  state  constitutional  problem  was  created  by  a  provision  that  the  “freemen”  of  
each   Vermont   town   must   “hold   elections   therein”   for   their   representatives   in   the   state  
House of Representatives.93 That left no room for absentee voting in elections for the
state house, and the legislature did not even try to get through that tightly shut door.
Instead, they wrote the 1863 military suffrage law to apply only to elections for
Vermont’s   executive   branch officials – governor, lieutenant governor, and treasurer –
plus congressmen and federal electors.

94

As the legislature knew full well, the

constitutional underpinning for even such a limited law was shaky, but arguably the
constitution left the door ever so slightly ajar for absentee voting for state executive
officers and in federal elections.
For   elected   positions   in   the   state’s   executive   branch,   including   the   governor,  
lieutenant governor, and treasurer, the constitution directed the freemen in each town to
"bring in their votes ... to the Constable...." 95 This happened on the same day as the
meeting in town at which the freemen elected their state representatives, but the
constitution did not expressly say that it had to happen at the same meeting. Perhaps, the
legislators   reasoned,   they   could   “bring   in”   their   votes   to   election   meetings   elsewhere,  

93. VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. II, § 7.
94. Vermont Soldier-Voting Law of 1863, § 3.
95. VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. II, § 10.
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including  out  of  state,  as  long  as  they  did  so  on  the  same  day  that  civilians  in  Vermont’s  
town meetings were electing their state representatives.
With evident uncertainty, reflected in the requirement for the Supreme Court to
weigh in before the law could take effect, the legislature fashioned a military suffrage law
on the Iowa model, with voting sites set up at the military posts where Vermont soldiers
were stationed.  To  protect   the  argument  that  soldiers  were  “bringing  in”  their  votes  “to  
the  constable,”  as  the  constitution  demanded,  the  law  designated  the  presiding  officials  at  
the  military  voting  sites  as  “special  constables.”  And  the  voting  had  to  occur  on the same
day as civilian elections in Vermont.96
The   Vermont   Supreme   Court   rejected   the   legislature’s   approach.   The   only   fair  
reading  of  the  constitution,  the  court  ruled,  was  that  the  place  for  freemen  to  “bring  in”  
their votes for executive officers was the same town meeting where state legislative
representatives were elected. As the Connecticut court had done, the Vermont justices
looked to history for answers to the constitutional issues. Throughout Vermont history,
“constables”  presided  at  town  meetings, the court noted, and they had no authority other
than  as  town  officials.  So,  in  requiring  freemen  to  “bring  in”  their  votes  to  the  constable,  
the constitution meant they had to deliver their votes to the constable presiding at the
same  freemen’s  meeting where they elected their state legislators. This interpretation also
made  sense  of  the  constitution’s  otherwise  inexplicable  demand  that  freemen  deliver  their  

96. Vermont Soldier-Voting Law of 1863, § 3.
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executive office ballots to the constable on the same day as the election meeting for state
representatives.97
The Vermont justices made it clear that this requirement of physical presence by
the voter in his town of residence was different from the residency qualification for
voting. While soldiers could lawfully cast their votes only in their home towns, the
absence of such persons from the state, in such service, is not a removal, or
change of residence, by which the right of voting is lost, but like a absence from
the state upon a journey, or business, is of a temporary character, and the domicil,
or residence, continues within the state, while the person is actually without the
state.98
The court reviewed the opinions of other state supreme courts on the
constitutionality  of  military  suffrage  laws  in  their  states  and  found  Connecticut’s  (where
the  state’s  high  court  had  found  that  state’s  law  unconstitutional)  most  helpful.  Vermont’s  
election   traditions,   and   particularly   the   centrality   of   freemen’s   meetings   to   the   voting  
process,   borrowed   from   Connecticut’s  similar  traditions,   and  the  two  state constitutions
approached suffrage similarly, the Vermont justices said. Both required physical presence
by the voters at election meetings, which occurred in town.99
The   Vermont   court   seemed   doubtful   that   any   state’s   constitution   permitted  
absentee voting  for  state  offices.  Its  opinion  took  Iowa’s  court  to  task  for  approving  that  
state’s   soldier-voting law in the face of a constitutional provision requiring 60 days
residence  in  “the  county  in  which  [the  voter]  claims  his  vote.”  The  Iowa  court  had  opined  
that   “to   claim”   one’s vote did not require physical presence in Iowa. That was

97. Vermont Advisory Opinion at 670-671.
98. Id. at 667.
99. Id. at 670-671.
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unpersuasive   to   the   Vermont   jurists.   The   Iowa   court’s   opinion,   said   the   Vermonters
dismissively,  was  “exceedingly  subtle  and  ingenious,  and  we  are  not  prepared  to  say  it  is  
sound  …”100
In answer to the question posed in the Vermont statute – “Are  the  provisions  of  
this  act  constitutional?”  – the  court  concluded  that  no,  Vermont’s  constitution  barred  the  
act’s  provisions  for  absentee  voting  for  state  officials.  But  it  arrived  at  a different answer
as to absentee voting for members of Congress and electors for U.S. president and vicepresident. The federal constitution governed election procedures for those federal
positions, the court noted, and that instrument gave state legislatures sufficient authority
to   opt   for  absentee  voting  if  they  so  wished.  The  “time,  place,  and  manner”  of  electing  
U.S.  senators  and  House  members,  the  federal  constitution  provides,  “shall  be  prescribed  
in  each  State  by  the  Legislature  thereof.”101 Similarly,  each  state  “shall  appoint”  electors  
for the president and vice-president   “in   such   Manner   as   the   Legislature   thereof   may  
direct.”102
The  state  constitution  was  the  wrong  place  to  look  for  an  answer  to  the  statute’s  
question about constitutionality on these federal election matters, the Vermont jurists
ruled. The federal constitution controlled entirely, and it assigned the matter entirely to
the  state  legislature.  Vermont’s  legislature  acted  within  that  broad  constitutional  authority  
when it prescribed absentee  voting  for  federal  elections.    So,  with  the  court’s  blessing,  the  
1863  “Act  providing  for  soldier  voting”  went  into  effect  in  1864,  limited  to  elections  for  

100. Id. at 675.
101. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
102. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The constitution’s  verb  here  is  “appoint,”  not  “elect.”
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Vermont’s  representatives  to  the  U.S.  congress  and  electors  for  U.S.  president  and  vicepresident.
The  law  excluded  soldiers  “in  the  regular  or  standing  army  of  the  United  States”  
as  well  as  those  “in  any  regiment,  battery  or  company  organized  and  officered  out  of  this  
State.” 103 By limiting the out-of-state   election   sites   to   “posts”   or   “camps”   where
Vermonters   served   in   a   “regiment   or   battery   of   artillery,   or   part   of   a   company   under  
separate  command,”  the  act  implicitly  excluded  servicemen  in  the  navy. 104 While nothing
in the 1863 statute either expressly or implicitly barred draftees, an 1864 amendment
effectively  excluded  them  by  limiting  absentee  voting  rights  to  “volunteers.”105
Voting was by company, with the three ranking officers serving as election
judges,  or  “special  constables,”  as  the  act  put  it.    The  highest  ranking  of  the  three  served  
as   “chairman   of   the   board   of   constables.”106 The special constables appointed clerks to
assist  with  the  voting  and  to  prepare  “poll  lists”  showing  the  soldiers’  names  and  places  
of residence. Each constable and clerk swore an oath. The oath read the same as those of
election  laws  in  most  states,  including  the  promise  to  “studiously  endeavor  to  prevent  all  
fraud,  deceit  or  abuse  in  conducting”  the  election.107
Each   soldier’s   ballot   had   to   show   his   county   of   residence   and   the   name   of   the  
preferred candidate for each office. Before the soldier could deposit his ballot in the
ballot   box,   the   constable   had   to   “be   satisfied   that   the   person   offering   to   vote   is   a   legal  

103. Vermont Soldier-Voting Law of 1863, § 1.
104. Id.
105. An Act in Amendment of an Act Providing for Soldiers Voting, P.L. No. 8, § 1, 1864, Vt. Laws 27,
27.
106. Vermont Soldier-Voting Law of 1863, § 4.
107. Id. at § 6.
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voter  of  the  county  shown  at  the  top  of  the  ballot.”  If  there  were  suspicions,  or  if  anyone  
challenged the   soldier’s   eligibility,   the   special   constables   questioned   the   soldier   under  
oath   about   his   qualifications.   Challenges   were   decided   “by   a   majority   of   the  
constables.”108
The constables tallied the votes and prepared written statements showing the
results by  county,  “so  far  as  practicable.”  Then  they  “sealed  up”  the  ballots  and  sent  them  
to the Vermont Secretary of State, together with their statements of results and the poll
lists. The Secretary of State forwarded the returns to the General Assembly, where they
were added to the results of in-state voting.
The 1863 law did not provide for commissioners from Vermont to assist in its
implementation, and it offered sparse guidance for the soldiers at the voting sites. They
were on their own in preparing poll lists and the statements of voting results, for example.
And the act made no provision for anyone to send the soldiers the text of the required
oaths or even copies of the law itself.
Post-war   changes   in   Vermont’s   general   election   law   eclipsed   the   soldier-voting
laws of 1863 and 1864. By 1870, the required location for voting for congressional
representatives   was   “any   town   in   the   congressional   district   in   which   he   [the   voter]  
resides.”   For   electors   for   U.S.   president   and   vice-president,   it   was   “in   any   town   in this
state.”  There  were  no  exceptions  for  absent  soldiers.109

108. Id. at § 8.
109. VT. COMP LAWS, Title I, §37, (1870).
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New Hampshire
Of all the Northern states that enacted military suffrage laws during the Civil War,
New Hampshire seems to have worked hardest to get the job done. By the time they
finished the task in 1864, the legislature had acted on three different bills and the state
supreme court had issued three different advisory opinions. The final product was a law
on the Iowa model, but (as in Vermont) limited to federal elections.
The legislature first drafted a bill in 1863, but before voting on it the state House
of  Representatives  asked  the  state  supreme  court  for  an  advisory  opinion  about  the  bill’s  
constitutionality. 110 That bill was patterned on the Minnesota model, allowing absent
soldiers to complete   their   ballots   “in   the   field,”   then   send   the   votes   back   to   their   home  
state. The bill would have the soldier execute a power of attorney appointing a qualified
elector,   in   the   town   of   the   soldier’s   residence,   to   receive   the   soldier’s   completed   ballot  
and   cast   it   for   him.   When   he   delivered   the   soldier’s   ballot,   the   designated   voter   back  
home had to submit his own affidavit attesting that he had received the ballot from the
soldier named on the envelope and that the soldier was indeed a qualified voter.111
The New Hampshire Supreme Court issued the requested advisory opinion in
June 1863, concluding that the bill would be unconstitutional if enacted. The court began
with  a  statement  of  the  common  law  principle  that  in  all  elections,  “every  vote  must  be  
personally  given.”112 New  Hampshire’s  constitution  incorporated  that  principle,  the  court  

110.   The   bill   was   named,   “An Act to secure the right of suffrage to the qualified voters of this State
engaged  in  the  military  or  naval  service  of  their  country.”  Though it was never enacted, its provisions are
described in the New Hampshire Supreme Court advisory opinion that found it to be unconstitutional.
Opinion of Justices, 44 N.H. 633 (1863).
111. Opinion of Justices, 44 N.H. 633-634 (1863).
112. Id. at 634-635.
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ruled. The opinion cites numerous provisions of the constitution of 1793 to the effect that
voting   had   to   happen   in   the   town   of   the   voters’   residence.   In   choosing   state  
representatives and senators, for example, the constitution provided that eligible voters
“shall   be   entitled   to   vote   within   the   district   wherein   they   dwell.”      Elections   for   other  
offices,   including   governor,   were   to   be   “in   the   same   manner”   as   elections   for   state
representatives.    Overall,  the  court  opined,  the  “provisions  of  our  Constitution  …  require  
that the right of voting shall be exercised by the voter in person at the meetings duly held
for the purpose in the places of the State pointed out by the Constitution.”113 That left no
room for the absentee balloting contemplated by the proposed law.
This took the legislature back to the drawing boards. In August 1864, they
produced a new military suffrage law clearly showing the influence of the recent
experience in neighboring Vermont. That state had struggled to harmonize absentee
voting   for   soldiers   with   a   state   constitution   that,   like   New   Hampshire’s,   quite   clearly  
allowed for only in-state balloting. The upshot of that struggle, produced with the guiding
hand of   Vermont’s   Supreme   Court,   was   a   law   allowing   absentee   voting   for   Vermont  
soldiers, but only in elections for representatives to the U.S. congress and for electors for
U.S. president and vice-president. The state constitution did not govern the manner of
conducting these federal elections, the Vermont court had concluded. The federal
constitution controlled, and that instrument gave state legislatures sufficient authority to
enact absentee voting if they chose to.

113. Id. at 636.
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The   drafters   of   New   Hampshire’s   1864   military suffrage law clearly had the
Vermont outcome in mind. In fact, no two military suffrage laws are more alike than
New   Hampshire’s   and   Vermont’s.   Like   Vermont’s,   the   New   Hampshire   law   granted  
absentee voting rights only in federal elections.114 Like Vermont’s  law  (but  unlike  New  
Hampshire’s  own  1863  bill)  this  law  followed  the  Iowa  model  by  calling  for  election  sites  
to   be   opened   at   the   military   encampments   where   New   Hampshire’s   soldiers   were  
stationed. Also unlike the 1863 version, this law did not include navy personnel, limiting
its  provisions  to  “regiments,”  “batteries  of  artillery,”  and  “companies,”  just  as  Vermont’s  
law   had   done.   Also   in   common   with   Vermont,   New   Hampshire’s   1864   law   excluded  
soldiers   “in   the   regular,   or   standing   army   of   the   United   States,”   as   well   as   soldiers   in  
military  units  “organized  or  officered  out  of  this  State.”115 The three ranking officers of
each New Hampshire company presided over the voting, appointed clerks, administered
oaths   (to   “studiously   endeavor   to   prevent   all   fraud,   deceit   and   abuse”),   resolved  
challenges by a majority vote, and prepared returns, all in language nearly identical to the
wording  of  Vermont’s  law.116
To   resolve   doubts   about   the   law’s   constitutionality,   the   New   Hampshire  
legislators did exactly what Vermont lawmakers had done – they added a proviso to their

114. An Act to Enable the Qualified Voters of this State Engaged in the Military Service of the Country
to Vote for Electors of President and Vice President of the United States, and for Representatives in
Congress,   ch.   4030,   1864   N.H.   Laws   3061(hereafter   cited   as   “New   Hampshire   Soldier-Voting Law of
1864”).
115. Id. at § 1.
116. Id. at §§ 2, 3, 5, 6.
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soldier-voting law stipulating that the statute would take effect only if the New
Hampshire Supreme Court confirmed its constitutionality.117
On September 9, 1864, the court issued its ruling.118 It concluded that the bill (it
had not been signed by the governor when their opinion was sought) was constitutional.
The  justices  based  their  ruling  largely  on  the  logic  of  the  Vermont  court’s  opinion,  from  
which  it  quoted  extensively.  That  state’s  supreme  court  ruled that the constitutionality of
an election law applying only to federal elections had to be tested by exclusive reference
to the federal constitution; the state constitution had no bearing on the question. In two
separate provisions the U.S. Constitution grants broad power to state legislatures to
decide   the   procedures   for   electing   congressional   representatives   and   “appointing”  
presidential and vice-presidential electors.119 It was within that authority for a legislature
to permit absentee voting for federal offices, the Vermont court had ruled.
To this analysis, the New Hampshire justices added consideration of a federal
constitutional question that the Vermont jurists had not addressed. The New Hampshire
court had ruled in its 1863 advisory opinion that the state constitution required that
ballots in elections for state offices   be   cast   in   person   in   the   voter’s   town   of   residence.  
Now the court addressed a different question: did this requirement constitute a
“qualification”   for   voting?   If   it   did,   then   the   U.S. Constitution posed an obstacle to
absentee voting for federal congressional representatives. This was so because, to be
117. Id. at § 8.
118.   Opinion   of   the   Justices   of   the   Supreme   Judicial   Court   on   the   Constitutionality   of   the   Soldier’s  
Voting Bill, 45 N.H 595 (1864). The opinion, in the form of a letter from the justices to the state senate, is
undated. The date of September 9, given above, is based on the estimate given by Josiah Benton in his
indispensable book, Voting in the Field at 215.
119. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4 (for electing congressional representatives) and art. II, § 1 (for appointing
federal electors).
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eligible  to  vote  in  elections  for  the  U.S.  House  of  Representatives,  one  had  to  “have  the  
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature.”120 If   casting   his   vote   in   the   town   of   his   residence,   as   New   Hampshire’s  
constitution  required,  constituted  a  “qualification”  for  voting,  then  according  to  the  U.S.  
Constitution the absent soldier was ineligible to vote for his congressman.121
After   an   extended   analysis,   the   court   concluded   that   a   voter’s   “qualifications”  
meant  something  different  from  “the  time  when  or  the  place  where”  he  could  vote.  Rules  
about   the   latter   constitute   “a   mere   regulation   for   the   exercise   of   his   right,”   not   a  
“qualification   of   the   elector   within   the   meaning   of   the   term   as   used   in   the   [U.S.]  
Constitution.”    When  the  U.S.  Constitution  referred  to  an  elector’s  qualification,  it  meant  
such   matters   as   his   “age,   fixed   residence,   [and] property,”   not   where   or   when   he   could  
cast his ballot. 122 The   court   found   support   in   the   history   of   New   Hampshire’s   election  
laws  for  viewing  voters’  qualifications  and  the  place  of  voting  as  two  different  subjects.  
The   court’s   historical   analysis   included an   observation   that   New   Hampshire’s   early  
colonial election laws had permitted voting outside of New Hampshire for absent
township proprietors, and voting in town by non-resident landowners was legally
permissible  until  adoption  of  the  state’s  constitution of 1783.123
Having   concluded   that   soldiers   did   not   lose   their   “qualification”   as   voters   by  
virtue of their absence from New Hampshire election sites, the court wound up exactly
where the Vermont court had: the U.S. Constitution authorized the state legislature to
120. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 2.
121. Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, 45 New Hampshire Reports at 602.
122. Id. at 602, 605.
123. Id. at 597-598.
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permit absentee voting for congressmen and federal electors. That meant the 1864
legislation   was   constitutional.   This   was   the   court’s   second   advisory   opinion   on   the  
subject of military suffrage legislation, but almost amazingly, there would be a third.
The court had deliberated the constitutionality of absentee voting after the
legislation was drafted and voted on, but before it became law. In an almost farcical
sequence of events after submission of the question to the court, a question arose about
whether it had become law at all. The bill had passed both houses along party lines, with
Republicans in favor and Democrats opposed. It was then sent to Governor Joseph
Gilmore, a Republican. Gilmore had backed the 1863 law, and he favored soldier voting
as  a  general  proposition.  But  when  the  state’s  high  court  struck  down  the  1863  law,  and  
after  New  York’s  Democratic  governor,  Horatio  Seymour,  had  vetoed  as  unconstitutional  
a   bill   similar   to   New   Hampshire’s   1863   law,   Gilmore   came   to   believe   that   a   military
suffrage statute would require a constitutional amendment. So, departing from the general
partisan division on the issue, this Republican governor vetoed the bill. Or at least he
tried to. It was not clear whether the bill had been properly delivered to him for
consideration, and through administrative sloppiness, he was slow to draft his veto
message and send it to the legislature. When he finally did, the Republican leadership,
obviously reluctant to receive the veto, was slow to acknowledge it.124
All this to and fro raised a technical dispute, heavily clouded by partisanship,
about  whether  the  governor’s  message  was  timely  under  the  state  constitution’s  five-day
124. The disputed facts about the attempted   veto   are   set   forth   in   the   state   Supreme   Court’s   advisory  
opinion on the matter, Opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court, 45 N. H. at 607. For the legislative history of
the New Hampshire soldier-voting   law,   and   for   the   political   backdrop,   Benton’s   Voting in the Field is a
valuable source.
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deadline for issuing a veto. 125 To resolve the dispute, on August 31, both legislative
branches joined in a concurrent resolution submitting the matter for yet another advisory
opinion, asking the justices whether the bill had become law. On September 22, the court
answered with its third advisory opinion, concluding that the bill had indeed become law.
The   issue   boiled   down   to   when   the   constitution’s   five-day veto clock started running.
Was  it  on  the  day  the  bill  was  dropped  off  at  the  governor’s  office,  or  the  next  day  when  
the governor first saw it? The court ruled that delivery to the office started the clock, and
that the veto message arrived at the legislature one day too late. The bill thereby became
“a  valid  and  binding  statute,”  the  court  declared.126
Two acts supplementing the 1864 law are noteworthy. One exempted absent
soldiers from the state’s  poll  tax.127 The second instructed the governor and secretary of
state to take additional steps to protect against fraud in the soldier voting. If any vote
should   “clearly   appear”   to   have   been   cast   by   an   unqualified   voter,   the   governor   was   to  
reject it,   drawing   on   “such   evidence   as   they   [the governor and secretary of state] may
deem  sufficient.”  Moreover,  the  names  of  voting  soldiers  were  to  be  sent  to  each  of  their  
townships, where the town clerks had to compare their names against voter lists and
inform   the   secretary   of   state   of   any   discrepancies.   Finally,   because   a   soldier’s   absence  
during   war   “shall   not   affect   his   right   of   suffrage,”   this   act   required   that   the   names   of  
absent  soldiers  be  maintained  on  township  voter  lists.”128

125. N.H. CONST. of 1792, art. 49.
126. Opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court, 45 N.H. at 607, 610.
127. An Act to Exempt Volunteers and Conscripts from the Poll Tax, ch. 2863, 1864 N.H. Laws 2816.
128. An Act in Relation to Counting the Votes for Electors of President and Vice President and for
Representatives in Congress, ch. 4031, §§ 1, 2, 4, 1864 N.H. Laws 3064-3065.
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A curiosity about New Hampshire’s   soldier-voting experience is that
commissioners from New Hampshire traveled to the military posts to assist with
implementation, although the act of 1864 did not provide for such commissioners. It is
conjectural, but perhaps commissioners were appointed under the 1863 law, which did
provide for them, before that law was struck down as unconstitutional. The 1864 law did
not prohibit commissioners, and it is possible that the holdovers from the 1863 were put
to use in 1864.
We learn not only that there were commissioners, but a good deal more about
how  voting  “in  the  field”  may  have  actually  worked,  from  this  New  Hampshire  soldier’s  
positive account:
The two commissioners, one representing the Republican, and one the
Democratic, party, came to the 13th New Hampshire bringing with them a list of
the legal voters in each regiment procured from the different towns, and permitted
only those to vote whose names were on that list. There were quite a number who
had come of age during their service whose names had not been added to the list
of voters, and therefore they were not permitted to vote. On a certain day at dress
parade the regiment was notified that between certain hours on a fixed day and
election would be held for President of the United States and Representatives in
Congress, at which they would be permitted to vote. I was present and voted on
that day. There was no speechmaking and no gathering of the regiment as a
whole. Each man came up to the polling place and voted by himself. He was
given two ballots, one representing the Democratic, and one the Republican,
candidates, and secretly, without knowledge of any one, he deposited whichever
vote he saw fit. There had been no campaign literature circulated and no
speechmaking. There probably never was a purer election held in the world than
that which was held under the two commissioners from New Hampshire. Both
expressed their opinion to the effect that no influence was exercised on the part of
anybody to vote one way or the other.129

129. As quoted in Benton, Voting in the Field, at 222.
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New Hampshire repealed its soldier-voting law in 1897 when the state amended
various aspects of its election law.130

Rhode Island
Rhode Island, like Nevada, Maryland, and Missouri, implemented absentee voting
for Civil War soldiers without enacting soldier-voting legislation. Instead, the state
adopted a constitutional amendment that not only enabled the legislature to enact a
military suffrage law, but also by its own terms provided for absent soldiers to vote even
if the legislature took no action at all. As it happened, the legislature did not pass a
military suffrage law during the war, perhaps because none was needed under this
peculiar constitutional amendment.
The prewar constitution clearly blocked absentee voting except perhaps for
federal elections, if Rhode Island had chosen to go the route that Vermont and New
Hampshire   had   traveled.   Adopted   in   1842,   Rhode   Island’s   suffrage   provisions   were  
conservative and convoluted compared to other northern states, with one set of
requirements  for  “native  citizens  of  the United  States”  and  a  different  set  for  naturalized  
citizens.  Voting  by  both  groups,  however,  had  to  happen  “in  town  or  ward  meetings.”131
The discrimination between native-born and naturalized citizens merits some
elaboration, if only because of the relevance of military service to the suffrage
qualification of the former group. Naturalized citizens, assuming they were twenty-one

130. An Act in Amendment of the Public Statutes, Relating to the Manner of Conducting Caucuses and
Elections, ch. 78, § 21, 1897 N.H. Laws 68, 77.
131. R. I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, §§ 1, 2.
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year  old  males  who  met  the  constitution’s  residence  requirements,132 had only one avenue
to the voting franchise. They had to own $134 worth of real property.133 A native-born
American, in contrast, could qualify with a lower level of property ownership, or no
property ownership at all. His options were either 1) to pay a one-dollar tax on whatever
property he owned (or a one-dollar voluntary contribution for the support of public
schools), or 2) to enroll for duty in the state militia during the year preceding the
election.134

Military service also relieved voters of liability for a one-dollar   “registry  

tax.”135 The constitution limited its favorable treatment for military service to militiamen
only; those stationed in Rhode Island in the regular army got no similar break. Moreover,
as in several states, service in Rhode Island by regulars did not count toward the
constitution’s  residency qualifications.136
Rhode Island politicians favoring absentee voting for soldiers saw more than one
difficulty with the suffrage hodgepodge of the prewar constitution. First and foremost, of
course,   was   the   requirement   of   voting   “in   town   or   ward   meetings.”   That ruled out
absentee voting for any soldiers. In addition, even if that hurdle could be cleared, the
imposition of a property qualification on the cohort of Rhode Island immigrant soldiers
who had returned home after serving in the war, but not on their native-born neighbors
who sat out the war without serving at all, created an embarrassing injustice.
132.  One  year  residence  in  the  state  and  six  months  “in  the  town  or  city  in  which  [the  elector]  may  claim  
a right to vote.”    R. I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, § 1.
133. R. I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, § 1. It was not necessary for the voter to own the property in the town
or city where he resided. He could vote there as long as he proved he owned property of the requisite value
somewhere in Rhode Island. Id.
134. R. I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, § 2. The state residence requirement for native-born citizens without
$134 of property was two years, compared to one year for citizens meeting the property qualification.
135. R. I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, § 3.
136. R. I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, § 4.
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So, in May 1864, with time running short before the 1864 elections, the
legislature approved three constitutional amendments and submitted them to Rhode
Island voters for ratification.137 One, a precursor to the modern Dream Act, would have
granted suffrage rights to naturalized citizens who had been honorably discharged after
service in the war, on the same terms that native-born citizens already enjoyed.
Effectively, this would have eliminated the property qualification for immigrant
veterans.138 The  second  would   have  thrown  out   the  “registry  tax”  and  substituted  a  poll  
tax that all citizens would pay, native-born and naturalized alike, without exception for
enrollment in the militia. 139 These two together, had they been ratified, would have
eliminated suffrage discrimination against those naturalized citizens who had served in
the war. But both suffered defeat in the ratification voting. 140 Nevertheless, Rhode Island
stands as the only state that even attempted to enlarge the voting franchise in connection
with its effort to grant absent soldiers the right to vote away from home.
The only amendment that voters did ratify was one giving absentee voting rights
to already   qualified   electors   “in   the   actual   military   service   of   the   United   States.” 141
Standing alone as it did, this amendment left landless immigrant soldiers out of the
franchise, even if they were naturalized citizens who met the residency requirements.
While  it  granted  the  legislature  “full  power  to  provide  by  law  for  carrying  this  article  into  
effect,”   the   amendment   eliminated   the   urgency   for   such   legislation   by   describing   how  
137. An Act to Approve and Publish and Submit to the Electors a Certain Proposition of Amendment to
the Constitution of the State, ch. 529, 1864 R.I. Acts & Resolves 3.
138. Id. at § 1 (proposed Article V).
139. Id. (proposed Article VI).
140. Benton, Voting in the Field, 186. According to Benton, no record remains of the tally of the
popular votes for and against ratification of any of the three amendments.
141. An Act to Approve and Publish and Submit to the Electors, § 1.
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absentee   voting   would   occur   “until   such   provision   shall   be   made   by   law.” 142 This
description  was  far  less  detailed  than  any  state’s  military  suffrage  law,  but  more  detailed  
than  other  states’  constitutional  provisions  enabling  such  laws.  For  the  elections  in  1864,  
there was no military suffrage legislation in Rhode Island, and this constitutional
amendment   set   forth   the   only   rules   that   would   govern   that   state’s   soldier   voting   in   the  
war.
The  constitution  adopted  the  Minnesota  model,  with  absent  soldiers’  ballots  being  
forwarded from their military encampment to the Rhode Island Secretary of State. It
applied   to   electors   “in   the   actual   military   service   of   the   United   States,”   without   stated  
exceptions. This meant not only that draftees were included, but also that naval personnel
were.  So  were  regulars.  Given  the  constitution’s  longstanding  bar against letting regulars
gain their residence qualification on the strength of service in Rhode Island, this created a
potential anomaly. A Rhode Island elector serving, say, two years in Virginia as a
member of the regular army could qualify as an absentee voter under the 1864
amendment, while a different regular having served two years in Rhode Island would
remain unqualified for want of the required term of residency.
The soldier completed his ballot, writing his name and place of Rhode Island
residence   on   the   back,   then   delivered   it   to   the   “officer   commanding   the   regiment   or  
company  to  which  [the  elector]  belongs.”  This  formulation  implies  an  exclusion  of  navy  
personnel, since sailors did not serve in regiments or companies. It might similarly have
excluded  artillerymen,  who  served  in  battalions.  The  commanding  officer  then  “certified”  

142. Id.

339

that the ballot had indeed been given to him by the man whose name appeared on it.
Finally, he forwarded the completed ballots to the Rhode Island Secretary of State, who
compared the names on the ballots with voter lists provided to him by all the clerks of the
state’s  towns  and  cities. 143
The potential for fraud abounded in this barebones arrangements. There was no
requirement that the commanding officer (who need not have been a Rhode Islander
elector himself) had to give this certification under oath. And the constitutional provision
said nothing at all about the form the certification should take. The constitutional
amendment included no requirement for the soldier to swear to his own identity and
qualifications. It assigned no commissioners to help explain the law to the soldiers or
their commanding officers, or carry the ballots back to the state. Presumably, the
legislature would have fleshed out all these details in a full-fledged soldier-voting law,
but  without  that  legislation,  these  gaps  riddled  Rhode  Island’s  soldier-voting  “system,”  as  
set forth only in the barebones constitutional amendment.
The soldier-voting   provision   of   Rhode   Island’s   constitution   survived the Civil
War, but the state enacted no soldier-voting legislation until the Spanish-American War,
in 1898. That law lifts the language from the constitution almost verbatim, without
elaboration and without filling in the gaps left in the constitutional language itself.144

143. Id.
144. R. I. GEN LAWS, tit. II, ch. 11, § 58 (1909).
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New York
New York got a soldier-voting law just in time for the 1864 election after an
earlier   effort   ran   afoul   of   the   governor’s   veto   pen.   The   governor,   Horatio   Seymour,  
rejected a soldier-voting bill in 1863 notwithstanding the attorney  general’s  opinion  that  
it was constitutional, and he stated his reasons why. This debate, with the governor
holding the trump card of veto power, provided an executive branch equivalent of a
judicial  majority  striking  down  a  law  over  a  minority’s  dissent. Clarity about the nature
of the legal dislocation emerges from the veto message and its counterpoint in the
attorney  general’s  opinion.
Governor Seymour, a Democrat, won his office in 1862 as part of the nationwide
Democratic resurgence. The following year, he vetoed a bill that would have given
absent soldiers the right to vote on the Minnesota model. His veto message gave two
reasons.  First,  Seymour  said,  the  bill  violated  the  constitution’s  suffrage  provision,  which  
entitled each eligible elector to  vote  “in  the  election  district  of  which  he  shall  at  the  time  
[of   the   election]   be   a   resident,   and   not   elsewhere….”145 Seymour’s   view   on   that   score  
contradicted  the  opinion  of  the  state’s  attorney  general,  Daniel  Dickinson,  a  pro-Lincoln
war Democrat. Dickinson had defended the bill in response to a request from the state
senate   for   his   view.      Aware   of   Seymour’s   misgivings   about   the   risk   of   fraud   in   soldier  
voting, Dickinson opined that it was constitutionally irrelevant that the proposed law
“may  be  inconvenient,  cumbrous,  and  liable  to   fraud  and  abuse.”  All  that  mattered  was  
whether the constitution expressly forbad absentee voting, which Dickinson said it did

145. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 1.
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not.   Just   because   the   constitution   required   the   elector   to   “offer   his   vote”   in   his   home  
district, Dickinson  wrote,  didn’t  mean  that  he  had  to  do  so  in  person.  The  legislature  was  
free  to  “prescribe  the  form  for  depositing  votes”  so  as  to  avoid  allowing  soldiers  to  “be  
disfranchised”  by  their  unavoidable  absence,  according  to  the  Attorney  General.146
Seymour   completely   ignored   Dickinson’s   argument.   In   fact,   he   very   nearly  
ignored the constitutional issue altogether. The constitutional violation was so clear,
Seymour   wrote,   that   it   was   “needless   to   dwell   upon   that   objection   to   the   bill.”147 Far
from dwelling on the constitutional issue, Seymour devoted only one sentence to it,
quickly  moving  on  to  his  second,  and  apparently  larger,  objection.  The  bill  “is  in  conflict  
with   the   vital   principles   of   electoral   purity   and   independence,”   Seymour   asserted   after  
rattling off all the ways that the absentee balloting called for in the bill was subject to
fraud   and   military   interference.   He   cited   a   treatise   proclaiming   that   elections   “must   be  
superintended  by  election  judges  and  officers,  independent  of  the  Executive,”  a condition
obviously missing when absent soldiers vote.148
The Lincoln administration had already shown its propensity for abusing soldier
suffrage, as far as Seymour was concerned. As proof, he quoted from a published order
from the Secretary of War cashiering   a   New   Hampshire   lieutenant   “for   circulating  

146. The senate had asked Dickinson whether the constitution meant that the voter must cast his ballot
“with  his  own  hand.”  In  what  reads today almost as a parody of strict construction, Dickinson answered no,
and as proof he observed that a qualified voter who had lost both his hands to injury could nevertheless
vote,  even  though  obviously  not  “by  his  own  hand.”  New York Times, April 17, 1863.
147.  “Governor  Seymour’s  Veto  of  the  Soldiers’  Voting  Bill,”  New  York  Times, April 26, 1863.
148. Id. The treatise was Francis Lieber, On Civil Liberty and Self-Government, ed. Theodore D.
Woolsey, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Company, 1874), 179. Lieber was a prominent political
scientist and historian at Columbia University. He enjoyed stature, among other things, for having edited
the Encyclopedia Americana in 1833. During the Civil War, he authored the Lieber Code, laying out legal
guidelines for the Union army. Roger K. Newman, ed., Yale Dictionary of American Legal Biography
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 335.
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Copperhead   tickets”   before   an   election. 149 The administration demonstrably sought to
block  soldiers’  access  to  Democratic  political  views,  Seymour  charged,  and  without  that  
access, the right to vote meant nothing.  “It  would  be  worse  than  a  mockery  to  allow  those  
secluded in camps or upon ships to vote if they are not permitted to receive letters or
papers from their friends [or if they] have not the same freedom in reading public
journals”  as  the  voters  back  home, Seymour wrote.150
Seymour’s  burden  in   justifying  an  executive  veto  was  different   from   the   burden  
judges bore when striking down a law as unconstitutional. The executive need not frame
his objections in constitutional terms. George Woodward attached constitutional
significance  to  the  high  risk  of  fraud  in  soldier  voting  under  Pennsylvania’s  prewar  law,  
as  did  Rufus  Ranney  with  respect  to  Ohio’s  1863  law.    Seymour  might  have  done  so  as  
well, but instead he pointed to the fraud risk as a prudential problem. Yes, the bill was
unconstitutional, he said, irrespective of the fraud risk. And yes, fraud prevention was a
“vital   principle”   that   the   bill   violated,   a   view   that   inched   Seymour   close   to   the  
Woodward/Ranney position that the high risk of fraud carried constitutional weight.
Seymour   did   not   quite   get   there,   as   one   can   imagine   that   a   “Justice   Seymour”   would  
have,  because  he  didn’t  need  to.  It  was  enough  for  him  that  the  bill  would  be  bad  law  if  

149. New York Times, April 26, 1863. The dismissed soldier was Andrew J. Edgerly of the Fourth New
Hampshire Volunteers, whose offense was campaigning for the Democratic candidate for Congress while
on furlough. Long after the event, Edgerly won exoneration from a congressional committee. (49th
Congress, Second Session, House of Representatives, Report No. 3756, January 26, 1887.) Throughout the
1864   election   season,   Democratic   newspapers   used   Edgerly’s   case   as   an   example   of   the   Lincoln  
administration’s  propensity  for  abusing  soldier  voting.
150.  “The  Soldiers  and  the  Right  of  Suffrage  – Message  of  Gov.  Seymour,”  New York Times, April 16,
1863. Seymour directed this message to the state senate before their vote on the bill, signaling his intention
to veto the bill if it passed.
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enacted. It would be bad law, Seymour said, because it would invite fraud and because
the Lincoln administration could not be trusted to implement it evenhandedly.
The  legislature  tried  unsuccessfully  to  override  Seymour’s  veto,  then  launched  a  
successful  effort,  with  the  governor’s  support,  to  amend  the  constitution. The amendment
was ratified in time for passage in 1864 of a new soldier-voting bill, which Seymour
signed.151 The new law, while constitutional by virtue of the constitutional amendment,
contained   all   the   other   infirmities   that   prompted   Seymour’s   veto   in   1863. That he
nevertheless signed it is testament to the greater political potency of the soldier-voting
issue by 1864.
Like the vetoed 1863 bill, the 1864 law instituted absentee voting on the
Minnesota model, though without commissioners to assist implementation. The law
applied  “in  time  of  war,”  not  expressly  limited  to  the  instant  war.    It  covered  servicemen  
in the army and navy, without exclusion of regulars or draftees, and it applied to all
general and special elections held in New York.152
Voting operated through a proxy system. The serviceman first authorized a
qualified voter in his hometown to cast his ballot for him. The authorization was a written
document signed by the serviceman and a witness, and sworn to before an officer, all of
who signed the document.153 The soldier then sealed that document, together with his
folded ballots, in an envelope. On the outside of the envelope was a printed affidavit by
which the serviceman swore to his age, citizenship, and residence, and stated that he had
151. An Act to Enable the Qualified Electors of this State, Absent therefrom in the Military Service of
the United States, in the Army or Navy thereof, to Vote, ch. 253, 1864 N.Y. Laws 549 (hereafter cited as
“New  York  Soldier-Voting  Law  of  1864”).
152. Id. at § 1.
153. Id. at § 2.
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not wagered on the election. The affidavit also identified his military unit and its
approximate location.154
Next the serviceman put this sealed envelope inside a second envelope, also
sealed.  He  marked  this  outer  envelope  “soldier’s  vote”  and  mailed  it  to  his proxy.155 The
proxy, after signing a receipt for the mailing at the post office, opened the outside
envelope. He delivered the unopened inside envelope to the inspectors of election at the
polling place on Election Day. If the envelope was not sealed when delivered to the
inspectors,  they  had  to  reject  it.  If  it  was  sealed,  they  compared  the  serviceman’s  name  on  
the  outside  of  the  envelope  to  the  voting  list.  If  the  serviceman’s  name  appeared  on  the  
list, they opened the envelope and deposited the still-folded ballots in the ballot boxes at
the polling place, comingling them with civilian ballots.156
If   the   serviceman’s   name   did   not   appear   on   the   voter   lists,   the   inspectors   could  
still  accept   the  ballots   if  “a  householder  of  the  district”  submitted  an  affidavit swearing
that the absent serviceman was a resident of the voting district. 157 This provision allowed
voting by men who turned twenty-one while in the service to cast ballots in their
hometown districts.
The law required the Secretary State to provide all the forms and envelopes called
for  in  this  voting  process,  “in  sufficient  quantity”  to  furnish  one  of  each  to  every  eligible  
New York serviceman.158 Among  the  law’s  penalty  provisions  was  imprisonment  for  up  
to a year, plus a fine of up to $1000, for any officer who influenced or tried to influence
154. Id. at § 3.
155. Id.at § 4.
156. Id.at §§ 5, 7.
157. Id. at § 5.
158. Id. at § 12.
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the  serviceman’s  voting  “by  menace,  bribery,  fear  of  punishment,  hope  of  reward,  or  any  
other  corrupt  or  arbitrary  measure  or  resort  whatever….”159
The  Civil  War’s  most  celebrated  instances  of  actual  fraud  in  soldier voting arose
out of voting under the New York Law. In two separate cases, federal authorities arrested
agents stationed (one in Baltimore, another in Washington) to receive and forward soldier
ballots from the Army of the Potomac. In one case the defendant, Moses, an appointee of
Governor Seymour (himself a candidate for reelection), confessed to forging the names
and ballots of soldiers, some of them dead. He was convicted and served a prison term.
The other case resulted in acquittal. Republicans pounced on both cases as proof of
endemic Democratic cheating. Reminding readers that Seymour had used his veto to
tailor the New York law to his liking, Republicans charged that he had designed the law
to facilitate exactly the kind of cheating that occurred.      After   summarizing   the   law’s  
complicated   procedures   and   claiming   that   it’s   complexity   “opens   the   widest   door   to  
fraud,”  the  pro-Lincoln New York Times, in an editorial just five days before the election,
pinned   the   responsibility   on   Seymour.      “The   Union men in the New York Legislature
passed the bill because they could not get a better [one], as it was openly declared that
Gov. Seymour would veto any bill unless it accorded in all respects with his own
views.”160 A few days later, directing its scorn at Seymour, the Times asked its readers
rhetorically,   “What   security   have   honest   men   under   an   administration   [i.e.,   Seymour’s]  
elected by forging the votes of dead soldiers, swindling the living of their suffrage, and

159. Id. at § 13.
160. New York Times, November 3, 1864.

346

importing Butternuts from Canada and Missouri to carry the elections by force and
fraud?”161
Democratic papers defensively claimed that Republicans had trumped up the
charges in New York and coerced the confession. They went so far as to assert that
federal agents intercepted the shipped ballots in order to substitute phony Lincoln ballots
for   genuine   McClellan   votes.      “Of   course   they   have   been   seized   by   Lincoln’s   agents,”  
wrote the Cincinnati Daily Enquirer in a tone suggesting that only the naïve could expect
otherwise.    “Lincoln  ballots  will  be put in the place of McClellan ballots, and the soldiers
will   be   cheated   of   their   votes.”162 But Republicans had the better of the debate on the
New York soldier vote. To the extent that fraud and cheating by the military had become
a centerpiece of the Democrats’  campaign,  the  New  York  case  severely  weakened  their  
argument as well as their prospects in November.
In late April 1865, well after Appomattox, New York amended it soldier-voting
law, adopting the Iowa model.163 No soldier voting occurred under this revised law. The
following year, the state repealed its law permitting absent soldiers to vote.164

161. New York Times, November 8, 1864.
162. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, November 3, 1864. The Detroit Free Press published several stories to
the same effect. See, for example, November 1, 2,and 6, 1864.
163. An Act to Provide the Manner in which and the Time and Places at which the Electors of this State,
Absent therefrom in the Actual Military Service of the United States, may Vote, and for a Canvass and
Return of their Votes, ch. 570, 1865 N.Y. 1151.
164.  An  Act  to  Repeal  an  Act  Entitled  “An  Act  to  Provide  the  Manner  in  which  and  the  Time  and  Place  
at which the Electors of this State, Absent therefrom in the Actual Military Service of the United States,
may Vote, and for a Canvass and Return of their Votes,”  Passed  April  Twenty-Fourth, Eighteen Hundred
and Sixty Five, ch. 524, 1866 N.Y. Laws 1132.
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Kentucky
Kentucky’s   experience   with   soldier   voting   was   unique   in   two   ways.   First,   to  
conform  to  its  constitution,  it  required  elections  “in  the  field”  to  be held by voice vote of
the soldiers. (Missouri permitted soldiers to vote either by voice or by ballot. All other
states required ballots.) Second, it was the only state that gave a majority of its soldier
votes to George McClellan in the 1864 presidential election.
Kentucky’s   1850   constitution   slammed   the   door   tightly   shut   against   absentee  
voting.   It’s   suffrage   provision,   after   stating   that   a   voter   needed   60   days   of   residence   in  
“the  precinct  in  which  he  offers  to  vote,”  added  this  unambiguous  requirement:  “and  he  
shall   vote   in   said   precinct,   and   not   elsewhere.” 165 Kentucky therefore fell back to a
military suffrage law limited to voting for electors of the U.S. president and vicepresident, relying on the independent authority the federal constitution gave states to
appoint   their   federal   electors   “in   such   manner   as   the   legislature   [of   the   state]   may  
direct.”166 Kentucky enacted its limited military suffrage law in February 1864, making
it  applicable  only  to  that  year’s  election.167
Kentucky followed the Iowa model of opening voting sites at the places where
Kentucky  servicemen  were  stationed.  The  act   covered  “all  qualified  voters  of  this  State  
who   shall   be   in   the   actual   military   service   of   the   United   States.”168 By these terms, the
law covered both draftees and regulars. While there was no express exclusion of sailors

165. KY. CONST. of 1850, art. II, § 8.
166. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
167. An Act Regulating the Manner of Soldiers Voting for Electors of President and Vice President of
the United States, within and without this States (sic), ch. 572, § 1, 1864 Ky. Acts 122, 122 (hereafter cited
as  “Kentucky  Soldier-Voting  Law  of  1864”).  
168. Id. at § 1.
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in the navy, the act implied such an exclusion, as a practical matter, by directing the
opening of election sites where army and artillery servicemen, but not sailors, were
stationed:  “posts,  camps, or places where the regiment, or battery of artillery, or part of a
regiment,  not  less  than  one  company,  under  a  separate  command….”169
Voting   was   by   regiment,   when   “practicable,”   and   otherwise   by   company.  
Regimental and staff officers could vote at any of  the  regiment’s  companies  that  opened  a  
voting site. Whether the voting site was at the regiment or the company, the three ranking
officers at the site served as election judges, with the highest-ranking officer among them
designated   as   “chairman   of   the   board   of   judges.” 170 There was no requirement that
election judges had to be qualified Kentucky voters, but they did have to swear an oath
that   they   would   “support   the   constitution   of   the   United   States,   and   of   the   State   of  
Kentucky.”   The   oaths   also   included   the promise, common to most such laws, that the
judges  would  “earnestly  endeavor  to  prevent  all  fraud,  deceit,  or  abuse.”171
Kentucky’s  law  makes  no  mention  of  ballots;;  the  soldier  voting  was  by  viva voce.
Kentucky’s  constitution  called  for  such  voice  voting  “in   all  elections  by  the  people.”172
By  requiring  that  soldier  voting  be  conducted,  “as  far  as  practicable”  consistently  with  the  
provisions   of   Kentucky’s   election   laws,   the   military   suffrage   act   incorporated   this  
requirement of voice voting.173 (This requirement also effectively ruled out the option of
implementing absentee voting using the Minnesota model, in which written ballots were
forwarded to election precincts back home. With viva voce voting, that mode of voting
169. Id.
170. Id. at § 3.
171. Id. at § 5.
172. KY. CONST. of 1850, art. VIII, § 15.
173. Kentucky Soldier-Voting Law of 1864, § 2.
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was by definition impossible.) Election   clerks   recorded   soldiers’   names   and   their  
Kentucky  residences,  as  well  as  their  voting  decisions,  on  poll  lists  as  they  “offered”  their  
votes.174
Each  election  judge  had  the  “duty,”  and  each  voter  the  “privilege,”  of  challenging  
a vote when he knew or had  “any  reason  to  suspect”  a  soldier  was  unqualified.  When  a  
challenge occurred, the judges interrogated the soldier about the challenged element of
his  qualification,  using  detailed  inquiries  set  forth  in  Kentucky’s  general  election  law. 175
(The Secretary of State supplied the commanding officer of each company with copies of
the relevant portions of the general election law for this purpose, as well as blank poll
lists and copies of the soldier-voting law itself.176)
When the polls closed, the election judges tallied the results on the poll lists,
which they and the clerks then signed and forwarded to the governor, secretary of state,
and attorney general. This was not necessarily the final word on the outcome, however.
The board of examiners back in Kentucky, upon   receiving   the   returns,   could   “correct”  
them,  or  reject  them  “in  whole  or  in  part,”  as  they  “shall  deem  just.”177 They based this
assessment   of   justice   on   written   “certificates”   provided   by   the   election   judges.   These  
were written statement in which the judges  had  to  “certify  whether  or  not  the  election  was  
free,  and  the  voters  permitted  to   vote  without  illegal   constraint,  or  force.”   If  the  judges  

174. Id. at § 9.
175. Id. at § 7.
176. Id. at § 13.
177. Id. at § 10.
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perceived  any  improper  “influence  or  constraint,”  they  had  to  “state  the  facts  fully  in  the  
certificate.”178
Whether  that  authority  to  “correct”  the  returns  influenced  the  outcome  of  voting  
for   Kentucky’s   electors   is   unclear,   but   Kentucky   is   the   only   state   whose   soldiers   are  
recorded as having preferred McClellan to Lincoln, 2823 to 1194.179
Kentucky repealed its military suffrage law in 1866, an arguably redundant
exercise, since by its terms the soldier-voting law applied only to the election of 1864.180

Maryland
Like Rhode Island, Kentucky, and nine other states, Maryland faced a time crunch
for implementing soldier voting. Military suffrage legislation depended on first building a
constitutional  foundation,  but  there  wasn’t  time  for  that  before  the  1864  elections.    The  
bootstrap solution, as in Rhode Island, was to incorporate soldier-voting mechanisms into
the proposed constitution itself, such that soldiers could cast absentee ballots in the 1864
elections at the same time they voted to ratify the constitutional authority for such voting,
all without the need for any action by the legislature.
Maryland’s   prewar   constitution clearly barred absentee voting. It said that a
qualified   elector   “shall   be   entitled   to   vote   in   the   ward   or   election   district   in   which   he  
resides.”181 That unambiguous language meant that military suffrage would depend on

178. Id.
179. Benton, Voting in the Field, 107.
180.  An  Act  to  Repeal  an  Act,  entitled  “An  Act  Regulating  the  Manner  of  Soldiers  Voting  for  Electors  
for President and Vice President of the United States within and without this State, ch. 370, 1866 Ky. Acts
25.
181. MD. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 1.
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changing the constitution. In 1864, a constitutional convention drafted, and submitted for
public ratification, new suffrage provisions deleting the restrictive wording of the existing
constitution   and   authorizing   the   legislature   to   “provide   by   law   for   taking   the   votes   of  
soldiers   in   the   army   of   the   United   States   serving   in   the   field.” 182 In recognition that
ratification would not happen in time for the legislature to act on military suffrage before
November,   the   convention’s   proposal   included   an   ingenious   shortcut.   In   an   article  
entitled   “Schedule,”   it   permitted   absent   soldiers   to   participate   both   in   the   ratification  
process and, while they were at it, in the elections for state and federal offices. 183 That
way, soldier-voting   legislation   was   unnecessary   for   1864’s   elections,   assuming the
constitutional changes were ratified. Absent soldiers could cast ballots in the annual
election at the same time they voted on the underlying question of whether the
constitution should permit absentee voting at all.
The ratification vote was tight, with the votes of absent soldiers providing the
very slim margin of victory.

184

The soldier-voting provisions of the proposed

amendments were not the only source of controversy. Probably the bigger sticking points
grew   out   of   changes   meant   to   block   “disloyal”   voting.      The   1864   constitutional  
convention addressed the problem with two proposals. The first would disqualify from
voting  anyone  who  had  given  “aid,  comfort,  countenance  or  support  to  those  engaged  in  
armed  hostility  to  the  United  States,”  or  who  had  declared  his  “desire  for  the  triumph  of  
said  enemies  over  the  arms  of  the  United  states.”185 The second required all voters to give
182. MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, §§ 1, 2.
183. MD. CONST. of  1864,  art.  XII  (“Schedule”),  §  11.
184. Benton, Voting in the Field, 246.
185. MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 4.

352

a  lengthy  loyalty  oath,  which  included  the  promise,  “I  have  never  expressed  a  desire  for  
the triumph of said enemies over the  arms  of  the  United  States,”  and  “I  will  in  all  respects  
demean   myself   as   a   loyal   citizen   of   the   United   States.” 186 These provisions generated
more political heat than did the soldier-voting provisions and probably accounted for the
closeness of the ratification vote.
The  absentee  balloting  provisions  in   the  “Schedule”  adopted  a  sparse  version   of  
the  Iowa  model.  It  covered  all  qualified  voters  “absent  by  reason  of  being  in  the  military  
service   of   the   United   States.” 187 There was no exclusion for draftees or regulars. The
description of the polling sites implicitly excluded navy personnel, as so many military
suffrage  laws  did;;  polls  were  to  open  “in  each  Company  of  every  Maryland  regiment.”188
Soldiers   stationed   more   than   ten   miles   from   their   own   company’s   headquarters, or
quartered  in  a  hospital,  could  vote  at  any  company’s  polling  site.189
Commissioned officers of the company were designated as election judges, with
no maximum number of judges and a minimum of just one. There was no requirement
that the election judges be qualified Maryland voters. If there were no officers present,
the voters at the site would elect two of their own to act as judges. There was no
provision for election clerks or for commissioners to assist with the voting. The judges
swore an oath   to   follow   the   law   and   to   “prevent   fraud.”190 The provisions very briefly
described  the  ballot  to  be  used  in  the  ratification  vote  (stating  either  “for  the  Constitution”  

186. MD. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 4.
187. MD. CONST. of 1864, art. XII, § 12.
188. MD. CONST. of 1864, art XII, § 11.
189. MD. CONST. of 1864, art. XII, § 12.
190. MD. CONST. of 1864, art XII, § 11.
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or  “against  the  Constitution”),  but  said  nothing  at  all  about  the  ballot  to  be  used  in voting
for state and federal offices.191
Election  judges  could,  in  their  discretion,  require  a  prospective  voter  to  swear  “to  
his  being  a  legal  voter  of  this  State,”  but  that  was  the  extent  of  the  guidance  for  judges.  
The Schedule was silent about the handling of voting challenges. The judges recorded the
names  of  the  voting  soldiers  in  a  “poll  book”  and  watched  over  the  ballot  boxes.  After  the  
polls  closed,  the  ballots  were  counted  and  “strung  on  a  thread.”192 The judges forwarded
the returns, showing totals for and against the new constitution, to the governor, along
with the threaded ballots. The Schedule said nothing about the form of the returns of the
voting for state and federal offices, but these too were to be forwarded to the governor.193
The governor had   authority   to   “judge   of   the   genuineness   and   correctness   of   the  
returns,   and   may   recount   the   threaded   tickets”   before   aggregating   the   soldier   vote   with  
the civilian results.194 According to Benton, the governor indeed exercised that authority,
throwing out 290 soldier votes on the constitution, 285 of them favoring ratification. It
was not enough to change the outcome. 195 It is not clear whether he took any similar
action in reviewing the results from the field in the voting for state and federal offices.
We know from Benton, however, that such voting did occur. He cites a telegraph
message Lincoln wrote to an acquaintance in Baltimore claiming, based on what
Generals Meade and Grant had reported to him, that Maryland soldiers in the Army of the
Potomac had supported Republicans in the November elections, 1294 to 134. The pro191. MD. CONST. of 1864, art XII, § 11.
192. MD. CONST. of 1864, art XII, § 13.
193. MD. CONST. of 1864, art XII, § 13.
194. MD. CONST. of 1864, art XII, § 14.
195. Benton, Voting in the Field, 249.
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Lincoln  soldier  ballots  contributed  modestly  to  Lincoln’s  victory  margin  of  nearly  7500  
in the overall vote in Maryland. 196
On March 23, 1865, the legislature acted on its new constitutional authority by
enacting a soldier-voting law on the Iowa model. It was the last such law enacted, and it
was never used.197 The narrowly approved constitution of 1864 had a very short lifespan.
A new constitution replaced it in 1867. It deleted the 1864 soldier-voting provisions and
restored  the  prewar  suffrage  rules,  once  again  entitling  each  elector  “to  vote  in  the  ward  
or  election  district  in  which  he  resides.”198

JUNIOR STATES
Iowa*, Wisconsin, Minnesota*, Ohio*, West Virginia, Michigan, Kansas,
Maine, California, Missouri, Nevada, and Illinois

These twelve states were organized after 1800, remained in the Union, and
enacted soldier-voting laws during the Civil War. (*Ohio is discussed in Chapter 1. Iowa
and Minnesota are discussed earlier in this appendix  under  the  heading  “Model  States.”)  
Compared to the experience of their senior, generally more easterly counterparts, the laws
in these junior states fared better constitutionally. Three of the five statutes that faced
high court challenges were upheld as constitutional, compared to zero for four in the
senior group. Only two out of the Union’s   fourteen   post-1800 states never enacted a
196. Id. at 247.
197. An Act to Enable the Qualified Voters of this State, in the Military Service of the United States or
this State to Exercise the Right of Suffrage, and to add the following Sections providing therefor to the
Thirty-Fifth Article of the Code of Public General Laws, ch. 124, 1865 Md. Laws 187.
198. MD. CONST. of 1867, art I, § 1.
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soldier-voting law at all (Indiana and Oregon) compared to three out of the Union’s  
eleven pre-1800 states (Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Delaware). And four of the
country’s   five   soldier-voting laws that endured well past the Civil War are from this
younger group.

Wisconsin
The Badger State enacted its version of a military suffrage law two weeks after
Iowa acted, on September 26, 1862.199 It followed the Iowa model. As with most states
adopting   that   model,   the   law   stated   that   its   elections   “shall   be   conducted   so   far   as  
practical, and not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, in the manner prescribed by
the general  election  laws  of  this  state.”200
The  Wisconsin  law  excluded  “any  person  in  the  regular  or  standing  army  of  the  
United States, nor any person in any regiment, battery, or company organized and
officered  out  of  this  state.”201 By implication, the law also excluded Wisconsin men in the
Navy; the only election sites the law authorized were at places where eligible Wisconsin
soldiers  served  in  a  “regiment  or  battery  of  artillery,”  which  sailors  never  did.202 There
was no express exclusion of draftees in the text of the statute, although the title of the law
referred  to  enabling  “militia  and  volunteers”  to  vote  in  the  field,  suggesting  that  draftees  

199. An Act to Enable the Militia and Volunteers of this State, when in the Military Service of the
United States or of this State, to Exercise the Right of Suffrage, ch. 11, 1862 (extra Session) Wis. Laws 17
(hereafter  cited  as  “Wisconsin  Soldier-Voting  Law  of  1862”).
200. Id. at § 2.
201. Id. at § 1.
202. Id.
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were ineligible. Indeed, in describing the law, the state Supreme Court treated it as
applying only to volunteers.203
Elections  in  the  field  were  to  be  held  by  company.  The  company’s  three  highestranking officers served as election inspectors, with the highest ranking among the three
serving  as  “chairman  of  the  board  of  inspectors.”  The  law  did  not  specify  that  clerks or
inspectors had to be qualified Wisconsin electors, although it did require each to swear to
“support  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  state  of  Wisconsin.”  Regimental  
officers  and  staff  could  vote  at  any  company’s  election  site.204
Wisconsin’s   law   made   no   provision   for   commissioners   to   assist   with  
implementing the statute. The inspectors ran the election and had several responsibilities:
They appointed clerks to help receive and tally ballots; they administered oaths to
themselves and to  the  clerks  (as  in  Iowa,  swearing  “to  studiously  endeavor  to  prevent  all  
fraud,   deceit   or   abuse   in   conducting”   the   election);;   they   examined   (“canvassed”)   the  
ballots,  making  sure  that  the  soldier’s  home  county  was  shown  at  the  top  of  each  ballot;;  
they challenged   any   voter   they   knew   or   had   “any   reason   to   know   or   suspect”   was  
ineligible,  then  they  questioned  the  challenged  voter  under  oath  about  “his  residence  and  
qualifications   as   an   elector,”   asking   the   same   specific   questions   relating   to   age   and  
residence that the general election law specified for civilian elections; they certified the
accuracy of the poll lists prepared by the clerks showing the names and home towns of
each voter; they tallied the voting results, county by county; and finally they forwarded

203. Chandler, 16 Wis. 398. In its opinion upholding the constitutionality of the law, the state supreme
court  described  the  law  as  applying  to  “volunteer  soldiers.”  Id. at 411.
204. Wisconsin Soldier-Voting Law of 1862, §§ 2, 3, 4, 5.
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the tallies, together with the poll lists, to the Wisconsin Secretary of State for inclusion
with the in-state voting results.205
The law purported to impose severe penalties on soldiers caught voting
fraudulently. Enforceable or not, the penalty language was indeed tough: six months to a
year   in   prison   for   ineligible   voting,   and   one   to   two   years   in   prison   “at   hard   labor”   for  
voting in more than one election.206
The contested result of an 1862 election for a county sheriff led in 1863 to a state
Supreme Court   review   of   the   statute’s   constitutionality.   Justice   Byron   Paine,   a   radical  
Republican, authored the opinion upholding the law. 207 The challenger relied on two
provisions  of  the  state  constitution.  One  (Article  VIII,  section  5)  provided  that  “no  person  
shall  vote  for  county  officers  out  of  the  county  in  which  he  resides.”  This,  according  to  
Paine, meant only that a voter could not vote for officers of a county other than his own
county of residence. 208 Second,   the   challenger   relied   on   the   constitution’s   requirement
that  criminal  offenses  be  tried  in  the  county  or  district  “in  which  the  offense  shall  have  
been   committed.”   (Article   I,   section   7)      This,   the   challenger   asserted,   rendered  
unconstitutional   the   legislature’s   effort   to   punish   voting   fraud   committed by soldiers
outside of Wisconsin. Justice Paine turned away that argument, too, ruling that this
constitutional provision applied only to crimes committed in Wisconsin and that the
205. Id. at §§ 7, 8.
206. Id. at § 17.
207. Chandler, 16 Wis. at 433. As an attorney before the war, Paine had defended an abolitionist
accused of impeding enforcement of the fugitive slave act. See biographical information complied by the
Wisconsin  Court  System.  “Byron  Paine,”  Wisconsin  Court  System,  accessed  May  19,  2014.  
http://www.wicourts.gov/courts/supreme/justices/retired/paine.htm. The enforcement episode that drew
Paine into his role is described in H. Robert Baker, The Rescue of Joshua Glover: A Fugitive Slave, the
Constitution, and the Coming of the Civil War (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 2006).
208. Chandler, 16 Wis. at 439-441.

358

legislature was free to criminalize acts Wisconsin citizens might commit outside the state.
He cited treason as an example of such a crime.209
According to the leading scholar of the Wisconsin law, the state legislature tried
to  tip  the  scales  of  justice  to  influence  the  court’s  decision.  The  device  for  doing  so  was  
an amendment to the soldier-voting law to permit soldier voting in elections for state
judges. 210 The intention, according to historian Frank Klement, was to pressure the
justices to favor soldier voting so as not to antagonize soldiers whose votes they needed
for their own elections. 211 Klement   argues   that   the   legislature’s   gambit   succeeded   in  
influencing the outcome of the court case.
The   year  after  the  court’s  ruling,  Wisconsin  amended  its  military  suffrage  act  to  
address an issue the legislature could not have anticipated in 1862. Starting in 1863, to
meet ever more demanding draft quotas, communities sometimes offered financial
bounties  to  entice  men  from  other  (usually  poorer)  communities  to  sign  up.  The  “bounty  
men”   who   accepted   were   counted   toward   the   draft   quota   of the community paying the
bounty and not the community where they lived. For voting purposes, did this affect the
residence  of  the  soldier  receiving  the  bounty?  No,  the  legislature  decided.  “[E]very  such  
soldier shall be deemed to be a resident of the town, ward or city in which he had a legal
residence  at  the  time  of  volunteering.”212

209. Id. at 444-445.
210.    An  Act  to  Amend  Chapter  11  of  the  General  Law  of  the  Extra  Session  of  1862,  entitled  “An  Act  to  
Enable the Militia and Volunteers of this State, when in the Military Service of the United States or of this
State, to Exercise the Right of  Suffrage,”  ch.  59,  1863  Wis.  Laws  77.
211.  Klement,  “The  Soldier  Vote  in  Wisconsin  During  the  Civil  War.”
212. An Act to Define the Residencies of Certain Soldiers from this State, in the Military Service of the
United States, ch. 471, §1, 1864 Wis. Laws 526, 526.
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Wisconsin omitted soldier-voting provisions from its revised election law in
1871.213

West Virginia
West Virginia came into existence during, and because of, the Civil War. But
unlike newcomer Nevada, which approached suffrage on a tabula rasa compared to older
states, West Virginia carried some of the legal and constitutional baggage of its much
older and estranged parent, Virginia. In setting suffrage qualifications, the new   state’s  
1863  constitution  tracked  Virginia’s  constitution  of  1851.     In  addition  to  being  a  white,  
male, twenty-one year old citizen, a qualified voter needed residence in the state (one
year for West Virginia, two years for Virginia) plus a briefer period (thirty days for West
Virginia,   one   year   for   Virginia)   in   the   locality   “in   which”   (West   Virginia)   or   “where”  
(Virginia)  “he  offers  to  vote.”214
If  absentee  voting  were  foremost  in  the  thinking  of  the  new  state’s  framers,  they  
might have chosen more propitious  wording.  Constitutionally  linking  an  elector’s  “offer”  
to vote with his local residence had proved fatal to the military suffrage law in
Pennsylvania;;  that  state’s  high  court  had  construed  the  wording  to  mean  that  a  voter  had  
to cast his ballot in person   in   his   place   of   residence.   (Michigan’s   court   would   rule   the  
same  way,  but  not  until  January  1865.)  But  West  Virginia’s  legislators  darted  right  past  
that  constitutional  obstacle  and  enacted  soldier  voting  in  the  state’s  very  first  legislative  
session, almost before the ink on the new constitution was dry.
213. Of Elections Other Than for Town Officers, WIS. STAT. tit. II, chs. 7, 8, p.207, et seq. (1871).
214. W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. III, § 1; VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1.
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Uniquely among the states enacting military suffrage laws during the war, West
Virginia incorporated soldier-voting provisions into its comprehensive election law.215
Adopting the theory that a soldier “offers”  his  vote  in  the  place  of  his  residence  as  long  as  
his ballot ends up in a ballot box there, no matter where the soldier physically makes out
his ballot, West Virginia adopted the Minnesota model. The statute applied to any
qualified  voter  “who  is necessarily absent [from his election district] on the day of any
election,   in   the   service   of   the   United   States   or   of   this   State….” 216 That covered
servicemen of all sorts: army, navy, conscripts, enlistees, regulars, surgeons, chaplains,
and musicians. And it  expressly  applied  to  “any” election, which meant that state, local,
and federal elections all fell within its scope.
The soldier-voting provision was extraordinarily brief. In a single section of a
long statute (65 sections in all), it required only that the soldier fill out his ballot, seal it in
an  envelope,  and  sign  the  envelope  “in  his  own  proper  hand,”  adding  a  description  of  his  
military   unit.      If   he   couldn’t   sign,   then   his   commanding   officer   attested   to   his   “mark.”  
The soldier then sent the envelope  (“by  mail  or  otherwise”)  to  the  election  supervisor  and  
two inspectors in his election district back home, or to any one of them. The supervisor
and  inspectors  accepted  the  ballot  if  they  were  “satisfied  that  the  signature  is  genuine  and  
the person is  entitled  to  vote.”217
The law added what was the law in many states – that no soldier could gain a
residence on the strength of being stationed in the state, and that no qualified elector

215. An Act to Regulate Elections by the People, ch. 100, § 26, 1863 W. Va. Acts 114, 119-120.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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could lose his residence by his absence during military service. 218 Each local assessor had
to  include  absent  soldiers  on  lists  of  qualified  electors  “so  far  as  he  is  able  to  ascertain  n  
the  same.”219 Election supervisors and inspectors who accepted a soldier ballot knowing
it was ineligible were subject to a financial penalty (not less than $30 or more than
$100). 220 But the statute made no provision for notifying absent soldiers about the
opportunity to vote, or for commissioners to assist soldiers with the voting, or for copies
of the law to be distributed to military units.
West   Virginia’s   military   suffrage   law   did   not   long   outlast   the   war.      It   was  
eliminated   from   the   state’s   election   law   by   the   time   of   the   first   post-war statutory
codification, in 1870.221

Michigan
Michigan patterned its military suffrage law, enacted on February 5, 1864, on
Iowa’s   law.   Voting   under   the   law   occurred   at   election   sites   created   “at   every   place,  
whether within or without the State, where a regiment, battalion, battery or company of
Michigan   soldiers   may   be   found   or   stationed.” 222 Because naval organization did not
include   these   designations,   this   statutory   formulation,   like   Iowa’s,   effectively   excluded  
sailors in the navy. All other servicemen were covered; there was no exclusion for

218. Id. at § 27.
219. Id. at § 52.
220. Id. at § 60.
221. Elections by the People for State, District, County, and Township Officers, W. VA. CODE, Ch. III
(1870).
222. An Act to Enable the Qualified Electors of this State, in the Military Service, to Vote at Certain
Elections, and to Amend Sections Forty-Five and Sixty-One, of chapter six, of the compiled laws, No. 21, §
7,  1864  (extra  session)  Mich.  Pub.  Acts  40,41  (hereafter  cited  as  “Michigan  Soldier-Voting  Law  of  1864”).
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draftees or soldiers in the regular army. As in Iowa, eligible soldiers specifically included
surgeons and chaplains.223
Michigan’s  law  included  language  that  had  become  boilerplate  in  many  statutes,  
optimistically  providing  that  the  general  election  law  was  to  apply  to  soldier  voting  “so  
far as applicable, and not qualified  by  the  provisions  of  this  act.”224 The law purported to
allow  soldiers  to  vote  “in  all  the  elections  authorized  by  law.”225 But its administrative
provisions effectively left out elections for township and ward officials, since nothing in
the law called for communicating returns to either townships or wards. As the Michigan
Supreme  Court  observed  in  reviewing  the  law’s  constitutionality,  this  meant  that  the  law  
could not, and did not, apply to township or ward elections. 226 But it did cover elections
for federal, state, county, and district offices.227 This included elections for presidential
and vice-presidential electors.
Polling sites were to be opened for each company of Michigan troops. If it was
“not   practicable   for   all   [members   of   the   company]   to   vote   together,”   as   when   part   of   a  
regiment   or   company   was   on   “detached   service,”   then   the   detached   unit   could   open   its  
own polling site.228 The eligible soldiers at each site elected three election inspectors,
who in turn appointed election clerks. Election inspectors need not be officers; the only
qualification was that each inspector (though not necessarily the clerks) had to be an

223. Id. at § 2.
224. Id. at § 5.
225. Id. at § 1.
226. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 171.
227. Michigan Soldier-Voting Law of 1864, § 1.
228. Id. at § 8.
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eligible Michigan voter.229 That meant, first, that he had to be at least 21 years old, a U.S.
citizen   (or   a   foreigner   who   “has   declared   his   intention”   to   become   a   U.S.   citizen),   or   a  
“civilized”   Native   Americans   who   did   not   belong   to   a   tribe.   Second,   he   had   to   have  
resided  six  months  in  Michigan  and  20  days  “in  the  township  or  ward  in  which  he  offers  
to  vote.”230
Inspectors and clerks swore oaths, as their counterparts did back home. As with
oaths in most states, the Michigan soldiers serving as inspectors and clerks promised
among   other   things   to   “studiously   endeavor   to   prevent   fraud,   deceit   and   abuse”   in   the  
election.231 As in Iowa, the law provided for commissioners to travel from Michigan with
necessary election paraphernalia: copies of the law, forms of poll lists and returns, and
the text of oaths to administer to judges, clerks, and challenged voters. Commissioners
also carried the election returns back home to Michigan.232
The governor appointed the commissioners, assigning one for each division
containing at least one Michigan regiment. 233

Commissioners had to be eligible

Michigan voters and had to swear an oath that included the promise to perform their
responsibilities   “without   reference   to   political   preferences.”   Like   election   judges   and  
clerks,  they  had  to  swear  to  “studiously  endeavor  to  prevent  fraud,  deceit  and  abuse.”234
The statute specified that each ballot had to show the  soldier’s  home  county  and  
town or city. The ballot had to be on a single piece of paper, though it could cover a long

229. Id.
230. MICH. CONST. of 1851, art. VII, § 1.
231. Michigan Soldier-Voting Law of 1864, § 10.
232. Id. at §§11, 24.
233. Id. at § 29.
234. Id.
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list of offices. The offices to be chosen, and the preferred candidates names, could be
printed in advance on the ballot or written by hand by the voter.235
Soldiers announced themselves to the inspectors and clerks, by name, county of
residence, and military attachment. The clerks entered all this information in the poll
books.236 If no one challenged the voter, the soldier placed his ballot in the ballot box.237
If there was a challenge, the judges administered one or more of five different oaths to
the soldier testing all elements of eligibility – U.S. citizenship, state and township
residency, and age. The statute stated the exact wording of each oath.238
At the close of voting, the inspectors tallied the votes and the clerks doublechecked the tally.239 The final results were entered on the return form, and the returns,
together with the poll books and ballots, were given to a commissioner (or placed in the
mail  “or  other  safe  mode”)  for  delivery  to  the  Michigan  Secretary  of  State.240 The results
of the soldier voting were added to the civilian results to determine election winners.
By  its  terms,  Michigan’s  statute  was  to  remain  in  force  only  “during the present
war,  and  no  longer….”241 As events unfolded, however, the law died slightly earlier than
that.   In   late   January   1865,   as   the   Confederacy   took   its   last   gasps,   but   before   the   war’s  
conclusion,   Michigan’s   Supreme   Court   struck   down   the   law   as   unconstitutional. 242
Washtenaw county canvassers had excluded the soldier vote in the 1864 election for

235. Id. at § 14.
236. Id. at § 15.
237. Id. at § 16.
238. Id.
239. Id. at §§ 18, 22.
240. Id. at §§ 24, 25.
241. Id. at § 38.
242. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 127.
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county prosecutor, finding that the soldier-voting law was unconstitutional. That decision
cost candidate Daniel Twitchell the job he would have won if the votes of absent soldiers
had  counted.  He  appealed.  The  case  ended  up  at  Michigan’s  high  court,  which  ruled  that  
the  canvassers  were  correct  to  exclude  the  soldiers’  ballots.  The  prosecuting  attorney  post  
that Twitchell had sought went instead to Amos Blodgett, who had the higher number of
votes cast within the county.
At  issue  was  the  1850  constitution’s  provision  that  “no  citizen  or  inhabitant  shall  
be an elector, or entitled to vote at any election, unless he has resided in the township or
ward in which   he   offers   to   vote,   ten   days   next   preceding   the   election.” 243 Twitchell’s  
counsel,  state  Attorney  General  Albert  Williams,  contended  that  a  vote  is  “offered”  in  the  
township if the township ultimately receives it. The provision of the constitution, he
urged, pertained only to the qualifications of the voter – he had to be a resident of the
township where his vote is received – and not to where the elector cast his ballot.

In

speaking only of who qualified to vote, not where he had to vote, the constitution left the
legislature free to establish voting sites for qualified electors outside the Michigan
township, and outside the state entirely.
When the bill had been under consideration in 1863, Williams had opined to the
state senate that the bill was indeed constitutional. It was inconceivable, Williams had
written   then   in   response   to   the   senate’s   request   for   his   opinion,   that   the   framers   could  
have   intended   to   force   absent   soldiers   into   the   Hobson’s   choice   of   either   losing   their  
opportunity  to  vote  or,  “at the risk of the national or State existence, [finding a way] to

243. MICH. CONST. of 1851, art. VII, § 1.
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come  home  to  vote.”  If  they  had  had  any  inkling  that  the  constitution  might  be  construed  
to   achieve   such   “palpable   injustice,”   he   argued,   neither   the   convention   nor   the   people  
would have adopted it. Likening the objectionable interpretation to a snake, he asked
rhetorically,  “Would  [the  framers]  have  aided  in  warming  such  a  viper  into  life  and  vigor,  
to  turn  and  bite  them?”244
By a 3-1 vote, the justices disagreed with Williams, concluding that an elector
met the constitutional requirement only by personally casting his ballot in the township
where he resides. Each of the three justices reaching this conclusion issued a separate
opinion. Justice James Valentine Campbell compared the 1851 constitution’s  language  to  
the corresponding provision of the 1835 constitution. The earlier version entitled an
elector   to   cast   his   ballot   only   in   the   “district,   county,   or   township   in   which   he   shall  
actually  reside….”245 Justice Campbell focused on the conjunction  “or.”  It  gave  the  voter  
the choice of voting anywhere in the county, including polling sites far from his own
township. This invited voting fraud, since no one at the polling site might be in a position
to challenge the credentials of the stranger arriving there to vote from some faraway
corner of the county. The constitution was amended in 1839 to tighten the voting
requirement,  now  insisting  that  the  voter  cast  his  ballot  in  his  own  “township  or  ward.”  
The 1851 constitution preserved that requirement, Justice Campbell concluded, and did
indeed prescribe the where of voting, not just the qualifications of who could vote. He
explained   the   framer’s   intent   in   requiring   that   voters   be   personally   present   in   their  
township or ward when they cast their ballots:
244. 1863 Mich. Senate Journal 424, 426.
245. MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1.
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If the voter is required to present himself personally at his own place of abode, his
neighbors will know his person, and will be likely to know his qualifications. If he
can vote elsewhere, and have his vote transmitted or counted in the township, he
may or may not be known personally to those who are where he is found, but they
are by no means likely to know his actual residence, nor, if he violates the law,
can his crime be as readily identified or proven. That other means of protection
may be devised is possible; but the test by neighboring eyewitnesses has always
been the favorite resort of the law, and it is the best.246
Justice Isaac Christiancy, who had helped organize the Republican Party in 1854
before joining the court, reached the same conclusion, but for somewhat different
reasons.  Relying  on  history,  he  concluded  that  the  term  “offers  his  vote”  in  a  township  or  
ward,  as  the  1850  framers  must  have  understood  the  term,  meant  “personal  presentation  
of the vote at that place to the inspectors or officers  presiding  at  such  election.”  This  had  
been  the  “uniform  mode  in  all  the  American  states  from  their  first  organization,”  with  the  
single  exception  of  Pennsylvania’s  1813  law,  which  Christiancy  brushed  aside,  observing  
that Michigan had certainly known no other mode in her history.247
Justice   Thomas   Cooley   issued   the   third   opinion   that   Michigan’s   1864   law   was  
unconstitutional.   He   agreed   with   Campbell’s   reasoning   that,   given   the   historical  
background of the 1851 constitution, there was no ambiguity in the term  “offers  his  vote”  
in   the   township   or   ward   where   the   elector   resided.   It   required   the   voter’s   personal  
presence in the township. But Cooley added an insight born of a particularly tight
reading   of   the   statute’s   text.   Twitchell   must   lose,   Cooley   wrote, even if his argument
were  correct  about  the  meaning  of  the  constitution’s  requirement  that  an  elector  “offer  his  
vote”   in   his   township   or   ward.   According   to   Twitchell’s   counsel,   an   elector   met   this  

246. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 144.
247. Id. at 155.
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requirement as long as his vote was ultimately received in the township or ward, even if
he  cast  the  ballot  elsewhere.  But,  as  Cooley  observed,  Michigan’s  military  suffrage  law  
made no provision for returning soldier voting results or ballots to townships or wards,
only to counties and districts. An absent soldier  could  not  be  said  to  “offer  his  vote”  in  a  
township or ward that, by this law, never received it. Whether through drafting oversight
or otherwise, the law did not apply to township or ward elections.248
Campbell, Christiancy, and Cooley, three of the four Michigan Supreme Courts
justice  who  would  soon  become  known  as  the  “Big  Four”  for  their  national  renown,  all  
agreed on the bottom line – the 1864 law was constitutional – even if they could not
agree on a single opinion stating why.249 Opposing them in this case was Chief Justice
George Martin. Like the three justices in the majority, Martin was a Republican. But his
dissenting opinion, the final opinion in the final case on Civil War soldier-voting laws,
echoed the first, the trial court opinion in the Pennsylvania case of Chase v. Miller by
Democrat John Conyngham. Like Conyngham, Martin believed that striking down the
soldier-voting   law   amounted   to   “disfranchising”   soldiers   and   intruded   on   legislative  
prerogatives.   Absent   “a   direct collision between [a statute]   and   the   constitution,”   the  
court’s   duty   was   to   defer   to   “legislative   discretion,”   wrote   Martin. 250 By   “direct”  
collision, Martin meant an express and unambiguous prohibition in the constitution
against the legislative action; implied prohibitions did  not  suffice.  “I  cannot  put  my  finger  

248. Id. at 170.
249.  The  fourth  of  the  “Big  Four”  was  Justice  Benjamin  Graves,  who  did  not  participate  in  the  case.  For  
more  on  the  Big  Four,  see  also,  “History  Overview,”  Michigan  Supreme  Court Historical Society, accessed
January
17,
2014,
http://www.micourthistory.org/history-overview/
http://www.micourthistory.org/history-overview/ (accessed January 17, 2014).
250. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 175, 177.

369

upon any word or clause of the constitution from which I can conclude that they [i.e., the
people  of  Michigan]  have  surrendered  [their]  will”  on  the  subject  of  setting  the  place  for  
voting. 251 To the contrary, he read the constitution as leaving it to the legislature to
determine where voting could occur. It mattered not at all to Martin that the framers
could   not   have   contemplated   absentee   voting.   The   “impressions   and   intention”   of   the  
framers,  considered  apart  from  “the  language  of  the  instrument,”  counted  for  nothing.252
Courts should not superimpose past understandings of the meanings of words of the
constitution.   “The   constitution   was   framed   for   the   very   purpose   of   adaptation   to   the  
progress   of   the   times,”   Martin   wrote, sounding very much like modern proponents of
“living  constitutionalism.”253
Remarkably, all three justices who voted to strike down the statute were
Republicans. 254 They certainly understood the party passions surrounding the issue.
Justice Christiancy lamented  the  law’s  “unfortunate  connection  with  the  party  politics  of  
the   day.”   Indeed,   the   statute   was   bitterly   contested   and   enacted   along   party   line   votes,  
with Republicans favoring passage and Democrats opposed. 255 On the other hand,
perhaps party loyalties over the issue spilled over to the bench but tugged at the justices
less forcefully in January 1865, when they ruled, than might have been the case in mid-

251. Id. at 185.
252. Id. at 181.
253. Id. at 179.
254. Regarding Campbell, see C.A. Kent, James Vincent Campbell, 5 MICH. L. REV. 161, 164 (1907);
regarding   Christiancy,   see   “Isaac   Peckham   Christiancy,”   Biographical   Directory   of   the   United   States  
Congress, accessed June 10, 2013, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000379 ; for
Cooley, see the website of the University of Michigan Law School, where he taught for many years, even
while on the Michigan high court:  “Thomas  Cooley,”  University  of  Michigan  Law,  accessed  June  10,  2013,  
www.law.umich.edu/historyandtraditions/faculty/Faculty_Lists/Alpha_Faculty/Pages/Cooley_ThomasM.as
px .
255. Twitchell, 13 Mich. at 148; Benton, Voting in the Field, at 93-97.
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1864. Michigan Republicans had already enjoyed the benefits of the law in the 1864
elections, and the justices might have supposed that the war would end – and the statute
with it – long before the next election.
After the war, in 1866, Michigan amended its constitution to authorize the
legislature,  during  wartime,  to  “provide  the  manner  in  which,  and the time and place at
which”   absent   servicemen   could   vote.   That   provision   was   incorporated   in   the   state’s  
revised  constitution  in  1908,  but  was  subsumed  in  the  1963  constitution’s  more  general  
grant of legislative authority for all classes of absent voters, not just soldiers.256

Kansas
Kansas was the youngest state in the union at the outbreak of the Civil
War, having been admitted in January 1861. The new state granted suffrage rights to 21year   old   white   men   who   met   the   constitution’s   residency   requirements and were either
U.S. citizens  or  had  “declared  their  intention  to  become  citizens,  conformably  to  the  laws  
of  the  United  States  on  the  subject  of  naturalization.”257 The state constitution articulated
residency requirements in words that elsewhere had proved fatal to absentee voting laws
for soldiers. But those same words proved not to be an insuperable problem in Kansas.
As   with   both   Pennsylvania   and   Michigan,   Kansas’s   constitution   said   that   men  
wishing to vote had to reside for a specific durational period (for Kansas it was thirty

256. Benton, Voting in the Field, 103; MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. III, § 1; MICH. CONST. of 1963, art.
II, § 4.
257. KAN. CONST. of 1861, art. V, § 1. Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan similarly granted suffrage
rights to non-citizens with a demonstrable intent to become naturalized citizens.
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days)  “in  the  township  or  ward  in  which  [the  elector]  offers  to  vote….”258 The high court
in both the Keystone and Wolverine states struck down absentee voting laws for soldiers,
concluding that   one   could   “offer   to   vote”   in   a township or ward only by a physical
presence there when he cast his ballot. Both courts looked to the history of voting
practices  in  their  respective  states  for  a  sense  of  what  their  constitutions’  framers  meant  
when  they  used  the  verb  “offer”  (as  in  “offer  his  vote”)  in  provisions  governing  suffrage.  
That history showed, in both Pennsylvania and Michigan (at least to the satisfaction of
their   high   courts)   that   “offering”   a   vote   meant   personally   presenting   a   ballot   in   the  
township, which ruled out absentee voting for soldiers or anyone else. The Kansas
constitution used the same verb, and a handful of opponents to military suffrage in the
Kansas legislature argued that it stood in the way of absentee voting as much in Kansas
as it had in her sister states. But the state attorney general disagreed, as did the vast
majority of Kansas legislators.259 And  after  enactment,  the  state’s  absentee  voting  law  for  
soldiers prompted no judicial intervention. Perhaps Kansas, unlike Pennsylvania and
Michigan, was too young to have developed long, pre-constitution election traditions that
imparted  fixed  meanings  to  undefined  words  like  “offer”  in  its  constitution.260
A   constitutional   hurdle   that   loomed   higher   than   the   requirement   to   “offer   his  
vote”  in  a  township  or  ward  was  a provision barring soldiers, seamen, and marines from
gaining residence by being stationed in Kansas. The provision added this prohibition in a
separate  clause:   “nor  shall  any  soldier,  seaman,  or  marine  have  the   right   to  vote.”    The  
258. KAN. CONST. of 1861, art. V, § 1.
259. Benton, Voting in the Field, 113-117.
260 . The ill-fated Lecompton   Constitution   also   used   the   verb   “offer”   in   stating   its   residency  
requirement:  A  prospective  voter  had  to  have  resided  three  months  “in  the  county,  city,  or  town  in  which  he  
may  offer  to  vote….”  KAN. CONST. of 1857, art. VIII, § 1(Lecompton).
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entire text of this provision  merits  a  close  look.     Here  is   the  full  sentence:   “No  soldier,  
seaman, or marine, in the army or navy of the United States, or their allies, shall be
deemed to have acquired a residence in the State in consequence of being stationed
within the same; nor  shall  any  soldier,  seaman  or  marine  have  the  right  to  vote.” 261
A reader encountering this 1859 text and looking for harmony with the text of a
1864 law allowing absent soldiers to vote, could conclude that the prohibition in the final
clause applied only to the those servicemen identified in the preceding clause: soldiers
and sailors in the regular army or navy of the United States and stationed in Kansas. Read
that way, which is how the state attorney general read it, the final clause stood not as a
flat prohibition of a military suffrage statute, but as a bar to voting by career servicemen
stationed in Kansas.262 Harmony could exist between that bar and a soldier-voting law
conferring  suffrage  rights  only  on  Kansas’s  militia  and  volunteers.  Kansas  passed exactly
such a soldier-voting law. Just to make sure, however, the legislature submitted a
constitutional amendment, which was ratified at the 1864 election, stating “the  legislature  
may make provision for taking the votes of electors who may be absent from their
townships or wards, in the volunteer military service of the United States, or the militia
service  of  this  state.”263
Kansas enacted its soldier-voting act in March 1864, after the legislature
recommended the constitutional amendment, but before it was ratified. Its constitutional
261. KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. V, § 3.
262. The attorney general, Republican Warren Guthrie, provided the state senate with a written opinion
stating   that   before   1861   (the   state   constitution   was   drafted   in   1859),   the   term   “soldier”   never   applied   to  
volunteers and militiamen,  but  only  to  “that  branch  of  the  national   military  service   known  as  ‘regulars.’”  
Kansas Senate Journal, 4th Cong., reg. sess., February 25, 1864, 413-414.
263. Joint Resolution, to Amend Section Three of Article Five of the Constitution of the State of
Kansas, ch. 45, 1864 Kan Sess. Laws 81.
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foundation, then, was the existing constitution, interpreted as presenting no obstacle. The
law followed the Iowa model, calling for opening election sites at the posts where
Kansas’s   soldiers   served.   It   covered   only   qualified   electors   “in   the   militia   or   volunteer  
military   service.” 264 This effectively excluded draftees and regulars. In calling for
election   sites   where   “regiments,   battalions,   companies   or   squads”   were   located,   the   act  
also left out any Kansans servicing in the navy.265 The act applied to all county, district,
state, and federal elections, but not to elections for township offices.266
Voting was by regiment, but the law allowed two regiments stationed together to
vote at a single site, as long as the combined regiments totaled no more than 12
companies. To assist the voting process, the state sent pre-printed poll books and tally
sheets,   delivered   by   “a   suitable   person”   whom   the   governor   appointed.   Unlike   the  
“commissioners”  sent  to  help  implement  absentee  voting  under several of the state laws,
this   “suitable   person”   apparently   had   no   duties   beyond   delivery   of   the   election  
paraphernalia.267
Kansas soldiers selected (by viva voce election) three judges and two clerks to
administer the voting process. The Kansas statute omitted any requirement that judges
and clerks be qualified Kansas voters. That created the possibility that non-Kansans, nonwhites, or soldiers younger than 21 could serve as election judges or clerks. Judges and
clerks swore an oath promising among other  things  not  to  accept  anyone’s  vote  without  

264.   An   Act   Supplemental   to   an   Act   Entitled   ‘An   Act   to   Regulate   Elections   and   to   Prescribe   the  
Qualifications  of  Electors,  and  to  Prevent  Illegal  Voting.’  Approved  June  3,  1861,  ch.  59,  §  1,  1864  Kan.  
Sess. Laws 101, 101 (Hereafter cited as Kansas Soldier-Voting Law of 1864).
265. Id. at § 2.
266. Id. at § 1.
267. Id. at § 3.
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first  being  “satisfied”  that  the  soldier  was  a  qualified  voter  “of  the  township  or  ward   of
which he   offers   his   vote.” 268 This   somewhat   clumsily   reframed   the   constitution’s  
requirement that an elector be a resident  of  the  township  or  ward  “in  which”  he  offers  his  
vote.
In assessing the qualifications of electors, the judges applied the standards of the
general election law, many of the provisions of which this soldier-voting law
incorporated by reference. The rule  for  testing  a  voter’s  residence,  for  example,  was  that  
“the   place   shall   be   considered   and   held   to   be   the   residence   of   a   person   in   which   his  
habitation is fixed, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of
returning.” 269 When someone challenged a soldier offering his vote, the judges
administered any of several oaths spelled out verbatim in the general election law.
Sometimes the statutory oath made no literal sense when applied outside of Kansas. Such
was the case in a challenge for lack of township or ward residency, for example. The
judges  asked  the  soldier,  “When  did  you  come  into  this  township  (or  ward)?”  Or,  “When  
you came into this township (or ward), did you come for a temporary purpose merely, or
for the purpose of making it your home?”270 An   oath’s   reference   to   “this   township”   or  
“this  ward”  hardly  fit  the  circumstances  of  soldiers  altogether  absent  from  Kansas.  This  
problem typified a breakdown in anti-fraud protections in soldier-voting laws generally.
Many, like the Kansas law, imported anti-fraud protections that may have worked well in

268. Id. at § 5. (Italics added.)
269. An Act to Regulate Elections and to Prescribe the Qualifications of Voters, and to Prevent Illegal
Voting, ch. 28, § 9, 1861 Kan. Sess. Laws (legisl. 1st session)133, 134. (The Kansas Soldier-Voting Law of
1864, in § 6, incorporated this provision by reference.)
270. An Act to regulate Elections and to prescribe the qualifications of Voters, and to prevent illegal
voting, ch. 28, § 9, 1861 Kan. Sess. Laws Statutes 133, 134.
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civilian   elections   back   home   but   that   offered   much   shakier   protections   “in   the   field,”  
where they barely made sense.
Even if a challenged voter swore to the required oaths, the judges could still reject
his   ballot   “if   they   shall   be   satisfied,   from   record,   evidence,   or   other   legal   testimony  
adduced  before  them,  that  he  is  not  a  legal  voter.”271 Unchallenged ballots, and those that
survived the gauntlet of oaths and investigation, were placed in a ballot box. Each was
marked   with   the   soldier’s   county,   township   (or   ward),   and   district.   The   name   of   the  
soldier  offering  the  vote,  each  of  whom  was  announced  “in  an  audible  voice”  by  a  judge  
before accepting the ballot, was entered in the poll books along with the identity of his
military attachment and his residence information.272
At the close of the voting, judges opened the ballot boxes and went through the
ballots, one by one, and reading out loud the choices appearing on each ticket. The clerks
recorded the results   on   the   tally   sheets   provided   by   the   governor’s   representative.   Poll  
books, tally sheets, and ballots were then bundled up and forwarded to the Kansas
Secretary of State in Topeka. The soldier vote was then made part of the overall voting
results.273
The Kansas soldier-voting law survived the Civil War and remained in effect until
at least 1947.274

271. Id. at § 13.
272. Kansas Soldier-Voting Law of 1864, § 7.
273. Id.at §§ 7-12.
274. Elections, KAN. STAT. ANN. Ch. 25, art. XII, §§ 25-1201 et. seq. (1947).
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Maine
Maine’s   prewar   constitution   posed   clear   obstacles   to   absentee   voting.   It   granted  
every twenty-one year old male, having three months residence in the state, voting rights
“in   the   town   or   plantation   where   his   residence   is   so   established.”275 Elections for both
legislative  branches  and  for  the  governorship  were  to  be  held  in   each  town  in  an  “open  
town  meeting”  where  local  leaders  (town  “selectmen”)  presided.276 Politicians favoring a
military suffrage law, mostly Republicans, saw the futility of pushing for a soldier-voting
bill  in  the  face  of  the  constitution’s  clear  insistence  on  the  voter’s  physical  presence  in  his  
town of residence on Election Day. They needed to amend the constitution.
Republican governor Abner Coburn urged the legislature to propose an
amendment   for   popular   ratification   in   1863,   but   that   effort   fizzled.   Coburn’s   successor  
Samuel Cony, also a Republican, was more persuasive the next year. In March 1864, at
Governor   Cony’s   urging,   the   legislature   passed   a   joint   resolution   recommending   a  
constitutional amendment allowing absent soldiers to vote.277 This came quite late in the
election year, and timing became a problem. Republicans wanted to implement soldier
voting in time for the general election in November, but the constitutional amendment
authorizing the needed legislation would not happen until very shortly before that, in
September.

Lawmakers could not wait for the people’s   verdict   on   the proposed

275. ME CONST. of 1820, art. II, § 1.
276. ME CONST. of 1820, art. IV, Part First, § 5 (for state house members); art. IV, Part Second, §. 3 (for
senators); and art. V, Part First, § 3 (for Governor).
277. Resolves Providing for an Amendment of the Constitution so as to Allow Soldiers Absent from the
State to Vote for Governor, Senators, Representatives and County Officers ch. 344, 1864 Me. Acts 334.
The legislative history of the constitutional amendment, and of the soldier-voting law it authorized, is
comprehensively described in Benton, Voting in the Field, 118, et seq.
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amendment if they wanted to have a soldier-voting system up and running for the
November elections.
The solution was a soldier-voting law that tackled the subject with a two-pronged
approach. 278 First, the law authorized soldier voting in purely federal elections – for
representatives to Congress and for electors of president and vice-president.279 For this,
Maine’s   lawmakers   had   the   benefit   of   the   pioneering   efforts   of   their   counterparts   in  
Vermont, guided by its Supreme Court. The Vermont justices had ruled that the state
legislature had plenary authority under the U.S. Constitution to regulate the time, place,
and manner of voting for these federal offices, regardless of what the state constitution
said about elections for state and local offices.    New  Hampshire’s  high  court  had  agreed.  
Both states implemented soldier voting only for federal elections. Maine lawmakers
could be reasonably confident that by copying this approach, the first prong of their
statute would similarly survive any constitutional scrutiny it might receive.
The   statute’s   second   prong   was   to   permit   the   same   absent   soldiers   at   the   same  
time   to   vote   in   the   election   for   Maine’s   governor   and   state   legislature,   contingent   on  
ratification of the state constitution in September.280 As it happened, the contingent event
occurred with ratification of the amendment in September. It was a characteristically
partisan affair, with yes votes predominating in Republican towns and no votes in

278. An Act Authorizing Soldiers Absent from the State in the Military Service to Vote for Electors of
President and Vice President, and for Representatives to Congress; also Regulating the Manner of Electing
Registers of Deeds, County Treasurers and County Commissioners, so that such Soldiers may be Allowed
to  Vote  therefor,  ch.  278,  1864  Me.  Acts  209  (hereafter  cited  as  “Maine’s  Soldier-Voting  Law  of  1864.”)
279. Id.at § 1 (for electors of president and vice president), and § 9 (for representatives to congress).
280. Id. at § 10. Absent soldiers were not, however, voters in the constitutional ratification process.
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Democratic towns.281 Notwithstanding partisan divisions, however, the amendment was
ratified,  so  Maine’s  absent  soldiers  were  able  to   vote  in  1864’s  November  elections  for  
federal,   state,   and   local   offices.   The   law   provided   that   each   voting   soldier   “shall   be  
considered as voting in the city, town, plantation and representative district where he
resided  when  he  entered”  his  military  service.282
Maine’s   law   followed   the   Iowa   model   of   setting   up   election   sites   at   locations  
where Maine servicemen served in the war. The constitutional amendment excluded
soldiers  “in  the  regular  army  of  the  United  States,”  and  so  did  the  statute.283 There was no
exclusion  for  draftees.  As  with  so  many  other  such  laws,  Maine’s  described  the  locations  
for erecting voting sites in terms that effectively excluded sailors in the navy. Elections
sites  were  to  be  opened  where  Maine  “soldiers”  served  in  a  “regiment,  battalion,  battery,  
company,   or   detachment   of   not   less   than   twenty”   men. 284 No provision was made to
accommodate detached units smaller than twenty men, but general and staff officers were
allowed to vote at any of the election sites, as were surgeons and chaplains.285
The three ranking officers of the military unit where an election site was opened
served   as   election   “supervisors,”   who   presided   over   the   voting.   Like   Wisconsin’s   law,  
Maine’s  law  had  no  requirement  that  the  supervisor  himself  be  a  qualified  Maine  elector.  
Theoretically, non-Maine officers could preside as supervisors of voting by Maine
soldiers, although lawmakers may have believed that they had protected against this risk
with  the  law’s  requirement  that  election  supervisors  swear  “to  support  the  constitution  of  
281 Benton, Voting in the Field, 121.
282 Maine’s  Soldier-Voting Law of 1864, § 9.
283 Id. at § 1.
284 Id. at § 2.
285 Id. at §§ 2, 3.
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the  United  states  and  of  this  state.”286 The law was also unusual in making no allowance
for clerks to assist the supervisors. Supervisors had to keep the poll lists of soldiers who
voted and prepare the returns, without clerical assistance. Less uniquely, Maine appointed
no commissioners to help implement the law. Supervisors, in other words, were on their
own in managing the election sites, although the law called for Maine’s  secretary  of  State  
to supply them with blank poll lists and forms for preparing returns.287
The  soldier’s  county  and  town  of  residence  had  to  appear  on  his  ballot,  as  was  the  
case in all such laws.288 Before  accepting  the  ballot,   the  supervisors  “must   be  satisfied”  
that  the  soldier’s  age  and  citizenship  qualified  him  to  vote  and  that  his  residence  was  in  
the location identified on his ballot. 289 If a supervisor or anyone else challenged a
soldier’s  eligibility,  it  was  the  job  of  the  supervisor  to  interrogate the soldier, under oath,
and take evidence from the challenger. The law did not include the text of oaths or
interrogatories the supervisor should administer to test the various categories of
eligibility.290 Final  say  on  the  voter’s  eligibility  rested  with the supervisors.
The supervisors forwarded the poll lists and returns (but, unlike most other states,
not the ballots) to the Secretary of State in Maine, where the results from the field were
incorporated with the civilian vote in final election outcomes.291

286. Id. at § 2.
287. Id. at § 17.
288. Id. at § 4.
289. Id.
290. Id. at § 5.
291. Id. at § 6.

380

Maine election law preserved the right of absent soldiers to vote through World
War II. In 1944, the state extended absentee voting rights more generally to citizens away
from their homes on Election Day.292

California
California enacted three soldier-voting laws, the first in 1863 then two more in
1864. All three were virtually identical in their basic structure – applying the Iowa model
of opening election sites in locations where California soldiers served – and in most of
their wording. The first applied by its terms only to elections held in a single year,
1863.293 The following year, that statute having lapsed by its terms, the state filled the
void with two new laws. One applied to elections of members of the state legislature,
representatives to Congress, and electors for President and Vice President, beginning
with the elections in 1864 and then continuing with elections for those offices "every year
thereafter during the continuance of our National War."294 The other, enacted three days
later, applied to elections for statewide executive officers, judges, and county officers

292. Elections, ME. REV. STAT. tit. I, ch. 8, §§ 83, 84, (1930); Absent Voting, ME. REV. STAT. ch. 6,
(1944).
293. An Act in Addition to an Act Entitled an Act to Regulate Elections, approved March TwentyThird, Eighteen Hundred and Fifty, and all Acts Amendatory thereof and Supplemental thereto, ch. 355, §
4, 1863 Cal. Stat. 549, 550 (hereafter cited as "California Soldier-Voting Law of 1863").
294. An Act to Provide for the Support of the Privilege of Free Suffrage during the Continuance of the
War, ch. CCLXXII, § 1, 1864 Cal. Stat. 279, 279.
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beginning in 1865 and then "every year thereafter."295 All three military suffrage laws
were repealed in 1866, before the elections of that year.296
The laws covered all categories of qualified electors "in the military service of the
United States," with no exclusions of regulars or draftees. By requiring election sites to
open not only for service units of the army and artillery ("regiments," "batteries," and
"battalions"), but also for "squadrons," the laws extended absentee voting opportunities to
naval and cavalry personnel as well. Coverage extended even to musicians.297
To limit voting to qualified electors (21-year old white men meeting state and
local residency requirements), the laws relied heavily on an elaborate process of list
making. First, California's Adjutant General compiled a single list of all qualified electors
"in the military service," identifying for each the county of residence and the military unit
to which he was assigned. The Secretary of State then used this list to compile separate
lists for each regiment, battalion, squadron, and battery, adding for each serviceman on
the list his congressional, senatorial, and assembly district. These separate lists were then
sent to the commanding officers of each unit. Working from these lists, the officers in
turn created separate lists for each "detached unit" under his command and sent those
shorter lists to the appropriate commanders.298

295 . An Act Amendatory of and Supplemental to an Act Entitled an Act to Regulate Elections,
approved March Twenty-Third, Eighteen Hundred and Fifty, and all Acts Amendatory thereof and
Supplemental thereto, Approved April Twenty-fifth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty Three, ch. CCCLXXXIII,
§§ 1, 2, 1864 Cal Stat. 431, 432.
296. A Bill for an Act to Repeal Certain Acts Providing for Soldiers to Vote out of their Election
Districts during the Rebellion, ch. CCLI, § 1, 1866 Cal. Stat. 277, 277.
297. California Soldier-Voting Law of 1863, § 1. Section 1 of all three laws stated the coverage in the
same inclusive terms.
298. California Soldier-Voting Law of 1863, §§ 1, 2, 3. (Each of the three laws describes this listmaking process, in identical language, in sections 1, 2, and 3.)
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The three most senior officers present oversaw the actual balloting process. The
laws did not require that they be eligible California electors. They opened the polling
place (at 9:00 AM, "if practicable"), watched over the ballot boxes, and "received" the
ballots, checking the names of the soldiers casting ballots against the names on the list.
The laws made no provision for clerks or commissioners to help them or for copies of the
law to be forwarded to them. The laws were similarly silent about how they were to
handle challenges of a soldier's eligibility, or even about whether challenges could be
made at all. The laws enjoined the responsible officers to "exercise due care and diligence
to prevent any soldier voting by mistake for any officer except such as he is eligible to
vote for," and they had to swear to "discharge the duties of _______ of this election to the
best of your ability, so help you God." The blank line appears in the statutes' provision
about the oath, but the laws give no idea what the speaker was to say at that point in the
oath. They assign no title to the officers' election role (Election judge? Supervisor?),
leaving the officer to figure out for himself what word to utter in filling in the blank
space.299
The laws provided no penalty for soldiers who cheated in the voting process, but
did penalize misconduct by the supervising officers. If they neglected their duties, or tried
to influence a vote "by command, threats, or promises of any advantage or preferment,"
they faced forfeiture of two hundred dollars in a civil action (with half the proceeds going
to the state treasury) and criminal prosecution "for such offense."300 What if the offense
299. California Soldier-Voting Law of 1863, §§ 4, 5, 6. (Each of the three laws assigned the officers'
these roles in sections 4, 5, and 6.)
300. California Soldier-Voting Law of 1863, § 7. (Each of the three laws provided for these penalties in
section 7.)
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occurred outside of California? The laws tried to overcome that hurdle with a "deeming"
provision: the misconduct "shall be considered, taken, and held to have been committed
by such officer within the jurisdiction of this State...." As if conceding the difficulty of
making the deeming provision stick in court, the laws also called on the Governor to
forward evidence of the misconduct to the President, "with the most urgent solicitations
that the commission of such officer be revoked and his name stricken from the army
roll."301
This was not the only deeming provision in the California laws. Another applied
to the voting itself. The laws provided that the absent soldiers' votes "shall be considered,
taken, and held to have been given by them in the respective counties of which they are
residents.” 302 By the legal fiction created by this deeming provision, the legislature
undoubtedly hoped to finesse a potential constitutional impediment to absentee voting.
As   in   so   many   other   states,   the   problem   arose   from   the   wording   of   the   constitution’s  
residency   qualification   for   voting.   The   suffrage   provision   of   California’s   1849  
constitution conditioned suffrage on two residency requirements: six months in the state
and,   more   problematically,   thirty   days   in   the   “county   or   district   in   which   [the   voter]  
claims   his   vote….” 303 As elsewhere, the question boiled down to this: did the
constitution’s  articulation of the local residency requirement establish not only who could
vote, but also where the eligible voter must cast his ballot? In other words, in restricting
the franchise to  men  having  thirty  days  of  residence  in  a  given  “county  or  district,”  did  

301. Id.
302. Id. at § 4.
303. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 1.

384

the constitution also require that those men cast their votes only in person within that
county or district? If so, then absentee balloting was barred. If not, then the legislature
was free to permit voting elsewhere, including military encampments where California
servicemen were stationed.
If  California’s  legislators  calculated  that  they  could  overcome  a  constitutional  bar  
by statutorily deeming each absentee ballot, no matter where actually cast, to have been
cast   in   the   soldier’s   home   county   or   district, they calculated wrong. The legal fiction
worked  no  better  in  salvaging  California’s  law  than  a  similar  fiction  had  worked  to  save  
Connecticut’s.  In  October  1864,  the  California  Supreme  Court  struck  down  the  1863  law  
as unconstitutional, concluding that the   constitution’s   local   residency   requirement   did  
indeed fix the place where voting must occur, the deeming provision notwithstanding.
The court reached this conclusion based on reasoning that applied equally to the two laws
passed in 1864, so the ruling effectively   nullified   all   three   of   the   state’s   soldier-voting
laws.
The case was Bourland v. Hildreth. 304 It arose out of eight contested elections for
various county offices in Tuolumne County. The county board of supervisors counted the
absent-soldier votes cast under the 1863 soldier-voting law, giving election wins to the
eight defendants. On challenge by the eight plaintiffs, who would have won their
elections if soldier votes had been excluded, the lower court overturned that result,
agreeing with the plaintiffs that the constitution barred absentee voting. The cases were
consolidated on appeal to the state Supreme Court, which in a 3-2 vote affirmed the lower

304. Bourland, 26 Cal. 161.
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court’s  exclusion  of  the  soldier  votes.    Four  of  the  five  justices  wrote  opinions,  covering  
84 pages in the California reports.
Perhaps   the   easiest   question   the   court   faced   was   whether   the   statute’s   deeming  
provision transformed absentee voting into local voting by declaring as a legal fiction that
votes   cast   outside   the   soldier’s   home   county   would   nevertheless   “be   considered,   taken  
and held to have been given by them [i.e., the soldiers] in the respective counties of
which   they   are   residents.”305 The   court’s   majority   opinion   ridiculed   this   attempted   end  
run. If the legislature can deem an absentee vote to have been cast locally, it could just as
easily  deem  a  minor’s  vote  to  have  been  cast  by  an  adult,  or  an  alien’s  vote  to  have  been  
cast  by  a  citizen,  or  a  colored  man’s  vote  to  have  been  cast  by  a  white  man.  Not  only  did  
this   provision   “efface”   the   constitution, it actually backfired, serving as a legislative
admission that the constitution created the very limitation that the act attempted, by
creating a fiction, to circumvent.306
Justice Oscar Shafter, whose pre-court ties were to the abolitionist Liberty Party,
wrote   the   court’s   majority   opinion.   Shafter   indulged   a   lengthy   examination   of   the  
sentence  structure  and  syntax  of  the  constitution’s  Article  II,  section  1.  He  concluded  that  
the  phrase  “in  which  he  claims  his  vote,”  as  used  in  the  constitution’s  statement  of  a  30day county residency qualification, made no sense other than as an expression of the
framers’  intent  to  fix  the  location  of  voting  in  the  elector’s  home  county.  To  this  syntactic  
analysis, Justice Shafter added what he saw as the instruction   of   history.   Plaintiffs’  
counsel  had  argued  that  one  could  “claim”  his  vote in his home county if that was where
305. California Soldier-Voting Law of 1863, § 4.
306. Bourland, 16 Cal. at 201.

386

his vote ended up being counted, even if he physically cast his ballot elsewhere. Shafter
disagreed. To the framers of the 1849 constitution,  the  meaning  of  the  word  “vote”  was  
“imparted   by   traditions   that   became   historical”   and   by   “habits   of   thought   that   became  
chronic, and habits of action that became muscular almost, both in England and this
country,  ages  before  1849.”  Under  those  traditions and habits, a vote was the physical act
of casting a ballot (or giving a voice vote) in person, not just the result of that physical act
in  the  subsequent  tally.  When  they  used  the  phrase  “claim  his  vote”  in  the  county  in  the  
county  of  the  voter’s  residence,  the  constitution’s  framers  could  only  have  meant  that  the  
voter must physically cast his ballot in that county.307
In a concurring opinion, Justice Lorenzo Sawyer leaned even harder on the
lessons  of  history  in  lending  meaning  to  the  constitution’s  wording. Settlers from all over
the country had populated California by the time of statehood, and they brought with
them a universal understanding of what an election was, Sawyer reasoned. In all states,
the personal presence of the elector was required at the place established by law
for  receiving  votes….  The  very  idea  of  an  election  embraced  the  idea  of  a  place  
appointed  within  the  district  for  the  meeting  of  the  voters  …  and  the  presence  of  
the  elector  in  person  to  offer  or  claim  his  vote….  Men  had  no  other conception of
the process of voting, or of offering to vote, or of claiming their votes. This
conception and these ideas were necessarily in the minds of the men who framed
our constitution and the people when they adopted it.308
The two dissenting justices, Silas Sanderson (a Republican) and John Currey (an
anti-Lecompton Democrat and member of the Union Party) did not even try to dispute the
historical novelty of absentee voting, but they attached no dispositive constitutional
significance to that novelty. Instead, in separate opinions, Sanderson and Currey argued
307. Id. at 197.
308. Id. at 216.
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that  the  constitution’s  wording  created  no  indisputable  bar  to  absentee  voting;;  there  was  
at least some ambiguity in the language. For them the controlling principle was that,
absent a clear constitutional prohibition, the legislature should be free to work its will.
They  saw  no  clear  prohibition  against  absentee  voting  in  California’s  constitution.  
Sanderson,  the  court’s  Chief  Justice,  observed  that  if  the  framers  had  intended  to  
fix the location  of  balloting  in  the  elector’s  home  county  or  district,  they  could  have  said  
so in much clearer language than they chose. Other states had done so, the chief noted,
with wording available to the California framers to borrow if they had wanted the same
result.   New   York’s   constitution,   for   example,   entitled   each   elector   to   participate   in  
elections   “in   the   election   district   of   which   he   shall   at   the   time   be   a   resident,   and   not  
elsewhere.”  Kentucky’s  similarly  said  that  each  elector  “shall  vote  in  said   precinct, and
not   elsewhere.”  California’s  framers  could   have   chosen  similarly  direct   wording  if  they  
had  meant  to  fix  the  location  of  voting  in  the  elector’s  home  county  or  district.  Sanderson  
was unwilling to infer a clear intent about the where of voting from the prepositional
phrase  “in  which  he  claims  his  vote”  appearing  in  Article  II,  section  1.  Currey,  too,  found  
the   constitution’s   meaning   debatable   enough   to   sustain   the   legislation.   Only   when   the  
constitutional  bar  exists  “beyond  a  reasonable  doubt” may the court strike down a statute.
For Currey, there was too much doubt here.309
The majority agreed with the dissenters that legislation is presumptively
constitutional. Sounding very much like dissenter Currey, Justice Shafter said in his
majority opinion,   “In   a   doubtful   case   the   benefit   of   the   doubt   is   to   be   given   to   the  

309. Id. at 244.
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Legislature.” 310 They disagreed not about the presumption, but about the source of
evidence that might overcome the presumption. The dissenters in Bourland v. Hildreth,
like the majority   in   Ohio’s   Lehman v. McBride (upholding   that   state’s   soldier-voting
law), stood on respectable jurisprudential footing in confining their analysis to the
constitution’s   text   as   they   found   it   in   1864   and   wherein   they   found   no   indubitable  
prohibition against absentee voting laws. The majority in Bourland v. Hildreth, like the
dissent in Lehman v. McBride, adopted a different, and also respectable, interpretative
approach. They looked to history to ascertain the meaning framers probably attached to
the words they used in drafting constitutional text. Those jurists found, in that historically
derived meaning, an original intention that left no room for absentee voting legislation,
and they gave effect to that intention by voting to strike down soldier-voting laws.

Junior State Outliers
Missouri, Nevada, and Illinois
The soldier-voting arrangements in these three states stand as a subset of the
junior states because each comes freighted with problems of legitimacy (Missouri) or
relevance (Nevada and Illinois). Missouri made provision for voting by absent soldiers
earlier  than  any  other  state  (Pennsylvania’s  prewar  law  aside),  but  it  did  so  with  dubious  
legitimacy. Nevada became a state only days before the 1864 election and implemented
soldier voting through questionable jerry rigging. And Illinois enacted its soldier-voting
law in 1865, too late to matter politically.

310. Id. at 262.

389

Missouri
A system allowing absent soldiers to vote took hold in Missouri early in the war,
having been adopted before any other state had enacted soldier-voting legislation
(Pennsylvania’s   prewar   statute   excepted).   It   was   installed   neither   legislatively   nor   by  
constitutional amendment, as were the soldier-voting arrangements in all other states.
Those routes were unavailable in Missouri, where an intrastate civil war, within the
broader national Civil War, had resulted in 1861 in the collapse of civil government. So,
instead of legislation or constitutional amendment, Missouri created its soldier-voting
system by a so-called   “ordinance”   issued   by an essentially rump legislative body, the
remnants of a convention originally elected to consider whether the state should secede
from the union and join the Confederacy.
Early   in   1861,   even   before   Lincoln’s   inauguration   and   months   before   Sumter,  
Governor Claiborne Fox Jackson had called for a secession convention in hopes that
Missouri would join the seceding states of the south. Jackson had made a name for
himself leading the invasion of pro-slavery Missourians into Kansas in hopes of securing
a pro-slavery constitution for that incoming state. The Democratic-controlled legislature
authorized the formation of such a convention by popular vote, without anticipating that
the populace would choose predominantly pro-union delegates. The convention spurned
Jackson and the legislature by rejecting secession.
That did nothing to dampen   Jackson’s   enthusiasm   for   the   Southern cause.
Fearing that Jackson would allow a federal arsenal to fall into Confederate hands and take
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the state out of the Union notwithstanding the unionist sentiments of the convention,
Federal forces under Nathaniel Lyon moved against Jackson and the legislature in
Jefferson City. Jackson and the legislature fled, leaving the state without a functioning
government. The convention, which had adjourned after rejecting secession, reconvened,
named   a   new   governor,   and   set   itself   up   as   the   state’s   legislative   body.      Dubbed   the  
“Long   Convention,”   it   retained   governing   control   of   the   state   throughout   the   war,   all  
without constitutional authority.311 Its claim to sovereign authority, such as it was, rested
on a provision of  the  convention’s  enabling  statute,  passed  by  the  legislature  in  January.  
That   law   granted   the   convention   authority   “to   adopt   such   measures   for   vindicating   the  
sovereignty of the State, and the protection of its institutions, as shall appear to them to
be   demanded.”312 Whether the legislature intended by this language to delegate plenary
legislative authority to the convention is uncertain, and the constitutionality of such a
delegation, assuming it was intended, is also uncertain. This casts doubt on the legitimacy
of the convention to take quasi-legislative action.313

311. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 290-293.
312. An Act to Provide for Calling a State Convention, § 5, 1861 Mo. Laws 20, 21.
313. One proponent of legitimacy concedes that the law-making activities of the convention were
“extra-constitutional.”   Dennis   K.   Bowman,   Lincoln   and   Citizens’   Rights   in   Civil   War   Missouri   (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011), 113. Another likened the Missouri convention to American
revolutionary   conventions.   The   context   of   internal   strife   and   potential   revolution   “to   a   certain   extent  
justified  [the  Missouri  convention]  in  acting  outside  of  what  was  their  more  proper  field.”  [Roger  Sherman  
Hoar, Constitutional Conventions: Their Nature, Powers, and Limitations (Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1917), 430-431.] Taking the other side of the scholarly debate, William E. Parrish asserted that
the convention acted illegitimately in its quasi-legislative role. William E. Parrish, Turbulent Partnership:
Missouri and the Union, 1861-1865 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press), 42. The parallel to
revolutionary conventions is imperfect, according to one skeptical view, since the American revolutionary
conventions derived their authority from Congress, whereas the Missouri convention lacked any
congressional imprimatur. John A. Jameson, A Treatise on Constitutional Conventions: Their History,
Powers, and Modes of Proceeding (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1887), 54. Moreover, the
conventions of the former colonies functioned on behalf of a revolution, while in Missouri the convention
stood in resistance to a rebellion.
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In   the   convention’s   fourth   session,   in   June   1862,   it   enacted   an   “ordinance”   to  
allow absentee voting by soldiers.314 By its terms,  the  ordinance  lasted  only  “during  the  
present  war.”315 It covered only militia and volunteers, not regulars. This comported with
the   state’s   1820   constitution,   which   excluded   from   the   voting   franchise   every   “soldier,  
seaman, or mariner in the regular   army  or  navy   of  the   United  States.”316 As limited to
volunteers and militia, the ordinance also excluded draftees.
The ordinance adopted the Iowa model by calling for election sites to open in
locations where Missouri soldiers served. 317

The process called for voting by

“company,”   which   effectively   excluded   naval   personnel.   The   ordinance   provided   no  
direct support for creating the voting site, as for example by having officials in Missouri
send the field commanders necessary election paraphernalia such as poll books and ballot
boxes. To the contrary, it left the commanding officers entirely on their own, instructing
them  to  “cause  …  poll  books  to  be  made  out  for  each  company….”318 The process called
for separate poll books for each Missouri county where voting soldiers resided.319 This

314.  Missouri  Convention.  “An  ordinance  to  enable  citizens  of  this  state,  in  the  military  service  of  the  
United States or the State   of  Missouri,   to  vote,  June  12,  1862.”   Journal and proceedings of the Missouri
State Convention: Held at Jefferson City, June, 1862. St. Louis: G. Knapp & Co., 1862 (hereafter cited as
“Missouri  Ordinance.”)
315. Id. at § 1. In April 1865, the state adopted a new constitution. It included absentee voting rights for
qualified electors absent in the volunteer military service of the United States or the militia service of
Missouri. MO. CONST. of 1865, art. II, § XXI. The replacement constitution of 1875 included no such
provision.
316. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10.
317.   Enactment   of   the   Missouri   ordinance   predated   enactment   of   Iowa’s   law   by   three   months,   so  
absentee-voting   laws   of   this   type,   including   Iowa’s,   arguably   adopted   the   “Missouri   model.”   Iowa,
however, was the first state to legislate an absentee-voting system in the Civil War through the mechanism
of an elected legislative body of indubitable legitimacy.
318. Missouri Ordinance, §§ 1, 2.
319. Id. at § 5.

392

could have created daunting logistical challenges for company commanders, depending
on  how  many  of  the  state’s  113  counties  were  represented  among  his  cohort  of  troops.320
The   company’s   commanding   officer   appointed   “three   good,   discreet and
disinterested  persons”  as  election  judges.  Each  had  to  be  a  qualified  Missouri  voter  and  
had   to   swear   an   oath   to   “impartially   discharge   the   duties   of   judge.”   The   judges   in   turn  
appointed two clerks. 321 Uniquely among all absentee voting systems, the Missouri
ordinance allowed soldier voting by voice or written ballot. (Kentucky required voice
vote, pursuant to its constitution. All other states provided for voting by written ballot.
See discussion of Kentucky, infra.)
The ordinance required all voters to take an oath of loyalty. 322 In addition, it
authorized  the  election  judges  “to  administer  oaths  and  to  test  the  qualifications  of  voters,  
and   to   prevent   frauds.” 323 But   it   provided   no   guidance   on   how   to   test   a   voter’s  
qualifications or what oath to administer.   Unlike   legislation   in   many   states,   Missouri’s  
ordinance made no provision for commissioners to assist with the voting or for copies of
the law to be provided to the company commanders or the election judges.

The

ordinance presupposed that the election officials knew the qualifications for suffrage in
Missouri, which the ordinance did not repeat. 324 The ordinance purported to subject
soldiers to criminal penalties – up to three months in prison, plus a fine of twenty to fifty
320 Missouri Counties, accessed October 3, 2013 www.mo.gov/government/city-countygovernment/counties/counties.
321. Missouri Ordinance, §§ 3, 4.
322. Id. at § 13.
323. Id. at § 8.
324. The 1820 constitution granted the suffrage  to  “every  free  white  male  citizen  of  the  United  States”  
who was 21-years old, and who had resided one year in Missouri and three months in the county or district
“in  which  he  offers  to  vote.”  MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 10. Similar formulations in Pennsylvania and
Michigan led the high courts in those states to strike down soldier-voting laws. In the absence of
functioning civil government, Missouri lacked an orderly mechanism for a similar test of its ordinance.
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dollars – for voting fraudulently, although, as in all other states, such extra-territorial
penalties would have been difficult to enforce.325

At the close of the elections, the

judges had to forward the election returns, plus a poll book, to each Missouri county
represented by a voting soldier. The judge could do so either by mail or by assigning one
of the clerks to carry the materials personally.326
In   July   1865,   a   new   constitution   went   into   effect   in   Missouri.      It’s   ratification  
process allowed absent soldiers to participate, and its suffrage provision granted absentee
voting   rights   to   members   in   “the   volunteer   army   of   the   United   States,   or   in   the   militia  
force   of   this   state….” 327 On revision in 1875, the state constitution omitted this
provision.328

Nevada
Nevada is the outlier among the twenty states that allowed absentee soldier voting
during the Civil War in that the novelty of absentee voting collided with no established
voting tradition there. The state was too young to have had any traditions at all. As of
Election Day in November 1864, Nevada was barely a week into statehood and had no
peacetime experience as an American polity. The first session of its territorial legislature
convened in October 1861, nearly six months after Sumter, and the former territory
became a state five months before Appomattox.329 The backdrop of war shaped all its
early   political   and   legal   development;;   among   its   nicknames   is   “the   Battle-Born   State.”  
325. Missouri Ordinance, § 12.
326. Id. at § 5.
327. MO. CONST. of 1865, art. II, § XXI.
328. MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII.
329. 1861 Terr. of Nev. Laws 1.
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During  those  formative  wartime  years,  as  the  state’s  leaders  most  surely  knew,  absentee  
soldier voting was becoming a reality all over the Union that Nevada sought to join.
Unsurprisingly, it joined that Union with absentee soldier voting engrafted into its legal
foundation.
More surprising is the role the federal government played in securing voting
rights  for  Nevada’s  absent  soldiers.  (In  no  other  state  did  Congress  play  any  formal  role  
at all.) The federal enabling act authorizing Nevada Territory to organize a state
government required that absent Nevada soldiers be permitted to vote in the elections for
delegates to the constitutional convention, as long as the absent soldiers were qualified
electors under territorial laws.330 Unsurprisingly, the convention proposed a constitution
that  explicitly  gave  absent  soldiers  “the  right  of  suffrage,”  provided  they were qualified
electors.331
The   same   federal   enabling   act   called   for   Nevada   to   pass   an   “ordinance”  
submitting the proposed constitution to a ratification vote, this time without a
requirement that absent soldiers participate. 332 Nevada’s   constitutional   convention
obliged  with  an  “Election  Ordinance”  that  allowed  absent  soldiers  to  vote  for  or  against  

330. Act of Congress to enable the people of Nevada to form a constitution and state government and
for the admission of such state into the Union on an equal footing with the original states, ch. 36, § 3, 13
Stat.  30,  35  (1864)  (The  federal  statute  is  set  forth  at  page  35  of  the  “Statutes  of  the  State  of  Nevada  Passed  
at the First Session of the Legislature, 1864-1865.”)   (The   federal   law   is   hereafter   cited   as   the   “Federal  
Enabling  Act”)
331. NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 3. The residence qualification was set at six months in the state and
thirty days in the district or county. NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 1. The proposed constitution also made
clear   that   a   person’s   presence   or   absence   “while   employed   in   the   service   of   the   United   States”   had   no  
bearing on his qualification as a resident. NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 2.
332. Federal Enabling Act, § 5.
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the proposed constitution in the ratification election in September 1864. 333 Then the
Election Ordinance went a big step further. It allowed soldiers to vote for the state and
federal offices at stake in the November elections. The Election Ordinance set both votes
– the one on ratification and the one for state and federal offices – for the same date in
September.334
It was a creative move by the constitutional convention. It purported to regulate
voting for federal electors before statehood became a reality and therefore before a state
legislature existed. This was problematic under the U.S. Constitution, which assigned to
state legislatures the job of deciding the “manner”   of   appointing   electors   for   president  
and vice-president.335 But, given the pace of the statehood timetable, it was the only way
to achieve military suffrage in time for the November elections. It worked. Absent
Nevada soldiers not only joined in the vote that ratified the proposed constitution, but
they also voted in the 1864 elections, doing so before Nevada even existed as a state.
Nevada’s  military  suffrage  act,  set  forth  in  sections  7  through  14  of  the  Election  
Ordinance, loosely followed the Iowa model. It applied to all soldiers who were qualified
Nevada electors, with no exception for draftees or regulars. It contemplated voting sites
not only where ground troops were stationed – regiments, battalions, and batteries – but
also naval squadrons. It called for the governor to send the commanding officer of each
unit where a Nevada elector served a list of the Nevada men in his command who was

333. Election Ordinance of 1864, § 2, 1 Nev. Comp. Laws; Embracing Statutes of 1861 to 1873,
(Bonnifield   &   Healy)   cxxxvii   (1873)   (Hereafter   cited   as   Election   Ordinance.”)   The   constitutional  
convention adopted the Election Ordinance and published it with the proposed constitution. The Election
Ordinance was not an enactment of the regular territorial legislature of 1864.
334. Id. at § 3.
335. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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eligible to vote.336 The three highest-ranking officers presided over the voting, checking
off the name of each soldier on his list as the soldier placed his ballot in the ballot box. A
single  ballot  stated  not  only  the  soldier’s  vote  for  or  against  the  proposed  constitution,  but  
also his preference for each of the state and federal offices up for grabs in November:
Supreme Court and district court judges, members of the state legislature, congressional
representative, and electors for president and vice-president.337
At the conclusion of the balloting, the presiding officers prepared a return of the
results, both on the question of ratification and for each contested office, using blank
forms provided by the governor. 338 The   commanding   officer   “sealed   up”   the   ballots,  
voting lists, and returns, then mailed the bundle to the governor in Carson City. 339
Separately, he sent a copy of the returns to the county clerks.
The arrangement was riddled with gaps that invited fraud. There was no
requirement that the presiding officers themselves be qualified Nevada electors. The law
prescribed no oaths for the officers or for the voters. It made no provisions for hearing or
deciding   challenges   of   a   soldier’s   eligibility.   It   prescribed   no   procedure   for   confirming  
that the soldier casting a ballot was the same man whose name appeared on the list of
eligible voters. It made no provision for supplying the officers with copies of the
ordinance. And it did not provide for commissioners to assist with implementing the
voting process. It was, in short, the barest of a barebones soldier-voting law.

336.  Election  Ordinance,  §§  7,  8.  The  territorial  “Adjunct  General”  compiled  the  list  for  the  governor.
337. Id. at § 10.
338. Id. at §§ 12, 13.
339. Id. at §11.
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Soldier voting in Nevada survived the Civil War. In 1866, the legislature
incorporated military suffrage provisions into the general elections law.

340

Such

provisions remained a part of Nevada law into the twentieth century.341

Illinois
Two obstacles stood in the way of a soldier-voting law in Illinois: the state
constitution  and  Democratic  majorities  in  the  legislature.    Section  1  of  the  constitution’s  
suffrage  provision  stated  that  no  elector  “shall  be  entitled  to  vote,  except  in  the  district  or  
county in which he shall actually reside at the time  of  such  election.”342 A very similar
provision   in   New   York’s   constitution   had   prompted   that   state’s   Democratic   Governor  
Horatio Seymour to veto a soldier-voting bill passed by the Republican-controlled
legislature. But political roles in Illinois were New York’s   polar   opposite.      Illinois  
Republican Governor Richard Yates, far from finding the constitution an impediment,
proposed in 1863 to the Democratically controlled legislature that they pass a soldiervoting law. Democrats declined.
Yates’s  based  his argument on a different provision of the constitution. Section 5
of  the  suffrage  article  said,  “No  elector  shall  be  deemed  to  have  lost  his  residence  in  this  

340. An Act Relating to Elections, NEV. REV. STAT. Ch. CVII, § 23 (1866).
341. An Act to Provide for Taking the Votes of Electors of the State of Nevada, who may be in the
Military Service of the United States, NEV. REV. STAT. § 1887, et seq. (1912). By 1921, the right to vote
by absentee ballot had been extended to all qualified voters. An Act to Provide a Method for Voting at any
General,  Special,  or  Primary  Election  by  Qualified  Voters  who  …  are  Unavoidably  Absent  …  on  the  Day  
of Election, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 2553, et seq., (1929).
342. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. VI, § 1. Illinois proposed a revised  constitution  in  1862,  but  the  state’s  
voters rejected it. It did not propose to change the language of Article VI, § 1 with respect to the place of
voting, and therefore would not have permitted absent soldiers to vote. Curiously, absent soldiers were
allowed to vote in the ratification process. Unsurprisingly, the soldier-vote was lopsidedly against
ratification. Benton, Voting in the Field, 252-253.
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state   by   reason   of   his   absence   on   the   business   of   the   United   States,   or   of   this   state.”343
Yates reasoned that the framers would not have included this provision if they believed
that the legislature lacked authority to provide absentee voting opportunities for the
troops.344 Democrats were unmoved.
When the legislature reconvened in 1865, Republicans controlled both chambers.
Yates again urged adoption of a soldier-voting law, and this time the legislature agreed.
It passed a law adopting the Minnesota model, and very nearly duplicating the law New
York had enacted after amending its constitution.345 By this time, however, the election
was past and the war was winding down. Governor and legislators alike may have sensed
that Illinois troops would derive little benefit from the law. But it went on the books
nevertheless. Only Maryland enacted soldier-voting legislation later than this enactment
in Illinois, and in Maryland soldiers had voted in the 1864 elections under the provisions
of an 1864 constitutional amendment. (See discussion of Maryland, supra.)
The law covered military personnel comprehensively,  applying  to  “every  elector  
…  in  the  actual  military  service  of  the  United  States,  in  the  army  or  navy  thereof….”346
This included regulars, volunteers, and draftees. The law applied to elections for state
and county offices, but not to federal elections.347 It called for each qualified soldier to
forward his sealed ballot or ballots to a qualified voter in his hometown, who then
343. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. VI, § 5.
344. Benton, Voting in the Field, 262.    California’s  constitution  of  1849  had  a  similar  provision.  In  the  
California Supreme Court case of Bourland, counsel   for  the  parties  seeking  to  uphold  the  state’s  soldiervoting law went a step further than Yates. He argued that this language not only authorized a soldier-voting
law, but actually mandated it. The court disagreed. Bourland, 26 Cal. at 161.
345. An Act to Enable the Qualified Electors of this State, Absent therefrom in the Military Service of
the   United   States,   in   the   Army   or   Navy   thereof,   to   Vote,   1865   Ill.   Laws   59   (hereafter   cited   as   “Illinois  
Soldier-Voting  Law  of  1865”).
346. Illinois Soldier-Voting Law of 1865, § 1.
347. Id.
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delivered the ballot(s) at the election site. Two sworn statements accompanied the ballots.
The first, sealed in the same envelope as the ballot, was a document appointing the
soldier’s   designee   back   home.   It   had   to   be   signed   by   a   witness   and   an   officer.   The  
second,  printed  on  the  back  of  the  envelope,  was  an  affidavit  attesting  to  the  serviceman’s  
qualifications as a voter (other than his race and gender): that he was over 21, that he was
a citizen of Illinois and had resided there for at least a year and in his city, ward or
precinct for at least 60 days. It also identified the military unit in which he served.348
The soldier then sealed this envelope inside a second envelope, marked the outer
envelope   “soldier’s   vote,”   and   sent   it   to   his   designee   back   home.   That   man   signed   a  
receipt for it at the post office349 and delivered the interior envelope, unopened, to the
voting site. If the inner envelope arrived at the election site unsealed, election officials
had  to  reject  it.    Those  officials  had  to  confirm  that  the  soldier’s  name  appeared  on  the  
voting lists. If it did, they opened the envelope and deposited the ballot in the ballot box.
If   it   did   not,   the   envelope   remained   sealed   and   the   ballot   uncounted,   unless   “a  
householder  of  the  district”  swore  in  writing  that  the  absent  soldier  was  indeed  a  resident  
of the district.350
To help absent soldiers cope with all the red tape and legalese, the law called on
the Secretary of State to prepare blank affidavits and envelopes and to ship them to

348. Id. at §§ 2, 3.
349. The law, anticipating that multiple soldiers might designate the same elector back home for
delivery of their ballots, required each designee to state, on the receipt he gave at the post office, how many
such letters he had received. Id. at § 7.
350. Id. at §§ 4, 5.
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military   locations   where   Illinois   men   served,   providing      “sufficient   quantity”   to   assure  
that there was one of everything – envelopes and affidavits – for every serviceman.351
The law set harsh penalties for cheating: four months in jail and $250 for election
judges  and  soldiers’  designees  who  “willfully”  broke  the  law;;  one  to  five  years  in  prison  
for false statements in an affidavit; and one to three years in prison for forging or altering
ballots.352
The   Illinois   law   never   came   before   the   state’s   high   court   for   review,   probably  
because the troops all returned home before the next election. In light of the results in the
nine states where supreme courts did review such laws, this one may have stood little
chance of surviving. No high court upheld a soldier-voting law in the face of
constitutional  language  as  restrictive  as  Illinois’s.
The Illinois law did not long outlast the war. No soldier-voting provisions appear
in  the  election  law  section  of  the  state’s  1874  revised  laws.353

351. Id. at § 12.
352. Id. at §§ 8, 9, 10.
353. Elections, ch. 46, ILL. REV. STAT. (1874).
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During the Civil War, twenty northern states changed their laws to permit absent
soldiers to vote. Before enactment of these statutes, state laws had tethered balloting to
the   voter’s   community   and required in-person participation by voters. Under the new
laws, eligible voters – as long as they were soldiers – could cast ballots in distant military
encampments, far from their neighbors and community leaders. This dissertation
examines the legal conflicts that arose from this phenomenon and the political causes
underlying it.
Legally, the laws represented an abrupt change, contrary to earlier scholarship
viewing them as culminating a gradual process of relaxing residency rules in the
antebellum period. In fact, the laws left intact all prewar suffrage qualifications, including
residency requirements. Their radicalism lay not in changing rules about who could vote,
but in departing from the prewar legal blueprint of what elections were and how voters
participated in them. The changes were constitutionally problematic, generating court
challenges   in   some   states   and   constitutional   amendments   in   others.   Ohio’s   experience

432

offers a case study demonstrating the radicalism of the legal change and the constitutional
tension it created.
In political history, prior scholarship has largely overlooked the role the issue of
soldier voting played in competition for civilian votes. The politics of 1863-1864 drew
soldiers into partisan messaging, since servicemen spoke with authority on the themes the
parties  used  to   attack  their  opponents:  the  candidates’  military  incompetence,   Lincoln’s  
neglect   of   the   troops,   and   McClellan’s   cowardice and disloyalty. Soldiers participated
politically not only as voters, but also as spokesmen for these messages to civilian voters.
In this setting, the soldier-voting issue became a battleground in partisan efforts to show
kinship with soldiers. The issue’s   potency   became   evident   nationally   after   the   1863  
Pennsylvania gubernatorial race, presaging the 1864 presidential contest. The Republican
incumbent  ran  as  “the  soldiers’  friend”  and  attacked  his  Democratic  rival  as  the  enemy  of  
soldiers for opposing that  state’s  soldier-voting law. The issue was decisive in securing
civilian votes for the victorious Republican. That experience launched a nationwide push
by Republicans to enact soldier-voting laws in time for the 1864 elections.
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